North Korean Economy Watch

With the likelihood that food is coming into short supply in North Korea, the authorities and individuals alike have implemented strategies to minimize the adverse effects.

I am keeping a running list of official and civil responses here as they appear in the media.

1. The DPRK supposedly ended rations for mid-level cadres (party and state employees), though food can still be purchased in markets. Unless the government is hoarding its grain supplies, this probably has the effect of improving food distribution (transferring food stocks outside Pyongyang), though not to the satisfaction of those who were used to receiving it for “free.”

2. The DPRK asked China for food aid. (Requested 150,000: tons of corn. Received: 50,000 tons on their first ask)

3. Propaganda extolling people not to waste food has been distributed to workers.

4. The DPRK has started cracking down on liquor production/sale.

5. Lets grow potatoes!

6. Distributing food stocks to military families from military warehouses.  This will hopefully take some of the pressure off the price of grains in the markets.

7. Solicit food aid from the US.

8. Officials begin to demand more bribes!

9.  The KPA halts military exercises to assist in farming.

10.  Propaganda campaign to educate the population about alternative foods (Good Friends via OneFreeKorea)

11. China increases food export quota

Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper
May 2008
Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Erik Weeks, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Download the paper here: haggard_noland_weeks_pb.pdf

Abstract:

North Korea is on the brink of famine. As detailed [in this policy brief], the margin of error between required grain and available supply has virtually disappeared. Local food prices are skyrocketing even faster than world prices. Aid relationships have been soured and the regime’s control-oriented policy responses are exacerbating distress.  Hunger-related deaths are nearly inevitable and a dynamic is being put in place that will carry the crisis into 2009, even if as expected, the US announces that it is sending 500,000MT in return for a signed nuclear declaration.
 
The US can provide aid in ways that maximize its humanitarian impact while limiting the degree to which aid simply serves to bolster the regime.  We know that aid is diverted.  Yet given the fragmented nature of markets in North Korea, diverted aid often finds its way into markets in the catchment area where it is delivered.  Geographically targeting aid to the most adversely affected regions and providing it in forms such as barley and millet that are not preferred by the elite can increase the ameliorative impact of assistance.  The Bush Administration has taken up the first part of this equation–requiring that most of its contribution to the World Food Program be targeted at the worst affected regions–but it could do more on the second part: providing aid in forms less preferred for elite consumption. It can also encourage others such as South Korea to follow suit.
 
The US should also exercise quiet leadership with respect to the refugee question as well. The Chinese government’s practice of returning North Korean refugees may reflect a natural self-protective response against the threat of a flood of migrants and even the breakdown of the North Korean regime; it was, after all, the notorious “hole in the fence” that helped precipitate the collapse of the Eastern European regimes. But the policy of returning refugees does not conform with China’s obligations under the refugee treaty and does not in the end serve the country’s underlying political objectives either; it simply serves to cutoff another escape valve, however small, that has contributed to taking pressure off of a rapidly deteriorating situation.

Although business seems to have stalled in the Kaesong Industrial Zone, Hyundai Asan’s tourism projects have picked up this year.

From Yonhap: 

As many as 100,300 South Koreans toured Mount Geumgang so far this year, up from 58,000 a year earlier, according to a spokesman for Hyundai Asan, Hyundai Group’s arm dealing with business with North Korea.

Hyundai Asan officials expect more than 500,000 South Korean to visit the North’s mountain resort this year alone, up from last year’s 350,000.

A total of 40,090 South Koreans also visited the North’s medieval capital city of Kaesong during the first four months this year, Hyundai officials said, adding they recently increased the daily quota for South Korean visitors to Kaesong to 500 from 300.

Read the full article here:
More South Koreans toured North Korea despite chill in ties
Yonhap
5/4/2008

UPDATE: From the Associated Press (Printed in the Herald Tribune):

The North’s Korean Central News Agency quoted quarantine official Ri Kyong Gun as saying all poultry in provinces near the border with the South have received emergency vaccinations, citing a bird flu outbreak in southern South Korea.

Ri was quoted as saying the North has also set up 1,600 observation posts along the east and west coasts to monitor the movement of migratory birds — which he said are a key way the virus spreads.

Bird flu hit North Korea in 2005, leading to the killing of about 210,000 birds, but no new cases have been reported since then.

Original Post:
North Korea sets up emergency body to fight  bird flu

From the article:

North Korea said on Wednesday that it has set up an emergency unit to tackle possible bird flu outbreaks after the disease spread widely in South Korea.

“The emergency state quarantine committee was formed to work out national plans to prevent a possible outbreak of bird flu,” said a television channel.

The committee will coordinate quarantine measures by local governments, the TV said, adding that it was set up on the instructions of leader Kim Jong-Il.

The North has reported no new case since it destroyed 210,000 chickens during an outbreak in 2005.

It has since actively taken part in anti-epidemic programmes offered by the World Health Organisation.

Several days ago, the DPRK banned South Korean poultry from the Kaesong Industrial Zone.

Read the full articles here:
North Korea sets up emergency body against bird flu
Huliq.com

North Korea inoculates poultry against bird flu following outbreak in South Korea
Associated Press
5/5/2008

Andrei Lankov is the first in the media to construct a narrative which details the series of decisions that have led to North Korea’s current food crunch.

From his article:

Merely a year ago, North Korean leaders were optimistic. The good harvest of 2005 persuaded them that food shortages were behind them, and that North Korean agriculture had begun to recover. The 2005 harvest was merely 4.6 million tons, well below the 5.2 million tons which are necessary to keep the entire population alive. Still, it was clearly an improvement.

Lankov’s assertion that 5.2 million tons of grain are needed to sustain the DPRK population comes from the UN.  Recent work by Marcus Noland estimates that this number is closer to 4.6, although exact figuress are not possible because the actual size of the DPRK population is unknown.

In addition, for a decade South Korean administrations have maintained their Sunshine policy of unilateral concessions and unconditional food aid. Since 2000, about 450,000 tonnes of food have bee delivered to North Korean granaries from the South every year, free of charge. Its distribution was almost unmonitored. Pyongyang leaders came to believe that such aid would continue for the foreseeable future. Additionally, increasing Chinese involvement with North Korea, while not necessarily welcomed by Pyongyang, was seen as a sign that additional food would be coming – and Chinese shipments were roughly equal to those of South Korea. Finally, the basic agreement with the US on the nuclear issue was perceived in Pyongyang as a sign of Washington’s willingness to pay generously for rather minor concessions.

As noted by many besides Lankov (here), this good fortune prompted the DPRK government to reimpose elements of the planned economy which failed long ago: 

In 2005, authorities claimed that the public distribution system would be completely revived, and banned private trade in grain. This ban was generally ignored and eventually failed, but subsequent moves were more successful. In late 2006, authorities banned male vendors from the country’s marketplaces. In 2007, women under 50 years old were also prohibited from engaging in business in markets. The assumption is that every able-bodied North Korean should go where he or she belongs, specifically to the state-run factories of the Stalinist economy.

The government also staged some campaigns against semi-legal private businesses that had been tacitly tolerated since the late 1990s. After 2005, authorities successfully cracked down on the trafficking, smuggling and illegal labor migration occurring on the border with China. There was also a remarkable increase in the volume of anti-market rhetoric in the official Pyongyang propaganda.

The economic problems they were attempting to achieve at home through these policies, however, were only the first of several shocks to hit the DPRK economy in the last year: 

1. Low harvest numbers

First of all, the 2007 harvest was a failure. It was estimated at only 3.8 million tons, well short of the critical 5.2 million ton benchmark [and Noland’s 4.6 benchmark]. As usual, floods were officially blamed (as if the impoverished North does not share the same small peninsula with the prosperous South, where no signs of food shortage have been seen in decades).

2. Drop in aid from South Korea

The presidential elections of December 2007 led to a change of leadership in Seoul. The new government, led by right-of-the-center pragmatist Lee Myong-bak, said that the era of unconditional concessions to the North was over.

3. International food prices rising

The situation was aggravated by the explosive rise of international food prices. The North Korean press has reported the trend widely obviously in an attempt to,place the blame for the current crisis on factors clearly beyond the government’s control. On April 20, Nodong Sinmun, the major official daily newspaper, ran an article that described food supply difficulties worldwide and mentioned a dramatic increase on food custom duties in “certain countries”.

4. Cold shoulder from China

The worldwide price hike means that the amount of food coming to North Korea via foreign aid channels is likely to decrease. China, preoccupied with the Summer Olympic Games in August, and increasingly annoyed by North Korean antics, is not too willing to help the North out of its trouble which, as some people in Beijing believe, were brought on Pyongyang by its own stubborn resistance to the Chinese reform model.

So what is Lankov’s prediction?

In North Korea, the domestic food situation is deteriorating fast. The sudden hike in food prices seems to be a sign of deepening crisis. There were reports about farmers who refuse to toil the state-owned fields, stating that they are too weak to work (but still willing to work on their private plots). There are rumors of villagers starving to death even though observers believe the food shortage has not yet developed into a famine. If the shortage of fertilizer damages this year’s harvest, a famine may develop by the end of this year.

The political consequences are unclear. Knowledge about the situation inside North Korea remains grossly inadequate. If the past is an indication, however, nothing of great political significance will happen if a few thousand fresh graves appear in the hills of North Hamgyong province. In all probability, Kim Jong-il’s government will use its time-tested tactics: the political elite and the best units of the army will receive full rations; the residents of major cities, police and common soldiers will get barely enough to survive; and the “politically unreliable”, largely villagers from the remote northwest, will be left to their sorry fate.

There is hope the government will momentarily halt its counter-offensive against free market economics, and will ease its border controls to allow more people to China – but even such moderate measures are unlikely. Isolated revolts are possible, but the government seems to be supremely confident. After all, the disorganized, isolated population, deprived of any opportunities to organize or even communicate between themselves, is not capable of challenging the system.

Read the full story here:
North Korea stoic in the face of famine
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
4/30/2008

The Daily NK reports that South Korean businesses have delayed moving into the zone, or canceled their plans outright:

78.5 percent of those firms which received lots at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the second round of the first stage of distribution in June last year have not begun construction of their facilities. 62.4 percent of them have not even hired a firm for construction,” said the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSB) in a report released on April 27. For the report, the KFSB selected 85 firms out of all those firms which received lots and conducted a survey on how these firms are preparing their move into the Complex.

Companies distributed with lots in June last year are required to begin construction of their facilities within two years after the initial distribution contract. It is true that these firms have enough time to build their facilities. However, a number of firms have expressed that they would not move into the Complex.

The report says, “13 out of a total of 167 firms have already told the KFSB that they would not move into the Complex, and five of them have canceled the contract.”

59 percent of the firms including those 13 said that they would relinquish their rights to move into the complex because they are unable to raise enough money. 64 percent of these firms said that the reduced government funding has contributed to their financial difficulties.

Read the full article here:
South Korean Firms Postpone Their Move into the Kaesong Industrial Complex
Daily NK
Choi Choel Hee
4/28/2008

On April 23, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)hosted, “The Lee Myung-Bak Administration’s Policy toward North Korea: Denuclearization or Disengagement.”  In this seminar they essentially answered this question with a ‘yes’.

According to the Daily NK coverage of the event:

[Dong Yong Seung, the Chief of the Security and Economics Department of the Samsung Economic Research Institute stated,] “While economic exchange between North Korea and China has been business-to-business, in the case of Kaesong, the exchange has been controlled from a single control tower, the North Korean regime. That is, the condition has been set up for government-to-government economic exchange to facilitate North Korean government’s planned economy. Economic cooperation in the style of South Korea’s has been obstructing North Korea’s rational transformation.”

In a sense, he is arguing that South Korea’s support for the Kaesong Zone yields results more similar to foreign aid than private economic exchange.  If this is the case, South Korea, and just about everyone else, could learn from China’s strategy for investing in North Korea.

As Judge Posner put it:

All the problems that foreign aid seeks to alleviate are within the power of the recipient countries to solve if they adopt sensible policies. If they do not adopt such policies, then foreign aid is likely to be stolen by the ruling elite, strengthening its hold over the country, or otherwise squandered. What we can do for poor countries is reduce tariff barriers to their exports. With money saved from eliminating foreign aid, we could compensate our industries that would be hurt by import competition from poor countries and thus reduce political opposition to tariff reform.

According to the Daily NK, many mid-level civil servants who used to receive enough rations to live on have now resorted to trading in the markets with the civilians.

“Since April, the government has only been giving out provisions to the head of each department of the People’s Safety Agency in Hyesan, Yangkang Province. As for the remaining staff, only 15-days worth of one-serving provisions have been supplied. The discontent among the agents of the People’s Safety Agency over the discrimination is quite significant.”

“With conditions worstening, those who have not been engaging in sales until now—the Provincial People’s Committee or the Municipal Committee leaders and average schoolteachers, doctors and their families—have been coming out to the alleyway markets. They do not even have a street-stand in a jangmadang, so they sit illegally in the alleyways, but the People’s Safety agents in charge of regulating the jangmadang have been reluctant to take action against them because they know who these people are.”

Is anyone starving?  Thankfully, it seems not yet..

In response to the question as to whether people have begun to starve to death as a result of the food shortage, the sources confirmed, “We have not reached that point yet.”

Our contact in Yangkang Province said, “During the ‘March of Starvation’, we did not even have brewers’ grains to eat, but now, people feed that to the pigs. It is true that living conditions have become a bit more difficult with the rise in food prices, but it has not reached the point of starvation.”

The Hoiryeong source also said, “With the significant rise in food price, the quality and the amount of rice have fallen quite a bit, but people have not been starving for days at a time. People who previously consumed only rice are now mixing rice and corn 50/50, and those in more dire situations eat 30/70 or 20/80.”  

The food situation in Ryanggang is probably better then most of the country on average due to its proximity to the Chinese border.

The full story can be read here:
The Price of Rice Has Risen, But Not to the Point of Starvation
Daily NK
4/22/2008
Lee Sung Jin

As North Korean Economy Watch readers are aware, this site hosts the most authoritative mapping of North Korea on Google Earth (click here to download).  Google Earth recently updated its North Korea imagery requiring me to update a colossal amount of information.  This update (version 10) will be released by the end of May.

Growing influence of entrepreneurs
While updating information on Google Earth, one has a chance to compare how things have changed over the course of a few years.  One of the interesting changes in Pyongyang is the emergence of a new market about 5 blocks east of the Tower of the Juche Idea (pictured below).  It seems to have replaced an older market formerly located on the city’s outskirts at the end of the trolley line.  In the past, street markets (or “jangmadang”) like this have been held on the outskirts of the city.  This new, more convenient location (near peoples’ homes) is a testament to the growing importance of these markets, and their budding entrepreneurs, in meeting the needs of the North Korean people.  

Click on the image to view full size.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-4-21-1
4/21/2008

The March issue of “Rimjingang”, a magazine publishing stories on life inside North Korea as reported by defectors and those still inside the DPRK, contains an eye-opening report on activities in North Korea’s markets.

Since 2003, North Korean authorities have legalized DPRK markets throughout the country. The previously existing farmers’ markets were remodeled into ‘combined’ general markets and all traders were permitted to sell their wares. After the legislation was passed, even in Pyongyang general markets emerged in each neighborhood.

According to the magazine, more than 60 markets have been set up, with each market housing around 50 traders. The use of mannequins at clothing stores and attractive price tags used to catch the eye of the shopper are in force. These days, it is not even surprising to hear cassette players extolling the virtues of a particular vendor’s goods. Sellers here do not speak abruptly to customers as they might in a State-run store. In markets, one can hear respectful language used even to children. These are not ideas taught by the labor bureau, but rather independent ideas put to use by the sellers.

Stalls selling a variety of seafood can also be found in a number of markets. Mackerel, squid and flatfish from the East Sea are among the surprisingly fresh products on display. This seafood is not on display courtesy of the North Korean government, but rather is delivered by private entrepreneurs running refrigerated trucks from the coast to Pyongyang. According to the magazine, a number of delivery services are in operation, providing goods to the highest level of North Korean society.

Around Pyongyang, a number of flower sellers have also popped up in the capitalist markets. It is custom to give flowers whenever there is an event in honor of Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il; but these days it is also popular for couples to give each other flowers as gifts. Even before the emergence of these markets, there was nothing that couldn’t be found in Pyongyang as long as someone had the money to purchase it.

Currently, women under the age of 39 are prohibited from working in markets, and efforts to extend this restriction to women under 49 have raised tension with many women trading in the markets. ‘Good Friends’, an organization aiding North Korea, has reported that recently thousands of women have organized in protest against security forces in the farmers’ market in Chungjin.