North Korean Economy Watch

“North Korean Market Vendors: The Rise of Grassroots Capitalists in a Post-Stalinist Society”
Andrei Lankov and Kim Seok-hyang
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 81 Iss.1 
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Abstract:
The article deals with the social changes that have taken place in North Korea [from 1994-2002], when the collapse of the centrally planned economy led to the growth of private commercial activity.  This activity remains technically illegal, but the relevant bans and restrictions have rarely been enforced due to endemic corruption and disorganization of the state bureaucracy.  The article is largely based on in-depth interviews with North Korean black market operators [who have defected to South Korea].  It traces their origins, the type and scale of their business, and changes in their mode of operation.

The article demonstrates that the “second economy” came to dominate North Korean economic life by the late 1990s, since authorities’ attempts to limit its scale were largely ineffective.  The growth of the “second economy” produced new grassroots capitalists who sometimes came from underpriveledged social groups, but more typically represented people with good official connections.  It is also remarkable that foreign connections (usually with China) played a major role: to a large extent, merchandise sold at the North Korean markets either came from overseas or was exported overseas eventually, and in many cases the merchants’ initial capital was also provided by relatives residing overseas.

Some highlights:
1. Changsa is the North Korean word for “dealings in the marketplace.” Tonju is the word for money changers/lenders meaning “master of money”. 
2. Public Distribution System (PDS) rations were cut for the first time in 1973.
3. The DPRK system restricted market activity primarily through three mechanisms: limited size of family farming plots, inminban surveillance system, and travel permits.
4. Before the arduous march, North Koreans were not inclined to resort to market trade.  These transactions were seen as ethically suspect.  Once the famine hit, people took up market trading remarkably quickly.
5. Before the arduous march, bribery was rare, even though patronage and indirect forms of corruption were rampant.  Mid-level bureaucrats had to vie for preferred access to poor-quality consumer goods, better schools, and study trips abroad.
6. At the height of the arduous march (1997), production was at 46% of capacity.
7.  North Korean traders seldom if ever have to deal with the protection racket.  When asked directly, respondents did not mention threats from mobsters as one of their security concerns (I wonder if this is still the case).
8. Pyongsong market is reputed to be the largest in the country.  It is just outside Pyongyang, making it accessible to citizens inside the capital as well as those who cannot get permits to enter the city (Pictured below with Google Earth coordinates).

North Korea’s agricultural and food markets suffer from a number of permanent constraints that prevent their efficient operation.  Rail transport is slow and/or unreliable, internal travel restrictions for “ordinary” merchants, and poor road conditions limit the distance food can travel before it goes bad.  Restrictions on communications and lack of a futures market makes it difficult to know how much food is available in each location, or what is expected to be available in each location.  This leads to hoarding, volatile prices, and a mismatch between local supply and demand.  Compounding these basic problems is a poor business environment characterized by collective farming practices, corruption, bribery, poor property rights protection, poor contract enforcement, and ex-post expropriation of profits.  Given these constraints, it is amazing agricultural and food markets work at all. 

In addition to these factors, the DPRK’s food markets suffered a number of adverse supply shocks this year from flooding, China’s restrictions on food exports, and a decrease in expected food aid from China, South Korea, and the US (See the effects on prices in this chart by Noland/Haggard/Weeks here). The arrival of food aid has since brought some of these prices down.

This week, the Daily NK reports on two other causes of price increases in the DPRK: Anti-corruption campaigns and restrictions on farming private plots.

Anti Corruption campaigns (more here and here)

He reported that “From March to late April, for almost 40 days, inspections were undertaken nationally. In Hwanghae Province, the inspection groups under the Central Court came down and confiscated food which the cadres in farms had embezzled. In some cases, they confiscated 500-1000kg of rice and grains from cadres’ households by searching with metal sticks in their backyard.”

The Director of the Ministry of Administration of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party Jang Sung Taek and his inspection group went to Shinuiju and inspected persons in charge of trading.

No. 112 Land System

The No. 112 land system operates whereby the authorities offer a certain width of fallow lands, which are different by grade of food distribution amount, to national public servants and clerical workers, given in order to make them solve their food problem by farming instead of relying on distribution. Ishimaru explained that “However, the new Kim Young Il cabinet abrogated this system and banned them from planting seeds on those fields.” 

Read the full story here:
Intensive Inspections in March and April a Direct Reason for Rise in Food Prices
Daily NK 
Kim So Yeol
7/4/2008  

Institute for far East Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-7-4-1
7/4/2008

It appears that the number of people involved in handmade goods manufacturing, trading, and other small-scale, individual businesses is steadily increasing among North Korean citizens.

According to a source inside North Korea on June 30, ever since North Korean authorities announced the ‘Market Stimulation Measure’ in March 2003, the number of small-scale private businesses employing between 1~8 people has continued to grow as citizens in the North have taken to markets aggressively in order to earn money,

As the North’s economic woes continue to stretch over time and the government is unable to provide basic living necessities, the people are looking for other ways to support themselves.

In March of 2003, North Korea expanded farmers’ markets into general markets, allowing not only the sale of agricultural goods, but of manufactured goods as well. At the same time, the state introduced ‘market use fees’ for vendors wishing to rent space to hock their wares, thus bringing about a tax-like ‘state payment’.

Small-scale commercial and industrial businesses took on the form of family manufacturing or collaboration between factories, enterprises and engineers working together, but ‘Chinese-model’ small enterprises hiring just one or two workers also appeared.

In-home food preparation or handmade goods manufacturing, restaurants, bus services, repair work and other service-related industries grew. There also appeared examples of those leasing import rights from organizations or enterprises and making a living through trade.

Authorities have given these businesses tacit permission to operate, recognizing their role in increasing public revenue and supplying the people with daily necessities, but at the same time, they have laid down some restrictions, criticizing those “bitten by the capitalist bug, working only to make money for themselves.”

Small-scale private commerce and industry has the positive benefit of expanding the provision of daily necessities and absorbing unemployed labor in the North, but on the other hand, anti-socialist side effects such as the increasing gap between the rich and the poor and mammonism are also on the rise.

As North Korean Economy Watch readers are aware, this site hosts the most authoritative mapping of North Korea on Google Earth (click here to download).  Google Earth recently updated its North Korea imagery requiring me to update a colossal amount of information.  This update (version 10) will be released by the end of May.

Growing influence of entrepreneurs
While updating information on Google Earth, one has a chance to compare how things have changed over the course of a few years.  One of the interesting changes in Pyongyang is the emergence of a new market about 5 blocks east of the Tower of the Juche Idea (pictured below).  It seems to have replaced an older market formerly located on the city’s outskirts at the end of the trolley line.  In the past, street markets (or “jangmadang”) like this have been held on the outskirts of the city.  This new, more convenient location (near peoples’ homes) is a testament to the growing importance of these markets, and their budding entrepreneurs, in meeting the needs of the North Korean people.  

Click on the image to view full size.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-4-21-1
4/21/2008

The March issue of “Rimjingang”, a magazine publishing stories on life inside North Korea as reported by defectors and those still inside the DPRK, contains an eye-opening report on activities in North Korea’s markets.

Since 2003, North Korean authorities have legalized DPRK markets throughout the country. The previously existing farmers’ markets were remodeled into ‘combined’ general markets and all traders were permitted to sell their wares. After the legislation was passed, even in Pyongyang general markets emerged in each neighborhood.

According to the magazine, more than 60 markets have been set up, with each market housing around 50 traders. The use of mannequins at clothing stores and attractive price tags used to catch the eye of the shopper are in force. These days, it is not even surprising to hear cassette players extolling the virtues of a particular vendor’s goods. Sellers here do not speak abruptly to customers as they might in a State-run store. In markets, one can hear respectful language used even to children. These are not ideas taught by the labor bureau, but rather independent ideas put to use by the sellers.

Stalls selling a variety of seafood can also be found in a number of markets. Mackerel, squid and flatfish from the East Sea are among the surprisingly fresh products on display. This seafood is not on display courtesy of the North Korean government, but rather is delivered by private entrepreneurs running refrigerated trucks from the coast to Pyongyang. According to the magazine, a number of delivery services are in operation, providing goods to the highest level of North Korean society.

Around Pyongyang, a number of flower sellers have also popped up in the capitalist markets. It is custom to give flowers whenever there is an event in honor of Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il; but these days it is also popular for couples to give each other flowers as gifts. Even before the emergence of these markets, there was nothing that couldn’t be found in Pyongyang as long as someone had the money to purchase it.

Currently, women under the age of 39 are prohibited from working in markets, and efforts to extend this restriction to women under 49 have raised tension with many women trading in the markets. ‘Good Friends’, an organization aiding North Korea, has reported that recently thousands of women have organized in protest against security forces in the farmers’ market in Chungjin.

Where do North Koreans get their alcohol?  The Daily NK has the scoop:

North Korean citizens started producing/distributing home-brewed liquor in 1987 after the prohibition of the production and sale of liquor in North Korea was lifted. 

Liquor made in the home of an average North Korean citizen consists of ingredients such as corn or rice and malt. The yeast cultivated from rice powder is combined with porridge prepared from the powder and fermented in a vat. After 12~14 days, the rice porridge and the yeast will produce a chemical reaction and will turn into a thick porridge, which is called “liquor porridge” in North Korea.

Refrigerating the steam from the cultivated liquor porridge and turning it into fluid produces liquor. North Korean citizens enjoy over 40% of alcohol content-liquor and approximately 800ml of liquor is produced from a kilogram of corn. A bottle of liquor (500 ml) is close to the price of a kilogram of corn, so selling liquor made from this produce can bring in a small profit.

Read the full story here:
North Korea’s Inspection of Home-Brewed Wine by the Party
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
4/9/2008

Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland published a piece focusing on North Korea’s economic integration.  Download it here: petersoninstitute.pdf

Although not the focus of the piece, here is an excerpt:

A first corollary of the injunction to avoid top-down approaches is that any collective development assistance must be extended in support of economic reform. Experience throughout the developing world demonstrates that assistance will have only marginal effects and may even have negative consequences if not coupled with policy changes. It is not simply that aid sustains the regime; since aid is fungible, even purely humanitarian aid will have that effect. The problem is that too much aid can delay or even undermine the reform process. Whatever the multilateral mechanism that ultimately emerges, it should encourage reform and economic opening in the North.

A second corollary of the injunction against top-down approaches is the importance of engaging the private sector: through trade, foreign direct investment, private capital flows (including remittances), and sheer expertise. Economic rehabilitation will require investment in social overhead capital, which will be led primarily by the public sector. But if North Korea is to evolve toward a self-sustaining market-oriented economy, private-sector involvement will be crucial. Participation of foreign firms means that projects are subject to the market test of profitability, and it encourages North Korean authorities to think of economic engagement in terms of joint gain rather than as political tribute.

(and)

North Korea is in need of depoliticized technical assistance for a whole panoply of issues running from the mundane but critical, such as developing meaningful national statistical capabilities, through basic agricultural and health technologies, to social infrastructure of a modern economy. This infrastructure includes policy mechanisms to manage macroeconomic policy, including through reform of the central bank; specify property rights and resolve commercial disputes; regulate markets, including financial markets as they emerge; establish and implement international trade and investment policies; and so on.

Read the full paper here:
A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension
Staphen Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Policy Brief
April 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-3-22-1
3/22/2008

Recently, North Korea passed a measure prohibiting women younger then 49 from selling goods in markets, leading to clashes between police enforcing the rule and younger women wanting to work in markets.

The March 19th newsletter from ‘Good Friends’, an organization providing aid for North Korea, reported that on February 5th in Haeju, South Hwanghae Province, women who were not allowed to enter the local market and so were selling goods on a nearby corner physically clashed and police. This reportedly led to the arrest and detention of 9 people.

The newsletter reported, “The women held at the police station were subjected to harsh interrogation as to ‘who was the ringleader’, and after being subjected to four days of torture, one who could no longer hold out confessed to being the ringleader and was sent to a detention center, while the remaining women were all released.”

North Korean authorities announced the measure restricting women under 49 from selling goods in markets after December 1st last year, and that measure is being enforced not only in Pyongyang, but in rural areas as well.

According to Good Friends, “Just like other cities, Haeju City has received absolutely no food rations since March,” and “Women from households barely managing regular meals through market trading are being reduced to the weakest level by North Korean authorities’ prohibition on trading.”

It follows that in Haeju City, either authorities recognize that if these women can not sell in the markets their families will starve to death and so turn a blind eye to their activities, or these women, prevented from selling in markets, will continue to clash with authorities.

The newsletter also reported, “On March 3, in Chungjin City, North Hamkyung Province, organized protests by women prevented from market activities by the new regulations broke out, and Chungjin City authorities are now allowing all women, with no exception, to sell goods in markets.”

Immediately following organized protests by these women, Chungjin City officials reported the disturbances, but no policies to deal with the issue were forthcoming, and so it appears that all women, with no exception, are now allowed to conduct market activities.

During the late 1990s, North Korea suffered a terrible economic collapse which resulted in famine and massive social dislocation.  During this time, most ministries and state-owned companies  were cash-strapped and unable to maintain their operations.  Out of desperation they turned to private investment for much needed revenues by outsourcing many basic services. (Individuals who were capable of taking up such opportunities were probably small in number at the time, but apparently now compose a healthy sub-section of the population.)

Outsourcing has benefited both the government and private entrepreneurs.  Outsourcing allows state-owned companies to receive capital financing from private individuals as well as a share of joint-venture revenues (tax revenues).  Private entrepreneurs need a legal business environment where they know they will not be subject to ex-post expropriation of profits.  Leasing the name of a government body gives them some of this legal cover.  This system is no doubt tolerated because it allows the government create space for entrepreneurship (and tax revenue) within the existing state structure while still maintaining de jure control of the means of production.   

According to the story in the Daily NK, the regulations for establishing a legitimate passenger bus company under this system (or “coach” company for readers in Her Majesty’s Commonwealth) are fairly strict.  Once an individual acquires a bus (appx US$6,000-10,000), he has to register it with the government body for whom he is working.  Revenues are then split 70/30 (the government taking 30%) for three years, after which the individual is required to “donate” the privately acquired bus to the state-owned enterprise.  This policy literally gives North Korean entrepreneurs just three years to recoup their investments!

The response of the North Korean business community was predictable:  investors sell the buses before the three years are up or they forge registration papers.  This is not hard to do in the DPRK.  In fact if you have just one other associate who owns a bus in similar condition, all you need to do is trade with him every three years and re-register the new vehicle. 

Word of this game has finally reached the top and they have responded by increasing their share to 70% of passenger bus revenues–leaving just 30% for the purchaser of the vehicle.  It is unclear from the story if investors are still required to “donate” their busses after three years, but realizing that the confiscation of buses was not enforceable, the North Korean government probably just opted for a larger share of the revenue over time.

The good news is that it is not likely that many people pay 70% of revenues either.  After-all, someone has to collect these taxes and he has needs too.  Sounds like some kind of arrangement could be reached…

You can read the full story here:
North Korea Regulates Operation of “Service Car”
Daily NK
2/18/2008

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
12/11/2007

Several sources in China have relayed that it is rumored North Korean authorities are planning to take extreme measures to prevent the sale of industrial products at the jangmadang (markets) next year.

One Chinese merchant, whom DailyNK met in Dandong, China on the 6th, said, “Rumors are circulating that a measure preventing all kinds of Industrial products from being sold in the jangmadang will be implemented next year, making Chinese merchants involved in trade between North Korea and China nervous.”

He informed that “In place of industrial products, only farm produce from the fields of homeowners will be allowed to sell in the jangmadang. Marine products that up to now have been selling in the jangmadang will only be made available at appointed marine shops, meat products at food shops, and industrial products at state operated stores.”

The Chinese source also maintained that, “There are quite a few overseas Chinese who, not knowing what will happen, have bought loads of industrial products with the idea that this might be their last chance, and they have brought them into the North.”

The North Korean authorities began unfolding a series of market regulations immediately following the Inter-Korea Summit in October. These included such policies as limiting the types of items for sale and imposing a minimum age limit on female merchants. However, limiting the sale of industrial products themselves, after having abolished permanent markets, can be seen as a means of returning to “agricultural markets,” where farmers traded only vegetables and a surplus of produce.

According to other Chinese merchants with whom DailyNK met in Dandong on the 3rd, “Under the name of the North Pyongan Party Committee in Shinuiju, a three-day meeting was held between the Secretaries of the Party and of the Army and enterprise managers, from November 20th to the 22nd.”

They informed that “The meeting was held to discuss whether to prohibit jangmadang operations and put people who have been trading in the market to work at enterprises or factories, since regular provisions will resume starting next year.”

The recent efforts to regulate the markets have been analyzed as means to revert the standard of societal regulation to that of the pre-90s by restoring the provision system and normalizing factory operations. However, such an extreme measure is likely to give rise to serious civilian opposition, so there are doubts as to whether or not it can be realized.

The North Korean civilians, before the mid-90s, relied on a complete provision system supplied by the State, which included the provision of goods such as soap, clothes and other necessities. However, after the food shortage, the national provision system completely collapsed. As a result, civilians began acquiring most necessities, goods and food items through the jangmadang.

However, agricultural markets, where miscellaneous cereals, vegetables and other agricultural items raised in home gardens were traded, existed around the time when North Korea’s provision system was in normal operation.

Following the execution of the “July 1st Economic Management Improvement Measure” of 2002, the North Korean government established general markets which brought simple agricultural markets out in the open in February 2003. Since then, individuals leasing stands from the city mercantile department have been able to sell all kinds of industrial products as well.

One source in Chongjin stated in a phone conversation on the 6th regarding the recent rumors, “If the sources are Chinese merchants, than the rumor is not likely groundless. A majority of citizens sustain their livelihoods through the jangmadang.”

He agreed that “It is highly feasible that measures to toughen the regulation of industrial products in the market will be executed.”