North Korean Economy Watch

From the LA Times:

More than 100 pages of written lectures smuggled out of North Korea this year reveal that the leadership is in a state of near-hysteria about outside influences seeping across the nation’s once hermetically sealed borders. The spread of “unusual lifestyles,” the lectures warn listeners, could render them “incapable of following revolutionary thoughts and sacrificing their lives” for Kim.

The documents also underscore the extent to which anti-Americanism gives meaning to the country and its people. More than 50 years after the end of the Korean War, the United States is blamed for all of North Korea’s woes, from food shortages to the infiltration of foreign culture.

In the last several years, trade between North Korea and China has surged, much of it not approved by North Korea’s leaders. Along with food and consumer goods, traders smuggle in DVDs, tapes, books and Bibles, radios and mobile phones. Once considered taboo, T-shirts with English lettering are pouring into North Korean markets from Chinese garment factories.

The regime fears not only critical material but depictions of other nations that would make North Koreans realize how poor they are in comparison.

“The enemies use these videos and specially made materials to beautify the world of imperialism … and to [spread] a fantasy of the free world,” one lecture says. North Koreans are urged to steel themselves against such corrupting influences by eating traditional foods, wearing traditional clothing and keeping their hair tidy.

A writer with the Institute for Internaitonal Economics has published an oped in the Herald Tribune on December 22, 2005:

Here is the Summary:

• Economy collapsed in 1990s with weather, end of Soviet aid, and bad policy
• 1995, DPRK asks for help..WFP feeds b/n 1/4 and 1/3 of population
• as the state was unable to feed the people, bottom-up marketization grew
• Now there is a revival of the PDS and controls on travel (which were suspended during the famine)
• Grains can no longer be sold at market, and supplies are being seized
• This incentivises farmers to harvest early, hoarding and running secret plots
• A revival of the failed socialist model would not only mark a U-turn in North Korea’s reforms, but would also set the stage for a recurrence of humanitarian problems in the future.

Asia Times
Michael Rank
12/3/2005

From psychiatrist to international banker and gambling tycoon is an unusual career path, but Hong Kong-born Dr Johnny Hon says it makes quite a lot of sense. “Wealthy clients need a psychiatrist more than they need a banker,” he quipped. “Training in psychiatry makes you understand clients better. Most of them are elderly. They are concerned about their health and how to plan for passing their wealth down to their children.”

Hon, 34, was awarded a PhD in psychiatry from Cambridge University in 1998, but left medicine for finance after being recruited by the Dutch bank ABN AMRO as a private banker in Hong Kong. He didn’t stay with the Amsterdam-based bank long, however, and now has his own business empire, Global Group (Europe) plc, stretching from a joint venture bank in North Korea to a stake in a lottery in China, not to mention another bank in the Comoro Islands off Madagascar and an online gambling company in London.

Hon’s business ventures tend towards the exotic, but in an interview at his headquarters in London’s Docklands financial district he came across as measured and affable – even if I never did quite understand how he switched from a dissertation on the association between Down’s Sydrome and Alzheimer’s disease to international finance.

This has been a big year for Hon, who in June opened the Koryo Global Credit Bank in Pyongyang and in July announced the signing of a contract to co-manage the state sports lottery in the southwestern Chinese province of Guizhou.

Under the deal with Guizhou, Hon’s UK company, Betex, became the first non-Chinese company to become involved in gambling operations in mainland China (although numerous overseas gaming firms are involved in the Macau SAR). Gambling is illegal in China, with the big and fast-growing exception of state-sponsored lotteries, currently worth US$4.8 billion a year, although illegal gaming expenditures are estimated at 10 to 15 times as much, according to a recent Deutsche Bank report.

The Chinese government is aiming to cash in on the huge illegal gaming market through a vast network of video lottery terminals, and Deutsche Bank says “these measures will help lottery capture 40-50% of the illegal gambling market over the next three years”. Hon said his company had invested about 1.75 million British pounds ($3.05 million) in Guizhou, where there were currently 780 lottery sales points. These will be upgraded to give results in real time rather than be downloaded twice a day.

“So far we are involved only in Guizhou,” one of China’s poorest provinces, he said. “But we will hopefully speak to more provinces. Gaming in China has a lot of potential.” Underlining this potential, Deutsche Bank has cited the Peking University Center for Lottery Research as valuing illegal gambling activities in China – including underground casinos, slot machines, black market sports betting, and illicit lotteries – at around $75 billion. State lotteries are supposed to hand a proportion of their profits to charity and to sports development bodies, but corruption is said to be rife.

Hon said he was “taking a cautious approach” with his bank in North Korea, in which Global Group has a 70% stake and state-owned Koryo Bank has 30%. Stalinist North Korea is notoriously closed and secretive, but Hon said up to 200 foreign business people lived in Pyongyang and the country was gradually developing a market economy. He said he was “very bullish” about the future of North-South Korean economic cooperation, and stressed the potential of the Kaesong industrial zone, where a large number of South Korean companies have opened factories.

Hon noted that China’s economic reforms had been greatly boosted by overseas Chinese entrepreneurs from Hong Kong and Taiwan, who have cultural, linguistic and family ties with the mainland, and South Koreans and overseas Koreans could make a similar contribution to North Korea’s economic development.

“I keep telling my North Korean friends to make use of the huge resources and capital from South Korea,” Hon said. “Labor costs are even cheaper than China … People are well educated and have good discipline. They need the right economic policies.” Regarding North Korea’s relations with the West, Hon said: “There have been a lot of misunderstandings on both sides … There is a big gap in how they read the West and how we read them.”

Hon noted that Macau billionaire, Stanley Ho, had a casino in Pyongyang, and said that “maybe I will talk to him a bit about banking arrangements”. But he denied that he had any involvement with North Korea’s reported online lottery venture, which is aimed mainly at South Koreans. North Korea is highly puritanical and its citizens are barred from the Pyongyang casino, whose main customers are Chinese entrepreneurs and tourists.

Hon said he was motivated not simply by money, but also wanted to “make positive contributions” to impoverished Third World countries. “I came to the conclusion that you can do more good to help more people by making money first,” he added.

This was part of the reason why he founded a bank on the tiny, impoverished island of Anjouan in the Comoros in 2002. The Comoros, in which Anjouan has autonomous status, have endured 19 coups or attempted coups since gaining independence from France in 1975, and Hon wryly admitted that “at the moment the bank has caused me more problems than it is worth”. He founded the bank after he was “asked to help” by the president of Anjouan to assist in drafting new financial laws and setting up an offshore banking industry on the Indian Ocean island.

Global says it is the only company authorized by the government of Anjouan to market financial and banking licenses. But the company says some websites allege that this is not the case and that Global is challenging this in the courts.

Hon, a British citizen, was educated in Britain from the age of 13 and says on his website that in just six years he “has built up a mini conglomerate, with interests in banking, property development, gaming, finance and leisure and from which the combined turnover in 2005 is expected to reach well in excess of 1 billion British pounds. Even more remarkable is that whilst building the Global Group of Companies from scratch, he has managed to pursue so many other interests both charitable and political.”

On the charitable side, Hon was part of a team that provided North Korea with 120 wheelchairs after a large explosion on a railway line last year in which 169 people died. There was speculation, strongly denied by the North Korean government, that the explosion was a failed assassination attempt against the country’s all-powerful leader, Kim Jong-il.

On the political side, Hon is a business supporter of Britain’s governing Labour Party, and a signed photograph of Prime Minister Tony Blair “to Johnny and all at Global” is on prominent display in the company’s boardroom. In Britain, his gaming company, Betex, is seeking a listing on the Alternative Investment Market, which has a more flexible regime than the main stock exchange, while Hon is also actively seeking business partners for tourism ventures in the Caribbean. Hon said he employs 115 people worldwide, mainly in Britain but including about 10 in China and seven in North Korea.

His other interests include helping Chinese companies get a stock market listing in London. These companies span a wide range of sectors, from biotechnology to education and tourism. On his website he lists some 30 companies of which he is founder or director, and states that Global Group “is growing at a rapid rate, employing more and more staff and operating in more diverse areas than ever before. Under Johnny’s chairmanship the group is certain to go onwards and upwards.”

Hon definitely seems like a man to watch, and you never know in which exotic corner of the world he is going to turn up next.

Nautilus Institute
Andrei Lankov
12/1/2005

The recent news out of North Korea leaves no room for doubt. After a decade of grudgingly allowing small-scale free markets, Kim Jong Il’s regime is seeking to reimpose total control. Ironically this turning back of the clock is being aided by the “no strings attached” aid policies of two countries, China and South Korea, which claim to be trying to encourage reforms.

From early October, all trade in grain has been forbidden in the small private markets that mushroomed across North Korea when the state-run food distribution system largely collapsed during the famine of the 1990s. North Koreans are now expected to rely on a revived public distribution system for supplies of grain. Special teams of officials have fanned out to check farming households for any “excessive” supplies of grain they might try to sell in the private markets, and ensure they are left only with their officially allowed ration of 700 grams a day.

Internal travel controls are also being tightened. During the famine, authorities turned a blind eye to violations of the regime’s tough restrictions on freedom of movement, as starving North Koreans crisscrossed the country in search of food. Now these are being enforced once again, with North Koreans required to obtain a travel permit from police before they can travel elsewhere in the country.

Pyongyang’s moves in this direction should not come as a surprise. Allowing even a minimal degree of private enterprise reduces the regime’s absolute control over its citizens — especially if they are no longer dependent on the state for their food — and provides firsthand evidence of the existence of a more successful economic system. The Kim regime has seen how economic reform preceded the collapse of Communist regimes across Eastern Europe. It’s no coincidence that one of the questions most commonly heard in private conversations with members of the Pyongyang elite these days is about the fate of Communist cadres in the former East Germany. To avoid reforms is the surest survival strategy for Pyongyang’s ruling elite.

Throughout the past decade, the regime had no choice but to tolerate some degree of private economic activity, because of the collapse of its state-distribution system. But now that the North Korean economy has bottomed out and the famine appears to be over, largely due to generous aid shipments from the outside world, the Kim regime is in a position to get rid of changes that it never wanted in the first place. In addition to trying to curb the activities of private markets, it’s ordered most of the representatives of the international aid agencies that it reluctantly allowed into the country during the famine to leave by the end of the year.

The Kim regime can afford to act in this way because it knows that food aid from its two key patrons, South Korea and China, will keep flowing come what may. These now exceed shipments from elsewhere in the world. According to a recent report to the U.S. Congress, North Korea received 350,000 tons of food aid from South Korea and China in 2004 — compared with 325,000 tons from the World Food Program. Seoul also provides the North with much needed fertilizer, while China takes care of most of its energy needs.

China and, especially, South Korea claim to be supplying aid as part of a strategy of encouraging North Korea to embrace economic reform. That’s the ostensible aim of Seoul’s “sunshine policy” of one-sided concessions to the North, while Chinese leaders have shown visiting North Korean leaders around Shanghai and Shenzhen in an effort to encourage it to follow the same path. But, far from encouraging reform, North Korea’s recent actions show that it can take advantage of such unconditional aid to move in the opposition direction.

While Western countries insist on their aid being monitored by international relief agencies to try to prevent its diversion to the military, South Korea and China take a much more forgiving stance. Beijing wants stability on its borders, and would not be happy to see another nominally Communist regime collapsing. South Korea also wants to avoid the collapse of the Kim regime, since it would then have to foot the bill for an expensive and socially ruinous German-style unification. This means that both governments are ready to ship aid without asking too many awkward questions or demanding that it be closely monitored. Although ostensibly encouraging economic reform in North Korea, in reality both China and South Korea share the same short-term goal of preserving the status quo. They tacitly understand that means the regime must be able to continue to rely on its police and elite army units, and so needs to keep them well fed. That means turning a blind eye to the diversion of aid to the military, police and other members of the Pyongyang elite, even at the expense of the long-suffering North Korean people.

In the long run, this creates a paradox. Unless Seoul and Beijing are willing to foot the ever growing bills from Pyongyang indefinitely, they need to promote reforms there. However the North Korean regime has shown it has no interest in implementing reforms except when it is the only way to survive.

That creates an uneasy dilemma, which is shared by other foreign aid donors to North Korea. Stopping all aid could lead to renewed famine, especially in those areas of the country closed to foreigners. But excessive and unconditional aid is likely to halt all reforms, since the Pyongyang government would simply reverse to its old policies, using foreign aid to pay for the system’s inherent inefficiencies (and perhaps for a bit of luxury for Kim and his cronies). And recent events have clearly demonstrated have how counterproductive showering North Korea with aid can be.

Perils of Investing in N. Korea Become Clear to a Pioneer
By Anthony Faiola and Joohee Cho
Washington Post

Hyundai Group pioneered South Korean economic development in North Korea, building hotels and restaurants and sending busloads of tourists across the DMZ. At the time, company officials argued that they were giving their communist northern kin a lesson in capitalism.

Now Hyundai is attempting to resolve a dispute with the North Korean government that has jeopardized more than $1 billion worth of investments. The dispute began in August after Hyundai Asan Corp., the subsidiary in charge of North Korean tourism operations, fired a top executive for allegedly misappropriating more than $1 million in company and South Korean government funds.  The dismissal was considered a heavy offense in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, because the executive in question had been granted several rare meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. Top Communist Party officials last month abruptly announced a review of all concession rights purchased by the company while secretly courting one of Hyundai’s rivals, South Korea’s Lotte Group, to take over Hyundai’s North Korean operations. Lotte officials, concerned about North Korean business practices, decided they did not want to take over Hyundai’s business.

The dismissal was considered a heavy offense in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, because the executive in question had been granted several rare meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. Top Communist Party officials last month abruptly announced a review of all concession rights purchased by the company while secretly courting one of Hyundai’s rivals, South Korea’s Lotte Group, to take over Hyundai’s North Korean operations. Lotte officials, concerned about North Korean business practices, decided they did not want to take over Hyundai’s business.

The actions by North Korea raised serious questions about the wisdom of investing there. Despite the dispute, however, the governments of both South and North Korea are lobbying foreign companies to move into a jointly developed industrial park opened earlier this year in the North Korean border city of Kaesong, where more than 20 South Korean firms employ 8,000 North Koreans. The governments describe the industrial park as an experiment with market reforms. The countries also held a joint trade fair at the economic summit of world leaders last week in the southern city of Pusan.

But since South Korea opened up friendly relations with the North in the late 1990s, more than 1,000 South Korean firms have gone bankrupt or lost significant investments in North Korea, according to South Korea’s Unification Ministry.

Most were small, low-tech enterprises involved in textile-making and rudimentary housewares. But the problems at Hyundai have shown that the fortunes of even the largest investors are linked to the whims of the North’s government.

If you visit Kumgang:
The resort has lost millions of dollars and was constantly hampered by North Korean activities. In 1999, for instance, North Korean agents arrested a vacationing South Korean woman after she suggested that the capitalist South — the 11th-largest economy in the world — enjoyed a higher standard of living than the impoverished North.

Lankov is on a roll again:

“Theirs is a dirty rich house. They have all seven contraptions!” These seven gadgets are the major status symbols in the North. The list has been changing, but now, in the early 2000s, it comprises the following : TV set, refrigerator, washing machine, electric fan, sewing machine, tape recorder and camera.

Only a tiny fraction of all North Korean households own all these “contraptions”. In the mid-1990s, the average black market cost of the entire package was 30,000 won or, roughly, some 30 (!) times the monthly salary of an average worker.

Nowadays TV sets can be found in approximately 40 percent of North Korean households, but they are very unevenly spread across the country. In Pyongyang and major cities a majority of households obviously have a TV, while in the countryside they remain a rarity. No precise statistics about numbers of TV sets and their distribution has ever been released: from Pyongyang’s point of view even such innocuous information is a state secret.

Even though the North began colour broadcasting before the South, the old-style black-and-white TVs still outnumber colour sets. Most of the TVs are old, imported from the “fraternal socialist countries” (especially Romania and the USSR) or locally assembled. The elite families have Japanese sets which are seen as an important status symbol.

VCRs have begun to spread among the more affluent households.

Cameras are owned by roughly 20 percent of North Korean families. A vast majority of them are old Soviet-made manual cameras

Electric fans are relatively common. Of course, air conditioning is unheard of.

Meanwhile, washing machines and refrigerators remain luxuries. Washing machines have been locally produced since the 1970s, but even in Pyongyang few houses can boast owning such an appliance.

TV sets and some of the other “seven contraptions” used to be distributed through government shops where prices were low, although one had to wait years for permission to buy a particular item (without such permission no shop would sell it). However, neither washing machines nor fridges could be bought officially, even in the best of times. They had to be acquired via the black market. In recent years the distribution system has collapsed completely, and the black market provides the only way to become an owner of the “seven contraptions” – if you can afford to spend some 30 average annual salaries, that is…

Despite the famine, the number of people who can afford these gadgets seems to be growing. This reflects the steady increase of inequality in the North.

From the Asia Times:
By Michael Rank
11/18/2005

Chinese companies are venturing into North Korea, and both countries hope to reap the rewards. North Korea’s heavy industry is in a desperate state, but Pyongyang is hoping that Chinese investment will come to its rescue, while China sees the North as a convenient source of minerals, from coal to gold.

China’s increasing investment also means that North Korea is casting off its rigid juche, or self-sufficiency, policy and overcoming its deep historical suspicion of its giant northern neighbor.

Border trade in consumer items from televisions to beer has been booming since the 1990s, but now the focus is turning to the industrial sector. Deals are being reached on mines, railways and leasing a North Korean port to a Chinese company, but North Korea is notoriously secretive and few details have been published outside China. The deals include an agreement to “completely open” North Korea’s railways to a Hong Kong millionaire, as well as moves to revive ailing coal, iron and gold mines.

Tumen-Chongjin rail link rumored
Hong Kong businessman Qian Haomin is reported to have reached a US$3 billion deal with North Korea that also involves the Chinese Railways Ministry building a new rail link between the Chinese border city of Tumen and the North Korean port of Chongjin. The agreement marks an end to long-running tension between the Chinese and North Korean state railway authorities over North Korea’s retention of up to 2,000 Chinese goods wagons and reluctance to repay loans.

The Hong Kong news magazine Yazhou Zhoukan recently reported that these issues had been resolved and that Qian’s grandly named company Hong Kong International has agreed to provide the North Koreans with 500 to 1,000 freight wagons. Qian told the magazine that “after six months of effort, there are now hopes of solving the railway transport bottleneck between China and North Korea”, and this would help to integrate the economy of the entire northeast Asian region.

Qian’s ambitions are not limited to railways. Not only has he expressed interest in investing in a North Korean coal mine, but Yazhou Zhoukan also reported that he hopes to set up a special economic zone in the North Korean border city of Sinuiju. He has clearly not been deterred by the unhappy case of Yang Bin, a Dutch-Chinese multi-millionaire who was made head of a similar development zone in 2002. Before Yang could take up his post, he was arrested by the Chinese authorities for tax evasion and other economic crimes and jailed for 18 years.

Qian, aged 41, is originally from the southern Chinese province of Guangdong and moved to Hong Kong in 1993. He has been involved in North Korea since the early 1990s, and has apparently established a fruitful relationship with Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju. He has said that “to invest in North Korea has been my dream” because three of his uncles fought in the Korean war; one was killed and one was seriously wounded. The Hong Kong investor has signed a plastics, tire and battery recycling agreement with North Korea and has expressed interest in investing in the country’s largest anthracite coal mine, which now produces only 1 million tons a year, compared with 3 million tons at its peak.

Tonghua Steel looks North
Meanwhile, state-owned Tonghua Steel or Tonggang, based in the northeastern city of Tonghua, expects to sign a 7 billion yuan ($865 million), 50-year exploration rights deal with the Musan iron ore mine, said to be North Korea’s largest iron deposit. Tonggang, Jilin province’s largest steelmaker, hopes to receive 10 million tons of iron ore a year from Musan as part of its plans to increase steel production from a projected 5.5 million tons in 2007 to 10 million tons in 2010.

The planned deal reflects China’s immense and growing appetite for steel. Although the country already produces 30% of global output, it is heavily reliant on imports and is concerned about rising prices. A Jilin provincial trade official said importing iron ore from North Korea was attractive because of low transport costs, which would increase Tonghua’s competitiveness.

Tonggang officials say they expect the deal to be signed soon, and that of the 7 billion yuan (US$866.1 million) pledged, 2 billion yuan will be invested in transport and power lines. Company president An Fengcheng said agreement had already been reached with China Development Bank on 800 million yuan worth of soft loans and 1.6 billion yuan of hard loans, while “the remaining investment will come in in stages”.

Rajin deal to give China Sea of Japan access
China’s export boom is one of the great economic success stories of the past 25 years, but it is constrained by a lack of suitable ports. In particular, the country lacks a port on the Sea of Japan, but after attempted deals with Russia came to nought, the inland Chinese border city of Hunchun has reached an agreement for a 50-year lease with the nearby North Korean port of Rajin.

The ceding of Rajin, an ice-free port with a handling capacity of 3 million tons a year, will give access to the sea to inland areas of northeast China which, at present, must send freight long distances by rail to the port of Dalian on the Bohai gulf. The agreement also provides for the construction of a 5-10 square kilometer industrial zone and a 67 kilometer highway, and envisages that the Rajin area will become a processing zone for Chinese goods which will then be re-exported to southeast China.

A Hunchun economic official stressed that the leasing of the port is “a business deal and not a government deal”. The South China Morning Post reported from Hunchun that the man behind the deal is Fan Yingsheng, a property developer from Hunan province who put up half the initial capital investment of 60 million euros (US$70 million). The sum could not be denominated in dollars for political reasons.

The paper quoted the United Nations Development Program as saying this sum would only be enough to build the road to Rajin, and far more would be needed to rejuvenate the port. The deadline for final agreement is December 30, 2006, and it remains to be seen if a final deal will be reached in time.

An unusually frank North Korean trade official noted the possible pitfalls as well as the advantages of such deals. Kim Myong-chol, head of the Korean Council for the Promotion of Foreign Trade, said the deals would have to involve importing “highly advanced technology and equipment”, and added: “These agreements are not easy to put into actual practice and can run into many problems so far as funding and bilateral cooperation are concerned.”

“Because the amount of money involved in these cooperative projects is quite large and [North] Korea will be investing ports, roads, etc, there are rather great risks in such investment, and in addition because the domestic Korean economy and its policies, laws and regulations, etc, are unclear, many problems are likely to arise in carrying out these plans,” Kim told a Chinese website.

Coal and gold
Such concerns may have been in the mind of the president of China Minmetals Corp, Zhou Zhongshu, when he signed “an agreement on setting up a joint venture in the coal sector of the DPRK” [North Korea]. The deal was signed in October when Chinese deputy premier Wu Yi visited Pyongyang, and is said to be the first of its kind. North Korean Vice Minister for Foreign Trade Ri Ryong-nam urged the Chinese side to “provide advanced technology and set up a good model for other joint ventures and cooperation between the two countries”.

North Korea also has substantial gold deposits, and a Chinese company plans to invest in a “semi-paralyzed” North Korean gold mine and refine the metal at its base in Zhaoyuan in Shandong province. Guoda Gold Co Ltd reached a preliminary agreement last year with Sangnongsan gold mine, which is said to have gold deposits totaling at least 150 tons.

Guoda deputy manager Lin Deming said his company was attracted to North Korea because of low labor, energy and transport costs as well as the “highly favorable” investment terms offered, but gave no details. Chinese investment in North Korea is certainly increasing, but final agreement on a number of deals has not yet been reached, and political factors such as uncertainty over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program may well discourage Chinese companies from moving too fast.

Michael Rank is a former Reuters correspondent in China, now working in London.

Nautilus Institute
David L. Asher
11/15/2005

I am very pleased to be invited back to the Wilson Center to speak today. I enjoyed my time here this summer and want to thank my colleagues for the chance to be affiliated with the Center, which I consider the finest organization of its kind in Washington. I also wish to thank my former boss, Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly and the many members of our inter-agency team for kindly attending today. In particular, I want you to know of the extraordinary work that our friends and colleagues here from the United States Secret Service have done recently to safeguard our nation and our currency from a determined adversary.

I left the State Department in July and I want to be very clear that my remarks today are personal in nature. They in no way should be interpreted as representing the view of the US government, the Department of State or the Department of Defense. They also are drawn strictly from unclassified sources (the vast amount of information now in the public domain is indicative of the scale of the problem of DPRK criminality).

Let me make clear, I am a believer in the Six Party Talks. I applaud the efforts of my former colleagues, Chris Hill, Joe Detrani, and Jim Foster to effect positive diplomatic movement via direct dialog and clearly demonstrate to all the parties seated at the big table within the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse that the US is sincerely willing to join the international community in engaging North Korea to facilitate its denuclearization, its economic development, and its opening to the outside world. At the same time, given this objective, there should be no further room for tolerating the unacceptable and in many ways outrageous criminal and proliferation activities that the North Koreans continue to engage in.

Allow me to begin my remarks by laying out the major aspects of North Korean trans-national criminal activity. I will then look at the specific question of how the DPRK’s growing ties to Organized Crime groups and illicit shipping networks could be used to facilitate WMD shipments. I’ll propose a possible way to reduce this risk. I will conclude by frankly commenting on the nature of state directed criminality in the DPRK and its implications for international law and the DPRK’s status in the international community and the United Nations.

My research topic this summer at the Wilson Center was on the rise and fall of “criminal states” – government’s whose leaders had become intimately involved with trans-national criminal activity. I compared North Korea under Kim Jong Il with Serbia under Milosevic, Romania under Ceausescu, and Panama under Noriega. I won’t get into the details of this comparative research now but, suffice to say, the scale and scope of the other cases pale in comparison with present-day North Korea.

The rise of the criminal state in North Korea is no secret. It has occurred in full view of foreign governments and with increasing visibility to the world media. Over the last three decades agents, officers, and business affiliates of the DPRK have been implicated in hundreds of public incidents of crime around the globe. Incidences of illicit activity have occurred in every continent and almost every DPRK Embassy in the world has been involved at one time or another. This should be no surprise. North Korea is perhaps the only country in the world whose embassies and overseas personnel are expected to contribute income to the “Party Center,” not rely on central government funds for their operations. Such repeated illicit actions from diplomatic premises amount to a serial violation of both articles 31 and 41 of the Vienna conventions on Diplomatic Relations, which respectively convey that A. commercial, and most certainly, criminal activities for profit shall not be conducted by accredited diplomats or via accredited facilities and B. mandate that officials posted abroad must obey the laws of the nation to which they are posted. The DPRK routinely pays no attention to either critical provision of the Vienna conventions.

I am frequently asked “how much is this stuff going on?” Although it is hard to pin down the exact scale of the illicit activity we can make a rough guess. In 2003 the DPRK ran a trade deficit of at least $835 million and that if more broadly measured to exclude concessionary trade with the ROK was more like $1.2 billion. Even making a very bold estimate for informal remittances and under the table payments for that year, the DPRK probably ran a current account deficit of at least $500 million. Moreover, North Korea’s accumulated trade deficit with the ROK and China alone since 1990 is over $10 billion. North Korea has not been able to borrow on international markets since the late 1970s and has at least $12 billion in unrepaid debt principal outstanding. Yet, until recently – at least – it has managed to avoid self-induced hyper-inflation (which should have occurred given the need to reconcile internal and external monetary accounts, even in a communist country). Instead, the street stalls in Pyongyang and other North Korean cities seem to be awash in foreign made cloths, food, and TVs and the quality of life of the elite seems to have improved. What’s apparently filling the gap and accounting for the apparent improvements to the standard of living for the elite? The short answer as I see it: Crime. And if I am right, then the criminal sector may account for as much as 35-40% of DPRK exports and a much larger percentage of its total cash earnings (conventional trade profit margins are low but the margin on illegal businesses is extremely high, frequently over 500%).

Whatever the precise size of the criminal surplus, all analysts and law enforcement authorities agree that overseas illicit and weapons trading activities have become increasingly important sources of foreign exchange for the DPRK. These earnings have provided support to North Korea’s “military-first” economy and contributed to Pyongyang’s ability to resist demands from the international community for an end to its nuclear weapons program. They also apparently have persuaded the Kim Jong II regime it can affordably maintain its political isolation and resist the imperative for sweeping economic and social reforms that all other communist states have had to engage in. Given that periodic exposure of illegal dealings by North Korean officials overseas in the past has not resulted in serious or lasting consequences, Pyongyang may believe that an open door for global criminality exists.

Let’s review the scale and scope of the North Korean “soprano state.” As is well known the North Korean government is involved in a wide range of illicit businesses in partnership with organized crime groups or unilaterally. These include:

1. Production and overseas distribution of narcotics, in particular heroin and methamphetamines:

DPRK Narco trafficking continues as a major income generator, although less prominently perhaps than before. China continues to be the major market for North Korean drugs and the situation became so bad that in March of last year the Vice Minister of the MPS called a highly unusual “press conference” to announce his determination to cut into DPRK drug rings in Jilin province, on the border with North Korea (which some Chinese law enforcement officials have stated is “out of control”). Japan probably still comes in second. From 1998-2002 Japanese police interdicted nearly 1500 kg of meth that in six separate prosecuted cases was shown to have originated in the DPRK. This amounts to thirty-five percent of all methamphetamine seizures in Japan in that period and had a wholesale value of over $75 million and a street value of as much as $300 million. Given the chemical profile for DPRK produced meth (essentially of extremely high purity) several Japanese authorities I spoke with the week before last believe that a fairly large percentage of the meth coming in from Northern China today is consistent with DPRK origin. As elsewhere, in Japan to mask their fingerprints the North Koreans are going through triads, snakeheads, and other indirect channels. This has been less true with Heroin where North Koreans continue to be observed selling the drugs. The Australian seizure of 125 kg of Heroin worth $150 million off the Pong Su – a Worker’s Party linked vessel and with a KWP secretary on board – in my mind was hardly a random or isolated incident (it is not surprising given that the North Koreans had established an Embassy in Canberra the year before that one would assume needed to produce income for the center – it was Pyongyang’s way of saying “thanks very much”).

2. Production and international distribution of counterfeit currency, in particular the US dollar, as well as counterfeiting or illegally reproducing and selling numerous other items, in particular counterfeit cigarettes and pharmaceuticals.

Under International Law, counterfeiting another nation’s currency is an act of causus belli, an act of economic war. No other government has engaged in this act against another government since the Nazis under Hitler. North Korea has been counterfeiting the dollar and other currencies of importance the entire time it has been on the international engagement bandwagon. What does this say about the regime’s intentions?

As the recent DOJ indictment of Sean Garland and other members of the Official IRA for their partnership in the criminal distribution of counterfeit US currency reads: “Beginning in or about 1989, and continuing throughout the period of this Indictment, a type of high-quality counterfeit $100 FRNs began to be detected in circulation around the world. Their high quality made it particularly difficult for them to be detected as counterfeit by untrained persons. The United States Secret Service initially designated these counterfeit notes as “C-14342” and they came to be known as “Supernote” or “Superdollar.” Quantities of the Supernote were manufactured in, and under auspices of the government of, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”). Individuals, including North Korean nationals acting as ostensible government officials, engaged in the worldwide transportation, delivery, and sale of quantities of Supernotes.”

The Royal Charm and Smoking Dragon investigations that were concluded this summer revealed a willingness to sell millions of dollars in DPRK supernotes into the US by Asian OCs linked to the North Korea government. Whether this was a deliberate act of policy decided in Pyongyang or just business among crooks is hard to tell but it seems unusual that according to the public indictment the cost of the notes was less than 40 cents per dollar, far below the market value associated previously with the counterfeit supernotes, given their ability to be circulated without ready detection by the naked eye. One wonders how such a price could be obtained unless the notes were coming from a very high source inside the country in question.

The relatively sophisticated shipping methods for transporting supernotes uncovered in the FBI-USSS Royal Charm/Smoking Dragon investigations also needs to be given scrutiny, especially given our topic today. The following slides, reproduced from a Taiwanese newspaper article gives you a sense of how they move the notes around, falsely manifesting the cargo as a non-dutiable item (in this case as “toys”), falsifying port of origin information (to indicate a port in Northern China instead of in the DPRK), and cleverly concealing the contraband.

The production of counterfeit cigarettes also appears to be a very large and profitable business for North Korea and one with global reach. Indeed, Counterfeit cigarettes may well be North Korea’s largest containerized export sector with cargoes frequently coming from the ports of Najin and Nampo for shipment via major ports in China and the ROK throughout the world. Phillip Morris International, Lorillard, Japan Tobacco and others have identified numerous factories producing counterfeit cigarettes in North Korea. Affected industry participants have worked assiduously with relevant government authorities around the world to stop this trade. The numbers explain why. A forty foot container of counterfeit cigarettes might cost as little as $70,000 to produce and have a street value of 3-4 million dollars, so it’s not surprising that the North has focused on this business line-with its profits increased if tax stamps are forged (something that has been observed repeatedly of late, costing affected states such as California tens of millions in stamp revenue per year). A 1995 Associated Press article reported the seizure by Taiwan authorities of 20 shipping containers of counterfeit cigarette wrappers destined for North Korea. According to officials of the cigarette company whose label and trademark were being violated, the seized materials may have been used to package cigarettes with a retail value of $1 billion. Increasingly DPRK counterfeit cigarettes, counterfeit pharmaceuticals (especially counterfeit Viagra), and counterfeit currency are being moved in parallel. Royal Charm revealed that weapons, too, potentially even manpads might be run through the same channels. What could be next?

3. Smuggling sanctioned items, including conflict diamonds, rhino horn and ivory, and endangered species, utilizing official diplomatic means

I find this to be one of the most outrageous and unacceptable of the DPRK’s criminal acts, absolutely contravening international law, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. There are numerous notorious examples to cite. In the early 1980’s, five North Korean diplomats were forced to leave Africa for their attempts to smuggle rhino horns. The horns were transported from Luzaka to Addis Ababa to South Yemen. From there, they traveled to the consulate in Guangzhou, which ran operations in Macau, Zhuhai, and Hong Kong. This kind of activity has apparently not changed. As Stanford researcher, Sheena Chestnut, noted in a recent thesis, in the years since 1996, “at least six North Korean diplomats have been forced to leave Africa after attempts to smuggle elephant tusks and rhinoceros horns.” Ivory seizures directly linked to North Korean officials amounted to 689 kg in Kenya in 1999; 537 kg in Moscow in 1999; and 576 kg in France in 1998. I don’t have more recent data I can share publicly but I don’t think they have given up on the illicit ivory trade.

4. Money laundering for its own account and in partnership with recognized organized crime groups abroad:

The extent to which the DPRK uses banking partners around the world to launder funds has recently gotten a lot of attention in the wake of the Macau based Banco Delta Asia designation under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act. The Treasury Department’s website paints a pretty clear picture: “One well-known North Korean front company that has been a client of BDA for over a decade has conducted numerous illegal activities, including distributing counterfeit currency and smuggling counterfeit tobacco products. In addition, the front company has also long been suspected of being involved in international drug trafficking. Moreover, Banco Delta Asia facilitated several multi-million dollar wire transfers connected with alleged criminal activity on behalf of another North Korean front company.”

5. Weapons smuggling and trading in WMD

Even while its customer base diminishes, North Korea defiantly remains in the business of selling MTCR class missiles and base technologies. It also continues to field more advanced systems domestically that could be exported. Logically speaking, as its stockpile of WMD grows so could its willingness to export technologies, systems, and even materials. Business and ideology conveniently mix in the minds of North Koreans, it seems, as they calculate where, when, and how to sell weapons and weapons systems.

Moreover, in the face of increased surveillance of DPRK flagged vessels, the threat of using conventional shipping means to move cargoes increases as does the incentive to use organized crime channels.

There are several thousand containers each year coming out of North Korea from its two main container cargo ports: Najin on the east coast and Nampo on the west coast. To get into the international maritime transport system, they have to go through friendly ports, typically in China, the ROK, and Japan. Virtually none of these containers in China is subject to inspection and few in the ROK. Japanese customs has made a bigger effort but it remains insufficient in regard to cargoes destined for non Japanese ports.

As we learned from the investigations concluded this summer, containers of counterfeit cigarettes, counterfeit currency, weapons, and other illicit items apparently produced in the DPRK or linked to a distribution chain it has ready access to have managed to make their way into the US. So could North Korean WMD if we don’t create a system to better scrutinize cargoes and enhance Maritime Domain Awareness to protect our SLOCs.

Unfortunately, neither the PSI no the CSI are attuned to addressing these threats. The Container Security Initiative is a worthy effort to move US customs outward, inspecting select cargoes destined for US waters overseas before they embark in our direction. I am impressed by the work being done by US Customs and ICE officers overseas to look into suspect cargoes and the dedication of personnel at the National Tracking center to identify ships and cargoes that may have not been covered by the CSI or fallen through the loop. Nonetheless, the CSI has no application to containers destined for non-US ports and, moreover, it is only operating in a small number of foreign venues. What happens to the majority of containers coming here or going elsewhere? Nothing.

Moreover, the hallowed Proliferation Security Initiative unfortunately remains much more talk that action. I support the initiative but it is not sufficient and does not substitute for a dedicated DPRK counter-proliferation policy. It is nice to see countries getting together to agree to intercept shipments but it is another to engage in such interdictions. There has not been one single PSI interdiction of a DPRK flagged vessel that I am aware of. Does this mean they have stopped sailing? A quick look at the “Lloyd’s List” database reveals this to not be true with many notorious North Korean vessels like the Sosang, which was interdicted shipping missiles to Yemen in December 2002 (before the PSI existed), still plying the high seas. What are these ships carrying? Moreover, I find the implicit premise that interdiction alone is adequate for stopping proliferation unsettling. Stopping a weapons shipment on the high seas is like stopping a drug shipment under dark of night-easier said than done. The odds are not good, especially when you face an adversary with access to near state of the art communications, excellent denial and deception, diplomatic immunities, and friendly criminal partners to facilitate its activities.

More decisive action is required, well beyond the PSI’s current scope. The AQ Khan network was brought down by a network disruption strategy that utilized all aspects of national power. Such a strategy may need to be mounted soon to stop a determined North Korea engaged in the weapons trading business.

Fortunately, there are some things in the area of peaceful international cooperation we can do to minimize the chance North Korean contraband, missiles, or WMD will get into the international distribution system. I propose that a special Container Security Initiative be created and applied to the DPRK, beginning in China and the ROK. Specifically, all containerized cargo out of North Korea should be mandated for inspection at the first international port of conveyance. Legitimate trade would be allowed to pass but illicit cargoes would be stopped. The US could not accept containers from ports that do not wish to join this special inspection regime. Such a regime would dramatically reduce the risk of weapons proliferation and cut into crime. Were all ships coming from the DPRK, whether bearing containers or not, subject to first order inspection the system would be even more effective. Given that DPRK trade represents a drop in the bucket for even major Chinese and Koreans ports, instituting such a regime should not be particularly onerous.

Down the road a more elegant solution is possible, whereby only smart containers can gain access to the international shipping system. The President recently announced a new policy on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). As Vice Admiral John Morgan has recently written, “MDA is the collection, fusion and dissemination of enormous quantities of data – intelligence and information to form a common operating picture (COP) – a web of integrated information which will be fully distributed among users with access to data that is appropriately classified.” Through the COP, specialists should eventually be able to monitor vessels, people, cargo and designated missions, areas of interest within the global maritime environment, access all relevant databases, and collect, analyze and disseminate relevant information.

This goal of Maritime Domain Awareness may sound overambitious, if not down right impossible. However, within the next five years, we likely will see the global deployment of such “smart-containers.” These sophisticated containers will be equipped with RFID tags that can not only broadcast the precise geo-location of the container but also be linked to relational databases that reveal detailed information on the container’s cargo: where it was loaded and by whom, when and where it was produced, and a host of other important information. IBM and Maersk have in fact just announced a pilot project to validate this smart container concept and allow the data to be trackable via an open information architecture.

In effect, driven by industry requirements even more than government regulations, by the end of the decade we can look forward to the development of a “world wide web of things” – the physical data tracking equivalent of the internet. Such a web promises to dramatically enhance supply chain management for multinationals, expedite and safeguard trade, and reduce counterfeiting. This is not science fiction: companies like Walmart have already demanded that their suppliers insert RFID tags into products with the goal of eventually being able to track in near real-time the status of virtually every asset in the company’s supply chain domestically and – relatively soon – globally.

Countries, ports, or companies not subscribing to smart container standards would be subject to automatic inspection or simply not be allowed to engage in international trade with countries participating in the initiative.

Conclusions:

North Korea is the only government in the world today that can be identified as being actively involved in directing crime as a central part of its national economic strategy and foreign policy. As a result, Pyongyang is radically – and perhaps even hopelessly – out of synch with international law and international norms. In essence, North Korea has become a “soprano state” – a government guided by a Worker’s Party leadership whose actions, attitudes, and affiliations increasingly resemble those of an organized crime family more than a normal nation.

North Korea’s serial violation of international laws and agreements begs the question whether it should be allowed normal protections granted to states under the United Nations treaties.

Its reliance on illicit activity for maintaining what my former colleague Bill Newcomb has termed the “palace economy of Kim Jong Il” perhaps makes it very hard for North Korea to abandon such activities and also provides Pyongyang a means to avoid serious engagement with the outside world. Thus, unless and until the North finds itself censured for its involvement in such activities and its illicit finances come under great pressure it may have few incentives to be cooperative and come clean and act normal.

The North must cease its dealings with trans-national organized criminals, its illicit export of weapons, its nuclear reprocessing, its threats to engage in nuclear proliferation, etc. Instead it should accept the extremely reasonable terms the US, with the others parties in the talks, have offered for promoting a positive and peaceful transformation of relations in the context of full denuclearization. If it does then next month’s talks should represent a turning point in the history of our relations with the DPRK. If it does not, as I have shown the evidentiary ground exists for the DPRK’s comprehensive diplomatic isolation and a systematic denial in diplomatic privilege, if not as a pariah state with nuclear weapons but as a criminal state engaged in causus belli acts against the United Nations, its laws, and its principles. I hope Mr. Kim Jong Il makes the right decision.

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
11/14/2005

Employees from the Emperor Hotel in the city of Rajin in North Korea are said to make their livings by doing business in market places. The hotel is well known for its casino.

On the 13th day of this month I had an interview with a manager of the hotel, who I will call Kim Myung Chul (alias, 42 years of age) for the sake of his safety. “The hotel has had much difficulty paying wages to its employees since it closed its casino in February,” he said. “It laid off about half of its 300 employees, and even some of the remaining half had to open restaurants near the hotel or start business in market places for their livings.”

The Emperor Hotel is a five star hotel founded by the Emperor Group in Hong Kong that invested about 24 million dollars in it. It is well known for the finest casino in North Korea.

For the last two years, two high raking Chinese officials have lost a large sum of government money to the casino and the Chinese government complained to the North pressing it to close it. Thus, it was closed in February, and the hotel lost many Chinese tourists. The number of Chinese tourists had been almost 20 thousands a year before. Virtually the hotel is out of business now.

Chae Moon Ho, a former head of Traffic and Transportation Office of Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin, China squandered 3,510,000 yuan (more than 434,000 dollars) of government money in the casino and was sentenced to 8 year imprisonment at the first trial. Mr. Wang, a former superintendent of highway construction, wasted 870,000 yuan (about 107,000 dollars) of government money in the casino and was taken into custody.

After these incidents, the Chinese government had prevented travel agencies around Yanbian area from holding North Korean tourism in March this year. It lifted the ban last September.

The following is some excerpts from the interview.

– When did you start to work for the Emperor Hotel?

I have been working in the hotel since 2000. People in Rajin call it Bipa Hotel or the Five Star Hotel. When the hotel was first opened, it was run in a capitalistic way. Even hostesses from Russia and China were recruited. But they have all returned now because they could no longer get paid. It took 3 years to complete its construction. I heard that it had been intended to be a 30 story building, but it is 7 stories high because the Emperor Group cut spending. Visitors were usually foreign gamblers and those Chinese who enjoyed fish and other seafoods.

– How is business now?

Business situation became very tough after the Chinese stopped coming. Usually thousands of Chinese people visited for the summer, and Russian and Chinese gamblers constantly came and went. But since the casino was closed and the Chinese stopped coming, it has been difficult for the employees to be paid. The hotel even laid off half of its employees. At frist 300 people were recruited, but there are less than 150 employees now. Among them, less than 50, mostly janitors, cooks, Karaoche coordinators, massagists, come to the hotel to work.

– Does the owner not pay the employees?

I do not know. Even though the owner is Emperor Group from Hongkong, the employees are controlled by the Administrative Committee of Rajin city. I suppose that wages must be distributed by the civil authorities. Anyhow, I have not been able to be paid since last spring.

– What kind of people are employed in the hotel?

High ranking people were eliminated from the recruit lest they be contaminated by capitalism brought in by foreign gamblers. For example, Kim Il Sung University graduates, partisans, workers involved with law and national defense and their family members were all eliminated. Mostly tall and good looking people from Rajin were accepted.

– How are the employees paid?

At first, we were well paid. We were not rationed but received wages. Until 2000, I received 300 yuan a month. At that time, 1 yuan($0.1237) was equivalent of 25 Chosun(NK) won($0.0125), and rice was quite cheap. Hence 300 yuan made a sound pay. Moreover, we were fed three times a day and allowed to sleep in the hotel, which was considerable benefits for us. But while business was getting difficult, employees were being turned into 8.3 workers one after another. Finally, payment started to be incomplete from last February. We could just take three meals a day thanks to the money the 8.3 workers gave to the hotel.

– What is 8.3 worker?

The hotel forced some of its employees to earn money all by themselves and to give some part of it to the hotel. 8.3 worker is called so because Kim Il Sung ordered the system during a factory visit on a third day of August.

– How do 8.3 workers earm money?

Some workers opened restaurants near the hotel, and others merchandize in market places. There are people like me who are out here in China and do business with old customers. Chinese tourists like to eat fish and other seafoods in Rajin. That’s why 8.3 workers like to open seafood restaurants near the hotel calling them branch restaurants of the hotel. There are more than 10 such restaurants near the hotel. There are also a few souvenir shops. If they earn money, they give some of it to the hotel. Those who merchandize are just like that. If you give some money to the hotel every month, you are not required to go there to work.

– Does the money go to Emperor Group?

No. It goes to the Administrative Committee of Rajin city. The hotel is just a Work Place: we are not under the owner’s control. We are required to take permission from the Administrative Committee to work outside the hotel.

– Do 8.3 workers make much money?

It is advantageous for business to be an employee for the hotel. We do not pay such heavy taxes as ordinary merchandizers do. It is also easier for us to occupy stalls in market places than for ordinary merchandisers.

– What is people’s life like in Rajin recently?

Outsiders envy Rajin and Seonbong because they compose the free trade zone, but the situation is on the contrary. The government takes more from Rajin and Seonbong because of the free trade. Rice is also more expensive. They are good places for the rich to live in but not for the poor.

Here are the highlights:

1.  In June 2005, Hyundai conformed its 1 millionth visitor to Kumgang.
2.  January 1999, soon after the launch of the project, Hyundai Asan leaders stated that by the end 2004 there would be an accumulated 4.9 million visits to the North.
3.  Managers predicted that in 2004 alone some 1.2 million tourists would visit the Kumgang Mountain Project. The actual number of the visits in 2004 was 273,000
4.  The project was first conceived in 1989, when Chung Ju-yung, the founder of the Hyundai Group, became the first South Korean industrialist to visit the North.
5.  Financially, the North Koreans have been doing very well. According to the initial agreement, the Hyundai Group would build all the infrastructure in the zone (presumably including the fences to keep the South Korean visitors under control), and pay $12 million every month as fee for the use of the area. Some additional income was earned by the North through the sale of grossly overpriced local products and souvenirs.
6.  Contrary to initial expectations, South Koreans were not too eager to spend their short vacations behind barbed wire.
7.  in the late 1990s a cheapest three night package cost about 700,000 won
8.  In April 2001 the Hyundai Merchandise Marine Company halved the number of trips available. It was also having trouble making payments to the North Korean partners, too.
9.  However, the government simply could not allow it to collapse: by that time the Kumgang Project had acquired a huge symbolic importance. It was salvaged by a massive government intervention, and stayed afloat largely because the Blue House (and also a large part of the public) needed a symbol of cooperation, at whatever cost to the taxpayers.