North Korean Economy Watch

Urgent: How to Topple Kim Jong Il
Foreign Policy Magazine
March/April 2007, P.70-74
Andrei Lankov

From: Andrei Lankov
To: Condoleezza Rice
RE: Bringing Freedom to North Korea

When North Korea tested a nuclear weapon late last year, one thing became clear: The United States’ strategy for dealing with North Korea is failing. Your current policy is based on the assumption that pressuring the small and isolated state will force itto change course. That has not happened—and perhaps never will.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Il and his senior leaders understand that political or economic reforms will probably lead to the collapse of their regime. They face a challenge that their peers in China and Vietnam never did—a prosperous and free “other half” of the same nation. North Korea’s rulers believe that if they introduce reforms, their people will do what the East Germans did more than 15 years ago. So, from the perspective of North Korea’s elite, there are compelling reasons to resist all outside pressure. if anything, foreign pressure (particularly from Americans) fits very well into what Pyongyang wants to propagate— the image of a brave nation standing up to a hostile world dominated by the United States.

Yet, sadly, the burden of encouraging change in North Korea remains the United States’ alone. China and Russia, though not happy about a nuclear North Korea, are primarily concerned with reducing U.S. influence in East Asia. China is sending considerable aid to Pyongyang. You already know that South Korea, supposedly a U.S. ally, is even less willing to join your efforts. Seoul’s major worry is not a North Korean nuclear arsenal but the possibility of sudden regime collapse. A democratic revolution in the North, followed by a German-style unification, would deal a heavy blow to the South Korean economy. That’s why Seoul works to ensure that the regime in Pyongyang remains stable, while it enjoys newfound affluence and North Koreans quietly suffer.

Do not allow this status quo to persist. Lead the fight for change in North Korea. Here are some ideas to make it happen:

Realize a Quiet Revolution Is Already Under Way: For decades, the Hermit Kingdom was as close to an Orwellian nightmare as the world has ever come. But that’s simply not the case anymore. A dramatic transformation has taken place in North Korea in recent years that is chronically underestimated, particularly in Washington. This transformation has made Kim Jong Ii increasingly vulnerable to internal pressures. Yes, North Korea is still a brutal dictatorship. But compared to the 1970s or 1980s, its government has far less control over the daily lives of its people.

With the state-run economy in shambles, the government no longer has the resources to reward “correct” behavior or pay the hordes of lackeys who enforce the will of the Stalinist regime. Corruption runs rampant, and officials are always on the lookout for a bribe. Old regulations still remain on the books, but they are seldom enforced. North Koreans nowadays can travel outside their county of residence without getting permission from the authorities. Private markets, once prohibited, are flourishing. People can easily skip an indoctrination session or two, and minor ideological deviations often go unpunished. It’s a far cry from a free society, but these changes do constitute a considerable relaxation from the old days.

Deliver Information Inside: North Korea has maintained a self-imposed information blockade that is without parallel. Owning radios with free tuning is still technically illegal— a prohibition without precedent anywhere. This news blackout is supposed to keep North Koreans believing that their country is an earthly paradise. But, today, it is crumbling.

North Korea’s 880-mile border with China is notoriously porous. Smuggling and human trafficking across this remote landscape is rampant. Today, 50,000 to 100,000 North Koreans reside illegally inside China, working for a couple of dollars a day (a fortune, by North Korean standards). In the past 10 years, the number of North Koreans who have been to China and then returned home may be as large as 500,000. These people bring with them news about the outside world. They also bring back short-wave radios, which, though illegal, are easy to conceal. It is also becoming common to modify state-produced radios that have fixed tuning to the state’s propaganda channels. With a little rejiggering, North Koreans can listen to foreign news broadcasts.

But there are few broadcasts that North Koreans can hope to intercept. It was once assumed that South Korea would do the best job broadcasting news to its northern neighbor. And that was true until the late 1990s, when, as part of its “sunshine policy,” South Korea deliberately made these broadcasts “non-provocative.” There are only three other stations that target North Korea. But their airtime is short, largely due to a shortage of funds. Radio Free Asia and Voice of America each broadcast for roughly four hours per day, and Free North Korea (FNK), a small, South Korea-based station staffed by North Korean defectors, broadcasts for just one hour per day.

Being a former Soviet citizen, I know that shortwave radios could be the most important tool for loosening Pyongyang’s grip. That was the case in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, some 25 percent of Russia’s adult population listened to foreign radio broadcasts at least once a week because they were one of the only reliable sources of news about the world and, more importantly, our own society A dramatic increase in funding for broadcasts by Voice Of America is necessary.  It is also important to support the defectors’ groups that do similar broadcasting themselves. These groups are regularly silenced by South Korean authorities, and they have to do everything on a shoestring. A journalist at the FNK gets paid the equivalent of a janitor’s salary in Seoul.  Even a small amount of money- less than U.S. military forces in Seoul spend on coffee-could expand their airtime greatly. With an annual budget of just $1 million, a refugee-staffed station could be on air for four hours a day, 365 days a year.

Leverage the Refugee Community in the South: There are some 10,000 North Korean defectors living in the South, and their numbers are growing fast. Unlike in earlier times, these defectors stay in touch with their families back home using smugglers’ networks and mobile phones. However, the defectors are not a prominent lobby in South Korea. In communist-dominated Eastern Europe, large and vibrant exile communities played a major role in promoting changes back home and, after the collapse of communism, helped ensure the transformation to democracy and a market economy. That is why the United States must help increase the influence of this community by making sure that a cadre of educated and gifted defectors emerges from their ranks.

Today, younger North Korean defectors are being admitted to South Korean colleges through simplified examinations (they have no chance of passing the standard tests), but a bachelor’s degree means little in modern South Korea. Defectors cannot afford the tuition for a postgraduate degree, which is the only path to a professional career. Thus, postgraduate scholarships and internship programs will be critical to their success. Without outside help, it is unlikely that a vocal and influential group of defectors will emerge. Seoul won’t fund these programs, so it will be up to foreign governments and non-governmental organizations to do so. Fortunately, these kinds of initiatives are cheap, easy to enact, and perfectly compatible with the views of almost every U.S. politician, from right to left.

Fund, Plan, and Carry out Cultural Exchanges: The Cold War was won not by mindless pressure alone, but by a combination of pressure and engagement. The same will be true with North Korea The United States must support, both officially and unofficially, all policies that promote North Korea’s Contacts with the outside world. These policies are likely to be relatively expensive, compared to the measures above, but cheap in comparison to a military showdown with a nuclear power.

It makes sense for the U.S. government to bring North Korean students to study overseas (paid for with U.S. tax dollars), to bring their dancers or singers to perform in the West, and to invite their officials to take “study tours.” Without question, North Korean officials are wary of these kinds of exchanges with the United States. However, they will be less unwilling to allow exchanges with countries seen as neutral, such as Australia and New Zealand. In the past, Pyongyang would never have allowed such exchanges to happen. But nowadays, because most of these programs will benefit elite, well- connected North Korean families, the temptation will be too great to resist. in-other words, a official in Pyongyang might understand perfectly well that sending his son to study market economics at the Australian National University is bad for the communist system, but as long as his son will benefit, he will probably support the project.

Convince Fellow Republicans That Subtle Measures Can Work: Some Republicans, particularly in the U.S. Congress, might object to any cultural exchanges that will benefit already-privileged North Koreans. And, for many, funding Voice of America isn’t as attractive as pounding a fist in Kim’s face. But these criticisms are probably shortsighted. As a student of Soviet history, you know that mild exposure to the world outside the Soviet Union had a great impact on many Soviet party officials. And information almost always filters downstream. A similar effect can be expected in North Korea. During the Cold War, official exchange programs nurtured three trends that eventually brought down the Soviet system: disappointment among the masses, discontent among the intellectuals, and a longing for reforms among bureaucrats. Money invested in subtle measures is not another way to feed the North Korean elite indirectly; it is an investment in the gradual disintegration of a dangerous and brutal regime.

North Korea has changed, and its changes should be boldly exploited. The communist countries of the 20th century were not conquered. Their collapse came from within, as their citizens finally realized the failures of the system that had been foisted on them. The simple steps outlined here will help many North Koreans arrive at the same conclusion. It may be the only realistic way to solve the North Korean problem, while also paving the way for the eventual transformation of the country into a free society. This fight will take time, but there is no reason to wait any longer.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
4/1/2007

Where is science produced? A typical Western answer would be: “in a university, of course.” Actually, it is not really the case these days, since an average teaching routine at most universities is increasingly incompatible with serious research, so a growing share of research is conducted in the corporateowned or independent research centers supported by industry, and by private and/or government money.

Somewhat surprisingly, the communist world was first in separating pure research from a teaching-oriented university. This was initially a Soviet approach, widely accepted by all communist countries, including North Korea.

Most Communist countries had a special academic body whose staff was responsible solely for conducting scientific research. This body was and is called an Academy of Science. In its original Soviet form it could be best described as a self-governing Ministry of Science and Humanities.

The Soviet Union inherited this institution from the old Russia of the tsars. Historically, in pre-Soviet times, the Academy used to be a prestigious closed club of prominent scholars and scientists.

The Communist government took on its payroll, but the institution retained a lot of its ingrained traditions and established privileges. The Soviet Academy of Science was governed by a council of full members, usually well-known scholars and/or academic administrators, who periodically voted new scientists into their circle. Government interference in the process could be serious, but elections still remained contested.

Full membership was a tenured position that could not be withdrawn, even if the bearer was engaged in acts the authorities did not like. Soviet authorities, incidentally, tolerated a high level of critical expression among academy members.

The academy ran a huge network of research centers that formed the backbone of the Soviet research community: the academy always had the best people and the best equipment.

North Korea acquired its own academy in 1952. The preparations began in spring, and on the 1st of December 1952, the academy was officially established. This date became its official foundation day and is regularly celebrated.

At the time of its foundation, the North Korean Academy of Science included 10 full and 15 candidate members and was responsible for 9 “research institutes” and 43 smaller “research laboratories.” Hong Myng-hi was elected as the first President of the Academy, but this aged man was hardly a good administrator. In all probability, Hong was chosen for his background and longstanding reputation as a leftist intellectual of high integrity. In 1956 he was replaced by Paek Nam-un, a prominent historian and another defector from the South (such defectors were very prominent in the North Korean intellectual circles of the 1950s). Unlike his predecessor, Paek was willing to become a real administrator.

Nowadays, the North Korean academy is a large institution. It runs 40 research institutes, about 200 smaller research centers of various kinds, a factory which produces research equipment and 6 publishing houses which issue books and about 40 periodicals. In 1982 the Academy became a ministry, unlike its Soviet counterpart which always had some trappings of an independent “scientists’ club.” But at the same time, the North Korean Academy never even gave a hint of the intellectual, let alone political, independence which was a hallmark of its Soviet counterpart in earlier times.

In the USSR, academies proliferated in the 1940s and 1950s when minor fields began to lobby the government for permission to acquire an academy of their own. Not least, they were attracted to the prestige associated with the name of an “Academy” (and, of course, leading authorities in their respective fields also wanted to be styled a “full member of such-and-such academy”). Thus, the Academy of Medical Science, the Academy of Agricultural Science and even the Academy of Pedagogical Science were born. Each had its own autonomous network of research centers.

A similar process was witnessed in the DPRK where there are minor academies as well. Following the Soviet example, North Korea established an Academy of Medical Science and an Academy of Agricultural Science. Nothing was heard about pedagogy, but the North did create two academies with no Soviet analogue: the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, responsible for military research; and the Academy of Social Science, responsible for the humanities. In 1992 the minor academies, with the exception of the second scademy, fused with the major Academy of Science, but in 1998 the old Soviet-style structure of one major and a number of minor academies was restored.

In better times, a much-coveted job with an academic research institute provided a North Korean scientist with some equivalent of an ivorytower life. Being a staff member of the academy meant good wages, good rations (in North Korea, the latter was more important than the former) and a lot of prestige. In some cases, especially in the natural sciences, the scientists could be even somewhat protected from ongoing political campaigns. However, over the last 15 years, the positions of the academy and its personnel have undergone a dramatic decline.

Dail y NK
Park Choel Yong
3/26/2007

Even in Pyongyang, entering into a top university is like picking a star from the sky. Not only must you be an A+ student, your family record must be clean.

Growing up in an ordinary family, I was luckily accepted into my preferred university based on my abilities. On receiving my results, I thought that I could achieve anything in the world. However, my sweet dream did not last long. Soon after beginning my tertiary studies, I felt as if I had gotten a big splash on the face. The reason being, marching parade training.

Three days into the semester, I was selected to participate in the marching parade, where the saying, tertiary students once “normal people become stupid” referring to post-training for the marching parade, became a reality. When people think of a marching parade, they think of school parades in South Korea. However, the marching parade in North Korea resembles a years worth of rigorous military training.

In North Korea, participants of the marching parade include students, workers, the military and average citizens who are trained for celebratory events such as Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s birthday, the anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Army and the Worker’s Party. The audience? Kim Jong Il. For the mere pleasure of one man, Kim Jong Il, hundreds and thousands of people must spend every day of the year working their bodies until exhaustion.

There is one criteria in which university students are selected for the marching parade and that is height. Students gather and their height examined. Compared to others, I was not short. I was also a freshman and so was instantly selected to participate in the marching parade. Occasionally I had seen the marching parade on television but was completely unaware of the intense and arduous training that awaited me.

Our university was assigned to one battalion. There are 12 lines in each battalion and 25 people in each line. The tallest person stands at the head of the line with the shortest at the end.

Elite officials excluded from training

A commander is responsible for each battalion, followed by the political commander and civilian commander. Next is the captain and political captain followed by the line leader, group leader and secretary. Each line is divided into 3 groups with the group leader in charge. This exclusive role normally goes to students in their 3rd, 4th year. Other students in the battalion who are not assigned to such jobs are mostly freshmen.

On the first day of training, many of the students gathered around laughing and talking, “Do you think the Great Leader will really come to see our parade?” However, the following day, a handful of people began to drop out.

At the time, we thought that these people had legitimate reasons for being unable to partake in the training. Only to soon discover that those people had been closely affiliated with elite officials who gave a common excuse that they were physically ill. Ultimately, the selection process which entailed measuring height ended with a group of freshmen and poor students living in the dorms from the country.

Each battalion is represented by one university. Students who are selected for the marching parade attend lectures in the morning and then training in the afternoon. After spending an afternoon training on a dirt field amidst dirt, your mouth practically becomes a small clusters of dirt itself by evening.

The first stage of training is warm-up and stretching. Every day, we had to replicate positions made by professional performers and showcase our days training. If we were unable to succeed in doing this, training continued.

During the first month, we trained on the university fields, but in the second month, we began training at the Juche Statue Education Square and here is where students began to show symptoms of arthritis. Unable to restrain myself from lack of sleep during class, I was frequently scolded by the lecturer and the number of patients increased. Regardless of how ill one was, strict punishment awaited those who missed training.

Wanting to smash the street lamp at Juche Statue

Every day, training began at 2PM and usually finished around 7PM. Once training was over, battalion commanders came and gave lectures. People who are late to training, people who participate in training disrespectfully and people pointed out throughout the training are severely criticized. Once the lecture is over, smaller, tutorials begin.

Naturally, tutorials aren’t any better. The tutor or divisional commander closes the lecture by stressing the importance of being on time and participating sincerely in the training. The lectures normally last an hour and half, but this does not mean that the day’s training is over.

The students criticized in the lectures must undergo re-training. There has never been a time where the street lamp at the Juche Statue has been more spiteful. The thought that training would end if only the lighting was lost would not escape my mind. Whether or not someone was looking we did not care. We only wanted to smash the street lamp.

When training is finished, exhausted students are finally dismissed and another 30~1 hour walk back to the dorms awaits them. There are no buses at that hour and so students do not have an option but to walk home. As for dinner, meals have long been served at the dormitories.

Daily NK
Park Choel Yong
3/18/2007

Rigorous Military Training is Killing North Korean Students
Buying food from outside the camps is, however, the privilege only for the wealthy students. Students who came from privileged families often are excluded from the military trainings for one or two months. The training is notorious for hardness, and hence students from the high authorities offer bribes with money or goods to military officers in return for taking rests at home.

For instance, if one ton of coals were offered to a training camp, a student can rest for a month; a box of cigarette, the “Cat” which costs 1,500 won (approx. US$4.8), is worth a day’s break.

With wealthy students out of training, the rest of students suffer from more than double the hardness. Often, poor students end up patrolling for 8 to 10 hours during national holidays and New Year’s Day.

Girl students in the training have their hair cut shortly and cannot keep private things; even cosmetics are not allowed. Therefore, wealthy girl students take their time at home with bribery.

Even during the training period, the students must take lectures. The basic subjects taught during the training are “The Unification History of the Fatherland” and “History of the Invasion of Japanese Imperialism,” and also includes a few majors.

The lectures, however, are often cut off to make room for the farm supporting activity and national performances.

According to the educational schedules, the college lasts four years, not including the training period; however, the time for lectures generally take only two of those years.

In spring and fall, students take part in the farm supporting activity to transplant rice for 40 days in spring and to harvest for 30 to 40 days during fall. Additionally, students from nationally renowned universities are often brought to various national performances. For six to eight months, students do not take lectures in order to practice military parades for Kim Jong Il’s birthday on the 16th of February and Kim Il Sung’s birthday on the 15th of April.

For torchlight processions, students take practices for two to three months. The torchlight processions are held usually in the Foundation Day of the State and the North Korean Workers’ Party, with more than ten thousand university students participating in the event. Students also practice dancing for another two to three months for students’ dancing party at the Kim Il Sung Plaza, which is held during the Chinese New Years’ Day.

That is not all, however. Working in the subsidiary farms that belong to the universities takes students a few months. Students who make the survey on the revolutionary historic spots and the Korean War landmarks are also exempt from the lectures for a few months.

In the end of a semester, reducing the day for lectures is not a special thing. The students do take lectures more intensively and even on Sundays to remedy this as necessary.

Asia Times
Sunny Lee
3/14/2007

North Korea is well known for its nuclear ambitions. But it is relatively little-known fact that the country is a hidden outsourcing mecca for the international animation industry, producing such well-known movies as The Lion King.

Even while North Korea has been under US-led sanctions that include a ban on commercial trade, several US animated films have allegedly been outsourced to the country, according to Beijing-based businessman Jing Kim, who says he was involved with American animation producer Nelson Shin’s filmmaking business in the Stalinist pariah state.

Shin, a 67-year-old Korean-born American, is best known for the television cartoon series The Simpsons, which was actually drawn in Seoul by a team of animators led by him since its premiere in 1989.

Shin and Kim first met in Singapore in 1999 at an international animation film fair, where Kim led the North Korean delegation. There, Shin asked Kim to help him to connect with the North Korean animation industry, Kim said.

China-born Kim, 47, has been doing business with North Korea for nearly 20 years and owns a restaurant in Pyongyang. Through his company in Singapore, where he holds a resident permit, Kim used to sell North Korean products to South Korea during a period when direct commerce between the two ideologically opposed neighbors was not possible.

After seven years of cooperation with North Korea’s state-owned SEK Studio, employing as many as 500 North Korean animators out of its staff of 1,500, and 18 visits to the country, Shin finally completed Empress Chung in 2005, a famous Korean folk tale about a daughter who sacrifices herself to a sea monster to restore her blind father’s eyesight. It was the first cartoon jointly produced by the two Koreas.

Apparently, however, according to Kim, Empress Chung was not the only film made by North Korean cartoonists. Shin, who heads Seoul-based AKOM Production, a unit of KOAA Film in Los Angeles, allegedly outsourced to North Korea part of the animation contracts that his firm had originally received from the United States.

On one occasion, for example, North Korean animators employed by Shin came to Beijing from Pyongyang to work exclusively on several US animation movies, staying there for months, according to Kim.

When asked whether any of the movies were actually broadcast in the US, Kim said, “Oh, a lot, a lot. The ones that I participated in were as many as seven.”

But Kim declined to name the US films, citing the sanctions imposed on North Korea. “If the names of the US companies are known, they will be screwed,” said Kim.

Kim said “many people will be hurt” if he went into details, adding, “We worked very carefully.”

When asked whether the US film companies involved actually knew that their cartoons had been made by North Koreans, Kim said: “They don’t want to know. If they knew, it wouldn’t be fun. After they make contracts with the South Koreans, they just assume that it is made there. They only care about the delivery [of the products] and their quality. It is too much for them to ask where they were actually made. We don’t have the obligation to tell them, either. The only thing they claim is the copyright.”

However, Nelson Shin denied the allegation. “There were no American cartoon movies made in North Korea,” Shin said from Seoul. “As far as I know, there were some Italian and French movies made in North Korea. But I am not aware of any American cartoons made in North Korea.”

Shin also noted the technical difference of production origination between “made in” and “made by”. He took the example of The Lion King. “It’s a Disney film. However, if Disney Europe, not the Disney company in the US, gave North Korea the production order, then it is not a deal placed by an ‘American’ company.”

Kim in Beijing, however, said his cooperation with Shin led them to employ eight North Korean animators in 2005 to come to Beijing, where the North Koreans stayed for six months, from June 10 to November 18. That was followed by a second group of North Korean animators, who came to Beijing and stayed for much of 2006, returning to Pyongyang on December 27-28, according to Kim.

When it was noted that Kim mentioned all these dates without referring to any written memo, he tersely said: “That’s how I make my living.”

Kim said he didn’t pay the North Korean artists in person for their work. Rather, he wired US$170,000 to North Korea directly for their 2006 assignments.

Kim said most North Korean animators are highly educated, including graduates from the prestigious Pyongyang College of Arts.

Animation involves the grueling job of grinding out tens of thousands of drawings for a single 22-minute cartoon. “They worked without complaint,” Kim said, while also praising the quality of their work. He said hiring North Korean artists meant that the usual company benefits, such as medical insurance, welfare and overtime, did not need to be provided.

“It’s a system that is doable,” Kim said.

North Korea’s cartoon industry has become quite sophisticated as a result of its cooperation with France and Italy in their animation projects since 1983. North Korea’s animation skills now rank among the world’s best, experts say.

“They are highly talented. That’s something I can say,” said Shin in Seoul.

South Korea itself was once the largest supplier of television animation in the world during its peak in the 1990s, churning out more than 1,000 half-hour episodes. However, its status has since declined with the rise of labor costs there, pushing animation companies to find alternatives such as India, the Philippines and North Korea. The Chronicles of Narnia, for example, used Indian animators for some characters. It’s unclear how much North Korea contributes to the world animation market today.

Meanwhile, when asked about the similarity of cartoon characters between Empress Chung and the ones seen in recent US animation movies, Shin said, “It’s inconvenient to talk about it on the phone.”

However, Shin said he is working on a new joint North-South Korea animation movie called Goguryeo, the title a reference to an ancient Korean kingdom that existed until AD 68. He expects it will take about two years to complete.

Daily NK
Park Choel Yong
3/10/2007

Forced Memorization of Kim Family History Ruining Student Potential

In the past, the greatest pleasure of North Korean university professors was meeting students whose abilities were superior to their own. However, these professors say new generations of students cannot be properly educated and their academic ability is declining because they are forced to memorize the revolutionary history of the Kim family. North Korean preschoolers are two through six years old.

Compulsory education consists of four years in elementary school and six in middle school, followed by an optional four year university degree. During the important middle school period when student development could be the greatest, students are instead directed to devote their efforts to rote memorization of North Korean revolutionary history. No exceptions are allowed even for gifted students.

The most important subject is Revolutionary History

In every province and city, there is “The 1st Middle School” in which the most brilliant students study. In Pyongyang there are the 1st Middle Schools in three districts: Chanduk School, East-Pyongyang 1st School and Moranbong 1st School. The best school among those 1st schools is Pyongyang 1st Middle School where the most gifted students in the country can study.

Pyongyang 1st Middle School used to be the Namsan Loyal Middle School where only children of high authorities and patriots who had fought against the Japanese colonial government can attend. Because Kim Jong Il graduated there, it has become a special school for the gifted.

To enter the Pyongyang 1st Middle School, high grades in Revolutionary History are necessary. There are sub-items under the Revolutionary History: “Revolutionary records of the respectable Father, Kim Il Sung”, “Revolutionary records of the beloved Leader, General Kim Jong Il” and others.

Students must completely memorize the history of Kim Il Sung’s activities along with those of his son Kim Jong Il. High grades on Revolutionary History entrance exams give students priority in attending the school.

Fortunately, Kim Il Sung achieved independence from Japan instead of his father

In order to enter the school, students develop their powers of retentive memory at the expense of intellectual learning. North Korean policy dictates that memorization of revolutionary history should be a cradle to grave endeavor, beginning in pre-school and lasting through university study and beyond. Students abbreviate “the Great Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary history” as “GR (‘Wihyuk’ in Korean)” and “the beloved Kim Jong Il’s revolutionary history” as “BR (‘Chinhyuk’ in Korean).”

Adding to student misery has been the inclusion of “MR (‘Eohyuk’ in Korean)” in 2000, meaning “the Heroine Kim Jong Suk, the Mother’s revolutionary history.”

Students cynically claim that it is fortunate that Kim Il Sung won independence from Japan instead of his father Kim Hyung Jic because the amount of material to be memorized would have doubled.

Foreign media focus on the starvation and ruined North Korean economy caused by Kim Jong Il. However, the destruction of North Korea’s educational system and the subsequent waste of human resources represent some of his most serious crimes. Revolutionary history brainwashing is destroying the intellectual development of future generations.

Daily NK (Part 1)
Han Young Jin
3/10/2007

The reason North Korea’s regime can persevere is because of the central class’ fear of regime collapse.

As a result of this perseverance, North Korea has been able to resist isolation and pressure for more than half a century, with the system even defeating the “March of Suffering” where tens and thousands of people died of starvation.

Today, powers maintaining the North Korean system are the hierarchical upper class including the North Korean Workers’ Paryy, the National Security Agency, the National Protection Agency, prosecutors and adjudicators.

Overall, there are about 4 millions members in the North Korean Workers’ Party (statistics as of 1995), this being roughly 20% of the population. Retrospectively, these people control the 23mn North Korean citizens.

The central class incorporating junior secretaries to the party, training officers, novice elites, generals from the army, safety and protection agents use their power position to control directly the North Korean people.

The most of these people have strong loyalty for the regime. In particular, military generals or party officials especially fear punishment and the thought that their privileges may be removed. Though they may be leaders, it is not one’s own desire to escalate in power but fear of retaliation from new powers.

Local party officers, security agents and protection agents directly control, inspect and punish civilians. In essence, they absolutely control the North Korean people and hence fear direct retaliation from the people. The collapse of the regime, also means that they may become jobless and troublesome.

In the 80’s, there was an incident where the Kangkye Munitions Factory incurred an explosion. The people who thought that a war had risen killed the security agent in charge and threatened to evacuate the country regardless of war or not. The people armed with weapons even raided the home of the security agent in charge, with stones and batons. As this rumor spread, security officers throughout the country felt the tension and were all on alert. Hence, control forces even to the lowest rank have become the trustworthy pillar to the North Korean regime.

Since the early stages of the regime, North Korea trained members of anti-Japan protestors and their families, Mankyungdae Revolutionary Academies and distinguished servicemen from the Korean War. As a result, the mindset of North Korea’s central class is relatively high in societal class awareness, as is their loyalty to Kim Jong Il.

Ideology amidst the central class and brainwashed passion

These people believe that the survival of the North Korea system is directly connected to their lifeline. They fear that they will not be able to receive the same privileges given by Kim Jong Il, if the current North Korean regime were to collapse. They believe that Kim Jong Il’s fate is their fate.

The North Korean regime is currently strengthening the multiple control system for their central class so that the ideology of the class is not shaken and the principals of Kim Jong Il kept intact.

In North Korea, every position and decision is focused around Kim Jong Il and his every single word is glorified. In one sense, it is a specialty of the dictatorial regime, but in reality it is a way to force the upper class to stand in awe and even dread the grand Kim Jong Il. Some defectors, once members of North Korea’s elite say that people work having no conscious awareness of their heavy duty or how to modify words spoken by Kim Jong Il.

Educational jobs by the central class are different to that of the common citizen. As the former Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc was merging in the 90’s inflicting collapse to the regime, elite officials internally passed video tapes on the end of Romania’s former President Nicolae Ceausescu to calm other comrades but in the end stirred greater fear.

Recently, it is said that tapes on the Iraq situation have been televised for commanders and military elites to see. The aim of this viewing, to plant into the minds of the commanders that compromises to the protection of the system means death.

The Kim Jong Il regime gives privileges to inspire the people supporting them. For example, people who work for the Central Committee systems department or the elite propagandists, receive a Mercedes Benz with the number plate ‘2.16’ symbolizing Kim Jong Il’s own birthday, and depending on the position, the car series is upgraded.

Other elites from the Central Committee and figures in key military posts are provided with luxurious apartments in Pyongyang. The apartment blocks are built and located separately to the average house. Soldiers guard the homes, even restraining relatives from entering the apartment premises. These homes are furnished with electrical goods, sofas, food and goods made in Japan, as well as being accompanied with western culture.

As Military First Politics was implemented in the late 90’s, private nurses, full-time house maids, private apartments and country residences, private cars, office cars, as well as “recreational clubs” with beautiful women, were granted as privileges to the head military and provincial officers.

Every Lunar New Year, expensive foreign gifts are presented to the core central class. However, across the bridge, local and system secretaries, public control officers await common goods that can be found in South Korea’s supermarkets such as mandarins, apples, cigarettes and alcohol. Nonetheless, people who work for North Korea’s local offices are more than happy to receive these gifts are it distinctly segregates them from the common North Korean citizen.

OK to Capitalist Goods But NO to Capitalist Regime
Daily NK (Part 2)
Han Young Jin
3/11/2007

The higher the class, the closer one is to the 2nd and 3rd tier network. If a person is discovered to be in opposition to the regime they will be brutally punished and so a person is cut off early if they are found to show any signs of anti-Kim Jong Il.

The people who inflict the greatest control are the military high commanders. North Korea’s military can be seen as a branch of national politics that really does represent half of the regime. Political elites from the military closely control high commanders with under cover spies whose job is to specifically tattle on suspicious officers to the Party. Then, the protection agency in command contacts an expert who equipped with bugging devices carefully monitors the high commander’s every move, 24 hours a day.

In addition to this, control over university students who are being trained to become North Korea’s next elite group is also severe. In order to intensify regulations on university students, the protection agency initiates secret movements. Protection agents and even information staff are grouped to control the student’s movement with one information staff in charge of monitoring every each 5 students.

Even amidst the Workers’ Party and the ministries, national safety agents are dispatched to monitor the elite.

“Capitalist goods are good, but reform is unacceptable”

Though envious of South Korea’s economic development, North Korea’s upper class are opposed to growth and reform.

There is a popular story of an elite North Korean official who visited the South and frankly revealed “Though we may crawl and be worn, we cannot follow South Chosun’s economy.” It is also a well known fact that elite officials preferred Samsung digital cameras and showed interest in Hyundai cars at a South-North Cabinet talks and Aug 15th event in Seoul. Nonetheless, when it comes to acknowledging the need for capitalist reform, North Korea’s central class discards it with a wave of the hand.

The reason that capitalist goods are preferred but reform rejected is a result of the ideology that their individual power will be lost with change to the regime. Those who have loyally followed authorities have no mindset nor special skills that will enable them to survive a capitalist system. Rather than confronting a competitive society, they prefer their current position and the glory that comes with it.

The central class is also well aware of the restraints on North Korea’s economy. Every year as the harvest season arrives, they see citizens march onto the fields malnourished and underfed. They know that the economic policy implemented by authorities has failed and is incoherent. Yet, ultimately they are unwilling to let go of the small privileges they are endowed upon by the preposterous and unreasonable regime.

These people have become accustomed to their power which is utilized to gain them their privileges and tyranny. Even if North Korea enters a famine, they need not worry about food or clothing.

For example, in the case of an official factory secretary, he/she satisfies ones own personal needs by selling factory goods. Using the excuse that factory profits are being raised, he/she orders the workers to engage in more work, on the side. This is how tyranny occurs with the factory secretary manufacturing personal gains. Yet, these officials are not punished with any legal sentences.

Newly-rich dualism, collaborative relationship with official powers

Following the July 1st economic measures in 2002 trade became legal and North Korea experienced a sudden boom in newly rich elites. What led this new rich class to accumulate so much wealth was the fact that they had introduced an enterprise system which allowed trade with China.

The newly rich have a great interest in reform and development, and are well aware that the North Korean regime will not be able to solve the economic issue without facing reform.

However even this class of people are disinterested in bringing an end to the regime. They have already accumulated their wealth and feel no onus in the poverty stricken situation in North Korea. Whether capitalism or the current North Korean regime, as long as they can sustain a living, these people can continue to remain in a dualistic mindset.

While North Korean authorities are strengthening control over this new class, they are in another sense, receiving money and bribes to protect them. Where investigations are involved, authorities are risking their own identities being revealed and hence often ignore the illegalities of the people, even going to the extent of passing on information.

It is a fact that North Korea’s central class is acting as the forefront in sustaining the regime, but then again, these people have greater educational standard than the average commoner and they have had more opportunities to experience Western civilization. Hence, they can compare the North Korean regime with the outside world. Though the majority of this class accommodates to the North Korea regime, the possibility that a fraction of the elites may have some sort of antagonism against the Kim Jong Il regime and the odds that these people may just act upon these feelings cannot be discarded.

In addition, as North Korean society continues to decay, the organization of its systemic corruption may just be hit with danger. As corruption deepens and a crack appears in the regime, authorities will try to control this leak but while doing so, it is possible that endless punishment may just incite some elites to secede.

Particularly, the more information about foreign communities flow into North Korea and the people’s animosity against Kim Jong Il increases, even the elite will not be able to completely suppress feelings of antipathy.

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
3/7/2007

90% daily goods made in China, 50% circulated by Chinese merchants

While some prospect that North Korea may be an affiliated market of China’s 4 provinces in the Northeast, the real focus is on the merchants who actually control North Korea’s markets. Recently, North Korean citizens have been asserting that markets would immobilize if Chinese merchants were to disappear.

Lately, Chinese merchants are nestling themselves with their newly found fortune in North Korea, undeniably to the envy of North Korean citizens.

In a recent telephone conversation with the DailyNK, Kim Chang Yeol (pseudonym) a resident of Shinuiju said “Most of the tiled houses in Shinuiju are owned by Chinese merchants in Shinuiju are upper class and the rich.” Unlike Pyongyang, tiled houses in Shinuiju are greater in value than apartments. In particular, the homes owned by Chinese merchants are luxurious and impressing.

Kim said “At the moment, 90% of daily goods that are traded at Shinuiju markets are made in China.” What Kim means by 90% of goods is basically everything excluding agricultural produce and medicinal herbs. Apparently, about half of the (90% of) supplies are circulated by Chinese merchants.

Kim affirmed that the market system could be shaken if supplies were not provided by the Chinese merchants. Hence, Chinese merchants have elevated themselves in North Korea’s integrated market system, to the extent that the market could break down without their existence.

In addition to this, Chinese merchants are playing a vital role in conveying information about the external world into North Korea. Even in 2004, it was Chinese merchants to first telephone China through mobile phones relaying the news about the Yongcheon explosion. As a result, rumors say that the movement of Chinese merchants can either be a “cure” to the economic crisis in which the North Korean government seems unable to fix, or “poison,” as more and more foreign information flows into the country.

How many Chinese merchants are there in North Korea?

A report by China’s Liaoning-Chosun Newspaper in 2001 sourcing data from North Korea, states that immediately after WWII, approximately 80,000 overseas Chinese were residing in the Korean Peninsula. Then following the Korean War and the formation of a Chinese government, the majority of people, approximately 60,000 Chinese, returned home. In 1958, statistics show that 3,778 families of overseas Chinese were living in North Korea, totalling 14,351 people.

These Chinese engaged in business related to farming, home made handicrafts and restaurant business, and in the late 50’s, lost all this due to the implementation of economic planning and dictatorial regime. Since then, the majority of merchants continued to return to China until the early 80’s.

In 2001, Liaoning-Chosun Newspaper confirmed that approximately 6,000 Chinese were living in North Korea. Of this figure, more than half were residing in Pyongyang, approx. 300 families living in North Pyongan and approx. 300 families residing throughout Jagang and northern districts of South Hamkyung.

At present, there are 4 middle and high schools for children (11~17 years) of Chinese merchants, located in Pyongyang, Chongjin, Shinuiju and Kanggae. In addition to these schools, there are a number of elementary schools (for children aged 7~11 years) located sporadically throughout each province.

Wang Ok Kyung (pseudonym) a resident of Shinuiju attended Chongjin Middle School for children of overseas Chinese in 1981~86. Wang said “At the time, there were about 40 students in each year. Now there is only about 5~6 students.” Nowadays, many Chinese children complete their elementary studies in North Korea, but the general trend is to send the children to China for middle school. She said “In order to enter a Chinese university, students must have completed their middle school studies in China and must be fluent in Chinese. He/she can also go to private institutes in China.”

Fortunes made through trade between North Korea-China during the food crisis

Even until the early 80’s there were no such thing as a wealthy North Korean-Chinese merchant. They were no different to North Korean citizens.

However, in the 80’s, many people began importing and selling goods such as socks, handkerchiefs, hand mirrors and cards from China, literally through their sacks. As the 90’s approached North Korean-Chinese merchants began to experience great wealth, the time where North Korea-China trade fundamentally kickstarted.

Today, Son Kwang Mi (pseudonym, 52) falls under the top 10 wealthiest Chinese merchants in Dandong, characterizing an unique rags to riches story. In the past, Sun lived in Chongjin and was one of the first figures to trade with China in the 80’s.

In the beginning, Son was so poor that she had to sell her watch received as a wedding gift in order to buy goods to sell.

Fortunately, Son found her money smuggling gold. In North Korea, gold is considered a public good or simply put Kim Jong Il’s personal inheritance, so private trade of gold is strictly regulated. Nonetheless, there are still some laborers who export gold secretly and a great number of people still collect gold through dubious ways. In particular, after the 80’s as North Korea began to experience economic decline, more and more people sold gold secretly.

Hence, a small number of Chinese merchants infiltrated the market of secretly trading gold with China. Chinese smugglers were able to take advantage of North Koreans by greatly raise their market margins, as the supply of gold and North Koreans wanting to sell their gold was high yet the demand in North Korea low.

Son said “Of the Chinese merchants in North Korea, 60% earned a great fortune at that time through illicit trade.”

She says that there were two opportunities for overseas Chinese to make a great fortune. The first was in 1985~89 through illicit trade of gold and the second, during North Korea’s mass food crisis in 1995~98.

“During the mass famine, everything in North Korea was in shortage and so Chinese merchants began to provide the daily necessities of life. At the time, if you brought large amounts of goods such as fabric and sugar, you could make a profit of 1 million Yuan (US$137,000),” she said.

Son was fortunate enough not to miss these two opportunities which led her to great wealth and allowed her to possess a fortune of 50 million Yuan (US$6.31 million).

Chinese merchants can relatively enter and exit China freely. Also, with the ability to speak Chinese fluently and the possibility of staying in the homes of many relatives in China, the occupation possesses ideal conditions.

Associated Press (Hat tip DPRK Studies)
3/3/2007

Three North Koreans ended a rare and discrete visit to Oregon this week after visiting Oregon State university scientists, orcharists in the Hood River area, the Nike campus, Gov. Ted Kulongoski and attending a Trail Blazers basketball game.

Because of sensitive six-way talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, Mercy Corps, which hosted the visit, declined to release the officials’ names.

Portland-based Mercy Corps is among a handful of humanitarian agencies running programs involving North Korea, which has no diplomatic relations with the United States.

Over 12 years, Mercy Corps has supplied fish and fruit trees for farm projects in North Korea, which has chronic food shortages.

The North Koreans, representing Mercy Corps’ main partner organization, the Korean American Private Exchange Society, arrived Tuesday and were to leave Saturday.

Mercy Corps President Nancy Lindborg said the three visited OSU, which has made scientists available to advise on the agricultural projects. On the way back they met with Kulongoski. They visited orchards in the Hood River area Friday.

At Nike headquarters near Beaverton, they met with managers who gave a presentation on e-commerce, an Internet activity with undetermined relevance in a socialist nation with limited Web penetration.

“I don’t have a specific point of view to share on their visit and the possible opportunities North Korea may present,” said Bob Applegate, a Nike spokesman.

The visit was perhaps the 10th in a series of low-profile North Korean delegations here over the years, Lindborg said. In North Korea, she said, “Oregon is very well-known.”

At the Rose Garden on Thursday the visitors watched the Trail Blazers dismantle Charlotte.

“They’re fans,” said Lindborg, who also attended the game. “Two of them actually play basketball.”

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2/22/2007

North Korean spy agencies love kidnappings. Of course, their colleagues worldwide also would not mind abducting a person or two, but in most cases there are some urgent reasons for taking such drastic measures _ the victims are prominent opposition leaders, or wanted criminals who cannot be extradited through normal channels, or people who are unlucky to know something way too important. North Korean abductions are different: They are often surprisingly random and target people of no significance. The very randomness of most of their abductions once was often cited by sceptics who tried to refute these accusations as “Seoul-inspired falsities.’’ Indeed, why should the secret services of a Stalinist state spend so much time and money only to kidnap a Japanese noodle chef, or a tennis-loving teenager? Nonetheless, in 2002 Kim Jong-il himself confirmed that these seemingly meaningless abductions of ordinary Japanese citizens did take place.

Of course, North Koreans spies did not limit themselves to Japanese only. Quite a number of South Korean citizens have disappeared into the Northern maw as well: it is known that at least 486 South Koreans have been forcibly taken to the North and have never returned.

A vast majority of them are fishermen who were imprudent to come too close to the North Korean coast, but this figure also includes a number of known victims of covert operations. Currently they number 17, but there are few doubts that the actual number is much higher. If the abduction is planned and conducted well, its victim simply disappears and is eventually presumed dead.

A good example is the case of the five South Korean high school students who disappeared from the island beaches in 1977 and 1978. They all were believed dead for two decades, but in the late 1990s it was discovered that the youngsters were working in North Korea as instructors, teaching the basics of South Korean lifestyle to would-be undercover Northern operatives.

Eventually, one of those former students was even allowed to briefly meet his family at the Kumgang resort. Kim Yong-nam disappeared from a beach in North Cholla Province in 1978. Later he was identified as the husband of an abducted Japanese woman, so North Korean authorities grudgingly admitted that Kim Yong-nam was indeed in the North, and staged a meeting with his family. Unsurprisingly, during this meeting and press conference, he insisted that he was not kidnapped but saved from the sea by North Korean sailors. Far more surprisingly, he sort of admitted that his job was related to spying.

It is remarkable that the kidnappings of the South Korean teenagers roughly coincided with similar abductions in Japan. In both cases the abductors obviously targeted randomly selected teenagers who were unlucky enough to be on a lonely beach. Another commonality was that the abductees were later used to train espionage agents. Perhaps, teenagers were seen as ideal would-be instructors for the spies _ still susceptible to indoctrination but with enough knowledge of local realities to be useful.

In April, 1979, a young South Korean walked into the North Korean Embassy in Oslo, Norway. His name was Ko Sang-mun, and he was a schoolteacher back home. Why and how he came to arrive at that embassy is not clear. As was usually the case, the North Korean side insisted that Ko Sang-mu defected, while the South Koreans alleged that the young teacher was the a victim of a taxi driver’s mistake: He took the taxi to a “Korean embassy’’ and the driver delivered him to the embassy of the wrong Korea.

It is impossible to say now whether this highly publicised case was abduction, defection, or something in-between. However, in 1994 it became known that Ko Sang-mun was in a labour camp. A small propaganda war ensued. Ko was made to appear in a North Korean broadcast assuring everybody that he was free, happily married, and full of righteous hatred for the US imperialists and their Seoul puppets (most of his speech consisted of customary anti-American rhetoric). We do not know where he went after delivering this speech _ to an apartment in Pyongyang or to a dugout in a prison camp. Meanwhile, Ko’s widow in the South committed suicide, unable to cope with the stress of the situation.

There were also more “normal’’ instances of abductions. The North Koreans kidnapped people who possessed important intelligence. In 1971 Yu Sang-mun, a South Korean diplomat stationed in West Germany was kidnapped in West Berlin, together with his family _ wife and two children. Perhaps, the few other South Korean officials who went missing in Europe in the 1970s were also abducted by North Korean agents, but presently only Yu’s case is certain.

In the 1990s most abductions of this sort took place in China, and their victims were political activists, missionaries, and real or suspected South Korean spies. All these abductions occurred in the Chinese North-East, near the borders of North Korea.

The abduction of North Korean dissenters, or suspected would-be defectors, from Soviet territory has been quite routine for decades. Sometimes these abductions sparked a crisis in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, but in most cases the Soviets simply turned a blind eye to such acts.