North Korean Economy Watch

According to the Daily NK:

Overall average prices in North Korea have doubled since the end of last year.

Sources say that the reason behind the price rises is insufficient supplies within North Korea coupled to the effect of relatively strict crackdowns on the smuggling of goods in from China.

Rice is now reportedly 2,000 won per kilo (as of the 11th). Late last year it was between 900 and 1,000 won.

In late January, rice even reportedly reached 3,000 won in some areas. A source explained why, “There were rumors that state rice stores were empty, because even those people who are targeted for state distribution didn’t get any food in late January in some areas.” So, he went on, “Around that time, wholesalers colluded to fixed the price at 3,000 won.”

Thereafter, the source said, “Now, rice has dropped to around 2,000won,” explaining that, “When the price went up, the supply increased, so the price was amended again.” According to the latest research by The Daily NK, rice is now selling for 2,000 won in Pyongyang and Shinuiju, while in Nampo it is 1,900 won and 1,800 won in Hyesan..

Corn, which generally costs half as much as rice, now sells for between 1,000 and 1,200 won, which is exactly double the price at the end of last year. Pork, which sold for 3,500 won per kilo in December last year, now goes for 6,500 won.

Sugar is even worse, having tripled: late last year it was 1,700 won per kilo, but has now reached more than 5,000 won. Red chilli pepper powder has also gone up from 7,000 won per kilo to 15,000 won.

Even though the North Korean authorities emphasized improving light industrial and agricultural production in the New Year’s Common Editorial, in reality the country is experiencing serious inflation due to a lack of goods in the markets. Therefore, it seems inevitable that people’s lives will get harder.

Read the full story here:
Inflation on the Rise in 2011
Daily NK
By Park Jun Hyeong
2/13/2011

Writing at his new blog, Marcus Noland argues that KOTRA overstates the percentage of the DPRK’s trade coming from China.

According to Noland, there are several problems with KOTRA data that makes it less than ideal for drawing policy conclusions.  KOTRA counts DPRK-ROK trade as a domestic exchange, not international trade.  Once corrections are made for South Korean trade and a few other tweaks, China’s share of North Korean trade falls from appx 80% to 30%.

In a different but related story, Yonhap reports on research findings by Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at the Nixon Center.  According to the report:

China’s investment in North Korea was less than US$100 million between 2003 and 2009, indicating Beijing’s investment projects in the reclusive country are still relatively small, a U.S. scholar said Thursday.

Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at the Washington-based Nixon Center, said Chinese investment in North Korea totaled $98.3 million over the seven-year period, compared to $1.2 billion in South Korea during the same period.

It was also less than China’s investments in other neighboring states, including $273 million in Thailand, $473 million in Vietnam, $729.8 million in Myanmar and $890.7 million in Mongolia over the same period.

The majority of Chinese investors in North Korea are small and medium enterprises, though some smaller firms enjoy brand recognition, such as Nanjing Panda Electronics Co., China Minmetals Corp. and Wanxiang Group, the scholar said.

The majority of Chinese investors in North Korea are not state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the Chinese central government, but privately owned companies and provincial-, prefecture- and municipal-owned SOEs.

Of the 138 Chinese-North Korean joint ventures established between 1997 and August 2010, 41 percent engage in mining, 38 percent in light industry, 13 percent in services and 8 percent in heavy industry, he said.

Thompson said Chinese investors in North Korea are geographically concentrated in the two northeastern provinces bordering North Korea.

Twenty-eight percent of Chinese companies involved in joint ventures are from Jilin, with 34 percent from Liaoning. The rest are from other regions, including Beijing, Shandong and Shanghai.

Jilin and Liaoning share a 1,400 kilometer border with North Korea and are increasingly focused on foreign trade and on achieving competitive economic advantages through their proximity to North Korea.

“(North Korea’s) joint ventures with China are an important aspect of the bilateral relationship, because in addition to propping up the regime in Pyongyang, they contribute to economic development in China’s northeastern ‘rust belt,'” the scholar said in an emailed note.

China’s northeastern region is seen as the country’s rust belt, covered with obsolete and unprofitable factories.

According to Yonhap:

North Korea and China are expected to sign an agreement on joint development of the North’s underground resources in the middle of this month in Beijing, a source here said Sunday.

“It has been learned that Pyongyang and Beijing are expected to conclude a deal to jointly develop North Korea’s underground resources on Feb. 15, one day before the birthday of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il,” said the source, noting the accord will be signed in Beijing between China’s Commerce Ministry and the North’s Joint Venture Investment Committee.

“Specifically, the two sides may agree to jointly develop natural resources such as gold, anthracites and rare earths under the bilateral deal. Following the agreement, the two countries are likely to establish a joint venture company in Hong Kong,” said the source, asking to remain anonymous.

Trade between North Korea and China reached US$3.06 billion in the first 11 months of last year, which marked a rise of 9.6 percent from the 2008 annual volume of $2.7 billion. Mineral resources like coals and iron ores account for over 30 percent of the North’s exports to China.

Chinese mining investors have had mixed results in the DPRK despite geographical proximity and monopsony purchasing power (the Chinese can offer lower prices because in many cases they are the only purchaser/investor).

At one point, a Chinese firm had a controlling share of the DPRK’s Hyesan Youth Copper mine (Satellite image here).  As best I can tell, the mine is no longer operable because of flooding from nearby dam construction.

A Chinese firm had also invested in the Musan Mine, the DPRK’s largest, conveniently located on the Chinese border (Satellite image here). This deal also fell trough (see here).

I have heard informally that Chinese mining investors do not particularly like doing business in the DPRK because their North Korean business partners routinely violate contract terms and local officials need to be bribed repeatedly.  Today Chinese mining firms operate across the world in both developing and developed countries, so why bother with the DPRK?

The particular deal mentioned in this Yonhap article is interesting because it hints that the Chinese and North Korean central governments are setting the terms for mining investment in the DPRK for the first time.  This will give local officials less room for post-contractual rent-seeking behavior and could smooth the way for regular/predictable business operations in the DPRK.

Again, centralized corruption is preferable to decentralized corruption for investors.

Read the full Yonhap story here:
N. Korea, China likely to ink deal on joint resource development
Yonhap
2/6/2011

In addition to the Haggard/Noland book release, there were a couple of other interesting North Korea events in Washington DC this week that I wanted to point out:

1. Korea Economic Institute: The Markets of Pyongyang
John Everard, UK Ambassador to the DPRK (2006-2008)

-Read his paper here (PDF).
-See his power point presentation here (PDF).
-See his full presentation in three parts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3.

2. US-Korea Institute at SAIS: Silent Partners: Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea
Drew Thompson, Director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center

-The event web page is here.
-Read an executive summary here
-Read the paper here.

Both papers are well worth reading.

I was in Washington today for the release of Haggard’s and Noland’s new book Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. According to the Peterson Institute’s web page:

Despite its nuclear capability, in certain respects North Korea resembles a failed state sitting uneasily atop a shifting internal foundation. This instability is due in part to the devastating famine of the 1990s and the state’s inability to fulfill the economic obligations that it had assumed, forcing institutions, enterprises, and households to cope with the ensuing challenges of maintaining stability with limited cooperation between the Korean government and the international community. The ineffective response to the humanitarian crisis triggered by the famine resulted in the outflow of perhaps tens of thousands of refugees whose narratives are largely overlooked in evaluating the efficacy of the humanitarian aid program. Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea uses extensive surveys with refugees who now reside in China or South Korea to provide extraordinary insight into the changing pathways to power, wealth, and status within North Korea. These refugee testimonies provide an invaluable interpretation of the regime, its motivations, and its capabilities and assess the situation on the ground with the rise of inequality, corruption, and disaffection in the decade since the famine. Through the lens of these surveys, preeminent North Korean experts Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland carefully document the country’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a highly distorted market economy, characterized by endemic corruption and widening inequality. The authors chart refugees’ reactions to the current conditions and consider the disparity between the perceived and real benefit of the international humanitarian aid program experienced by this displaced population. Finally, the book examines these refugees’ future prospects for integration into a new society.

I have read the book and found it tremendously helpful for understanding the changing dynamics within the DPRK.

In conjunction with the release of the book, the two authors have launched a new blog.  You can see it here. They have already posted some fantastic data—and we can also see a sense of humor as well!

UPDATE:

1. Here is a link to the presentation given at the event.

2. Here is coverage in the Daily NK.

3. Here is coverage in the AFP.

According to the Choson Ilbo:

The price of rice and foreign currency exchange rate in North Korea have both dropped drastically in a matter of a week, according to Radio Free Asia.

The radio station reported Saturday that rice in Hyesan, Yanggang Province was selling for 2,000 won per kg as of Friday, down from 3,300 won or nearly 40 percent from six days earlier. The Chinese yuan was trading for 400 North Korean won, down from 520.

A local source said that various rumors had prompted merchants to stockpile rice and then suddenly release it. The source also added that the rice requisitioned for the military, a key cause of recent price increases, is being siphoned off and sold, bringing the price down.

Read the full story here:
Rice Prices in N.Korea Plunge 40%
Choson Ilbo
1/31/2011

Andrei Lankov writes in the Korea Times about the state of the North Korean economy.  Excerpt below:

The existing statistics are remarkably untrustworthy, being essentially educated guesses by analysts. Nonetheless, these statistics indicate a moderate growth of the North Korean economy.

But the present author talks to North Koreans quite frequently. So I don’t need statistics to confirm what becomes clear from my talks with refugees, smugglers, migrant workers and those Koreans who have illegal Chinese mobile phones. Throughout the last ten years the economic situation in the country has improved, even though this improvement was very moderate.

What does “improvement” in this context exactly mean? First of all, few if any North Koreans now face the threat of starvation, though malnourishment remains a widespread problem. Many (perhaps, a majority) of North Koreans don’t have enough to eat in spring. This has a seriously negative impact on their health and is especially bad for children. Nonetheless, unlike the 1990s, it seldom leads to death.

The average North Korean meal is a bowl of boiled corn with a few pickles. Meat or fish are eaten only on special occasions or by affluent people.

Indeed the last decade was a time when material inequality increased in leaps and bounds. Some of the new rich are officials who take advantage of their positions while others are successful entrepreneurs running all kinds of private businesses.

A successful North Korean entrepreneur nowadays might even openly own a car. For instance in a relatively small borderland city with a population of some 90,000 people there are officially three private cars. Much more frequently well-to-do North Koreans prefer to register their cars with state agencies. At any rate, ten years ago a private car was almost unthinkable.

The less successful entrepreneurs or craftsmen are still doing quite well as indicated by significant increase in the number of consumer durables owned by North Koreans. Fifteen years ago a fridge was a sign of exceptional luxury, almost as rare as a private jet in the U.S. Now it’s a bit like a luxury car, an item that 10-20 percent of households can afford.

What is also interesting is the spread of computers, including privately owned ones. In most cases these are old, used computers which are imported or smuggled from China. They are quite outdated but they are computers nonetheless. Recently I interviewed a group of school teachers from the countryside, and they said that nowadays every high school, even in remote parts of the country, is likely to have at least one computer (admittedly, this wonderful contraption is seldom switched on).

This does not mean of course that North Korea has become a consumer paradise. In spite of some improvements, the gap between the North and its successful neighbors continues to widen. However in absolute terms the North Korean economy is not shrinking any more.

There have been serious setbacks, the currency reform early last year is a perfect example. For a while, this failure almost paralyzed the economy and created serious food shortages across the country.

But what brought about this moderate growth? It seems that there are three major contributing factors.

First, North Korea has been quite good at begging and blackmailing the outside world into providing aid. The aid was initially provided by South Korea and the U.S., but now it comes almost exclusively from China.

Second, North Korea’s technocrats have learned how to run the country in its new situation. They are not very efficient at this, but, to quote Marcus Noland, “they are muddling through.”

The present author is inclined to believe that it is the third reason which is the most important of all. Over the last decade a relatively powerful private economy has developed in North Korea. North Koreans did not merely learn how to trade privately, they now produce privately as well and this growth of industry invisibly and privately, seems to have contributed to the growth described above.

The growth is moderate, and no breakthrough is likely. Nonetheless, it is real and palpable.

Read the full story here:
Between myths and facts
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
1/30/2011

Pictured above: Nampho Glass Bottle Factory visited by Kim Jong-il

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
(NK Brief No. 11-01-26)
1/26/2011

According to North Korean media, Kim Jong Il began this year’s onsite instruction with a visit to the Nampo Glass Bottle Factory. The January 20th issue of the Choson Sinbo also ran an editorial stating that “These days, in our country, improving the lives of the people is especially emphasized.” It also noted that Kim Jong Il’s first onsite visit of the year was to a site important to improving people’s standard of living. The paper boasted that great efforts were being made in the development of light industry — especially factories producing daily-use goods and food products — and revealed that the bottle factory in Nampo will play an important role in meeting the increased countrywide demands for packaging from factories large and small.

Despite this praise, the reality is that the people of North Korea are suffering ever-worsening economic conditions. Just as South Korea is in the middle of a cold spell, the North has suffered chilling conditions ever since the end of December. The Korean Central News Agency reported on January 22, “The cold-weather conditions are expected to continue until the end of January,” and, “this cold spell is causing more than a little damage to the lives of the people and to spring farming preparations.”

As the cold spell drags on, their hardship will continue. North Korea is ill-prepared to deal with such cold weather; freezing pipes make it difficult for the people to access fresh water, while food and firewood are in short supply. Hunger and cold are exacerbated this winter because those without access to firewood or heating oil are also faced with an environment devoid of wild plants or animals.

Power shortages have also grown more severe in the new year. On January 20, Open Radio for North Korea (ORNK) reported that an area of the Yanggang Province has been without electricity since the first of the month. Even Pyongyang has been experiencing power difficulties, with electricity only available to most residents for 1~2 hours each day. ORNK reported that “recently in North Korea, students and parents have been burdened with supplying firewood for school heating, while the prices of coal and wood are skyrocketing in the markets.”

The cost of food has also shot through the roof. Rice, corn, pork, and other staple foods are becoming increasingly more expensive. Young-wha Lee, a spokesperson for the Japanese human rights organization Rescue the North Korean People! Urgent Action Network (RENK), announced on January 17 that a source inside North Korea had reported a 500 Won jump in the price of rice within Pyongyang, from 1,400 Won per kilogram on the January 7 to 1,900 Won within 3~4 days. Corn jumped from 750 to 950 Won, and pork was up from just under 4,000 Won to its current price at around 5,000 Won. Gasoline now costs 3,500 Won.

According to a South Korean online source for news on North Korea, Daily NK, one can see the impact of inflation by taking notice of the price gap of around 200 Won per kilogram of rice in Pyongyang and rice in rural areas (North Pyongan Province’s Sinuiju and Ryanggang Province’s Hyesan, in particular). It is noteworthy that prices are shooting up in January, rather than during the lean season of March and April.

Good Friends, a South Korean-based humanitarian organization, has also relayed reports of inflation from sources within North Korea. It has reported that rice was selling in Pyongyang for as much as 2,100 Won per kilogram on January 7, significantly more than the 1,600 Won per kilogram reported at the end of last year. Prices continued to hover around 2,000 Won until recent rations eased shortages and brought the price back down to around 1,500 Won. As North Korean organizations and social units distribute these overdue holiday rations, there has been a fall in food prices.

However, these rations were not seen in all areas of the North, and in those regions where residents were not provided food, prices remain high. Rice in Hamheung jumped from 1,500 Won per kilogram on January 1 to 1,800 Won just one week later. On January 7, similar prices were seen in Chongjin (1,750 Won) and Sinuiju (1,800 Won). Ten days later, rice in Chongjin had climbed to 1,980 Won, and was threatening to break the 2,000 Won barrier. Corn in Pyongyang was selling for 950 Won per kilogram on January 7, while it cost 780 Won in Chongjin and 850 Won in Hamheung, Sinuiju, and Pyongsong. By January 17, corn averaged between 750 and 800 Won. Only in Pyongyang, agricultural regions, and other areas receiving rations had prices fallen to 600 Won per kilogram.

According Good Friends, grain prices in the North have shot up this year because several Party officials in charge of grain imports are behind schedule with incoming shipments, and the rising value of the US dollar and Chinese yuan have driven up the cost of overseas purchases.

Pictured above: Ontan Worker’s District, Onsong (Google Earth)

According ot the Daily NK:

In advance of next week’s lunar New Year’s Day holiday, National Security Agency agents are concentrating on getting together things for the holiday from households of those whose family members have crossed into China or South Korea.

Exploitation by the NSA or other powerful state apparatus is exceedingly common, of course, and the obtainment of necessities for holidays such as Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s birthdays, the Korean thanksgiving day (Chuseok) and lunar New Year’s Day are often covered via exploitation of the people. The difference this time, however, is that the specific targets are the families of defectors.

A source from North Hamkyung Province told The Daily NK today, “NSA agents in charge of northern border regions including Onsung have been engrossed in preparations for the holidays and generating private benefits, targeting smugglers and households with family members who have crossed into China or South Korea.”

The source explained, “Modes of exploitation by agents of the NSA and People’s Safety Ministry and cadres of the Party or prosecutors have been varied of late. They win houses which have problems over to their side and then get them to give certain things.”

The source said that as the lunar New Year’s Day comes closer, these moves have become more active and transparent. “NSA agents visit all of these houses and force them, or sometimes beg for things. They are no different from thieves, just without a knife.”

According to the source, the Conspiracy Research Office of the NSC in Onsung, North Hamkyung Province, which employs 25 agents, has allotted each agent items to get from their district.

There are two sets of items: one set is ten bottles of liquor, 5kg of pork, 20 packs of expensive cigarettes called “Yeomyung,” and the other set contains 20kg of gasoline, a certain amount of fruit and candy, and bottles of oil. Each agent has to select one set.

According to Onsung Jangmadang standards, a bottle of liquor can be bought for 4,000 won, 1kg of pork for 5,000 won, a pack of “Yeomyung” for 6,000 won, 1kg of gasoline 3,000 won, and a bottle of oil for 5,000 won.

In Ontan workers-district within Onsung, there are three agents. The goods assigned to them are also unaffordable, but only defector families have to provide them, the source said.

The source explained, “When an agent visits one’s home, they won’t leave until the host has set up a table of drinks for him. After drinking some, the agent coaxes them, ‘Have you got some news from the South?’ ‘Are you getting money well?’ or ‘When you get a call next time, you should grumble that the situation is hard, so that they will send more money.’”

Sometimes, agents call for bribes for their own family events, too. The source said, “While talking, agents hint furtively that there will be a family event and call for something for that, saying, ‘There will be nothing bad for you if you help out.’”

“Agents say openly that, ‘If more money is delivered, we can live well; it’s is a good thing, and a way to maintain socialism.’ They only need so much as to smell money and they come running,” the source complained.

Due to possible revenge from agents, people cannot complain about the situation and have to provide them with the things they demand, according to the source, who added, “However, the effect works only at that moment when they get the goods. When a problem occurs for these defector families, they are nowhere to be seen.”

Read the full story here:
Defector Families Are Moneybags for NSA Agents
Daily NK
Im Jeong Jin
1/27/2011

According to the Daily NK:

High level North Korean cadres are visiting a casino in the far northeast of the country, disguising their identities so as to avoid government regulations which forbid them from entering, a defector-led NGO has revealed.

Reporting the news, an NK Intellectuals Solidarity inside source explained yesterday, “Recently, cases of high level North Korean cadres disguising their identities to enter Orakjang Casino, which is in the Emperor Hotel in Rasun City, have been occurring frequently.”

The Emperor Hotel was established in 2000 by Emperor Group, a Hong Kong-based property developer. With around 100 rooms, bars, cafes, an indoor swimming pool, sauna, night club, sports center and a fine sea view, the hotel, which cost $64 million to build, employs around 500 people, including a number of North Korean women.

According to the source, while the hotel was regularly frequented by Chinese tourists and officials when it opened, it closed down at the end of 2004 after one official, acting independently, squandered a fortune in public funds there.

However, seizing the opportunity presented by Kim Jong Il’s visits to China last year, the hotel reopened and, according to the source, has recently been doing well off Russian traders, among others.

On this, the source explained, “One of the conditions placed on the opening of the hotel was that North Koreans would not be allowed to enter, and at the beginning their entry seemed to have been thoroughly prohibited,” adding that therefore, “However, as the number of Chinese traders going to the casino increased, so high North Korean cadres doing business with the Chinese and wealthy North Koreans disguising their identities also entered.

The North Koreans apparently pretend to be Korean-Chinese when they enter the casino, where some reportedly gamble away as much as $10,000 per day.

Because North Korean enterprises and factories are unable to operate properly due to a lack of raw materials and capital, average cadres and staff go to gamble mostly to relieve their boredom, the source explained.

Read the full story here:
Casino Luring in Bored North Koreans
Daily NK
Cho Jong-ik
1/27/2011