Archive for the ‘Economic reform’ Category

North Korean authorities using market prices for policy

Monday, November 16th, 2015

According to the Daily NK:

The North Korean authorities officially determine product prices in North Korea. However, according to inside sources, these prices are being ignored more and more in favor of prices determined by market forces. Instead of official price designations, the authorities have posted ‘price ceilings,’ but they are not strictly enforcing them.

In a telephone conversation with the Daily NK on November 13th, a source from North Hamgyong Province said, “Official prices have almost completely disappeared from the markets. Reflecting this trend, even the market management offices located in each official marketplace are listing ‘price ceilings’ instead of official prices.”

Daily NK spoke with a source in South Hamgyong Province who confirmed this to be the case there as well.

“Furthermore, the price ceilings are being determined by the market rates, so the meaning of these regulations is fading. For example, if the going rate for rice at any given time is 5,000 KPW [0.58 USD] per kilogram, than the price ceiling would be set at something like 4,500- 5,000 KPW [0.52-0.58 USD],” she said.

“These ceiling prices are indeed posted, but they are not enforced. Ministry of People’s Safety [which act as the North’s police forces] officers are not able to command merchants to lower their prices. The atmosphere is such that if they even tried, they would likely be insulted and cursed at by the vendors.”

She added, “At the market, it has been quite some time since people realized that the official prices are meaningless. If a buyer asked a merchant for the official price of a given product, that merchant would likely to scold the buyer for not having proper control of his mental faculties.”

In a true indication that the national prices are being disregarded on a wide-scale level, even the authorities have shown signs that they are interested in understanding how market rates work.

For example, from Provincial People’s Committees, cabinet ministers are being kept abreast of the local market rate for product prices on a daily basis. “They are trying to understand the exact market prices for given quantities of goods like electronics and foodstuffs,” the source explained.

When asked to describe how ordinary North Korean folks were reacting to this news, she said, “People are saying things like, ‘The authorities explain that they want to understand rice prices so they can think of measures to improve the lives of the people, but that just makes us laugh. The best thing they can do to help is to stay out of the way.’”

Read the full story here:
Authorities tacitly recognize market-determined prices
Daily NK
Lee Sang Yong
2015-11-16

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DPRK announces new EDZ (SEZ) regulations

Sunday, November 15th, 2015

According to the Pyongyang Times:

Regulations on tax in EDZ worked out

Regulations on Tax in Economic Development Zones have been published pursuant to the August 19 decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly.

The regulations have 11 chapters and 72 articles.

According to them, they are applicable to foreign-invested businesses, foreign individuals and overseas Koreans that conduct business transactions or earn income in EDZs, and tax supervision in the zones will be conducted by relevant taxation institutions under the guidance of the central taxation organ.

Enterprise income tax rate is 14 per cent of the net profits, or 10 per cent in case of the priority sectors.

Tax rate on remuneration will be 5 to 30 per cent of the amount of income, if the monthly amount of income is higher than 500 euros, and that on the income from donation 2-15 per cent if the amount of income is greater than 5 000 euros.

Property tax rate is 1 per cent on buildings and 1.4 per cent on vessels and planes, and the property owner is required to submit the application for registration of property to taxation institutions within 20 days of property ownership and register the property.

Individuals who have inherited properties in EDZs and residents in EDZs who inherited properties outside EDZs are bound to pay inheritance tax and the rate is 6 to 30 per cent.

Turnover tax rate is 1-15 per cent of the sales proceeds of products or income from construction work guidance and 16 to 50 per cent in case of defined luxury articles.

Service tax rate is 1-10 per cent, and up to 50 per cent tax rate is applied to special entertainment category, but it is reduced by 50 per cent for businesses engaged in the latest science and technology service sector.

Resource tax rate varies from 1 to 20 per cent according to its kinds and it may be exempted in case the resources are exported in the form of processed products with high value based on modernized technological processes, or sold to local institutions, businesses and organizations by government measures.

It may be reduced by 50 per cent in case the businesses engaged in the special priority sector uses underground water for production.

City management tax rate is 1 per cent and businesses and individuals must pay vehicle taxes on the use of cars and other road vehicles.

Read the full story here:
Regulations on tax in EDZ worked out
Pyongyang Times
2015-11-15

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Tumen Triangle tribulations: The unfulfilled promise of Chinese, Russian and North Korean cooperation

Thursday, November 12th, 2015

Andray Abrahamian has published a report with the US-Korea Institute on developments in the Tumen Triangle.

Here is the report description:

The Tumen Triangle region-where North Korea, China and Russia meet-is, in many ways, the story of regional integration being held back by the political concerns of Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow. There are long-term forces at work here, such as Moscow’s concerns over Chinese dominance in the sparsely populated Russian Far East. This legacy of mistrust frames cross-border interactions and despite recent warm relations, major cross-border cooperation remains limited.

In this USKI Special Report, Andray Abrahamian, Director of Research at Choson Exchange examines historical legacies, contemporary relations and shifting strategic priorities between the three countries. The report then focuses trade and investment in the Tumen Triangle region, particularly how the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Primorsky Krai interact with and affect Rason Special City, the center of the Rason Special Economic Zone.

You can download the report here (PDF).

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North Korean food shortage news roundup: October and November (updated)

Tuesday, November 10th, 2015

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

This summer and fall has seen a somewhat contradictory stream of information about the North Korean food situation. First there were the drought warnings, which were closely followed by regime sources claiming that harvests were actually getting better thanks to agricultural reforms. During the fall, however, the picture painted by multilateral institutions like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP) has been one of dire and continued problems.

In early October, the FAO said that North Korea’s staple food production could go down by 14 percent during the year compared to last year, as AFP reported:

North Korea’s staple food production could plummet by 14 percent this year because of bad weather, sparking fears of exacerbating chronic food shortages in the impoverished nation, according to the UN agricultural agency.

The gloomy forecast from the Food and Agriculture Organization comes as the reclusive communist country prepares for a lavish military parade Saturday to mark the 70th anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party.

The North is expected to produce 3.7 million tonnes of rice and corn this year, down from 4.3 million tonnes last year, according to a report from the FAO early warning system.

Pyongyang plans to import 500,000 tonnes of rice and corn from abroad, the FAO said, but it will not be enough to feed its 25 million people.

The country, plagued by regular droughts, will face a total shortfall of 1.2 million tonnes of its staples.

State media reported in early June the country’s main rice-growing areas had been badly hit by the “worst drought in 100 years”.

North Korea saw significant rainfall later, but analysts said the prospects for this year were still grim.

Full story here:
North Korea food production could drop 14%: FAO 
Yahoo News/AFP
10-9-2015

Later last month, the FAO reiterated its concerns over North Korea in its yearly report on the state of agriculture in the world. Voice of America:

More than 26 percent of children in North Korea’s countryside are underweight, a U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization report says.

The agency, in its recently released “State of Food and Agriculture 2015” report, also estimated that there are twice as many undernourished children in the communist country’s rural areas as in its cities.

Andre Croppenstedt, an FAO researcher who wrote the report, told VOA that “it’s normal to have a much higher percentage of children underweight in rural areas as opposed to urban areas,” but that the gap “is perhaps a little larger than usual” in North Korea.

The North Korean ratio is the 24th highest among the 123 low-income developing countries. Among East Asian countries, North Korea’s ratio ranked fifth, after East Timor, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea and Laos.

Read the full story here:
FAO: 1 in 4 Rural North Korean Children Underweight
Kim Hyunjin
Voice of America
10-22-2015

And last month, WFP announced it was extending its aid to North Korea over next year due to expected food shortages. Voice of America again:

The United Nations’ food agency plans to extend aid to North Korea amid reports that the communist country is facing food shortages next year.

Damian Kean, a regional spokesperson for the World Food Program (WFP), told VOA this week the agency plans to extend the current food aid program for another six months.

“This current program cycle is supposed to be finished this December. What we decided to do is to extend the program until the middle of next year,” said Kean.

He added that the agency needs an additional $23.3 million to fund the extension.

The WFP is conducting an assessment of the nutritional status of North Koreans to determine if further assistance is needed after June of next year, Kean said.

The agency launched a two-year food aid program in July 2013, and it had already extended the program through the end of this year.

According to Kean, the food shortages are affecting the most vulnerable groups, including young children and pregnant women.  More than 30 percent of North Korean children under five are experiencing stunted growth because of malnutrition, and more than a third of pregnant women and breastfeeding women are suffering from anemia.

Full story here:
UN to extend aid to North Korea
Kim Hyunjin
Voice of America
11-03-2015

This all suggests, as one might have expected, that North Korean claims of successful agricultural reforms may not have been the whole truth. At the very minimum, had such reforms had a strong and positive impact, harvests shouldn’t be declining compared with last year. Or harvests could just be stronger than what they would have been after the drought absent economic reforms. In any case, North Korean claims of a growing harvest do not seem to have held out.

UPDATE 10-10-2015:

Marcus Noland at the Peterson Institute’s Witness to Transformation Blog offers an interesting theory on these numbers: they aren’t that bad when compared with output over the last decade.

Last week Yonhap ran a story titled “N.K. may suffer severe food shortage next year: S. Korean expert” in which Kwon Tae-jin, formerly of the Korea Rural Economics Institute and now at the GS&J Institute, argued that North Korea may be facing its greatest food shortage of the Kim Jong Un era. Numerous articles, citing reports from the UN system, have highlighted high rates of malnutrition, particularly among vulnerable groups such as children.

The problem is that while the situation appears to be deteriorating relative to last year, as shown in the chart above, the FAO forecast of actual food availability per capita for 2015-16 actually represents a slight improvement over conditions for most of this decade.

Detailed data from the FAO displayed in the table below confirm that while production is forecasted to decline for coarse grains, maize, and rice, only in the case of rice is output forecasted to be below the 2011-13 average, and in this case, increased imports are expected to offset most of the shortfall.

Full story here:
Is North Korean food insecurity being hyped? 
Marcus Noland
Witness to Transformation
10-10-2015

What I wonder still is what this says about the progress of reforms, even if the figures aren’t particularly alarming. Also, the trend has been an increase in harvest figures over the past few years. So even if these figures aren’t particularly out of range, they still go against a trend of growth.

 

UPDATE (11-27-2015): Daily NK interviews one person in the country who says that this year saw a bumper harvest despite weather conditions, but not thanks to state reforms. The article says it’s not thanks to increases in collective farm harvests that things are going better, but because those tending individual plots have found better farming methods:

However, the number of people working hard to ensure the success of the rice harvests on collective farms is dropping. This is in large part due to the fact that despite reassurances from the state that farmers will receive sizable allocations of the harvest for their own use, for the past several years this has not been the case.

After “repeated failures by the authorities to fulfill stated promises,” he asserted, farmers have concluded that it makes no difference to them personally whether the collective farms do well or not.

Read the full article:
Despite Mother Nature, a bumper year for rice harvest
Lee Sang Yong
DailyNK
11-26-2015

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New taxes to kick in for KIC firms

Wednesday, November 4th, 2015

According to Yonhap:

South Korean firms operating in North Korea are required to pay a land use fee starting this year, officials here said Wednesday, after a decade of exemption.

The relevant authorities of the two Koreas will soon begin talks on how much more the 120 South Korean companies in the Kaesong Industrial Complex should pay, they added.

Launching the facilities in 2004, the North agreed to exempt the South from a land use fee for a decade. The measure expires this year.

“It’s a kind of tax to be paid once a year,” a Unification Ministry official said. “Thus, the North’s Central Special Development Guidance Bureau and the South’s Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee should begin consultations before long.”

The two sides recently ended months of negotiations on the level of wages for around 53,000 North Korean workers in the Kaesong zone near the inter-Korean border.

They agreed on a 5-percent increase in minimum wages from US$70.35 a month.

Read the dull story here:
S. Korea to pay ‘tax’ for Kaesong complex
Yonhap
2015-11-4

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Factory owners rent out unused space

Monday, November 2nd, 2015

According to the Daily NK:

Recently in South Pyongan Province, the practice of renting out sections of state-run factories to individual entrepreneurs is taking off. This latest development is further evidence of de facto private enterprise flourishing on the back of state facilities.

“There is a factory that manufactures coal mining equipment located in a building that is now partially rented to a donju [literally ‘money masters,’ or new affluent middle class] who is making shoes there. By renting out the building, the authorities can also make ‘a little extra’, which is a nice benefit for them,” a source in South Pyongan Province reported to Daily NK on October 27.

“‘A little extra’ refers to profits falling outside of enterprise work quotas utilizing state labor and raw materials.”

An additional source in the same province corroborated this news.

She added that the officials in charge of the factory must first make sure that they will be able to sell enough of the extra goods manufactured by the donju on the market to make it worth their while. If they calculate that it will be a profitable good to sell, they go ahead and agree to rent out part of the factory warehouse.

Winter is, without fail, a busy season for shoe markets in North Korea. Demand explodes for cotton wool and fur shoes to prevent frostbite. North Koreans put cotton wool into black or army green cloth to make shoes known as “Tong (a mispronunciation of the word Chinese-derived word in Korean meaning ‘winter’) Shoes”. Fur shoes are boots made of synthetic leather and stuffed with compressed cotton wool or sheep wool.

As North Korea’s primary shoe factories, “Pyongyang Shoe Factory” and “Sinuiju Shoe Factory” receive a quota for the number of shoes they should produce to distribute seasonally, they cannot adjust their production levels to meet actual market demand. This leaves a hole in the market the donju are keen to step in and fill.

What really determines the quality of wool or fur shoes is the sole. The donju buy rubber in the general markets and hire laborers to construct soles from it in, as might be expected, exceedingly unsafe work environments. With no access to safety masks, let alone other protective gear, workers inhale overwhelming quantities of noxious gases in the process.

Nonetheless, workers eager to do the job are never in short supply– those hired for the task are paid who wages 2-3 times that of typical day laborers working for the donju.

Although it is possible to sew the leather outer parts and midsoles of shoes at home, proper equipment is required to produce quality insoles. Rubber is pulverized, reconstituted using a machine, and then mixed with fresh rubber to fabricate insoles. However, a compressor is needed to complete this task, which is where the factories come in.

These days, although it is possible to earn a fair amount of money producing goods at home, “if you’re more ambitious and want to enter into large-scale production you’ll run into an electricity supply problem,” the source noted.

“While it can be said that utilizing the unused space of factories contributes to national production, in the end it’s really the factory’s supply of electricity that proves to be the lure.”

In fact, the first thing donju check when scouting a factory to approach is that the facility has a stable power supply. If all on this front checks out, the donju seek out the cadres in charge and set up a contract stipulating that said entrepreneur pay 30% of his or her profits from the sale of goods produced in the factory as rent.

The factories involved in these deals are typically those associated with the coal mining industry. These enterprises produce the majority of the equipment used in North Korea’s coal mines, and because iron is the most used raw material in the production of the related equipment, such factories receive a larger allotment of electricity than typical light industry factories.

There are, of course, other types of factories receiving steady streams of electricity, but for the time being, they are off limits, according to the source. By way of example, the source explained that because munitions factories harbor a litany of “national secrets, ordinary citizens cannot access them no matter how much money they spend.”

And yet, the fact that North Korea’s donju are now turning their focus towards the production of consumer goods can be interpreted as yet another sign of North Korea’s ever-expanding marketization.

She analyzed these trends as follows: (1) as the relative purchasing power of North Korea increases, demand is increasing as well; (2) markets are developing within North Korea, and state-operated stores are also being rented out and run as de facto private operations; (3), the number of retail outlets selling consumer goods is skyrocketing; (4) the use of ‘servi-cha’ has especially improved the distribution process; and (5) compared to goods directly imported from China, the price competitiveness of local goods has improved as well.

In the past, North Korea’s foreign-currency earning enterprises or the donju would go to Zhejiang Province in China or other regions with low labor costs and import large quantities of consumer goods at low prices to distribute within North Korea.

However, these cheap goods fall short of satisfying the market preferences of North Korean citizens today, the source concluded.

Read the full story here:
As factories rent out space, donju move in and set up shop
Daily NK
Seol Song Ah
2015-11-2

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DPRK tourism revenue estimates

Sunday, November 1st, 2015

According to Yonhap:

North Korea earned tens of millions of dollars from foreign tourists in 2014, around half of the hard currency it won from the lucrative inter-Korean industrial park, a researcher said Sunday.

North Korea’s income from foreign tourists is estimated at US$30.6 million to $43.6 million last year, considering about 95,000 Chinese tourists and 5,000 tourists from Western countries visited the country, Yoon In-ju of the Korea Maritime Institute said in a paper.

North Korea’s annual income from the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the North’s border town of Kaesong, accommodating 124 South Korean firms that employ more than 50,000 North Korean workers, reached $86 million in 2014.

North Korea has launched a drive to woo foreign tourists since leader Kim Jong-un assumed power in 2011 by introducing a variety of tour packages that give participants sports, military and labor experiences.

North Korea, however, lacks enough infrastructure, such as transportation and lodgings, to attract foreign tourists, Yoon said, adding the North’s policy of allowing only group tours and limiting tourist destinations also serve as obstacles to foreigners investing in infrastructure, as well as tourists.

I have not read the report, and have been unable to find a copy in English, but I want to highlight that there is a difference in the kind of revenue that is earn from tourism versus from the KIC.

The KIC earns $US in cash, which are delivered from the South Koreans to the North Korean government. Because South Koreans cover all the expenses in the KIC, the DPRK government’s gross take effectively equals net take (100% of proceeds). However with tourism, gross take  is not what the government actually receives. Tour operators take a cut, KITC takes a cut, guides take a cut, restaurants and hotels take a cut. Local governments take a cut. Of course how the average tourist dollar is divided up remains a mystery, but it is not anywhere near the government’s 100% share that the KIC draws.

This distinction may have been addressed in the paper, but the Yonhap report did not make that clear.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s income from tourism half of that from Kaesong complex
Yonhap
2015-11-1

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The (Market) Forces of History in North Korea

Friday, October 30th, 2015

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The market is a common topic for debate in history. How did it impact the rise of the anti-slavery movement in the US and the UK? What impact did economic conditions have in the French Revolution? These questions are, and should be, asked in the current debate about North Korea’s socioeconomic development as well.

But despite the hope of many, the market might not simply be a story of growing individualism and disconnect from the power of the state. While such a trend may well be at work, it could also be the other way around.

This was recently illuminated through an interesting story by Reuters. In a visit to Pyongyang, they took a look at how markets and everyday business transaction function in North Korea at the moment. As they note, it is telling that a reporter from an international news agency can make transactions in the open, with a government minder by his side, at the black market rate. Business that previously had to be done in the shadows now happens in the open:

Shoppers openly slapped down large stacks of U.S. dollars at the cashier’s counter. They received change in dollars, Chinese yuan or North Korean won – at the black market rate. The same was true elsewhere in the capital: taxi drivers offered change for fares at black market rates, as did other shops and street stalls that Reuters visited.

The most obvious conclusion is that the state is adapting itself to the bottom-up development of the market. Indeed, this is the way the story is often told. In this narrative, the government is only reacting to developments and has long lost the economic policy initiative.

But one could also see a government that is confident enough to relax the rules. It just isn’t a certain fact that the state and the market are two opposing entities.

First, connections to the state still seem to be good for those wanting to trade on the market. For example, according to the surveys conducted by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland that laid the foundation for Witness to Transformation (2011)party membership is still considered one of the best ways to get ahead in North Korea (or at least it was at the time when the surveys were conducted). A somewhat similar trend can be discerned in survey results presented by Byung-Yeon Kim of Seoul National University at a conference at Johns Hopkins SAIS in late September this year. Kim’s results also indicate that there is a strong positive correlation between party membership and participation in both the formal and informal economy.

Second, the government is making money off of the market. DailyNK recently reported that the fees charged by state authorities for market stalls was raised. They also noted that regulations of the markets seemed to have gotten more detailed over the years. As noted in this report published by the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, the space that the government allocates to markets has consistently increased in the past few years. Not only have official markets grown, many of them have also been renovated and given better building structures.

All in all, this paints a picture of a government that controls markets while allowing them more space to function. It is not clear that formerly black market activity happening in the open means that the market is gaining ground at the expense of the state. They may well be moving together. That is good news for those hoping for stability, but bad news for those banking on a market-induced revolution. Despite the hope of many that the market will cause the demise of the regime, the role of the market force in North Korea’s history is far from clear.

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On recent economic developments in the DPRK

Thursday, October 29th, 2015

James Pearson writes in Reuters:

When North Korea’s late “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il opened the Pothonggang Department Store in December 2010, he called on it to play “a big role” in improving living standards in the capital Pyongyang, official media said.

Five years later, judging by the long lines inside the three-storey store that sells everything from electronic gadgets and cosmetics, to food and household goods, the Pothonggang is meeting Kim’s expectations – at least for privileged Pyongyang residents.

But the department store also starkly illustrates the extent to which the underground market has become the new normal in isolated North Korea. And that poses a dilemma to the Kim family’s hereditary dictatorship, which up until now has kept tight control of a Soviet-style command economy, largely synonymous with rationing and material deprivation. Now that the black market has become the new normal, Kim Jong Un’s government has little choice but to continue its fledgling efforts at economic reforms that reflect market realities on the ground or risk losing its grip on power, experts say.

A Reuters reporter, allowed to roam the store with a government minder for a look at the North Korean consumer in action, noted almost all the price tags were in dollars as well as won. A Sharp TV was priced at 11.26 million won or $1,340; a water pump at 2.52 million won ($300). Beef was 76,000 won ($8.60) a kilogramme. North Korean-made LED light bulbs sold for 42,000 won ($5). The exchange rate used in these prices – 8,400 won to the dollar – is 80 times higher than the official rate of 105 won to the dollar. At the official rate, the TV would cost over $100,000; the light bulb, $400.

Shoppers openly slapped down large stacks of U.S. dollars at the cashier’s counter. They received change in dollars, Chinese yuan or North Korean won – at the black market rate. The same was true elsewhere in the capital: taxi drivers offered change for fares at black market rates, as did other shops and street stalls that Reuters visited.

For the last twenty years, North Korea has been undergoing economic changes, the fruits of which are now more visible than ever in the capital, Pyongyang, where large North Korean companies now produce a diverse range of domestically made goods to cater to this growing market of consumers. People are spending money they once hid in their homes on mobile phones, electric bicycles and baby carriers.

The latest sign that the workers’ paradise is going capitalist: cash cards from commercial banks.

GREW OUT OF FAMINE

Four months before Kim opened the Pothonggang Department Store, the United States imposed sanctions on North Korea, including its imports of luxury goods, for torpedoing a South Korean ship – a conclusion Pyongyang rejected. Since then, the U.N. has imposed more sanctions on North Korea for violating restrictions on its nuclear and missile programmes.

None of that has had much effect on the vast majority of North Koreans living in the countryside, where a rudimentary market has evolved considerably over the past two decades. Agricultural mismanagement, floods and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to famine in the mid-1990s. The state rationing system crumbled, forcing millions of North Koreans to make whatever they could to sell or barter informally for survival.

The regime penalised this new class of entrepreneurs in 2009 when it redenominated the won by lopping off two zeros and setting limits on the quantity of old won that could be exchanged for the new currency. That move ended up destroying much of the private wealth earned on the market.

Demand for hard currency surged after the bungled currency reform as more and more merchants in the underground markets required transactions to be conducted in foreign currency. It triggered two years of hyperinflation.

But the government of Kim Jong Un, who became North Korea’s leader after his father’s death in December 2011, has essentially accepted the ubiquity of the black market rate and a widespread illicit economy, North Korea experts say.

“Under Kim Jong Un, not a single policy has been implemented which would somehow damage the interests and efficiency of private businesses,” said Andrei Lankov, a North Korea expert at Kookmin University in Seoul.

“It’s a good time to be rich in North Korea”.

THE NEW CONSUMER

Many of the goods inside the Pothonggang Department Store, a grey building nestled between willow trees and a river of the same name, are still beyond the reach of many North Koreans.

An air conditioning unit sells for 3.78 million won ($450 dollars) – which if paid in won would require a bag of 756 five thousand won notes, the highest denomination note in won.

A growing middle class called “donju”, meaning “masters of money”, who made cash in the unofficial economy are starting to spend it on these new products, along with the long established elite of Humvee-owning individuals with powerful political connections.

Only recently an elite item, mobile phones are now common in the capital, with nationwide subscriber numbers topping three million, an employee with Koryolink, the cellular carrier controlled by Egypt’s Orascom Telecom told Reuters.

The number has tripled since 2012 and indicates one in eight of North Korea’s 24 million people now have a mobile phone.

Energy-saving products are a fast-growing sector of North Korea’s new consumer market and were one of the hottest items in the department store.

Domestically produced LED bulbs are ubiquitous in North Korea, where satellite images have shown a country almost completely black at night. The 9-watt bulb costs $5 and is a best-seller at the Pothonggang store, said a staff member. The energy-saving bulbs are used inside homes and on street lamps that now bask the formerly darkened streets of the Pyongyang night in a dull, faint glow.

Solar panels with USB-enabled inverters and batteries are available in the store alongside water pumps and small generators – exactly the kind of systems North Koreans now use to take power into their own hands.

CASH CARDS

Baby products are another booming consumer item. A large section of the department store is devoted to strollers and baby carriers produced in China and South Korea.

Many residents of Pyongyang can be seen riding Chinese-made battery powered bicycles, which only began to appear in the capital over the last year, locals said.

Some of these transactions are done with the Narae Card, a cash card run by North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank – a designated entity under U.S. sanctions since 2013 for the part it reportedly played in nuclear weapons procurement.

Cash cards have been in the hands of the few for the last several years but have recently become a new growth industry. Narae cards are topped up with U.S. dollars and are mainly used for foreign currency purchases. They can also be used to top up mobile phone accounts.

Foreign investors can also set up banks in North Korea and are allowed to lend money and provide credit-based financing schemes to North Korean companies, according to a bilingual book of North Korean law available to foreign investors.

Ryugyong Commercial Bank, for instance, offers shopping discounts as well as gold or silver card options for its customers. As with the Narae card, customers are encouraged to top up their accounts with dollars.

LOSING FACE?

After a $4 dollar taxi ride, the driver reluctantly handed the change from a twenty dollar note to a Reuters correspondent who insisted on getting change in North Korean won.

Foreigners are not officially permitted to use the currency, so the openness of the transaction – in the presence of a government guide – was another sign of the black market turning white in north Korea. The driver’s reluctance to hand over won was because of its inconvenience, not because he was afraid of being caught.

“It’s a lot of notes in our money,” he grumbled, counting out 130,000 won from a large crumpled bundle of discoloured 5000 won notes.

That note, still the highest denomination, once carried a smiling portrait of founding president Kim Il Sung but is being gradually phased out by a version with no portrait – an indication a larger denomination note may one day replace it to accommodate the widespread use of black market pricing.

That would also get around the embarrassing problem that the faces of American and Chinese leaders, not the Kims, adorn much of the cash used in the country now. For a regime that has cultivated a personality cult around the Kim dynasty, it is quite literally losing face on its own money.

MATTER OF TIME

Where there’s commercial enterprise, advertising is sure to follow. Sprinkled in among the roadside signs and billboards, once the exclusive domain for propaganda, are small notices that tout car repair services, electronics and trading companies

One prominent company, Naegohyang [Naekohyang/내고향] (my homeland) advertises at football games and has a women’s football team by the same name. It produces everything from clothes and sanitary pads to 7.27 brand cigarettes, a favourite of Kim Jong Un’s who can be seen smoking them on state TV. They also make ‘Achim’ cigarettes for export to Iran with printed health warnings written in Farsi.

At a speech following a military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the ruling Workers Party, Kim Jong Un promised to introduce “people-first” politics. It remains unclear, however, how committed he and his Workers Party – not to mention the powerful military – are to market-based reforms.

But it’s only a matter of time before the Kim regime formally adopts a market-based economy – as China did 35 years ago under Deng Xiaoping, said Kookmin University’s Lankov, who lived in Pyonyang in the 1980s.

“That’ll be a great day, but it’ll be relatively meaningless in one regard,” he said. “It’ll be a formal recognition of something which has happened anyway”.

Read the full story here:
North Korea’s black market becoming the new normal
James Pearson
Reuters
2015-10-29

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Kaesong Complex’s cumulative output reaches USD$3 billion

Monday, October 12th, 2015

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)

The Kaesong Industrial Complex has reached 3 billion USD (3.5 trillion won) in cumulative output since it started operation 11 years ago. According to the Ministry of Unification, between 2005 (when operation went into full swing) and July 2015, the complex’s total output reached 2,996,160 USD.

This year the Kaesong complex recorded a total of 320 million USD in output through July, an average of 46 million USD each month. This guarantees that cumulative production surpassed 3 billion USD sometime in August.

The annual output of the Kaesong Industrial Complex started at 14.9 million USD in 2005 and reached 180 million USD in 2007, exceeding 100 million USD for the first time.

Except for 2013 (when operations were suspended for about five months), output has grown rapidly each year since 2007, shooting up to 470 million USD last year.

While it took the complex five years to reach 1 billion USD in cumulative output, it took only three additional years to surpass 2 billion USD by 2013, and just two more years to exceed 3 billion USD.

If the complex can maintain a similar rate of output in the second half of this year as in the first half (it produced 278 million dollars-worth in the first half), this year it will surpass an annual output of 500 million USD for the first time.

Even between March and May of this year, when tensions were heightened due to North Korea’s demands for a unilateral minimum wage increase, production was up 10-20 percent over the previous year. Thus, the Kaesong Industrial Complex has maintained a stable growth rate.

The number of resident companies at the complex has also increased significantly. While in 2005 only 18 companies did business at the complex, currently there are 124. Furthermore, the number of North Korean workers at the complex has risen nine-fold, from 6,000 at the beginning of its operation to approximately 54,000 at present.

Looking at the Kaesong complex companies by industry, textile companies account for over half of companies at 58 percent; machinery metal companies account for 19 percent; electronics companies, 11 percent; and chemicals companies, 7 percent.

The cumulative number of people who have visited the Kaesong Industrial Complex reached 1,100,000 this August, while 723,000 vehicles have visited the complex.

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