North Korean Economy Watch

Andrei Lankov writes in Newsweek:

North Korea will never follow the Chinese path because its circumstances are profoundly different. The biggest factor is the existence of a rich and free South Korea across the border. Southerners share the same language and culture as the dirt-poor North, but their per capita income is at least 20 times higher—and at the moment, average North Koreans are ignorant of the gap. The regime’s self-imposed isolation is so draconian that even owning a tunable radio set is a crime. If North Korea started reforming, it would be flooded with information about South Korea’s prosperity. This would make North Koreans less fearful of the authorities and more likely to push for unification with their far richer cousins, just as the East Germans pushed to rejoin the West.

Knowing all this, North Korea’s rulers will do whatever they can to maintain control. Given the weakness of its Stalinist economy, this means coming up with new ways to squeeze aid from the outside world. In order to keep the money flowing—with as few conditions as possible—Kim is likely to continue engaging in risky brinkmanship and blackmail. To survive, Pyongyang has to be, or appear to be, dangerous and unpredictable.

But such tactics could easily lead to disaster. The only way to avoid this is to replace the regime.

That’s easier said than done: Military options are unthinkable. And sanctions won’t work either, since China and Russia are unlikely to cooperate fully. Even if Moscow and Beijing did go along, the only likely result would be a lot of dead farmers. North Korea’s great famine of 1996–99 demonstrated that the locals do not rebel when oppressed, even under terrible circumstances. North Koreans are terrified, disorganized and still largely unaware of any alternative to their misery.

But there’s a way to change that equation. The past 15 years have seen the spontaneous growth of grassroots markets in the North and partial disintegration of state controls. Rumors of South Korean prosperity have begun to spread, assisted by popular smuggled DVDs of South Korean movies. The world’s most perfect Stalinist regime is starting to disintegrate from below.

The best way to speed things up is for Washington and its allies to push for active engagement with the North in the form of development aid, scholarships for North Korean students and support for all sorts of activities that bring the world to North Korea or take North Koreans outside their cocoon. Such exchanges are often condemned as a way of appeasing dictators, but the experience of East Europe showed that an influx of uncensored information from the outside is deadly for a communist dictatorship.

Pyongyang understands the danger of such exchanges, but it needs money and technology badly enough that it might allow them nonetheless—so long as they fill its coffers and don’t look too dangerous. This is even more the case when exchanges ostensibly benefit members of the elite. For example, a scholarship program to study overseas would go mostly to students from top families. Yet this wouldn’t limit its impact: experience of the outside world will change these young people and turn some of them into importers of dangerous information. A similarly small step helped to unravel the Soviet Union: the first group of students allowed to study in the U.S., in 1957, numbered just four and were carefully selected. Yet two grew up to become leading reformers, and one of them—Alexander Yakovlev—is often credited as having been the real mastermind behind perestroika.

Read the full article here:
Newsweek
Andrei Lankov
4/18/2009

Writing in Reuters, Lucy Hornby and Tom Miles point out that the DPRK faces greater economic uncertainty from falling commodity prices than from new sanctions.  Below I have posted excerpts and charts:

Lower commodity prices may prove more painful to North Korea than the tightened sanctions, which will likely blacklist certain firms known to deal in military goods.

“Sanctions won’t have a big effect, they won’t change their actions,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.

“There will be no impact on trade with China, which is mostly grains and basic materials … Sanctions may have some influence on luxury goods, but only a weak effect on overall trade volume.”

The isolated country’s $2 billion annual trade with China, equal to about 10 percent of the North’s annual GDP, is its most important economic relationship.

North Korea profited from strong prices for minerals and ores over the last few years, ramping up exports of zinc, lead and iron ore to resource-hungry China.

Most of those exports have dropped again since last summer, in line with sharp decreases in metals prices buffeted by the global economic crisis.

The North’s mineral deposits could be worth $2 trillion, according to an estimate by the South’s Korea Resources Corporation. But dilapidated infrastructure and a broken power grid hinder mining and the transport of minerals out of the country.

The irregular pattern of North Korea’s alumina imports implies that its smelter only runs in fits and starts. Other ore exports are equally ragged, possibly indicating that North Koreans are only digging the easily accessible ores.

Chinese companies that have tried to invest in North Korean mines complain of constant changes in regulations and report that the North tries to tie mining access to commitments to build mills and other industrial projects.

“China and North Korea are friendly neighbors and we will continue to develop friendly cooperative relations with North Korea,” Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said on Tuesday after the North’s withdrawal from the six-party talks.

Diplomats’ expectations that China might use trade to influence its prickly neighbor rose when China cut off crude oil shipments in September of 2006, as North Korea prepared to test a nuclear bomb. It had tested ballistic missiles that July.

In fact, energy trade data shows that China is reluctant to apply trade pressure. Increased oil products shipments offset the brief cut in crude supplies in 2006.

“The imposition of these sanctions (in 2006) has had no perceptible effect on North Korea’s trade with the country’s two largest partners, China and South Korea,” wrote Marcus Noland, of the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Data since early 2006 show that Chinese crude shipments have in fact been overwhelmingly consistent, at 50,000 tons a month.

North Korea has imported very little Chinese grain since the 2008 harvest, reflecting the better harvest. Flooding and a disastrous harvest in 2006 and 2007 required heavy imports of grains from China in those years.

Chinese corn shipments to North Korea since August have dropped to 2,670 tons, from 136,595 tons in the previous twelve months and 32,186 tons in the year before that.

Rice and soybean shipments show a similar pattern.

Read the full story below:
Little leverage left for North Korea sanctions
Reuters
4/14/2009
Lucy Hornby and Tom Miles

According to Radio Free Asia:

Following North Korea’s April 6 rocket launch, South Korea began limiting the number of its citizens allowed to cross the border to the Kaesong Industrial Zone, which was set up just inside North Korea amid thawing relations between the two sides in 2004.

“We plan on maintaining the minimum personnel needed to run the Kaesong operations,” South Korean Unification Ministry spokeswoman Lee Jong-joo said.

“The South Korean government has requested enterprises invested in Kaesong to maintain their staff at the minimum level necessary to avoid disruption of production and business operations in the complex.”

South Koreans trying to travel to Kaesong this week were surprised to find their entry permits revoked by the South in the wake of the rocket launch, with the number of South Koreans working in the zone cut to a little above the minimum needed for basic operations.

“Eight persons initially received permission to travel to Kaesong, but eventually only three were allowed to take the trip, and actually most South Korean managerial staff had to stay behind,” a Kaesong-based South Korean entrepreneur said.

‘Skills gap’
“The big issue here is that the skill level of North Korean workers is insufficient, and that’s why South Korean management is essential.”

He warned of negative economic consequences if management personnel were unable to reach the zone from the South.

“Banning South Korean managerial staff from traveling to Kaesong will inevitably have a negative impact on production in the complex,” the entrepreneur said.

Tensions have further escalated over the March 30 detention of a South Korean employee of the Kaesong-based Hyundai Asan factory, allegedly for encouraging North Koreans to defect and criticizing the communist regime.

Hyundai’s company president visited Kaesong for a second time this week to press North Korean officials for the employee’s release, but he was refused permission to see the employee, identified only by his surname, Yoo.

Unification Minister Hyun In-taek warned that Seoul wouldn’t tolerate further detention of the employee.

Warning to North
“In the case of Mr. Yoo, the Hyundai Asan employee in the custody of the North Korean authorities, we will react vigorously to any unreasonable extension of the detention of the South Korean,” Hyun told a foreign affairs, trade, and unification committee in Seoul.

He also warned against “any punitive measures exceeding what was agreed upon between the two Koreas, such as a warning or expulsion to South Korea.”

The South has ruled out the possibility of closing the joint industrial park despite rising tensions with the North, however.

In March, in protest against a joint South Korea-U.S. military exercise, the North blocked the border crossing to the industrial complex several times, affecting production in some factories.

Experts have called for bilateral talks to hash out a clear framework for the running of Kaesong, to prevent economic fallout from political events in future.

“South and North Korea need to discuss and consult on the relevant systemic and legal issues associated with inter-Korean economic cooperation in the area,” said Hong Ik-pyo, researcher at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

Read the full story here:
Korean Tensions Hit Zone
Radio Free Asia
J.W. Noh
4/10/2009

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Evan Ramstad offers some information on China’s investments in North Korea:

The diplomatic minuet is taking place after China increased trade with North Korea over the past four years. Last year, trade between China and North Korea jumped 41% to $2.79 billion, with most of that coming from increased exports by China.

 On Tuesday, truck traffic between the two countries resumed after a break Monday for a Chinese holiday. Dozens of trucks made the crossing in Dandong, a major city along the North Korean border.

China has been North Korea’s chief political and economic sponsor since the Soviet Union collapsed nearly 20 years ago. For much of that time, it served as donor of last resort, making up the difference when energy, food and donations to North Korea dropped off from other countries. That often amounted to $100 million to $200 million in aid.

China broke from that pattern in 2005 by boosting its exports and widening its trade surplus with North Korea. Outside experts view China’s trade surplus as the chief measure of its economic aid to North Korea because North Korea has no measurable debt instrument and little ability to narrow the trade gap.

Chinese companies, sometimes with help from the Chinese government, are investing heavily in North Korea’s mining industry, construction and light manufacturing such as textiles. Chinese consumer goods line store shelves and market stalls in North Korea.

Many executives of Chinese companies in North Korea say it’s a difficult place to operate. Among the challenges: getting money out of the country. China helped Panda Electronics Group, based in Nanjing, start a computer assembly factory with Taedong River Computer Corp. in North Korea five years ago.

North Korea’s currency, the won, can’t be converted. To move money out of the country, Panda must buy commodities in North Korea and sell them in China for cash, an executive said.

The increased business activity in North Korea reflects China’s desire to treat North Korea more as a “normal country” rather than a socialist brother entitled to unlimited assistance, scholars and analysts in China say. They say China also hopes its companies in North Korea will encourage the North’s government to open its economy as China began to do in the 1980s.

Wang Kai, a manager of Liaoning Fuxin Tianxin Technology and Development Co., says the company decided to build a pipe-making factory in North Korea because the country’s economy has few places to go but up.

“North Korea’s situation and economic status are pretty similar to China’s before the start of the opening up and reform policy,” Mr. Wang said in an interview before the rocket launch.

Others note China’s desire is to prevent North Korea’s collapse, which might pour refugees into China’s northeast.

The increased business is yielding a payoff in political influence for China in Pyongyang that’s become more important since North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il was incapacitated by illness in August. One signal that Mr. Kim was back in control came when he met in late January with a delegation of visiting diplomats from Beijing.

Read the full story here:
Economic interests shape Beijing’s Pyongyang Policy
Wall Street Journal Online
Evan Romstad
4/8/2009

Granted that information from the DPRK is nearly impossible to verify, it seems likely that the DPRK government continues to encounter difficulties implementing its most restrictive market regulations.  They have tried repeatedly to impose rules which dictate who may work in the markets, how to allocate vending slots, what goods may be sold in the markets, what prices may be charged, and when markets may open. 

With each new rule vendors and entrepreneurs respond by fighting back against the authorities (sometimes violently) or simply moving to the black market, which (as in other communist countries) composes a significant portion of the nation’s GDP.

The DPRK’s most recent market regulation (issued in the autumn of 2008) is the 10-day rule—prohibiting markets from opening except every tenth day.  This rule was supposed to take effect in March 2009, yet it has not been successfully implemented—even in the areas where Pyongyang exercises the most control (large cities).

According to the Daily NK:

The North Korean authorities issued a decree in October, 2008 aimed at shifting the existing market system over to a 10-day market system and restricting the range of items being sold, but by mid-March of this year there was no market where the decree had been properly implemented.

Decrees attached to the entrances to markets were all removed and only the specific list of restricted goods is posted there. However, secondhand goods have been strictly regulated in some regions, so conflicts between citizens have arisen.

Each story about the failure of market restrictions stresses the inconsistency with which the rules are imposed across the country.  In other words, local conditions predict the effectiveness of Pyongyang’s dictates.  This is perhaps due to the DPRK’s market governance structure.  Local markets are controlled by a local Market Management Office which is in turn subordinate to each City People’s Committee.  According to the Worker’s Party organizational chart (view here), each City People’s Committee is subordinate to a Provincial People’s Committee (PPC), and all PPCs are subordinate to the Central Committee of the Workers Party.  

This governance structure puts three layers of bureaucracy between the Central Committee and the actual markets, perhaps allowing local leaders to exercise significant discretion over market operations.  True, random inspection units from the central authorities can make surprise visits, but their numbers are likely too small to enforce country-wide compliance, particularly when local officials can benefit from accomodating traders.

Still, these kinds of stories are both disconcerting and pleasing.  Why disconcerting?  Because the expectation by “Western” analysts (including myself) that market legitimization signaled a stable policy shift by Pyongyang has proven unjustified.  The good news, however, is that the DPRK’s markets are proving surprisingly robust.

In 2003, North Korean authorities “legalized” markets throughout the country by converting previously existing “farmers’ markets” into “combined general markets” and allowing all traders sell their wares. After the legislation was passed, markets began to spring up in neighborhoods across the country–even in Pyongyang.

Although it is clear now that this was a politically defensive move on the part of the central government,  North Koreans now reportedly spend more than 80 percent of their incomes in these markets.  Despite authorities’ efforts to assert more control over the markets, they have (paradoxically) become the social safety net of socialist Korea. 

The Daily NK offers some recent food price data from the DPRK:

A defector named Kim, who keeps in touch with his family in the North, reported Monday in a telephone conversation with Daily NK, “The current food prices remain stable, according to sources from Hoiryeong and Pyongyang.”

Mr. Kim explained, “Rice sells in the Hoiryeong jangmadang at between 1,600 and 1,800won, around 200 won lower than before. Other grains and foods have fallen too. Pork sells for 2,800 to 3,000 won per kilogram and corn for 600 won per kilogram. An egg sells for 350 to 500.”

He added that, “Pork sold for about 5,000 won around lunar New Year’s Day and now it sells at half the price. Egg prices have risen a bit; they used to sell for 250 to 350 won. In Pyongyang, the price of rice, which was 2,200 won per kilogram in mid-January, is 1,700 won now. Corn per kilogram fell from 900 won to 750 won.”

He accounted for the lower food prices: In January, to greet the 60th anniversary of the friendship between North Korea and China, Chinese rice came in through Nampo port, so rice prices fell and provision of food increased. Since last year, the authorities have been able to deliver provisions to workers in a few major cities like Shinuiju.

He also relayed news that, “In February, a month’s provisions, 14 kilograms, were delivered to workers and their dependents; corn was provided through food distribution offices.”

Mr. Kim predicted that the situation will be at its worst in May and June of this year, although the food situation is comparatively much better than last year. No matter how good the last harvest was, though, it is not so significant for those who have to buy their food in the jangmadang.”

“Since 1995, food prices have always soared in May and June, the spring shortage season. After the spring this year they will soar again.”

In March or April, food in stock runs out and potatoes, barley, and other vegetables are not harvested until June. Therefore, rising food prices are a chronic spring phenomenon.

Pyongyang must feel reasonably confident, or they want us to think they feel reasonably confident, about current and anticipated food stocks.  As reported last week, the DPRK has requested that all foreign NGOs and aid agencies responsible for distributing food aid to cease operations and head home.

Mr. Kim does offer some good news from North Korea’s markets (Jangmadang).

For some time we have heard news that the North Korean government is attempting to turn the clock back on local markets by regulating who may work in them (older women), when they may open, what they may sell, and at what price.  All of these restrictions are supposedly part of a plan to break them down and reorient the population towards receiving goods from state-owned shops and the Public Distribution System.  These measures could be part of the “2012 Kangsong Taeguk” plans, or they might simply be part of a longer-term political strategy.

It is rumored that these kinds of regulations have lead to violent backlashes because the socialist economy is not capable of supporting the population, and (paradoxically) markets are considered the social “safety net”.  As a result, these market regulations are often ignored or “bypassed” by local officials and then quietly rescinded.  Mr. Kim offers anecdotal evidence that regulation of the markets has still proven unsuccessful:

“Decrees to close the jangmadang were posted at the entrances but in January they were all removed and the jangmadang operated as usual.”

Let’s hope that this is the fate of more recent regulations as well.

Read more below:
Previous posts on food.

Previous posts on North Korea’s markets.

Food Prices in North Korean Markets Stabilize
Daily NK
Yoo Gwan Hee
3/23/2009

Institute for Far Easter Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-3-20-1
2009-03-20

According to the North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity group, North Korean authorities released a list of goods banned from markets across the country on March 15. The ban goes into effect on April 1. The official list is said to include almost all wares currently being sold in the North’s markets, effectively banning market operations and practically outlawing private trade.

It was also reported that notices posted in the Hyesan and Wei Yan markets, in Yanggang Province, included not only a list of over 200 goods banned from sale, but also dictated the price at which allowable goods were to be sold.

Any goods from the United States or South Korea are specifically banned, as well as goods manufactured through inter-Korean projects such as joint ventures or from within the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Medicines and other supplies provided by the United Nations or other international organizations are also banned. Prices on foodstuffs were set, with Chinese millet to be sold at 1800 won, foxtail millet at 1700 won, and adzuki beans at 2100 won. Prices for privately harvested grains, eggs, tofu, poultry, pork, soybean oil, and other goods were also announced.

This measure appears to be in line with ongoing efforts underway since last year to close the North’s markets. While its effectiveness remains to be seen, if authorities succeed in shutting down markets, it could further exacerbate the North’s critical food shortages. In October of last year, North Korean authorities from regional commerce management offices throughout the country announced a ban on the sale of Chinese and South Korean goods, industrial products, and rice, corn and other grains, but this policy was never enforced.

Over the last few years, the European Union has pursued an engagement policy with North Korea.   MEP Glyn Ford makes regular trips to Pyongyang to facilitate diplomatic progress; the German Freidrich Naumann Foundation runs economic education courses; European donors founded the Pyongyang Business School; and a small group of European ex-pat businessmen formed a de facto chamber of commerce, the European Business Association in Pyongyang.  Although European companies have experienced mixed success in the DPRK they continue to look for new opportunities. 

This morning, however, Felix Abt, a Swiss director of the PyongSu Pharmaceutical Joint Venture Co. in Pyongyang informs me that his life insurance policy (purchased from a European company) has been cancelled. 

“A European life insurance company cancelled my life insurance because I am a dangerous person living in a dangerous country. Credit card organisations cancel credit cards for such persons in such countries, health insurance companies come up with other reservations and limitations and the latest organisation that has just expelled me is LinkedIn with a very curious explanation.”

I am unsure how the cancellation of life insurance policies could impact other Europen investments in the DPRK, but the marginal effect cannot be positive.  Mr. Abt has been a resident of Pyongyang for years where he manufactures Western-quality pharmaceuticals.  Needless to say, the DPRK is very much in need of his services, so it is a shame that after all this time he is now considered a liability by his insurer.

Mr. Abt also forwarded his rejection from the business networking site LinkedIn, which is posted below:
 

Apparently LinkedIn‘s legal department considers logging into the server as “receiving goods of US origin” (the software I presume), and so it prohibits account holders, or even logging in, from Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria—even if they are Swiss.

North Korea Uncovered v.16
Download it here

The most recent version of North Korea Uncovered (North Korea Google Earth) has been published.  Since being launched, this project has been continuously expanded and to date has been downloaded over 32,000 times.

Pictured to the left is a statue of Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo.  This statue, as well as many others identified in this version of the project, was built by the North Koreans. According to a visitor:

From the neck down, the Kabila monument looks strangely like Kim Jong Il: baggy uniform, creased pants, the raised arm, a little book in his left hand. From the neck up, the statue is the thick, grim bald mug of Laurent Kabila (his son Joseph is the current president). “The body was made in North Korea,” explains my driver Felix. In other words, the body is Kim Jong Il’s, but with a fat, scowling Kabila head simply welded on.

This is particularly interesting because there are no known pictures of a Kim Jong il statue.  The only KJI statue that is reported to exist is in front of the National Security Agency in Pyongyang.  If a Kim Jong il statue does in fact exist, it might look something like this.

Thanks again to the anonymous contributors, readers, and fans of this project for your helpful advice and location information. This project would not be successful without your contributions.

Version 16 contains the following additions: Rakwon Machine Complex, Sinuiju Cosmetics Factory, Manpo Restaurant, Worker’s Party No. 3 Building (including Central Committee and Guidance Dept.), Pukchang Aluminum Factory, Pusan-ri Aluminum Factory, Pukchung Machine Complex, Mirim Block Factory, Pyongyang General Textile Factory, Chonnae Cement Factory, Pyongsu Rx Joint Venture, Tongbong Cooperative Farm, Chusang Cooperative Farm, Hoeryong Essential Foodstuff Factory, Kim Ki-song Hoeryong First Middle School , Mirim War University, electricity grid expansion, Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground (TSLG)” is also known as the “Musudan-ri Launching Station,” rebuilt electricity grid, Kumchang-ri suspected underground nuclear site, Wangjaesan Grand Monument, Phothae Revolutionary Site, Naedong Revolutionary Site, Kunja Revolutionary Site, Junggang Revolutionary Site, Phophyong Revolutionary Site, Samdung Revolutionary Site, Phyongsan Granite Mine, Songjin Iron and Steel Complex (Kimchaek), Swedish, German and British embassy building, Taehongdan Potato Processing Factory, Pyongyang Muyseum of Film and Theatrical Arts, Overseas Monuments built by DPRK: Rice Museum (Muzium Padi) in Malaysia, Statue de Patrice Lumumba (Kinshasa, DR Congo), National Heroes Acre (Windhoek, Namibia), Derg Monument (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), National Heroes Acre (Harare, Zimbabwe), New State House (Windhoek, Namibia), Three Dikgosi (Chiefs) Monument (Gaborone, Botswana), 1st of May Square Statue of Agostinho Neto (Luanda, Angola), Momunment Heroinas Angolas (Luanda, Angola), Monument to the Martyrs of Kifangondo Battle (Luanda, Angola), Place de l’étoile rouge, (Porto Novo, Benin), Statue of King Béhanzin (Abomey, Benin), Monument to the African Renaissance (Dakar, Senegal), Monument to Laurent Kabila [pictured above] (Kinshasa, DR Congo).

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
(NK Brief No. 09-3-3-1)
3/3/2009

INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
As February began, North Korea continued to publicly warn that the two Koreas were on a path toward war, stating on February 1 that downward spiraling relations between the two Koreas were brought on by ROK President Lee Myung-bak The (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) printed that Lee’s policies toward the North were “the very source of military conflicts and war between the North and the South,” and warned that tensions on the peninsula “may lead to an uncontrollable and unavoidable military conflict and war.”

Poll results released by the Korea Economic Research Institute on February 2 indicated that 68.4 percent of South Koreans support President Lee Myung-bak’s aid-for-denuclearization policy toward the North, and a separate poll by Gallup Korea showed on February 23 that 62 percent of South Koreans blame North Korea for strained inter-Korean relations.

A South Korean official stated on February 4 that 3,000 tones of steel plates that were to be sent to North Korea as part of the energy aid-for-denuclearization deal reached in 2007 would be delayed due to the North’s recent saber-rattling. According to the official, “It is hard to predict when we will send the steel plates. For now, we are not even seriously considering the timing…North Korea should first change its attitude.”

The South Korean government has shot down a project by an ROK journalist organization that would allow the exchange of news with North Korea. It was reported on February 4 that a Unification Ministry Spokesman Kim Ho-nyoun stated, “There are concerns that the exchange of news articles may undermine national security, public order and the interests of the general public.”

On February 16, it was reported the ROK Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee has mandated field commanding officers in all branches of the South Korean military to immediately respond to any North Korean provocation without first seeking permission from superiors. This has further heightened concerns over the possibility of a naval confrontation in the Yellow Sea around the disputed Northern Limit Line.

On February 19, North Korean media warned, “Now that the political and military confrontation between the North and the South has gone into extremes, a physical clash may break out at any moment,” and, “North-South relations have reached such a pass that there is no way to improve them or bring them under control.”

INTER-KOREAN TOURISM
Hyundai Asan, the South Korean company running the Kumgang Mountain tourist resort and the Kaesong City tours in North Korea is on the brink of bankruptcy. A Hyundai representative stated on February 4, “We are reaching a critical situation…unless the tours resume by April, it will be difficult for us to stay afloat.” Hyundai Asan brought in 255.5 trillion Won, or approximately 170.3 million USD, through tour sales in 2007, but in 2008, the company sold only 228.8 billion Won, or 152.5 million USD-worth of tours in 2008. The company employed 1,084 workers when tours were in operation, but has cut back to 479 employees. Of those, approximately 20 percent are receiving only 70 percent of their wages while they work from home. The tours have been on hold since a South Korean tourist was shot and killed at the Kumgang resort last summer.

ROK lawmaker Song Hun-suk stated on February 22, “Since the suspension of the [tourism] program, dozens of South Korean businesses and approximately 1,000 travel agents that offered organized trips to the North have gone to the brink of bankruptcy,” and he reported that approximately 30,000 North and South Koreans were on the verge of unemployment due to the travel ban, with 80 percent of shops and restaurants in South Korea’s Gosung, Gangwon Province, which is near the border, have been forced to close due to the absence of tourists passing through.

INTER-KOREAN TRADE
On February 3, the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) launched a new website, “Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Information Center”, at http://interkoreatrade.kita.net. The website is designed to provide information and education on North Korean investment and inter-Korean cooperation

On February 8, South Korea’s Unification Ministry released statistics for 2008 regarding the Kaesong Industrial Complex. According to the ministry, production in the complex was up 36 percent over the previous year, reaching a value of 251.42 million USD. The total value of goods produced in the complex since it began operations in 2005 comes to 524.84 million USD.

The Economic Times ran an article on February 15 titled, “Ever heard of Gaesung? Gear up for its products,” in which it reports that the India-South Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) soon to be signed will mean that India recognizes goods produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex as South Korean goods.

ROK UNIFICATION MINISTER
On February 12, Korea University Professor of Political Science Hyun In-taek was sworn in as the new South Korean minister of unification. At his inauguration, Hyun stated that he is willing to meet with North Korean counterparts “at any time, at any place” in order to repair inter-Korean relations. Hyun has been criticized as being a hardliner, and an architect of the Lee Myung-bak administration’s “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness” policy. Hyun was a key advisor during Lee’s presidential campaign, at which time Lee introduced the Vision policy, and was also a member of Lee’s presidential transition team, which at one point had advocated the shuttering of the Ministry of Unification.

U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS
A group of high-ranking former U.S. officials now advising the Obama administration on the DPRK visited North Korea during the first week of February. The group included Stephen Bosworth, Jonathan Pollack, Morton Avramowitz, and Leon Sigal. The delegation reported that North Korea does not appear to be rushed, and that they had taken a “wait and see” attitude in Pyongyang. Bosworth stated that “[North Korean officials] understand the Obama administration will need some time to sort itself through the policy review and the expressed patience, there is no sense of alarm or urgency.” He also noted that the officials were willing to move forward with denuclearization talks.

Leon Sigal stated on February 1, just prior to his visit to the North, “the Obama administration should promptly send a high-level emissary, perhaps former President Bill Clinton or former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to Pyongyang.” Sigal also wrote in an online opinion piece that Obama should “hold a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in return for North Korea disposing some of its plutonium.”

On February 2, the U.S. State Department announced that it would impose sanctions on three North Korean companies for missile export violations. In accordance with the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, Executive Order 12851 of June 11, 1993, Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, the Korea Mining and Development Corporation, the Mokong Trading Corporation, and Sino-Ki are subject to Nonproliferation Measures and Category II missile sanctions.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated on February 13 that the Obama administration would be willing to normalize bilateral relations with North Korea if the North is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate its nuclear weapons program. She stated that the U.S. would have a “great openness” to North Korea, and added, “It’s not only on the diplomatic front,” but that Washington had a “willingness to help the people of North Korea, not just in narrow ways with food and fuel but with energy assistance.” Two days later, North Korea’s head of state Kim Yong Nam reaffirmed that North Korea would “develop relations with countries that are friendly toward us.”

On February 17, Clinton reiterated the U.S. offer of a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War, normalization of relations, and aid, but stated, “The decision as to whether North Korea will cooperate in the six-party talks, end provocative language and actions, is up to them,” and , “If North Korea abides by the obligations it has already entered into and verifiably and completely eliminates its nuclear program, then there will be a reciprocal response,” indicating that North Korea will have to make the next move.

During a trip to South Korea, Clinton stated that North Korea was “badly miscalculating” if it thinks it can “drive a wedge” between Washington an Seoul, and that “North Korea is not going to get a different relationship with the United States while insulting and refusing dialogue with the Republic of Korea.”

U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY TO NORTH KOREA
Following his return from a trip to North Korea at the beginning of the month, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Steven Bosworth was named by Secretary of State Clinton as the Obama administration’s special representative for North Korea. He will remain dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, but will now be responsible for coordinating U.S. policy regarding the DPRK. Special Envoy Sung Kim is responsible for ‘day-to-day’ negotiations with Pyongyang.

UK-DPRK RELATIONS
A British parliamentary delegation arrived in North Korea on February 3, coinciding with a visit to London by a DPRK Workers’ Party of Korea delegation. EU Parliament member Glyn Ford stated that he hoped to reopen dialog that was broken off in 2005 on human rights, and denuclearization, hinting that restarting dialog could lead to the transfer of renewable energy technology to the North.

PRC-DPRK TRADE
It was reported on February 24 that trade between China and North Korea reached 2.78 billion USD in 2008, a 41.2 percent increase over the previous year. DPRK imports were up 46 percent, at over 2.03 billion USD, while its exports to China grew 29.7 percent, to 750 million USD. Mineral resources made up 54.7 percent of North Korea’s exports to China, and machinery and electronics made up the majority of imports.

DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAM

(NKeconWatch: Although this is simply a reprint of the IFES report, I have been notified by NTI that this report is inaccurate. According to NTI Communications Director Cathy Gwin:

“I am writing to respond to your post that referred to erroneous reports that the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is preparing to open an office in Seoul ” in order to help prepare DPRK nuclear scientists for peaceful civilian employment.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has worked in the past to develop ideas on how governments could apply cooperative threat reduction (CTR or “Nunn-Lugar”) approaches as part of a solution to the North Korean nuclear challenge.  However, we have no current program to carry out those activities ourselves, nor do we have a program to retrain North Korean scientists.  In addition, we have no current plans to open an office in South Korea, and we do not have branch offices in Ukraine or Kazakhstan.  We have a main office in Washington, DC and a presence in Moscow.

January 31 was the deadline for North Korea to shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear reactor as part of 6-Party negotiations, but it failed to meet the deadline. Christopher Hill stated on February 3 that the U.S. would “hold on for a few more days,” but that “we’re not happy that the DPRK essentially has missed this very important deadline.”

On February 2, it was reported that the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) would open a new office in Seoul in order to help prepare DPRK nuclear scientists for peaceful civilian employment. The NTI is in the process of building a program to retrain the North’s experts, and “is also considering ways to support not only nuclear scientists at Yongbyon, but also farmers near Yongbyon who provide them with rice,” according to Roy Kim, a professor at Drexel University.

The U.S. government criticized Pakistan’s decision on February 6 to release Abdul Qadeer Khan from house arrest. Khan as been under house arrest for the past 5 years, after admitting to selling nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, as well as Iran and Libya. In 2004, A.Q. Khan took full responsibility for selling the nuclear secrets, stating that the military and government were unaware of his actions. He recanted this confession last year, stating that he had been a scapegoat.

DPRK MISSILE LAUNCH PREPARATIONS
Several countries have reported intelligence pointing to a launch by North Korea of a Taepodong-2 long-range missile. The U.S. State Department warned on February 3 that “a ballistic missile launch by North Korea would be unhelpful and, frankly, provocative,” while the ROK Foreign Ministry noted that a missile launce would “constitute a clear breach of the UN resolution” adopted in 2006. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated, “We hope all the parties can recognize that maintaining stability is in the common interest of the people of the Korean Peninsula.” Preparations appear to be underway at its Musudan-ri base, near the DPRK-PRC border. A Taepodong-2 is thought to have a range of 6,700 kilometers (4,150 miles).

Amid reports that it was preparing the missile launch, North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun printed, “The DPRK’s policy of advancing to space for peaceful purposes is a justifiable aim that fits the global trend of the times. There is no power in the world that can stop it,” and, “ As long as developing and using space are aimed at peaceful purposes and such efforts contribute to enhancing human beings’ happiness, no one in the world can find fault with them.” North Korea continues to deny preparations for a long-range missile launch, and insists that it is preparing to launch a satellite

According to a researcher at the South Korean Agency for Defense Development, if North Korea were to launch a satellite, “given the size of the rocket, the satellite will likely be a low-orbit device,” and low-orbit devices usually need to be fired toward either the North or South Pole in order to successfully reach orbit. This would mean North Korea would need to use Chinese, Russian, Japanese or South Korean airspace.

JAPANESE FIRM, DPRK MISSILES
On February 26, Japanese police raided Toko Boeki, a Tokyo trading company with ties to the DPRK residents’ association in Japan. The company is suspected of trying to export magnetic measuring instruments that could be used to manufacture missiles to North Korea via a third country.

DPRK MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
It was reported on February 5 that North Korea’s new 3G cellular network, built by the Egyptian company Orascom Telecom, has been very popular. Orascom Telecom Chairman Naguib Sawiris stated, that in the first two weeks of service, “so far we have about 6,000 applications. The important point is that they are normal citizens, not the privileged or military generals or party higher-ups. For the first time, they have been able to go to a shop and get a mobile phone.”

DPRK SPORTS
North Korea’s soccer squad defeated South Arabia 1-0 as it moved closer to the World Cup finals. The North now has seven points in Group 2, after four games, and is in second place, with only South Korea having more points. North Korea has not been in the World Cup finals since 1966.

KIM JONG IL BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS
Kim Jong Il’s 67th birthday was marked on both sides of the DMZ. In the North, ceremonies were held throughout the country on February 16, and special rations were provided to the people of the country, with extra noodles, rice and other grains given out to mark the day.

In South Korea, the Abductees’ Family Union marked the day by flying 100,000 leaflets with North Korean currency and criticisms of the North’s leader. South Korean authorities announced plans to investigate, as it is illegal for South Koreans to possess North Korean bank notes without permission.

DPRK SUCCESSION
More rumors were heard in February concerning who might succeed Kim Jong Il as leader of the North Korean regime. Kim’s youngest son, Kim Jong-un has reportedly registered as a candidate for the March 8 parliamentary elections, which would launch his political career. In addition, an editorial marking Kim Jong Il’s 67th birthday stressed the “inheritance of bloodline of Mount Paektu,” further stoking rumors that one of Kim’s sons may be next in line.

DPRK CENSUS
Results of a preliminary census by the United Nations Population Fund were released in February. According to the data, there were 24.05 million North Koreans as of October last year, with 11.72 million males and 12.33 million females. South Pyongan Province was the most populous, with 4.05 residents. 3.26 million people reside in the North’s capital, Pyongyang. This census, conducted by the United Nations Population Fund, was the first in 15 years to be conducted in North Korea.