Archive for the ‘Economic reform’ Category

Pyongyang Strikes Back: North Korean Policies of 2002–08 and Attempts to Reverse “De-Stalinization from Below”

Wednesday, July 15th, 2009

Andrei Lankov
Asia Policy 8, July 2009
The National Bureau of Asian Research

Download the article (PDF) here. 

Executive Summary
This article explains why the North Korean government has attempted to reassert state control over society—which had been eroding from 1994–2002—and offers predictions regarding the impact that this shift will likely have on North Korean society.

Main Argument
From 1994 to 2002 North Korean society changed tremendously: state-run industry collapsed, the rationing system ceased to function, and free-market activity, though still technically illegal or semi-legal, became most citizen’s major source of income. Although not initiated by the government, in 2002 some of these spontaneous changes won the belated and conditional approval of the regime.

The evidence emerging in the last three to four years demonstrates, however, that the North Korean government has chosen not to tolerate those changes. This policy of recrudescence, while economically self-destructive, makes political sense because the existence of an affluent and free South Korea makes North Korea far more insecure. The leadership in Pyongyang has reason to believe that any domestic liberal reform in North Korea would lead to a regime collapse.

Policy Implications
1. Pyongyang’s decision to reject reformist policies is based on a rational and well-informed assessment of North Korea’s domestic and international situation. Therefore, the outside world can do very little to influence the regime’s position, and thus there is no chance of meaningful reform in North Korea in the foreseeable future as long as the current regime remains in power.

2. Because the current policy makes sustainable economic growth impossible, the North Korean government will need to rely on stratagems to secure vital foreign aid, with the U.S. being one of the main (but not only) targets of these maneuvers. The “North Korean problem” will remain a part of the international landscape in the foreseeable future.

3. If the current attempt by the government at counter-reform fails, this failure will create additional avenues for influencing the North Korean government from within.

Download the article (PDF) here. 

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DPRK market closure reports deemed rumor

Wednesday, July 8th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-7-8-1
7/8/2009

North Korea’s main wholesale market, in Pyongysong, was temporarily closed for just over a week during mid-April, but it has reportedly been open and operating normally since then. It was rumored, and reported [previously (see below)], that the Pyongysong Wholesale Market was shut down in mid-June. There was a report that officials felt the market had grown too large, and there was a plan to divide it into East and West Markets. However, reports of these plans have now been deemed nothing more than rumor.

A source in Kangdong-gun stated that there has been much talk of closing markets since the beginning of the year, but that no measures have been enforced and everything is operating normally. Another source reported that many traders are traveling to and from Sinuiju and Pyongysong, and that their numbers have been growing since the onset of summer. While rumors still abound regarding market closures, the source noted that there is significantly less talk of such measures compared to earlier in the year.

In January, North Korean authorities released a statement indicating that general markets would be transformed into farmers’ markets, and only open once every ten days. However, six months has already passed, and there has been no action taken. There have been no measures to transform even some of the largest markets, in Hyeryong, Hyesan, Musan and Sinuiju. That said, it is always possible that the North Korean authorities proceed with plans to close or transform the markets.

The majority of North Koreans trading in the markets do not believe the authorities could easily carry out market-closing measures. Due to the likelihood of large-scale civil revolts, the regime must come up with an alternative to the markets if it intends to close or transform them. The current food issues faced by the North make it impossible to close markets. In addition, transforming general markets into farmers’ markets would force residents to buy daily necessities and other manufactured products at department stores or government-run shops, but these shops have nothing in stock. Furthermore, preventing residents from selling in the markets makes it more difficult for them to acquire the food necessary to sustain themselves and their families. The number of empty stalls in markets appears to be slowing increasing, but a complete shutdown of the market would likely lead to protests.

Original Post:
North Korea begins closing general markets
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-6-26-1
6/26/2009

It has been reported that North Korea’s market closing measure is slowly beginning to be enforced. The June 23 27* issue of North Korea Today, a newsletter from the South Korean group Good Friends, announced that the Pyongsong general market has now been shut down, in what some call the most prominent omen that all general markets will be shut down throughout the country. As the Pyongsong general market served as the central wholesale market for the entire North, some believe it was shut down first in order to encourage the use of smaller, more local traditional markets. In addition, central Party authorities have ordered department stores and general stores in Pyongyang to stock up on Chinese goods. The North Korean government has announced, on a number of occasions since last year, that general markets would be closed and turned into farmers’ markets, but for a variety of reasons, the measure has been on hold for over six months.

Regional authorities were also ordered to import various goods from China, in accordance with the demands of local citizens and regional conditions, in order to head off any concerns that daily necessities might not be available after the markets are closed. This series of measures indicates that the government is concerned that attempts to forcefully close the markets may lead to citizen revolts, as clashes between traders and police occurred previously when the North attempted to enforce market restrictions.

One official in Pyongyang stated that this measure put citizen’s concerns and inconveniences first, stating, “[The Party] must unconditionally get rid of markets. But on the inside, they see that there will be huge opposition from the citizens if they only use force, so this time they decided to combine it with conciliatory policies.” The source added, however, that authorities plan to continue to operate restricted markets while at the same time, completely changing the market system before the end of this year.

Currently, as the 150-day ‘battle’ campaign to improve the economy is underway, more and more lectures are also being given. One week after the North’s second nuclear test, propaganda speeches were given in each factory and business in Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province, stating, “Now there is no one in the world that can face off with our military might,” and, “If the United States and those countries that kowtow to it carry out an economic blockade against our country, we will see it as an act of war and stand against it with military power. If only we carry out the 150-day battle well this year, we will completely attain a Strong and Prosperous Nation. [All the people] must follow after the revolutionary military spirit of the People’s Army and open the door to a strong and prosperous nation without one day’s delay.”

UPDATE: According to the Daily NK, the closing of the Pyongsong Market was not successful:

Despite North Korean official attempts to shift general markets onto an agricultural format, the general markets are operating as normal because of popular resistance to change.

A source residing in Kangdong-gun, Pyongyang told Daily NK, “In mid-April, a wholesale market in Pyongsung was shut down for around ten days, but after that it reopened and continues to operate.” He added that, “I’ve heard that the existing market was supposed to close early this year and be changed into an agricultural market, but there have actually been no shutdowns at all.”

He continued, “I don’t know the exact reason for the closure of Pyongsung market in April, but I’ve heard that there was an investigation of the individuals who manage the big wholesale businesses there. Traders strongly opposed it, so the closure of the market could not be completed.”

The source added, “In Kangdong-gun and other districts of Pyongyang, there have been many rumors about market closures, but there have not been any so far. Markets are operating normally.”

A source from Shinuiju confirmed it. “Many rumors of market closure have circulated, but they are working as usual,” the source said, “Markets in Pyongsung are operating as well, so there are still many traders coming and going between Shinuiju and Pyongsung. Especially, as summer approaches, trade is increasing.”

He added, “People still talk about the closure of the markets, but they don’t talk about it as much as earlier this year. In truth, if the jangmadang is closed, it will be hard for even the cadres to live, let alone ordinary residents. So cadres also have a negative opinion of the measure, and for that reason it will be difficult to shift to agricultural markets.” 

Read the full story here:
Markets Continue Despite Official Bluster
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
7/3/2009

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More on the market closing measure

Sunday, July 5th, 2009

Barbara Demick has an informative article in the Los Angeles Times.  The whole piece is worth reading but here are some themes and excerpts.

Market restictions ordered

In the markets of Kilju, a city of 100,000 near North Korea’s eastern seacoast, the ruling Korean Workers’ Party has ordered the removal of Chinese-made cookies, candies and pharmaceuticals.

Even soybeans, many articles of clothing and shoes are now forbidden.

It is all part of a great leap backward taking place in the secretive autocracy. North Koreans interviewed in China in recent weeks say that the regime of Kim Jong Il has made a concerted effort to roll back reforms that had over the last decade liberalized the most strictly controlled economy in the world.

… 

So many Chinese goods are now taboo that markets stock only about 35% of the merchandise previously available, some say.

Import substiution policy implemented?

“They want to promote our own products made in North Korea, but since everything is ‘made in China,’ there is nothing to buy,” said Kim Young Chul, a civilian working for the North Korean military who had come to China to sell wild ginseng on behalf of his employer.

Exports curtailed

Kim Chol Hee, a trader from Yanji, a Chinese city near the border with a large ethnic Korean population, said it was harder now than at any time in the 10 years he’s been in business to import from North Korea.

“I used to bring in squid, crab, steel parts from Chongjin. We can still buy seafood, but the North Korean government won’t let us buy steel,” he said Kim. “They say they need to keep all their resources for themselves.”

Restrctions inefective

Kilju residents have not dared to hold public protests against the restriction. But the Korean Workers Party nonetheless might be fighting a losing battle. Much of the trading is done by people with powerful connections in the provincial government and the military. Many state-owned enterprises do illegal trading to raise cash for their operations.

For example, trader Kim Young Chul says he is responsible for raising about $900 each year for his work unit by selling ginseng, while he and his partners keep any additional profits.

“I have a lot of freedom. They don’t dare ask me too many questions in North Korea, because I work for the ministry,” said Kim.

Just as quickly as the Korean Workers’ Party issues a decree, people find a way to circumvent it. Vendors banned from the market bring out their mothers and grandmothers, while secretly running the businesses from behind the scenes. Others sell banned good from their homes, or simply stash it behind other merchandise.

“If you want to buy cosmetics in Kilju, you still can find them, but they are usually hidden underneath the table,” Lee said.

Once a loyal member of the Workers’ Party, Lee said she had remained devoted to Kim Jong Il up to her departure from North Korea in May, vowing that she would return home as soon as she got money for her family.

“Even the day I left, I was singing songs about Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in my house,” said Lee. “Now that I’ve come to China, I’m not so sure.

Read the full article here:
North Korea moves to restrict economy
Los Angeles Times
Barbara Demick
7/5/2009

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Nick Bonner offers comments on North Korea tourism

Sunday, June 28th, 2009

From China Business News:

Q: Koryo Tours has built its business by providing tour trips to North Korea. Why did you choose North Korea, and how tricky was it to get the business started?

A: In 1993, Joshua Green and I were approached by a North Korean colleague (that Josh had studied Chinese with at the Beijing Foreign Language University in 1998 and Nick played football with in 1993) who, after returning to Pyongyang had worked in the national travel company. At that time, it was a real fledgling travel industry (they only opened to western tourism in 1987) and less than 50 western tourists visited per year. We started going every month but with very few tourists, mainly driven by fascination, realisation that we had incredible access and the fun of working with some amazing Koreans. During the famine, we worked with aid agencies and continued tourism which brought in a steady amount of work for our Korean colleagues. in the past five years, DPRK tourism have seen growth, and we now take just under 1,000 tourists a year – about half of all western visitors. With my colleagues Simon and Hannah, we make sure that tourists have the best access possible to the country and people. Having specialised in one country for 16 years, it really does mean we are literally the only experts in this destination, and for every tourist we have taken it rates as one of their most amazing experiences.

Q: What effect does North Korea’s aggressive stance on defense have on your business – do people become more or less interested in visiting when it tests a nuclear bomb or fires a missile?

A: Every few weeks, North Korea makes the news for one reason or another, usually a negative reason of course. However, North Korea remains one of the safest and most fascinating countries in the world to visit. For those who are of the opinion that seeing a country for yourself is more valuable than watching the interpretation on the world news, then we provide them that access. In addition, as we accompany the tours, we provide an insight into the country that is difficult for a visitor to interpret. Our clientele are generally very worldly and aware and interested in what is going on, I think the DPRK being in the news for any reason puts it on people’s mental map and thus makes more people visit rather than being scared off.  

Q: North Korea is a pretty ‘left-field’ travel destination. What have been the key approaches to marketing your company, both locally and internationally?  

A: Our reputation has been established because we provide excellent service and we really do make sure that any visitor to Korea will have the time of their lives. We have a company responsibility to engage with the Koreans and much of our work is involved in cultural exchanges, film making and charity projects. I think this aspect of our work comes across to potential clients who see we really are more than a travel agency. We rely heavily on word of mouth and a great deal of our tourists know someone else who has been before, also we get a good number of repeat visitors as we don’t simply run the same tour over and over again. Being honest, doing the best job possible and maintaining good contacts with our previous clients are critical. This is how we keep a good reputation which we see as being the key to selling our product.  

Q:  Are you planning to diversify to other locations beyond North Korea – and if so, how do you choose new destinations?

A: Since 2006, we have been running twice-yearly tours to Turkmenistan, which is a fascinating and amazing place to go. In addition to this, in 2010, we are planning on offering a wider range of tours to places such as Tajikistan (for Persian New Year – when they hold a Buzkashi event), to the Tumen river area including Yanji in China, the North Korean free trade zone of Rajin-Sonbong, and Far Eastern Russia (around Vladivostok), also a tour to the North Western Caspian Sea region including Volgograd (once known as Stalingrad) and the mysterious republics of Kalmykia and Dagestan. All are remarkable, highly-interesting, and unique places that we think our discerning clients will be interested in. North Korea remains the focal point of our company, but these other destinations fit well in the mould of visiting unusual but interesting places.

Although I have never visited the DPRK with Koryo Tours, I did travel to Turkmenistan and I recommend it.  That trip launched my interest in Central Asia, and I quickly followed it up with visits to Iran and Tajikistan.

Read the full story here:
BizTalk Interview: Nick Bonner, Founder of Koryo Group
Gary Bowerman
6/27/2009

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North Korea on Google Earth v.18

Thursday, June 25th, 2009

North Korea Uncovered version 18 is available.  This Google Earth overlay maps North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, markets, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks.

This project has now been downloaded over 140,000 times since launching in April 2007 and received much media attention last month following a Wall Street Journal article highlighting the work.

Note: Kimchaek City is now in high resolution for the first time.  Information on this city is pretty scarce.  Contributions welcome.

Additions to this version include: New image overlays in Nampo (infrastructure update), Haeju (infrastructure update, apricot trees), Kanggye (infrastructure update, wood processing factory), Kimchaek (infrastructure update). Also, river dredges (h/t Christopher Del Riesgo), the Handure Plain, Musudan update, Nuclear Test Site revamp (h/t Ogle Earth), The International School of Berne (Kim Jong un school), Ongjin Shallow Sea Farms, Monument to  “Horizon of the Handure Plain”, Unhung Youth Power Station, Hwangnyong Fortress Wall, Kim Ung so House, Tomb of Kim Ung so, Chungnyol Shrine, Onchon Public Library, Onchon Public bathhouse, Anbyon Youth Power Stations.

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FDI and JVCs in the DPRK…

Thursday, June 25th, 2009

The General Association of Koreans in Japan (Chongryun) have made a video about foreign direct investment and joint venture companies in the DPRK.  I have posted links to the video below.  It features the PyongSu pharmaceutical factory among other things.  It is in Korean and Japanese (with Japanese subtitles), so if there are any readers who care to translate, please let me know if there is any interesting information in the videos:

Part 1:
chongryn-pyongsuvideo1.JPG

Part 2:
chongryun-pyogsu2.JPG

Part 3:
chongryun-pyogsu3.JPG

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Inter-Korean exchange, investment reduced as relations crumble

Friday, June 19th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-6-16-1
6/16/2009

The amount of inter-Korean exchange has shrunk considerably this year, as tensions between the North and South continue to mount. According to the ROK Customs Administration’s inter-Korean trade office, cross-border transactions between January and April of this year fell 24.8 percent from 2008; trade amounted to 426.35 million USD, down from 566.92 million USD during the same period last year. South Korean imports were down only 9.5 percent, at 260.19 million USD, but exports to the North amounted to a mere 59.4 percent of the amount sent last year, recording 166.17 million USD. 54.9 percent of these goods (by value) traveled across the border by passing through Dorasan Station; 32.8 percent went through Incheon Harbor; 6.4 percent through Busan Harbor, 1.6 percent through Sokcho Harbor; and 1.1 percent passing through Goseong.

In April, with the North’s launch of a long-range missile in spite of the opposition of the international community, inter-Korean trade dropped to 69.2 percent of last year’s level, falling to 105.53 million USD. In fact, inter-Korean trade fell relative to the same month in the previous year eight months straight, beginning in September of last year.

With last month’s sudden nuclear test and South Korea’s subsequent joining of PSI, inter-Korean trade is expected to continue to wither in the latter half of the year. The amount of trade seen from January to April of this year is equivalent to 23.4 percent of the total trade for last year (1.82078 billion USD), and even if the current level of trade is maintained for the rest of the year, it is expected to amount to a mere 70 percent of what was traded in 2008.

Inter-Korean trade had previously been recording significant growth; in 1999, during Kim Dae Jung’s ‘People’s Government’, inter-Korean trade was worth only 328.65 million USD, but began to climb, growing more than five-fold by 2008, topping out at 1.82078 billion USD last year. However, after the launch of the current government, the amount of goods imported by the North from the South began to fall; exports to North Korea in 2008 were worth 883.41 USD, 145.15 million less than in 2007.

North Korean companies involved in processing-on-demand, agriculture and fisheries work have been part of Pyongyang’s trade ambitions, and these companies have also been hurt by the freeze in inter-Korean relations, with dozens of businesses facing closure, and many more severely hit by the North’s shrinking trade.

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The Political Economy of North Korea: Implications for Denuclearization and Proliferation

Tuesday, June 16th, 2009

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
East-West Center Working Papers
Economics Series, No. 104
Download paper here (PDF)

Abstract:
Despite North Korea’s turn away from economic reform and the constraints of the second nuclear crisis, the country has in fact become more economically open. But it has emphasized closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in political quid-pro-quos, let alone sanctions. Yet the U.S. can still exercise economic leverage by going aggressively after third-party financial intermediaries. This particular form of sanction does not require multilateral coordination, since foreign banking institutions that conduct significant business in the United States have a strong interest in avoiding institutions that the United States Treasury has identified as money laundering or proliferation concerns.

There is some evidence that North Korea moderated its missile proliferation activities during periods when rapprochement with the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, was a priority, but in the absence of such interest and as legitimate trade, investment, and aid dry up, the incentives to intensify proliferation activities increase.

The internal organization of the North Korean economy has important implications for any policy seeking transformation via engagement. The economy is structured in such a way that outside economic ties are still largely monopolized by stateowned enterprises and other gatekeepers, such as the military. Under such circumstances, the precise design of engagement policies requires very close scrutiny. Even nominally commercial relations can be exploited if the North Korean counterparties believe that they are ultimately political in nature, subsidized and thus vulnerable to blackmail. If economic ties are truly commercial in nature, those choosing to trade and invest with North Korea do so at their own risk. Under these circumstances, private actors will make economic decisions fully factoring in political risk, and North Korea will bear the costs if it chooses to renege on commitments or fails to provide a supportive policy environment.

Paper prepared for the conference on “North Korean Nuclear Politics: Constructing a New Northeast Asian Order in the 21st Century,” University of Washington, June 4-5, 2009. We would like to thank the Smith Richardson, MacArthur, and Korea Foundations for financial support and Jennifer Lee for research assistance.

UPDATE: A shorter version of this paper can be found here.

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Inter Korean trade falls in 2009

Tuesday, June 9th, 2009

According to Yonhap:

Trade between South and North Korea plunged nearly 25 percent in the first four months of this year amid growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, a report showed Tuesday.

Inter-Korean trade amounted to US$426.35 million during the January-April period, down 24.8 percent from $566.92 million a year earlier, according to the report by the Korea Customs Service.

The decline comes as tensions mounted after North Korea fired a rocket on April 5, prompting the U.N. Security Council to unanimously condemn the move. The North responded by kicking out outside nuclear inspectors and quitting six-party denuclearization talks.

Trade between the two Koreas, which amounted to $328.65 million in 1999, surged more than five-fold to $1.79 billion in 2007 when leaders from the two sides met for the second time. Last year, trade inched up to $1.82 billion.

Experts say that trade is expected to fall further in months to come as tensions are still running high after the North conducted its second nuclear test last month in defiance of repeated warnings by the international community and recently sentenced two U.S. journalists to 12 years in a labor camp for illegally entering the country.

In addition, we pointed out earlier this month that the South Korean government had barely touched the funds it appropriated for inter-Korean projects in 2009.

Finally, although inter-Korean trade has floundered this year, the DPRK’s trade volume reached a record US$3.8 billion in 2008, due largely to its trade with China.  

Read the full Yonhap story here:
Inter-Korean trade tumbles amid growing tensions
Yonhap
Koh Byung-joon
6/9/2009

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2009 Inter-Korean cooperation fund largely untouched

Thursday, June 4th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-6-4-1
6/4/2009

As inter-Korean relations continue to worsen, cooperative projects and humanitarian aid efforts have practically ground to a halt, leaving inter-Korean cooperation funds almost untouched.

According to the report “South-North Cooperation Fund Statistics” released by the Ministry of Unification on May 31, the South Korean government budgeted just over 1.508 trillion Won (1.2 billion USD) to fund inter-Korean cooperative projects in 2009, but as of the end of April, only 1.8 percent (26.919 billion Won) had been spent.

Some projects originally granted funds include financing for the construction of an East Sea line inter-Korean import facility and joint-use yard (8.795 billion Won); capital loans for Hyundai Asan economic cooperative projects (5.739 billion Won); NGO aid to the North, including nutritional supplements for children and soybean oil from the Catholic Seoul Archdiocese (2.933 billion Won); loans to cover expenses of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) Management Committee (2.08 billion Won); and the construction of a KIC General Support Center (2.444 billion Won).

Use of this fund has hit a low water mark, in part because 800 billion Won allocated for rice, fertilizer and other humanitarian aid has not been spent. A ministry official stated, “Rice and fertilizer aid can only proceed according to an agreement between North and South Korean officials following a request from North Korea, but this year, there was no request from North Korea, and therefore the amount of cooperative funding spent was low.

The South-North Cooperation Fund distributed 674.409 billion Won in 2005, 470.995 billion Won in 2006, 715.734 billion Won in 2007, and 231.205 billion Won last year.

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