North Korean Economy Watch

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
8/19/2007

Sometimes even Stalinist propaganda tells the truth. When the North Korean newspapers occasionally told grossly exaggerated horror stories about South Korean inflation, they stressed that nothing like that could possibly happen in North Korea. This was the case indeed. For nearly half a century, from the late 1950s to the late 1980s retail prices in North Korea remained essentially unchanged. One kilogram of rice cost 0.08 won in 1960. It was still the same price in 1990.

This was possible because almost nothing was actually “sold’’ in North Korea. Communist states often rationed goods distributed through retail trade, but in most cases it was only a handful of most prestigious goods that were subjected to rationing _ like, say, cars. North Korea went much further: by the early 1970s, retail trade in the North ceased to exist, being completely replaced by an elaborate public distribution system. Rations depended on a type of work performed, but also on one’s position within a complicated hierarchy of social groups, as well as one’s place of residence (inhabitants of major cities, and Pyongyang in particular, enjoyed much better rations than those in the countryside).

There were some markets, of course, barely tolerated by the government. But until the late 1980s markets were small, with their trade volume being almost negligible. It seems that most people were reasonably satisfied with what they could get from the state distribution system _ of course, it helped that they knew next to nothing about the situation in other countries, so they could not compare.

The situation began to change around 1990 when the old distribution system collapsed under the pressure of an economic crisis. From 1993-94 there were increasing problems with rations, and from around 1996 rations pretty much stopped altogether. Some food was still distributed in major urban centers, but even there the distributed amount was so meager that nobody could survive on rations alone. A large-scale famine ensued, with at least half to one million dead (the oft-cited figure of three million victims seems to be an exaggeration).

People turned to trade and handicrafts, and with this arrival of a market economy inflation became a North Korean phenomenon as well. Even in the 1980s market prices exceeded the official prices in the state shops. By the mid-1990s, the difference was much greater. In theory, rice still cost 0.08 a kilo, but by 2000 its price on the market reached 45-50 won. Official wages remained unchanged, however, so around 2001 the average salary was approximately 20 times less than the income necessary for physical survival. People had no choice but to augment their income.

The government understood that there was no way to restore the old system: a decade of economic crisis had undermined the basic machinery of distribution and obviously the system was beyond repair. Thus, in 2002 the much trumpeted “July 1 Reforms” were introduced.

It’s difficult to describe these measures as “reforms”–the government simply gave official recognition to the situation which had existed for quite a few years.

The distribution system (long defunct) was curtailed. There was a dramatic increase in the retail prices of basic goods and services _ obviously in an attempt to approximate the prices of the market. Thus, that one-kilo of rice which cost 0.08 won since July cost 44 won.

Wages increased as well. Obviously, the wage increase was not even, and some groups have gained _ or lost _ more than others. It was estimated that the average increase in wages has been approximately 2500 percent (that is, 25 times). At the same time, prices have increased 3000-4000 percent (that is, 30-40 times). This necessitated the issue of 1000 won bills _ the largest denomination in North Korean financial history since the 1959 currency reform. Later, 5000 won bills were issued as well.

But the measures had another effect. The increase in salaries meant that the market was instantly flooded with cash. Needless to say, the only outcome could be inflation. Some people speculated that this was the intention of the Pyongyang leaders who hoped to kick-start the economy in such a way. Perhaps. But I would not be surprised if in 15 or 20 years down the track we learn from interviews and talks with the planners of this reform that they did not really expect inflation. Pyongyang economic managers have not had much exposure to market theory, and are sometimes very naive in their understanding of these questions.

Indeed, by October 2002 the market price of rice had increased to 120 won per kilo. In 2003, the price doubled to 250-300 won, and now it is about 1000 won. Inflation has become a part of North Korean life.

What will happen next? Will the North Korean leaders manage to stabilize the situation, or will a new wave of economic crisis wipe out the entire North Korean system? We do not know yet. But it is clear that there is no return to old days when a kilo of rice could be had for 0.08 won _ that is, if you were lucky enough to live in an area where they distributed grain rations in rice, not in maize.

Again, while trapsing through the jungle of YouTube videos on North Korea, I stumbled on this clip shown on Japanese television which was secretly recorded in a North Korean market.  Since my Japanese ranges from rusty to nonexistent, I do not know where it is.

What does this clip teach us?  That some North Koreans are becomming more sophisticated shoppers/ consumers–looking to the outside world to get a sense of what’s fashionable.  Chinese entrepreneurs are hard at work building brand loyalty for western companies that are not yet aiming for the DPRK market.  Chinese knockoffs of Nike, the North Face (mislabeled “the Nice Face”), and fake designer apparel are all on display.  I imagine no North Korean citizen expects to ever see these goods in the local Public Distribution Office. 

Japanese narration highlights (thanks, Tony):

• Are the North Koreans familiar with these western brands? Some are familiar and others are not so sophisticated.
• These items sell really fast.  You can buy a Rolex Watch (knock off) for 800 Yen (appx. $8 or appx 2,400 North Korean Won).
• The narrator contrasts lifestyles.  He compares shoppers that can afford these market goods with others in the same village who cannot.

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
8/7/2007

Defector Choi Young Lim [pseudonym] who entered South Korea this past January was a “broker” in North Korea who would receive money from defectors and deliver it to family members in North Korea. He was exposed while mediating money and arrested but was released after giving bribes.

Choi said, “Previously, even with just evidence that there was a connection to a South Korean, you were dragged to a political prison camp and your family members were exiled. However nowadays, even if it is exposed that a defector who entered South Korea sent money, the family members aren’t severely punished.”

“These days, even if there is evidence that you received wired money, unless there is hard evidence of ties to the National Intelligence Service in South Korea the national security agents just impose a fine and release you,” he said.

According to Choi the fine is around the range of USD $2000.

Most of the foreign currency that enters North Korea these days is done through wired transfers from defectors in South Korea to family members. The money that Korean defectors send to family in the North undergoes a 20-30% processing fee and is finally delivered to the individual. The process is from the defector in South Korea through Chinese exchange broker to North Korean broker.

If USD $100 is sent from South Korea, the brokers share $30 and the remaining $70 is delivered to the family.

Until the mid-1990s, regardless of reason, North Korean authorities would take any monetary matter related to South Korea and punish them as “spies”. However, as the number of defectors concentrated in the North and South of Hamkyung increased after the food crisis, a uniform punishment became difficult to impose.

Choi said, “Even the National Security Agency doesn’t consider receiving money from family in South Korea as a spy activity. If they punish everyone, there is a side effect that even their own personal connections will be made adversaries. Thus, they can’t touch this issue.”

The emergence of taxis targeting large city wealthy classes

Trader Hwang Sang Do [pseudonym] who had traveled Chongjin, Hamheung and Shinuiju to collect trade items to export to China entered the South Korea this March.

Hwang introduced a variety of daily activity that he experienced in North Korea. “Even in Hamheung and Chongjin, taxis are operated. The base fare is around 3,000 won. Some cars have the mark that says, ‘taxi’ but some operate as passenger cars without such marks,” he said.

In the North Korean black market 1kg of gasoline (North Korea ordinarily uses kg) costs around 2,000 won. Hwang says, “There are drivers who solicit customers in front of the Chongjin Station or Hamheung Square Station. There aren’t many customers so when veering outside of central city, they receive the round trip fare.” The customers are mainly trade workers, overseas Chinese emigrants or the wealthy class.

It is known that taxi drivers refurbish used taxis or passengers cars that come in from China, then register it as an institution or business entity and start business activity. As there was an order earlier this year to remove all Japanese cars within 3 years, most of the cars that are on the street are manufactured in China.

Massage Parlors, Skincare Salons – Prostitution Secretly Going On

In large cities of North Korea, motels, massage parlors and skincare salons have been established and prostitution has been going on secretly.

Trade worker Hwang says, “There has been an increase of places in Hamheung motels that also function as saunas or skincare salons. A Chinese style massage at a massage parlor is 10,000 won (around US$3.4) per 60 minutes and there is instantaneous prostitution with female masseuse.” It is told that prostitution goes on for about 20,000 – 30,000 won.

With North Korean bathhouses, a service culture to put women at the forefront has taken place. The owners here use jargons such as “selling a bed” or “selling flowers” to feel out a customer’s intention for prostitution. There are cases where women find private homes to prostitute themselves. Hwang says that because it is easy to make money through prostitution, there has been an increase of female prostitutes.

Previously, if prostitution was exposed, you would be sentenced to forced labor. Even now, the authorities ban prostitution. However, the reality is that related entities have secretly been increasing.

On the other hand, there have been several luxury restaurants that opened in Wonsan and Hamheung. These places have implemented the Chinese service system, so the interior facilities are luxurious and female employees greet customers with a “Welcome” at the door.

Previously, only overseas Chinese emigrants or Chinese businessmen invested in such restaurants but recently, there are many cases where North Korean residents open large restaurants as well. Hwang says that as the Chinese restaurant culture that competes with taste and service infiltrated North Korea, North Korea has been undergoing a huge transformation to gain customers through service.

A service concept to “treat the customer as a king” has been emerging different from 1990s.

Yonhap
8/6/2007

Most South Korean companies operating at an inter-Korean industrial zone in North Korea plan to increase their facility investment there, a survey showed Monday.

The survey, conducted by the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business, found that 87.8 percent, or 19 out of 24 companies operating at the North Korean border city of Kaesong, said they plan to boost investment levels.

South Korea began building the industrial park, located just 70 kilometers north of Seoul, in 2003 on a trial basis with the hope of creating a model for an eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Currently, 26 South Korean plants employ about 16,000 North Korean workers who produce garments, kitchenware and a number of other goods.

If the industrial zone becomes fully operational by 2012, more than 350,000 North Korean workers will work there, according to the South’s Unification Ministry.

Last week, officials from the Koreas agreed to increase the minimum salary of North Korean workers at the Kaesong industrial complex by five percent to US$52.50 a month, marking the first pay raise since the complex’s launch.

The industrial park is one of the prominent symbols of inter-Korean reconciliation efforts following a landmark summit in 2000 between then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
7/20/2007

A newsletter published on the 18th by “Good Friends” a North Korean aid organization claimed that “On average 10 people die of starvation throughout North Korea.”

However well informed North Korea defectors and North Korean tradesmen who travel to China refute the organization’s claim and argue, “It would be difficult for that to happen.”

The organization published in its newsletter, “Since the end of June, starvation has been occurring in each province throughout North Korea” and informed, “The number of people dying in North Pyongan, Yangkang, Jagang, South and North Hamkyung continues to rise everyday.” 

In particular, Good Friends stated, “In South and North Hamkyung, about 10 people are dying of starvation in each city and province” and “On the whole, the people dying are aged 40~65 years.”

“Though the cause behind the deaths is different for each person, most of the complications are related to malnutrition” informed Good Friends. They added, “A mass famine has not yet begun, however authorities and people feel the threat of the situation” stressing the urgency of North Korea’s food crisis. 

An affiliate of Good Friends said, “Presently, only 20,000 tons of South Korea’s food aid is offered (to North Korea)” and commented, “This rate of aid is too slow in saving the lives of the dying people.” 

However, there are criticisms against this claim. Some argue that Good Friends had excessively inflated North Korea’s food crisis. 

Choi Young Il (pseudonym) questioned this claim by Good Friends after a telephone conversation with his family in North Korea on the 16th. He said, “Even up to two days ago, I spoke to my family on the phone but they didn’t mention anything about a food crisis.” 

Moreover, Choi said, “Alleging that about 10 people on average are dying in the cities and province of South and North Hamkyung is no different to saying that nearly 400 people are dying throughout the whole region of South and North Hamkyung every day” and added, “In that case, this is similar to the early period of mass starvation in the early 90s.” 

“Only looking at North Hamkyung, most of the people living in the border regions live off illegal trade through China and though they may not be living well, I was aware that they got by without having to eat porridge” Choi said and remarked, “I don’t believe the claim that 10 people are dying of starvation every day.” 

On the same day, Hwang Myung Kil (pseudonym) a North Korean citizen who came to Yanji to visit his relatives in China said in a telephone conversation with a reporter, “I cannot believe the rumor that people are starving to death around the border areas of the Tumen River” and commented, “I haven’t even heard stories of more people starving to death in the mines and they live in masses around Musan.”

Hwang said, “Even amongst the people in Musan, there are only a small number of people who live off corn for three meals a day… Nowadays, people look for quality rather than quantity.” Further, he said “Though life is tough, people have found their own way of survival. It’s not to the point of starvation.”

If according to Good Friends, 10 people are dying on average due to starvation, this situation would indicate signs similar to the mass starvation in the early 90s. However, the cost of rice claimed by Good Friends clashes with their claim. 

When North Korea faced their mass crisis in the mid-90s, the cost of corn rose dramatically. In October 1995, 1kg of corn cost 16won, but this doubled to 30won. However, there has not been much change to the cost of food in North Korea.

According to a recent survey by the DailyNK on the cost of goods in North Korea’s Jangmadang (markets), 1kg of corn rice at Hoiryeong markets sells for 450won and 1kg of rice produced in North Korea costs 900won. 

More importantly is the cost of cigarettes. A packet of Sunbong, a North Korean brand of cigarettes sells for 1,000won and “Cat” cigarettes for 1,300won. The cost of a kilo of rice is still cheaper than a packet of cigarettes. 

If North Korea’s starvation was on the brink of a massive food shortage, then it is expected that the cost of rice and corn would escalate dramatically as an onset to the crisis. 

On the other hand, Kim Il Joo (pseudonym) a Chinese tradesman and expert on North Korean markets said, “I can’t say that North Korea’s food situation is smooth, but I don’t think it will get any worse than this.” Kim said “Now you can eat new potatoes and soon new corn will be available on the markets” and added, “Then, I think we will be able to get through another year.”  

Deaths from hunger rise across N. Korea: civic group
Yonhap
7/18/2007

A growing number of people have died of starvation across North Korea since late last month, a South Korean civic group working to defend rights of North Koreans said Wednesday.

“Famine-driven deaths began to occur across North Korea in late June,” Good Friends said in a commentary carried in its weekly newsletter. “In some cities and counties in the provinces of North Pyongan, Ranggang, Jagang and South and North Hamkyong, the number of deaths is on the increase daily.”

In North Hamkyong Province, a daily average of ten people, mostly those aged between 40 and 65, died of starvation, the group added.

“The leading cause of death varied for each case, but most people are dying of famine-driven malnutrition and its complications,” the commentary said.

The price of rice rose steadily this month, with North Korea facing a crisis of massive deaths from hunger, it said.

The group then called on the Seoul government and the international community to send more emergency food aid to help North Koreans, especially through the just-reconnected cross-border railways.

In mid-May, the two Koreas conducted the historic test of the railways, reconnected for the first time since the 1950-53 Korean War. But it remains unclear when regular train service might start.

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
7/12/2007

The North Korean jangmadang’s (market) rice price has narrowly increased after the spring shortage season.

As a result of DailyNK’s investigation of price levels in Northern cities of North Korea at the end of June and beginning of July, the price of North Korean rice is 900 won per kilogram which has increased 80 won compared to its price at the end of March.

At the jangmadang in Shinuiju, North Pyongan, the price of rice, compared to three months ago, has been sold at a 120 won higher price at 980 won. North Korea’s spring shortage season is around March to May before the barley harvest, after the passage of spring.

The reason why the price of rice has shown a narrow upward tendency of 100 won domestically is that along with the effects of the spring shortage season, the nationwide “farm supporting combat” was implemented last May. During the farm supporting period, the jangmadang was closed out, so it became difficult to obtain rice.

Further, with the delay in South Korea’s support of 40,000 tons of rice to North Korea, the increase in the price of rice seems to have been fueled. The price of South Korean rice, compared to the end of March, increased over 150 won. South Korean rice was sold at the increased price of 1,100 in the Shinuiju region.

Along with the increase in the price of rice, the exchange rate seems to show a slight increase as well. In Hoiryeong, it increased by 50 won, compared to the end of March, according to the basis of 3,100 won per dollar. The Chinese Yuan was sold at a 390 won line, having increased 20 won.

Besides this, the staple of North Korea’s lower-class, corn, compared to the end of March, increased by approximately 80 won to 450 won per kilogram. With the rise in the price of rice, the demand for corn as a substitute ration seems to have increased as a result. Frozen pollack, which cost 4,000 won per one, went down to 3,500 won.

Chinese-made shoes, compared to March, is being sold for 7,000 won per pair, having decreased around 5,000 won. In addition, the price of Chinese industrial products as a whole is showing a decline.

Due to North Korean merchants who received goods through Korean-Chinese peddlers in the past going over to China themselves and obtaining goods through dumping, the drop in prices has been continuing.

Pork (2,300 won per kg) or cabbage (300 won per kg) and the price of other vegetables, compared to the end of March, declined by 200 won. In the case of fruits, the price of apples skyrocketed by 1,400 won from three months ago to 2,900 won per kilogram.

Also, among North Korean cigarettes, a product with the brand “Dog” recently surfaced. The price is the same as “Sunbong” at 1,000 won. The representative foreign brand “Craven (called ‘Cat’ in North Korea)” narrowly declined to 1,300 won.

Cost of DPRK grains up as lean season continues
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-7-16-1
7/16/007

The results of a general survey of market prices in the northern region of North Korea carried out by the “Daily NK” show that grain prices continue to rise. The survey, taken from the end of June to the beginning of July, showed that the price per kilogram of domestic rice was 900 Won, 80 Won higher than at the end of March. Sinuiju market prices have risen 120 Won over the last three months, with rice now selling for 980 Won per kilogram.

The ‘lean season’ in North Korea runs from the spring and lasts 3 to 5 months into the summer until barley crops are ready for harvesting. The rise in rice costs by around 100 Won appears to be due to a combination of factors, one being the influence of the lean season, and another being the mobilization of city residents to farming communities to help with harvesting. During harvesting season, markets are closed as workers are sent to the fields, making it difficult to purchase rice. In addition, the decision by Seoul to delay delivery of 400 thousand tons of aid has further aggravated the situation. The price of South Korean rice in the North has also risen, up 150 Won since March in some areas, and up as much as 250 Won in Sinuiju, where a kilogram of ROK rice sells for 1,100.

The rising cost of rice is fueling demand for substitute grains, causing their prices to rise as well. Corn, a staple food for low-income DPRK families, has risen 80 Won since March, to now sell for 450 Won per kilogram. In addition to rising grain prices, currency exchange rates also appear to be on the rise. In the city of Hyeryung, one USD is worth 3,100 Won, 50 Won more than in March. The Chinese Yuan has risen 20 Won, and now trades for 390 Won.

On the other hand, the prices of some goods in the markets are falling. In particular, Chinese goods are becoming more available, thus lowering costs. Chinese shoes have fallen to 7,000 Won, 5,000 Won less than the price in March. Previously, goods were brought into the country only through Chinese-Korean cross-border traders, but now North Korean vendors have direct access to Chinese goods being ‘dumped’ in the North, causing their prices to continue to decline.

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
7/3/2007

A North Korean insider source relayed on the 2nd that citizens’ complaints have been rising because the North Korean government recently gave guidelines to sell a portion of products which have been selling with popularity at the jangmadang (markets) only at state-operated stores.

This source, who resides in North Pyongan, revealed in a phone conversation with DailyNK, “Recently, plastic floors have been popular, so “plastic sales” is earning a lot of money. However, government authorities have mandated that the commerce office directly oversee plastic floors and that they be sold at state-operated stores.”

The insider relayed, “Families above middle-class have been showing a lot of interest in acquiring furniture. Besides floors, drawers on which TV can be placed and cabinets displaying wines and others are very popular.”

Previously, floors made of paper covered the floors of houses, but since North Korean civilians’ standard of living started rising recently, Chinese-made plastic floors decorated in flowers is drawing popularity.

He said, “Rumor has been leaking that pork (1,700 North Korean won per kg), the price for which has declined recently, is also directly managed by the commerce office, along with plastic floors.” “Besides this, the complaints of merchants have been rising since rumor starting circulating that the list of items to be overseen by the office will increase.”

He added, “Would they want to do any business given that individual sales are discouraged and turned over to national control when sales go even remotely well? There are grievances due to the fact that earning a livelihood through jangmadang sales is not even allowed, on top of the lack of provisions.”

Further, he said, “Regulations regarding people engaging in “Chapan-Jangsa (sales by trucks)” using privately-owned buses or trucks exceeding eight tons have begun. If one is caught, the vehicles become registered as national property and the vehicle owner receives a salary from the country instead.”

“Chapan Jangsa” refers to carrying out wholesale while ferrying the load on trucks. The “plastic floor” and “Chapan Jangsa,” along with what is popularly known as “ice (drug) sales” are counted are the top three business that brings in the most amount of money.

“The complaints of people are high, but the scope of regulation is wide-ranging, so there are people who think that the inspections will stop after several times.”

Even guideline to prevent wearing of wedding dresses

He also said, “Since October 2006, there were even guidelines to prevent wearing of wedding dresses at weddings. Not only wedding dresses, but wearing white gloves were also prohibited.”

In North Korea, wearing wedding dresses at weddings became a trend seven to eight years ago. Nowadays, many civilians are known to wear them. Even if they do not wear wedding dresses, North Korea’s general wedding culture is donning flowers on the chest part of dresses and on the head and putting on white gloves.

Additionally, the insider relayed, “The size of the flower of the groomsmen and the bridesmaids should not be bigger than the groom’s and the bride’s. The flower of the groom and the bride is fixed at 7cm and the flower of the groomsmen and bridesmaids fixed at 5cm. In the case with those who go against the orders and get their pictures taken after marriage, the photo volunteer in charge’s volunteer card (employment permit) can be revoked.”

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
6/12/2007

Recently, it has been reported that businesses in charge of facial plastic surgery and skin maintenance are becoming more popular among the wealthy class.

Through a survey DailyNK conducted on actual living conditions in the Northeast region of North Korea, it was discovered that massage rooms, steam baths, beauty-related enterprises (plastic surgery and skincare maintenance) are the main thriving businesses.

Beauty-related businesses such as these prevail in relatively large-sized cities, such as Chongjin in North Hamkyung, Hamheung in South Hamkyung, and Wonsan in Kangwon. This trend seems to follow the up and coming wealthy class who have risen through doing business in North Korea.

Skin maintenance and plastic surgery which has caused a stir among the women in Shinuiju and Pyongyang have spread to inland countrysides within the last several years.

Double eye-lid surgery, eyebrow tattoos, and others can be simply performed by a plastic surgeon doctor or beauty operation specialists, so it has been widely popular among young women.

The cost of plastic surgery, in the case of double eye-lid surgery, was 500 North Korean won per one-eye in 2004, but the asking price has been 1,500 won since 2006. The North Korean exchange rate was recently 2,980 won per dollar.

In addition to double eye-lid surgery, breast augmentation has been spreading to a portion of upper-class women. The popularity of the breast enlargement surgeries demonstrates an encouragement of beauty among North Korean upper-class women.

◆ “Massages” a rage, centered on large-scale cities = Chinese-style health massages cost around 10,000 (US$3.4) North Korean won per hour and for an additional 2~30,000 won, on-the-spot sex with a female masseuse is possible.

This survey, based on the latter half of May, took place by focusing on the price of commodities in five cities, such as Kim Chaek and Chongjin City in North Hamkyung, Danchun and Hamheung in South Hamkyung, and Wonsan Kangwon.

The results of the survey showed that the region with the highest standard of living in the Northeast region is Wonsan City of Kangwon. The reason why Wonsan has a relatively high standard of living is that it has been a central place of trade with Japan.

If North Korea and China’s trade can be represented by Shinuiju, then Wonsan has played that role with trade with Japan. However, it has recently been severely targeted by the suspension in North Korea and Japan’s trade.

Wonsan’s upper-class restaurants are known to show aggressive service by shouting “Welcome” when guests come in, by decorating the interior of restaurants, and by adopting a Chinese-style waiter and waitress system.

In addition, Japanese secondhand goods have been highly traded in Wonsan. Electronic rice cookers, sewing machine, fans, TVs and other Japanese thrift goods are commonly traded and have more reasonable prices than the other regions.

Newly released 2-3 person electronic rice cookers are around 13~150,000 won, fans around 7~80,000 won, used gas stoves around 15~200,000 (approx. US$50.34~67.10), used TVs around 20~250,000 won, and flat-screen TVs over 350,000 (approx. US$117.50) won.

The supply of electricity is not an issue, so it is provided 24 hours long and electricity is better-supplied than in Hamheung.

Further, the “105 factory (furniture production factory)” in Wonsan produces furniture which is delivered to the Central Party and the quality, compared with the cost, is supposed to be the best in North Korea.

Industrial goods in Chungjin are relatively economical, but Chinese-made color TVs and flat-screen newly-released TVs are sold for 20~250,000 and 350,000 won, respectively. Used bicycles imported from Japan is sold for 10~150,000 won.

In Chongjin, the number of taxis have risen lately, but because of the expensive cost, not too many people take advantage of it. Going 4km costs around 5,000 won. Taxis that are operating are either Chinese used taxis or imported cars which are past the expiration date.

◆ The price of rice narrowly rises = In Hamheung, the cost of taxis is supposed to be slightly higher than Chongjin. There are not too many people who ride taxis, so the rate is doubled beyond the center of cities and in remote places.

The cost of penicillin has risen significantly in Chongjin, with the spread of the measles, the scarlet fever, and other infectious diseases since last winter. Chinese penicillin is hard to acquire due to its reputation for having poor quality and North Korean penicillin is sold at Jangmadang (market) for 500 won per one.

The cities considered to have low standards of living are Kim Chaek of North Hamkyung and Danchun in South Hamkyung. The size of the jangmadang (market) is smaller than in other regions and there is a limit in the variety of goods. Steam baths or massage places do not even exist. The price of medical goods are also supposed to be exorbitant.

The specialty of Kim Chaek City is its low cost of nails. The Sungjin Steel Works Complex in Kim Chaek produces nail by melting steel and sells them, which is sold for 2,200 won~2,500 won per kg in Hoiryeong, at 1,200 won in Kim Chaek. However, not only is the weight heavy and is difficult to package, but the usage by civilians is not very high, so the incidence of sale to other provinces is low.

In Danchun, the price of fruit is very expensive, so it is not sold by the kilogram unit, but is sold individually. One medium-size apple is sold for up to 800 won.

On one hand, the price of rice in North Korea’s northeast region showed a narrow upward tendency in the latter half of May at the end of the spring shortage season. Corn, the staple of low-income civilians, did not show a huge change.

Hankyoreh
Authored by Ryu Yi-geun and translated by Daniel Rakove

PYONYANG: “Next time, please come back and purchase something,” implored Mr. Hong to the customers leaving his store empty-handed.

“You’re saying you earn more if you sell more?”

“You bet.”

But this reporter was still suspicious. Four days later, I carefully asked our handler for confirmation.

“Of course it’s true,” he assured me. “Even in the same eight-hour workday, he who produces more results gets paid more.”

The concept of receiving compensation in proportion to the amount of sales is one that is now long familiar to North Koreans. Yet what is surprising is the gusto with which North Korean store staff will go to in encouraging South Korean tourists to buy their products, a phenomenon indicative of how great the materialistic impulse has become in the reclusive communist nation.

Constructed in Pyongyang’s central district in 1995, the 47-story Yanggak Hotel seems to float above the Daedong River like an island. Mr. Hong works at a store there on the second floor. There is even a spot next door to exchange money. Though the set prices are written on each product – in Euros – the South Korean customers managed to save a bit through bargaining. The owner was at first insistent that all products be only sold for the listed price, but he finally gave way after a long give and take with the customers. He decided it worthwhile to sell his products slightly cheaper, if only to make a profit. Though most transactions are conducted at the listed price, there were instances at the hotel store and other establishments of selling to tourists at a discounted rate after haggling over the price.

Elements of capitalism are slowly making their way into North Korean life – wrapped in the euphemism of “utility.” After returning from his trip to North Korea from May 14-18, on which he led 130 economic delegates, Min Byeong-seok, Director of the Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture proclaimed, “I could unmistakably feel here and there that North Korea is changing.”

It is of course difficult to confirm the presence of change in North Korea. This is in part because the changes are occurring at a low level. After all, there is always a difference in what we look for compared to what we are shown. This is what makes it difficult for someone to declare unreservedly, “North Korea is this,” or “North Korea is that.” There are also parts of North Korea that are difficult to understand due to the biases originating from the political system and values of the observer. Hankyoreh21 managed to get a spot in the group of Pyongyang-bound economic delegates, and recorded below is a compilation of the various things we witnessed.

“My life has gotten so much better since last year.” These words did not seem to be mere propaganda. Whether spoken by our North Korean guide or the various Pyongyang citizens with whom we came in contact, their words were by and large the same. One citizen told us, “My wages increased from 3,000 to 6,000 North Korean won,” and consumer prices “went up about 10-20 percent.” In other words, wages have increased much faster than has the rate of inflation. Yet that man cannot be taken to be the representative Pyongyang laborer, nor does he have the credibility of an economist.

Indeed, it is hard to grasp the level of inflation in North Korea: all one can do is take an educated guess. Lee Do-hyang of the Institute for National Security Strategy said, “These things are evidence that the financial situation is improving and the economy is enduring,” adding, “It seems that the quality of life for common people is taking a turn for the better.” Yet in North Korea, where it is said some US$30 a month is necessary to get by, a 3,000 North Korean won raise is not exactly a windfall: 6,000 North Korean won is about equivalent to $2, and on the black market, $1 sells for 3,000 North Korean won. Thus, the rationing and side jobs that bring in an additional $15-20 a month are an essential source of income.

Pyongyang’s major marketplaces have grown livelier. Stretching between 2,000 and 3,000 pyeong (1 pyeong is 3.3 sq. meters), one large-scale market has taken up a spot next to Kimchaek Industrial School on a once-empty spot along Otangangan Street. In the shape of a high school gym, the market’s two-story building is covered in a blue roof and the exterior is clean. Visible from the Yanggak Hotel, the market was bustling at 6 p.m. on May 16. The Bonghak Market next to the Pyongyang Cosmetics Factory was also busy once the sun set. At least one marketplace has taken shape in each of Pyongyang’s 18 districts. Each one is a symbol of capitalism’s penetration of the socialist, planned economy. The activities in each market are said to be hardly distinguishable from the capitalism found in other countries.

One citizen said, “The people go to the markets more, where the prices are a little bit cheaper than at the nationally operated stores. Even if one doesn’t buy anything, it is fun to look around, what with the variety of goods for sale and the haggling going on.” Most citizens are said to buy their daily necessities at such markets, having become an essential part of daily North Korean life.

Street food vendors started appearing quite a while ago, but their numbers are ever-increasing. The fairly tidy vendors can be seen here and there throughout Pyongyang, selling a variety of goods, including soft drinks, ice cream, bread, rice cakes, and so on. Each product runs between 100-300 North Korean won.

The local People’s Committee gives licenses for the operation of such stands to various companies or the descendants of revolutionaries. A portion of sales is taken by the state and the remainder of the profit goes to the managing company or individual.

Though the residents of Nampo, a port city 40 minutes by bus from Pyongyang, do not seem to be better off than their Pyongyang counterparts, the city is quite lively. On the journey from the major ship repair factory by the port, through the city center, and to the freeway entrance leading to Pyongyang, 50-60 separate street food vendors were spotted. The products they were selling as well as their method of sale were quite diverse. Some vendors – most likely new ones – simply laid out their goods on the ground for sale, showing even to the outsider that North Korea’s markets have hit a growth surge.

Five years have passed since the July 1, 2002 economic measures were instituted by the North Korean government, raising wages as well as the currency’s value. In addition, the price of rice and other necessities was increased, and a system of incentives and limited independent capital was expanded. Yet very few North Korean people have even heard of “the 7/1 measures.” Only after talking for a significant length of time will they mention the notion of “utility” that has been pursued over the last few years.

At the end of Unification Road in the Nagnang district of southern Pyongyang, the Phoenix Clothing Factory is producing clothing on commission. The 1,000-pyeong factory is unceasingly filled with the whirr of sewing machines. U Beom-su, 53, introduced himself to the South Korean observers as the company’s “chief executive,” explaining, “The workers work eight hours a day, but when the fixed day for shipment draws near, we have no choice but to put them on overtime.” The payment system for workers is multi-tiered, with five levels, the salary increasing with rank. Every month, one laborer is chosen from each team of workers as being the most outstanding, and is given bonus compensation. The ‘chief executive’ explained that further incentive payments were rewarded based upon the factory’s production levels on the whole.

It is unclear as to how widespread this model of business is, but director of the Korea Institute for National Unification Lee Bong-jo said that “the seeds of competition are visible.” However, the workers at the Yuwon Shoe Factory and the Pyongyang Cosmetics Factory were flustered when asked about their salaries or the labor system and evaded giving an answer.

The will for liberalization was evident here and there. At the 10th annual Pyongyang Spring International Trade Fair on May 14, 200 companies from 12 countries participated, either to view the product lines or to display their own. The majority were Chinese companies, including its largest electronics firm, Haier, while there were several sections of the exhibition primarily interested in retailing to the foreign visitors themselves, the determination by North Korea to get its products out to foreign markets was apparent.

Many members from the South Korean team of economic representatives also participated. In particular, representatives from Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd, the world’s second largest shipbuilder, as well as the Korea Port Engineering Company, visited the Yeongnam Ship Repair Factory and the Nampo Port to explore the possibility of making investments in those places. In a gesture of consideration, the Northern handlers prepared a separate automobile for the potential investors to explore the grounds, and held a separate consultation session for them beyond the general one for the economic delegates. On multiple occasions, various North Korean officials expressed an interest in attracting South Korean capital. The self-confidence they showed hinted at a sense that they had to some extent resolved the immediate issues of day-to-day subsistence. It may sound strange, but the consensus of those who had also made the trip last year was that the electricity situation had improved. In other words, basic economic conditions seemed to be on the upswing. Perhaps the self-confidence North Koreans showed in displaying their possession of a nuclear weapon has now flowed into the economic sector, thus explaining their will for some liberalization.

Yet simply because there is a will for opening up does not mean liberalization will come easily. One Daewoo source explained, “[We told the North Koreans that] there must be assurances before we invest. They have to provide the same conditions that China does.” At this point, there is probably not a single person who could make such assurances on behalf of the North Koreans. The country is still unprepared to take advantage of the money available to it from the South through the economic cooperation program. The six-party talks also must also make some progress on the nuclear issue. Furthermore, if North Korean – U.S. relations do not improve, then free trade between North and South will remain uncertain indefinitely.

In the case that external matters are settled and the will for liberalization strengthens, then the vitalization of the North Korean economy could quickly pick up with the improvement of infrastructure, such as the electricity grid and logistics, which are pointed to as the largest stumbling blocks. The reporters who arrived first on May 12 witnessed, for instance, how the automatic doors and the elevator on the first floor of the Yanggak Hotel took 30 minutes to warm up. While the houses themselves gave off light after the sun set, the streets between them were completely dark. The mere 20-30 percent rate of operation at factories as estimated by experts is partially accountable to a lack of raw materials, but most of all to the deficiency of electricity.

The rigidity of the economic system only adds to North Korea’s list of woes. Though the director of Pyongyang Cosmetics has requested raw materials and modern machinery, he does not have the full authority to manage the company. Another company has imported the raw materials from China, and he confessed that he knew little of the specifics on the subject. The director of the Daeanchinseon Glass Factory made a similarly vague request for “raw materials.”

The problems go deeper. For one, there was no sign on the part of the North Korean factory managers to think of the visiting economic representatives as business counterparts in the world of capital and industry. For example, even photography by the group of South Korean trade representatives was forbidden within the factory grounds. Another chronic problem is the ease by which North Koreans that are not economic officials or specialists break promises. Furthermore, as often appears in planned economies, there is a single-minded focus on “production” without consideration of whether the product being made is for domestic use or for export. This sort of difficulty was evident at the cosmetics and shoe factories, as well.

Lee Bong-jo, director of the Korea Institute for National Unification, offered some advice to the South: “Knowledge of North Korea must precede any investments there.”

It seems that amongst difficulty, Pyongyang may be carefully seeking change. Though it remains stuck in the dilemma of pursuing liberalization while maintaining regime stability, it is increasingly sending strong signs to the outside world of a will for liberalization. As South Korean Former Minister of Unification Jeong Sye-hyeon said, “It is difficult for North Korea to go backwards.”

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
5/21/2007

Recently, the cost of living for North Koreans has become increasingly burdensome, as the value of the North Korean won (KPW) has steadily fallen. This phenomenon has been observed since the introduction of the July 1st measures in 2002, but the toll on poorer citizens is growing as money is concentrated in the hands of the elite.

A decent jumper jacket from China sells for 30,000 to 50,000 won, a kilogram of meat for 3,000 won, and a bottle of cooking oil for 2,700 won. North Koreans tell of taking 100,000 won to the market and, having only made a few purchases, leaving with an empty wallet.

Every month, a family of four requires 50 kilograms of rice (50,000 KPW or 1,000 won per kg) and 20 kg of corn (7,000 KPW or roughly 350 won per kg). On top of this, the expense of buying supplementary food items such as cooking oil, red pepper flakes, vinegar, garlic, and scallions is almost equivalent to the price of rice.

One North Korean woman (hereafter referred to as Ms. Kim) who sells noodles at the Hweryung Nammun market estimates her living expenses at 60,000 won per month. Ms. Kim, a housewife responsible for a family of three, earns about 2,000 to 3,000 won a day selling noodles. This amounts to roughly 60,000 won a month, which only covers food expenses. She cannot even dream of buying rice, let alone saving up to raise seed money for a business, as her income goes toward supplementary items like corn (23,000 KPW for 70 kg), cooking oil (2,700 KPW), and beans (950 KPW for 1 kg).

Ms. Kim’s husband, who works at the Hweryung machine factory, receives a monthly salary of 4,000 won. This money is only enough to buy four kilograms of rice. Ms. Kim started selling noodles ten years ago, when it became clear that relying on her husband’s income would end in starvation for her family. She said that she has not put meat on the table for her child in a long time, as it is difficult to afford even one kilogram a month. With the exception of merchants who trade with overseas Chinese, workers who earn foreign currency, and those with relatives in China, the majority of Hweryung’s residents live day to day.

With the recent order from the Ministry of Public Security to “cease selling, as rations will be provided starting in April,” local markets have come under stricter regulation. This regulation has had the effect of raising the price of goods manufactured in China. Before the restriction, transactions took place at stalls and impromptu shops, but now buyers must hunt down merchants, which has led to a rise in prices.

On a related note, the dollar’s weak performance in the international market has been reflected in the North Korean black market. The exchange rate remains pegged at one dollar to eight Chinese yuan, but the rate of the North Korean won to the dollar and to the yuan changes daily. North Korea does not have a fixed exchange rate, because individuals who offer money exchange services occasionally receive information on currency rates from China. Due to the dollar’s recent weakness, the rate of the North Korean won to the dollar as well as to the yuan has been falling for several months.