Archive for the ‘Emigration’ Category

Foreign Policy Memo

Tuesday, April 3rd, 2007

Urgent: How to Topple Kim Jong Il
Foreign Policy Magazine
March/April 2007, P.70-74
Andrei Lankov

From: Andrei Lankov
To: Condoleezza Rice
RE: Bringing Freedom to North Korea

When North Korea tested a nuclear weapon late last year, one thing became clear: The United States’ strategy for dealing with North Korea is failing. Your current policy is based on the assumption that pressuring the small and isolated state will force itto change course. That has not happened—and perhaps never will.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Il and his senior leaders understand that political or economic reforms will probably lead to the collapse of their regime. They face a challenge that their peers in China and Vietnam never did—a prosperous and free “other half” of the same nation. North Korea’s rulers believe that if they introduce reforms, their people will do what the East Germans did more than 15 years ago. So, from the perspective of North Korea’s elite, there are compelling reasons to resist all outside pressure. if anything, foreign pressure (particularly from Americans) fits very well into what Pyongyang wants to propagate— the image of a brave nation standing up to a hostile world dominated by the United States.

Yet, sadly, the burden of encouraging change in North Korea remains the United States’ alone. China and Russia, though not happy about a nuclear North Korea, are primarily concerned with reducing U.S. influence in East Asia. China is sending considerable aid to Pyongyang. You already know that South Korea, supposedly a U.S. ally, is even less willing to join your efforts. Seoul’s major worry is not a North Korean nuclear arsenal but the possibility of sudden regime collapse. A democratic revolution in the North, followed by a German-style unification, would deal a heavy blow to the South Korean economy. That’s why Seoul works to ensure that the regime in Pyongyang remains stable, while it enjoys newfound affluence and North Koreans quietly suffer.

Do not allow this status quo to persist. Lead the fight for change in North Korea. Here are some ideas to make it happen:

Realize a Quiet Revolution Is Already Under Way: For decades, the Hermit Kingdom was as close to an Orwellian nightmare as the world has ever come. But that’s simply not the case anymore. A dramatic transformation has taken place in North Korea in recent years that is chronically underestimated, particularly in Washington. This transformation has made Kim Jong Ii increasingly vulnerable to internal pressures. Yes, North Korea is still a brutal dictatorship. But compared to the 1970s or 1980s, its government has far less control over the daily lives of its people.

With the state-run economy in shambles, the government no longer has the resources to reward “correct” behavior or pay the hordes of lackeys who enforce the will of the Stalinist regime. Corruption runs rampant, and officials are always on the lookout for a bribe. Old regulations still remain on the books, but they are seldom enforced. North Koreans nowadays can travel outside their county of residence without getting permission from the authorities. Private markets, once prohibited, are flourishing. People can easily skip an indoctrination session or two, and minor ideological deviations often go unpunished. It’s a far cry from a free society, but these changes do constitute a considerable relaxation from the old days.

Deliver Information Inside: North Korea has maintained a self-imposed information blockade that is without parallel. Owning radios with free tuning is still technically illegal— a prohibition without precedent anywhere. This news blackout is supposed to keep North Koreans believing that their country is an earthly paradise. But, today, it is crumbling.

North Korea’s 880-mile border with China is notoriously porous. Smuggling and human trafficking across this remote landscape is rampant. Today, 50,000 to 100,000 North Koreans reside illegally inside China, working for a couple of dollars a day (a fortune, by North Korean standards). In the past 10 years, the number of North Koreans who have been to China and then returned home may be as large as 500,000. These people bring with them news about the outside world. They also bring back short-wave radios, which, though illegal, are easy to conceal. It is also becoming common to modify state-produced radios that have fixed tuning to the state’s propaganda channels. With a little rejiggering, North Koreans can listen to foreign news broadcasts.

But there are few broadcasts that North Koreans can hope to intercept. It was once assumed that South Korea would do the best job broadcasting news to its northern neighbor. And that was true until the late 1990s, when, as part of its “sunshine policy,” South Korea deliberately made these broadcasts “non-provocative.” There are only three other stations that target North Korea. But their airtime is short, largely due to a shortage of funds. Radio Free Asia and Voice of America each broadcast for roughly four hours per day, and Free North Korea (FNK), a small, South Korea-based station staffed by North Korean defectors, broadcasts for just one hour per day.

Being a former Soviet citizen, I know that shortwave radios could be the most important tool for loosening Pyongyang’s grip. That was the case in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, some 25 percent of Russia’s adult population listened to foreign radio broadcasts at least once a week because they were one of the only reliable sources of news about the world and, more importantly, our own society A dramatic increase in funding for broadcasts by Voice Of America is necessary.  It is also important to support the defectors’ groups that do similar broadcasting themselves. These groups are regularly silenced by South Korean authorities, and they have to do everything on a shoestring. A journalist at the FNK gets paid the equivalent of a janitor’s salary in Seoul.  Even a small amount of money- less than U.S. military forces in Seoul spend on coffee-could expand their airtime greatly. With an annual budget of just $1 million, a refugee-staffed station could be on air for four hours a day, 365 days a year.

Leverage the Refugee Community in the South: There are some 10,000 North Korean defectors living in the South, and their numbers are growing fast. Unlike in earlier times, these defectors stay in touch with their families back home using smugglers’ networks and mobile phones. However, the defectors are not a prominent lobby in South Korea. In communist-dominated Eastern Europe, large and vibrant exile communities played a major role in promoting changes back home and, after the collapse of communism, helped ensure the transformation to democracy and a market economy. That is why the United States must help increase the influence of this community by making sure that a cadre of educated and gifted defectors emerges from their ranks.

Today, younger North Korean defectors are being admitted to South Korean colleges through simplified examinations (they have no chance of passing the standard tests), but a bachelor’s degree means little in modern South Korea. Defectors cannot afford the tuition for a postgraduate degree, which is the only path to a professional career. Thus, postgraduate scholarships and internship programs will be critical to their success. Without outside help, it is unlikely that a vocal and influential group of defectors will emerge. Seoul won’t fund these programs, so it will be up to foreign governments and non-governmental organizations to do so. Fortunately, these kinds of initiatives are cheap, easy to enact, and perfectly compatible with the views of almost every U.S. politician, from right to left.

Fund, Plan, and Carry out Cultural Exchanges: The Cold War was won not by mindless pressure alone, but by a combination of pressure and engagement. The same will be true with North Korea The United States must support, both officially and unofficially, all policies that promote North Korea’s Contacts with the outside world. These policies are likely to be relatively expensive, compared to the measures above, but cheap in comparison to a military showdown with a nuclear power.

It makes sense for the U.S. government to bring North Korean students to study overseas (paid for with U.S. tax dollars), to bring their dancers or singers to perform in the West, and to invite their officials to take “study tours.” Without question, North Korean officials are wary of these kinds of exchanges with the United States. However, they will be less unwilling to allow exchanges with countries seen as neutral, such as Australia and New Zealand. In the past, Pyongyang would never have allowed such exchanges to happen. But nowadays, because most of these programs will benefit elite, well- connected North Korean families, the temptation will be too great to resist. in-other words, a official in Pyongyang might understand perfectly well that sending his son to study market economics at the Australian National University is bad for the communist system, but as long as his son will benefit, he will probably support the project.

Convince Fellow Republicans That Subtle Measures Can Work: Some Republicans, particularly in the U.S. Congress, might object to any cultural exchanges that will benefit already-privileged North Koreans. And, for many, funding Voice of America isn’t as attractive as pounding a fist in Kim’s face. But these criticisms are probably shortsighted. As a student of Soviet history, you know that mild exposure to the world outside the Soviet Union had a great impact on many Soviet party officials. And information almost always filters downstream. A similar effect can be expected in North Korea. During the Cold War, official exchange programs nurtured three trends that eventually brought down the Soviet system: disappointment among the masses, discontent among the intellectuals, and a longing for reforms among bureaucrats. Money invested in subtle measures is not another way to feed the North Korean elite indirectly; it is an investment in the gradual disintegration of a dangerous and brutal regime.

North Korea has changed, and its changes should be boldly exploited. The communist countries of the 20th century were not conquered. Their collapse came from within, as their citizens finally realized the failures of the system that had been foisted on them. The simple steps outlined here will help many North Koreans arrive at the same conclusion. It may be the only realistic way to solve the North Korean problem, while also paving the way for the eventual transformation of the country into a free society. This fight will take time, but there is no reason to wait any longer.

North Korean Restaurant in China Shuts Down as Receptionist Escapes

Wednesday, March 21st, 2007

Daily NK
Kwon Jeong Hyun
3/21/2007

A North Korean restaurant “Pyongyang-kwan” in China is facing a similar predicament as another restaurant in the same area “Pyongyang Moran-kwan,” where a female employee “Lee” was repatriated back to North Korea last October having been arrested for fleeing the restaurant. As a result, North Korean authorities made the restaurant accountable and repatriated all the employees back to North Korea, which inevitably led to the restaurant closing its doors.

In 2000 also, some female employees fled a restaurant “Pyongyang” in Yanji. As a result, the business was terminated and has yet to restart operations again.

The majority of North Korean restaurants located in China are run by entrepreneurs who have signed a contract with North Korean authorities. While the Chinese are responsible for business and property lease for the restaurant, North Koreans bestow the female workers and extract 40% of the net income.

As more and more waitresses break away from restaurants, North Korean authorities are continuing to withdraw the remaining restaurant employees, as is their custom. Consequently, if all North Korean employees are removed, the restaurant has little choice but to shut down.

North Korean workers sent overseas must undergo a meticulous selection period. North Korean authorities select graduates as their ideal candidates and even if a minor detail is undesirable, the candidate is discarded. Furthermore, North Korean authorities dispatch independent National Security Agents to regulate the overseas workers. Normally, 2~3 security agents are residing at the restaurant also.

N. Korea revives one-child limit for diplomats abroad: source

Tuesday, March 6th, 2007

Yonhap
3/6/2007

North Korean diplomats have recently been limited to taking only one of their children with them when assigned abroad amid reports of some diplomats seeking asylum out of their impoverished homeland, an informed source said Tuesday.

The measure is a revival of a decades-old regulation, which has been temporarily suspended since 2002, the source said while speaking on condition of anonymity.

“North Korea is said to have ordered its diplomats and officials overseas to send all but one of their children back to Pyongyang,” the source said.

“It appears North Korea believes there is a greater chance of defection by these expatriates as they now have all of their family members overseas,” the source added.

Defections by North Korean diplomats or their families are rarely publicized, but government officials say they are not unprecedented.

South Korea usually maintains a tight lid on defection cases involving ranking North Korean officials out of fear they may provoke the communist nation, thus making future defections by others more difficult.

More than 10,000 North Koreans have defected to South Korea since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War while as many as 300,000 others are believed to be hiding in China or other neighboring countries.
NK Diplomats Ordered to Send Kids Home
Korea Times
Lee Jin-woo
3/6/2007

North Korean diplomats and those who work at overseas branches of state-run trading companies have been ordered to send their children home except for one child by the end of this month, sources said.

The order was issued on Feb. 14, after a one-month-and-a-half notice, the source said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

In the early 1990s, the North ordered its students abroad to return home during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the Berlin Wall.

But this was the first time for Pyongyang to call home the children of diplomats and officials at trading companies.

The measure is a revival of a decades-old regulation, which has been temporarily suspended since 2002. The ban was lifted in 2002 to help more children pick up foreign language skills in a more advanced educational system.

The North has decided to return to its previous policy to prevent possible mass defection of its diplomats and white collar workers abroad with their families in the reconciliatory mood, including the ongoing efforts to normalize the diplomatic ties between Pyongyang and Washington, experts on North Korean affairs said.

Neither primary school students nor college students, however, are allowed to stay overseas.

“Diplomats and workers at state-run trading companies are allowed to keep only one child, who is old enough to attend either junior high or high school, but primary school children and college students are banned from staying overseas,’’ Hong Soon-kyung, a North Korean defector, told The Korea Times.

A former senior North Korean diplomat, Hong serves as chairman of an association of North Korean defectors in Seoul.

Hong said it was because the Stalinist state does not want its young generation to be influenced, or brainwashed, by U.S.-style market economy.

He said North Korean college students are allowed to study only in China, the North’s closest ally.

“Those North Koreans who go overseas for physical labor have not been allowed to bring any child, not even one,’’ he added.

Under the order, some 3,000 North Korean children in some 50 countries will have to return home, sources said.

Borderline Activities

Monday, March 5th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
3/5/2007

When future historians analyze the history of North Korea in the 1990s and early 2000s, what will they see as the most important events of that era (likely to be remembered as the “demise of Kim Il-sung’s socialism’’)? I do not think that future works of historians will spend too many pages (or megabytes) describing the never-ending soap opera of the “nuclear crisis.’’ Perhaps, some still unknown clashes in the North Korean palaces will deserve attention. But much more important will be the social changes in North Korea and, among other things, the near collapse of border control on the northern frontiers of the country. This collapse has opened the North to foreign influences and international exchanges of all kinds.

It is a bit of an overstatement to say that the North Korean border with China is now “open.’’ It is not open in the same sense as, say, the border between the Canada and U.S., let alone borders between the West European states. But it is porous to the extreme, and this situation is quite new.

For decades, cooperation between the DPRK and Chinese authorities ensured that defectors stood little chance of gaining asylum across the border. Sooner or later a defector would be arrested by the Chinese police and sent back to the North where he or she would be prominently sent to a prison camp forthwith. Everybody, including aspiring defectors, was clear on this point.

But this system collapsed about ten years ago, and the adjacent areas of China were soon flooded with North Korean refugees whose numbers in the late 1990s reached some 200,000 (now the numbers are much lower).

Nowadays crossing the border is not too difficult or dangerous. In the late 1990s, the people who crossed the border every night could be counted in the hundreds. Most of them were refugees fleeing the destitution and hunger of their Korean villages. Others were smugglers, engaged in the somewhat risky but profitable business of moving valuable merchandise across the border. And yet others were engaged in more unusual activities.

There are professional matchmakers, for example. While ethnic Korean girls from the Chinese North-East try, and sometimes succeed, in marrying South Koreans, the girls from the North would not mind having a Chinese husband, normally _ but not always _ of Korean ethnicity. China, with its abundant food supply, appears a veritable dreamland for them.

Such marriages are quite common: according to one study, in 1998 some 52% of all North Korean refugees (overwhelmingly women) were living with their local spouses. In most cases such marriages are arranged via Chinese (Han or ethnic Korean) brokers, and sometimes these brokers contact girls and their families while they are still in North Korea. If the girls are interested in the idea, the matchmaker or his/her agent crosses the border and then escorts the would-be bride to her new place of residence.

Most of the “husbands’’ are people who, for a variety of reasons, have had difficultly in finding a wife by more orthodox methods: widowers with children, habitual drunkards, the handicapped. In many North Eastern villages the mass migration of young women to the booming cities has resulted in a bridal shortage, such that North Korean wives are in high demand.

Of course, being illegal aliens, North Korean wives face a risk of deportation, and there are problems with children born of such unions. Nonetheless, a bit of caution, and a hefty bribe, can often solve some of the problems, ensuring the much-coveted registration for a baby and buying the local constable’s willingness to look elsewhere.

Another business is getting people from the North to China and, ultimately, to South Korea. Nowadays, there is large and growing community of North Korean refugees in Seoul. Many of these people save every cent to get their families in from North Korea. When they have enough money, they pay the brokers who arrange the escape. A few thousand dollars will be enough to ensure that a professional agent will cross into North Korea, locate the person and escort him/her across the border. $10,000 is the payment for getting a resident of Pyongyang, but for closer areas the fees are lower. Then, an additional payment will be necessary to get the person to Seoul (this costs between another $2,000 and $9,000, depending on various factors).

And there are money transfers, both from the North Korean refugees doing well in China, and from South Korea. Money has to be sent in cash, through reliable couriers (and there are many ways to confirm that the transfer has been delivered).

Take, for example, the case of Ms. Lim, a 31 year old refugee, happily married to a Chinese man and engaged in running a small business (the story was recently described by the Daily NK, a South Korean web-based newspaper). Twice a year Ms. Lim sends about $400 to her parents in the North. Being a retired officer of an elite unit, and a devoted supporter of the regime, her father initially refused to accept any money from the “daughter who had betrayed the country,’’ but he changed his mind. Nowadays, these transfers keep the family alive and even prosperous by North Korean standards.

I also assume that some of the people who cross the border have far more important tasks than delivering a few hundred dollars from a loyal daughter. The area is perhaps a hotbed of spying activities of all kinds. But those are other stories, not to be told in full in the next fifty years…

Defector’s dating service unites North women with South men

Monday, March 5th, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
Choi Hyun-jung
3/5/2007

Kang Hak-shil left a husband and a child in North Korea when she defected here in 2002. Completely alone, she hoped to remarry to settle into Korean society.

However, the men she met often lied about themselves, she said, some pretending to be single when they were married. A friend finally introduced her to her husband, whom she married in 2005. She decided to help North Korean women like her.

In July 2006, she established the Korean Council of Human Rights Solidarity for Women Out of North Korea. Finding many female defectors, she also established a matchmaking agency.

She named it Nam-nam-buk-nyeo, ― South man, North woman ― which is an old Korean saying claiming that men from the South are good-looking and women from the North are beautiful.

The company provides services pro bono for more than 500 North Korean women, but male patrons have to pay 1.3 million won ($1,390) when they find a match.

She strictly checks the identification of the men before accepting them as members because, she said, they often lie. Therefore, in order to be considered for membership, men need to bring ― among other things ― personal identification papers, family registration papers and proof of education and employment.

“I think the fundamental idea behind this company is good,” said Park Jung-ran, of the Seoul National University Institute for Unification Studies.

“But it is likely that the matches will fall apart if South Korean men have the wrong idea about North Korean women, and vice versa. Participants must try to look beyond stereotypes and strive for a true understanding of one another.”

According to Ms. Kang, most of the men who join the service are over the age of 30. They work in various fields and come from various backgrounds. “The men are often not good enough for our women,” she said, smiling. “These ladies are domestic, pretty and ready for marriage. Sometimes the men are not as nice.”

Currently, there are 30 male members, and 20 successful matches have been made.

One such couple is Park Su-yong and Hong Seung-woo, both 39. Park Su-yong crossed over into South Korea from Cheongjin, North Korea, via China with her father almost five years ago. At first she settled in Ulsan and worked at a noodle shop. She met two or three men, one of whom hid the fact that he was divorced.

She had known Ms. Kang from her days in Hanawon, the government-run rehabilitation facility all defectors go through before being released to South Korean society. When she learned Ms. Kang was running a matchmaking company, she sought out her help. She met her husband, Hong Seung-woo, through Nam-nam-buk-nyeo.

The couple dated just three times before tying the knot two times, once in October at a small ceremony with family members, and again in December at a joint wedding with other defector couples.

“Neither of us is that young, so there were none of the love games that you normally have to go through. We knew each other’s objectives clearly enough.” Mr. Hong said.

Mr. Hong, who works as a bus driver and can speak Chinese, had initially thought about marrying a Korean-Chinese woman or taking a foreign wife. When a friend introduced him to the matchmaking company last year, he was delighted with the results. He had divorced his wife in 2004 and lived with his two sons, aged 7 and 9, and his parents before meeting Ms. Park. The couple now lives in a small apartment complex in Incheon.

Although the boys acknowledge Ms. Park as their stepmother, they do not know she is from North Korea. The couple feels the boys are not yet ready to handle the truth. They will tell them when they are ready. When Ms. Park occasionally lets slip a North Korean word, the kids assume it’s because she’s a foreigner.

“She is very pure of heart, and she’s very domestic, unlike many South Korean women these days,” Mr. Hong said of his wife. He said she was the first North Korean person he had ever met. People he knew were equally fascinated with the nationality of his new wife. “My friends want to know what she’s like. I teach them a new North Korean phrase every day; they love it.”

Ms. Park emphasizes that when North Korean women defect, most are all alone. “Because we are in South Korea, it’s natural for us to look for a South Korean husband,” said Ms. Park. “Marriage has helped me adjust into Korean society,” she said.

The two do not plan to have any more children, and said they are happy. “We have no reason to fight,” Mr. Hong said.

When Ms. Kang’s younger sister crossed over into South Korea, she also got married through the company. “No one wants to be alone when they cross over. They are all looking to settle into society and the best way is through marriage,” she said.

Key facts on relations between North and South Korea

Monday, February 26th, 2007

Reuters (Hat tip DPRK studies)
2/26/2007

Senior officials from South and North Korea resume talks on Tuesday, seven months after dialogue broke down in acrimony over Pyongyang’s missile tests.

Following are key points in the ties between the two:

STILL AT WAR

- An armistice ending the 1950-53 Korean War dominates the relationship between the two Koreas. Nearly 1.2 million North Korean soldiers and South Korea’s 680,000 troops remain in a tense military standoff despite political and commercial ties that have warmed since 2000.

- The two have enough missiles and artillery pointed at each other to largely destroy major cities on both sides of the Korean peninsula.

POINTS OF EXCHANGE

- An industrial park in Kaesong just a few minutes’ drive from the heavily-fortified border is home to 21 companies employing about 12,000 North Korean workers.

- About 1.4 million South Koreans have visited the Mount Kumgang resort in the North just above the border on the east since the tours began in 1998. Roughly a quarter of a million made the visit in 2006 even as tension spiked following the North’s missile and nuclear tests.

- About 102,000 people crossed the border last year, not including Kumgang tourists and most of them South Koreans visiting the North for business. The total exchange of people was 269,336 as of the end of 2006.

TRADE

- Cross-border trade was $1.35 billion in 2006 up from $1.05 billion a year ago, largely from the strength of the Kaesong industrial park.

HUMANITARIAN AID

- South Korea has supplied between 200,000-350,000 tonnes of fertiliser a year to the North since 2000.

- It has also shipped up to 500,000 tonnes of rice a year to the North in the form of low-interest, long-term loans. Food aid has been suspended since the North’s missile tests in last July.

REFUGEES, PRISONERS OF WAR AND ABDUCTEES

- South Korea believes more than 1,000 of its people are still alive in the North either as civilian abductees or as prisoners captured during the Korean War.

- North Korea has said 10 South Korean POWs and 11 civilians were alive there.

- More than 1,000 North Koreans each year have fled hunger and persecution in the North and sought refuge in the South. In the first six months of last year, 854 arrived in the South for a total of 8,541. (Source: South Korean Unification Ministry, Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, Reuters)

The Ordinary Abductions

Thursday, February 22nd, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2/22/2007

North Korean spy agencies love kidnappings. Of course, their colleagues worldwide also would not mind abducting a person or two, but in most cases there are some urgent reasons for taking such drastic measures _ the victims are prominent opposition leaders, or wanted criminals who cannot be extradited through normal channels, or people who are unlucky to know something way too important. North Korean abductions are different: They are often surprisingly random and target people of no significance. The very randomness of most of their abductions once was often cited by sceptics who tried to refute these accusations as “Seoul-inspired falsities.’’ Indeed, why should the secret services of a Stalinist state spend so much time and money only to kidnap a Japanese noodle chef, or a tennis-loving teenager? Nonetheless, in 2002 Kim Jong-il himself confirmed that these seemingly meaningless abductions of ordinary Japanese citizens did take place.

Of course, North Koreans spies did not limit themselves to Japanese only. Quite a number of South Korean citizens have disappeared into the Northern maw as well: it is known that at least 486 South Koreans have been forcibly taken to the North and have never returned.

A vast majority of them are fishermen who were imprudent to come too close to the North Korean coast, but this figure also includes a number of known victims of covert operations. Currently they number 17, but there are few doubts that the actual number is much higher. If the abduction is planned and conducted well, its victim simply disappears and is eventually presumed dead.

A good example is the case of the five South Korean high school students who disappeared from the island beaches in 1977 and 1978. They all were believed dead for two decades, but in the late 1990s it was discovered that the youngsters were working in North Korea as instructors, teaching the basics of South Korean lifestyle to would-be undercover Northern operatives.

Eventually, one of those former students was even allowed to briefly meet his family at the Kumgang resort. Kim Yong-nam disappeared from a beach in North Cholla Province in 1978. Later he was identified as the husband of an abducted Japanese woman, so North Korean authorities grudgingly admitted that Kim Yong-nam was indeed in the North, and staged a meeting with his family. Unsurprisingly, during this meeting and press conference, he insisted that he was not kidnapped but saved from the sea by North Korean sailors. Far more surprisingly, he sort of admitted that his job was related to spying.

It is remarkable that the kidnappings of the South Korean teenagers roughly coincided with similar abductions in Japan. In both cases the abductors obviously targeted randomly selected teenagers who were unlucky enough to be on a lonely beach. Another commonality was that the abductees were later used to train espionage agents. Perhaps, teenagers were seen as ideal would-be instructors for the spies _ still susceptible to indoctrination but with enough knowledge of local realities to be useful.

In April, 1979, a young South Korean walked into the North Korean Embassy in Oslo, Norway. His name was Ko Sang-mun, and he was a schoolteacher back home. Why and how he came to arrive at that embassy is not clear. As was usually the case, the North Korean side insisted that Ko Sang-mu defected, while the South Koreans alleged that the young teacher was the a victim of a taxi driver’s mistake: He took the taxi to a “Korean embassy’’ and the driver delivered him to the embassy of the wrong Korea.

It is impossible to say now whether this highly publicised case was abduction, defection, or something in-between. However, in 1994 it became known that Ko Sang-mun was in a labour camp. A small propaganda war ensued. Ko was made to appear in a North Korean broadcast assuring everybody that he was free, happily married, and full of righteous hatred for the US imperialists and their Seoul puppets (most of his speech consisted of customary anti-American rhetoric). We do not know where he went after delivering this speech _ to an apartment in Pyongyang or to a dugout in a prison camp. Meanwhile, Ko’s widow in the South committed suicide, unable to cope with the stress of the situation.

There were also more “normal’’ instances of abductions. The North Koreans kidnapped people who possessed important intelligence. In 1971 Yu Sang-mun, a South Korean diplomat stationed in West Germany was kidnapped in West Berlin, together with his family _ wife and two children. Perhaps, the few other South Korean officials who went missing in Europe in the 1970s were also abducted by North Korean agents, but presently only Yu’s case is certain.

In the 1990s most abductions of this sort took place in China, and their victims were political activists, missionaries, and real or suspected South Korean spies. All these abductions occurred in the Chinese North-East, near the borders of North Korea.

The abduction of North Korean dissenters, or suspected would-be defectors, from Soviet territory has been quite routine for decades. Sometimes these abductions sparked a crisis in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, but in most cases the Soviets simply turned a blind eye to such acts.

Settling in

Saturday, February 10th, 2007

Korea Herald
2/10/2007

What was once a trickle of defectors from North Korea has now become a steady stream, forcing the South Korean government to reexamine how it handles settlers from its communist neighbor.

Gone are the days when defectors were given a hero’s welcome, used as propaganda to demonstrate the failure of the totalitarian communist system, and given large sums of money as a reward. These days, news of individual defectors hardly receives any attention, and without much fanfare their numbers have been growing rapidly. The number of defectors who arrived in the South totaled 148 in 1999. Last year, more than 2,000 North Koreans settled in the South. By the end of this month, the total number of North Korean settlers here is expected to reach 10,000.

To deal with the prospect of a surge in the number North Korean defectors in the future, as food shortages and poverty continues to ravage that country, the South Korean government has revamped its settlement policy. By cutting its one-time settlement aid from 10 million won to 6 million won and increasing job subsidies to a total of 15 million won spread over a three-year period, the government is hoping to encourage the settlers to seek gainful employment rather than relying on government support.

For the new settlers, life in the capitalist South is harsh. Many of those who risked their lives to escape hunger and poverty, live in a state of poverty even in the South. Three months of training at a settlement center is insufficient to equip these people for our highly competitive capitalist society.

Some settlers are cheated out of their settlement awards and end up alcoholic and destitute. Most of the settlers are semi-skilled laborers, making it difficult for them to find permanent jobs. Difficulties in finding employment are exacerbated by prejudices harbored by South Koreans who perceive North Koreans as lazy and unmotivated.

According to a report by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights which surveyed 1,336 settlers over the age of 13 who arrived between 1997 and 2004, more than 28 percent of the settlers are unemployed, significantly higher than the national average of 3.5 percent as of the end of last year. Of those who are employed, about 78 percent earn 1 million won or less a month.

To assist the North Korean settlers in seeking employment, the Unification Ministry and the Labor Ministry plans to jointly set up an individual job plan system. Employment subsidies, paid to businesses that hire North Koreans to cover 50 percent of their wage, will be extended to three years from the current two years.

However, government policies can only go so far in assisting North Korean settlers to make a life in the South. In a society that harbors regional prejudices even within its own borders, the discrimination suffered by North Koreans who speak with a different accent and who may still be regarded as an enemy must be enormous.

As much as the settlers need training to adjust to a new way of life here, South Koreans also need to receive sensitivity training on how to deal with the North Korean settlers. Understanding each other will go a long way toward helping the settlers become full, productive members of this society.

Government to raise subsidies for defectors here
Joong ang Daily
2/9/2007

South Korea will nearly double the amount of cash incentives that North Korean defectors receive after working here for one year, the Unification Ministry said yesterday.

Under the plan, the government will grant a total of 15 million won ($16,040) to defectors over a three-year period after they are registered on an employer’s payroll for one year. Previously, defectors received 9 million won over three years.

“The incentive is designed to increase support for North Korean defectors who are trying hard to adapt to South Korean society,” said Kim Joong-tae, chief of the social and cultural exchange bureau at the ministry.

Since 2005, Korea has reduced its cash payment to defectors to 10 million won from 28 million won per one-person household.

Under the new plan, which considers the rise in rental fees, the housing subsidy will be increased to 13 million won per one-person household from the current 10 million won, while the cash subsidy will be further cut to 6 million won, he said.

The total number of North Korean defectors to the South since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War will likely top the 10,000 mark sometime this year, according to government data.

When heavy floods hit North Korea in the mid-1990s, the annual number of North Korean defectors reached double digits. In 1999, the number swelled to a triple-digit level. In 2006, as many as 1,578 defectors arrived in the South, a rise from the previous record of 1,139 in 2002, according to the data.

About 9,700 North Koreans have been resettled in the South after finishing procedures and obtaining government identification, while some 300 are now receiving adaptive education at a state-run institute. More than 500 defectors are currently believed to be in the custody of South Korean embassies or consulates in Thailand, Mongolia and other countries.

In 2000, the leaders of the two Koreas held the first-ever summit since the end of the Korean War. The war ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty, meaning the two Koreas are still technically in a state of war.

N. Korean Defectors to Get More Job Incentives

Thursday, February 8th, 2007

Korea Times
Lee Jin-woo
2/8/2007
 
The government has decided to slash the amount of cash provided to North Korean defectors who come to South Korea and to focus more on helping them find jobs here, the Ministry of Unification said Thursday.

According to the plan, the subsidy provided in cash for the settlement of North Korean defectors will be cut from the current 10 million won ($9,500) to 6 million won. The amount is based on a one-person family and varies according to the number of people in the family.

Those who have come to Seoul since Jan. 1 this year will be subject to the new regulations, the ministry said.

The ministry, which deals with inter-Korean affairs, said it would almost double incentives to encourage North Korean defectors to find workplaces in the South.

Regardless of their annual income, a North Korean employee will get up to 15 million won for three years.

Some 4.5 million won would be provided after the first year of labor, which will increase by 500,000 won per year up to 5.5 million won for the third year.

Previously, the labor incentive was 9 million won over three years.

The new measure will be effective retroactively to defectors who have arrived from the beginning Jan. 1 of last year.

Despite the cut, the total amount of subsidies will be slightly lower than now, as the ministry decided to provide 13 million won, up from 10 million, for each one-man family to help find housing in the South, the ministry said.

Those who are handicapped or suffer from a serious disease will get up to 15.4 million won, it said.

“North Koreans should no longer sit idle in South Korean society,’’ Kim Joong-tae, acting chief of the ministry’s social and cultural exchange bureau, told reporters. “The incentive is aimed at increasing support for North Korean defectors who are trying to adapt to South Korean society.’’

Life is getting more challenging for North Koreans arriving in the South. As the number has surged, the government subsidy for each defector has plummeted.

Many North Korean defectors have complained that the government’s decision lacks an understanding of the harsh reality that they face in Korean society.

“Officials are ignoring the fact that the majority of North Korean defectors who come here after years of hardship in China and other Southeast Asian countries are not able to work normally for a certain period of time,’’ Lee Hae-young, an official of an association of North Korean defectors in Seoul, told The Korea Times.

Lee said it takes about five years for defectors adjust to a completely different market society.

“I think only about three out of 10 defectors who arrive in the South are healthy enough to work,’’ Lee said.

The total number of North Korean defectors to the South since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War is presumed to have surpassed 10,000 early this year, according to the ministry.

1 Out of 5 N. Korean Defectors Swindled

Tuesday, January 30th, 2007

Korea Times
Kim Rahn
1/30/2007

One-fifth of North Koreans who defected to South Korea have gotten swindled here, according to the Korean Institute of Criminal Justice Policy. The majority of the swindlers were other North Korean defectors.

The report released Tuesday was based on a survey of 214 defectors over 20 years old conducted between July and September.

According to the report, 50 of the 214 polled had been the victims of fraud, theft or burglary. The victims constituted 23.4 percent of the total. Only 4.3 percent of South Koreans report having been the victim of similar crimes.

Most of the defectors who reported the crimes were affected once, but one defector was the victim of eight crimes. The 50 who reported crimes were involved in 91 crimes. Of the 91, 46 involved fraud and 11 involved violence.

The percentage of the victims who fell prey to fraud was 21.5 percent. About 0.5 percent of the South Korean population has reported fraud.

Among the 46 fraud victims, 28.6 percent lost money through a business or investment, 26.6 percent lent money to others and were not paid back and 19 percent gave money to someone who said they would bring the defectors’ family in the North to South Korea and didn’t do so.

Most of the victims of business-related fraud lost money after investing in multi-level marketing companies. Those who invited the victims to the join the businesses were mainly other North Korean defectors, according to the report.

Six of the eight cases related to bringing relatives here from the North were committed by North Korean defectors.

Those with more education were more subject to fraud. Some 42 percent of defectors with college degrees and 14.1 percent of high school graduates were swindled, but none of those who had elementary school education was a victim of fraud.

Most of the surveyed defectors did not trust people, with 63.9 percent saying they should be wary of others in South Korean society.

“The government has to prepare counseling centers and give more detailed law education to North Korean defectors when they leave Hanawon, a state-run settlement facility for defectors,” a researcher said.

N. Korean defectors shift attitude to adapt to capitalism
Yonhap
1/11/2007

For a growing number of North Korean defectors to South Korea, the stark reality of capitalism might offset their long-held dream of living in a free, affluent country.

In a capitalistic society like South Korea, a measure of freedom and independence can come only with ability to compete for decent jobs and willingness to adapt to new circumstances.

“They have a sheer illusion that if they arrive in South Korea, the people will treat them well. But they get disillusioned soon, and their lives get devastated if they don’t try hard to adapt themselves,” said Kim Seung-chul, a researcher at the Institute of North Korea Studies.

The total number of North Korean defectors will likely top 10,000 sometime this year, according to government officials.

So far, 9,265 North Koreans have settled down in the South after finishing all the procedures and obtaining social security numbers, while some 400 are receiving adaptive education at a state-run institute. More than 500 defectors are currently under the custody of South Korean embassies or consulates in Thailand, Mongolia and other countries.

“This year, a lot more North Koreans will likely escape and attempt to come to the South because the food situation is expected to worsen following the missile and nuclear device tests,” said a senior official at a Seoul-based aid group for the defectors on condition of anonymity.

Since heavy floods hit the North in the mid-1990s, the annual number of North Korean defectors reached double digits and in 1999 it swelled to a triple-digit level. In 2002, as many as 1,139 defectors arrived in the South, a sharp rise from 583 the previous year, government data showed.

“In the past, we provided direct help, or unilaterally protective aid, but the policy is shifting to an indirect one aimed at helping them stand on their own. The government will provide more job training and employment opportunities,” a Unification Ministry official said, asking to remain anonymous.

Since 2005, South Korea has introduced an incentive system for North Korean defectors on the basis of their performance in job training and the level of adaptation, aside from the money provided to help them settle in the South.

But the prevailing sentiment among the defectors is that they cannot survive in the South only with government subsidies or state-offered jobs.

“What matters is attitude. They should make efforts to understand the South Korean society and prepare themselves for competition,” said Kim Young-hee, 43, president of an aid group for North Korean defectors.

Park Cheol-yong, 32, who fled the North and arrived here in 2002, had difficulties adapting to the different work culture, but he decided to soldier on, believing that he would have a chance to get recognition after years of experience.

“The cultural differences are far greater than expected, but I tried hard to overcome the problem by adjusting to new circumstances,” said Park, who works at a stationery company.

Park, who is married with a three-year-old son, graded himself “mediocre” in the level of adaptation and expressed hope that life will get much better here as time goes by.

“Life will be much more difficult if I quit the job so easily because of the stress I get from work now. I will do my best to succeed,” said Park, who works for the sales of stationery in the morning and delivers stationery in the afternoon.