North Korean Economy Watch

From the Donga
11/3/2006

It is being reported that North Korea has increased its oil imports from Primorsky, Russia every year and made its payment by sending labor abroad due to its payment incapability.

According to the government of Primorsky yesterday, North Korean oil imports increased from 62,000 dollars in 2001 to 4.4 million dollars last year. Considering that the export price for Russian Urals oil has increased 35% during the past four years, North Korean oil supplies imported from Primorsky have been more than a 42-fold increase.

“Primorsky, which does not have oil resources, exports oil to North Korea through the federal government and in compensation we get labor instead of money due to North Korean incapability of making its payment,” said Primorsky experts on North Korea.

Dong-A Ilbo special team confirmed in an interview with the government of Primorsky that North Korea has been increasing its labor exports from 3,320 workers at the end of last year to 5,000 workers until late of this year. The current number of abroad sending workers is the greatest ever since Statistics Committee of Primorsky analyzed statistics of North Korean labors in 1993.

The government of Primorsky allowed only some North Korean labor force imports. Recently, however, it is reported that they have increased the scale according to the increasing demand from local companies in Russia.

A government official of Primorsky stated over a phone call with reporters on October 30, “We have limited the number of labor permits since foreign workers are taking away employment from Russian workers.” The official did not specifically mention the reason of the recent growing North Korean labor forces because “the person in charge is away at the moment.”

However, Professor Larisha Jabrobskaja at the Far Eastern Research Center in Vladivostok, who has studied North Korean labor problems for 15 years, explained the reason as, “North Korea, suffering from a chronic trade deficit since the 1990s, is sending labor abroad in an attempt to make its payment.”

He added, “Considering the current trade structure of Primorsky, which its oil import to North Korea accounts 70% of the total exports, it seems Primorsky is swapping oil for North Korean labor.”

“North Korea is planning to expand its oil import through attracting Russian energy corporations in the Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone and the Primorsky’s project to expand its oil and coal export is taking shape these days,” according to the government of Primorsky.

Most of the workers who were forced to enter into Russia in the 1990s worked as woodcutters, but nowadays they work in various fields including construction, agricultural and marine industry.

Local Russians in Primorsky said, “North Korean workers usually get disadvantaged when they look for jobs after the entry and also when they exchange money through North Korean executives, even by offering bribes.”

From Yonhap
11/1/2006
Yonhap

North Korea on Wednesday said it would take “stern measures” against South Korea following any changes to a tourism program to the North’s Mount Geumgang, a South Korean project recently accused of funneling hard currency to the communist state.

“Foul attempts are underway in the South by (South Korea’s) Grand National Party to destroy the Mount Geumgang tourism project, which is a symbol of North-South economic cooperation,” said a spokesman for the North’s Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee in a statement carried by the country’s Korean Central News Agency.

“We will always treasure the hope and wish of South Korean peoples toward Mount Geumgang, but we make it clear that we would have no choice but to sternly take corresponding measures if an irreversible situation is created by the Grand National Party,” it said.

The statement follows claims by the South Korean opposition party that cash paid to the communist nation in return for the North’s opening of the inter-Korean border to allow South Korean tourists to the mountain could be helping the North’s nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs.

The opposition’s claims and demands to halt the inter-Korean project intensified after Pyongyang conducted a nuclear test on Oct. 9, defying all international warnings and appeals.

The U.N. Security Council has adopted a resolution on North Korea that prohibits the transfer of any financial resources or other materials that could benefit the North’s weapons program.

Seoul refuses to shut down cross-border roads to the North Korean mountain and a North Korean border town, Kaesong, where the two Koreas are jointly developing a large-scale industrial complex for South Korean firms.

Hyundai Asan, the South Korean developer of the Mount Geumgang resort, pays an average US$1 million a month to the North Korean committee in admission fees for South Koreans traveling there, while the country’s firms operating at the Kaesong complex are paying about US$600,000 each month in wages to some 8,700 North Koreans working there.

One of the ways, partly proposed by the opposition GNP, to cut currency inflows to the communist nation was to pay the fees and wages in goods, instead of cash.

The North, however, said the idea is not even worth mentioning, saying it is as outdated as it is absurd.

“The Grand National Party, which puts the interests of foreign forces before those of the nation and tries to realize its scheme to take power by violating the nation’s interests, would pay high prices,” the North Korean statement said, adding the country will closely watch South Korea’s move.

Asian Survey
November/December 2006, Vol. 46, No. 6, Pages 898-916
Jae Cheol Kim
Professor of International Studies at the Catholic University of Korea, Seoul.

PDF here: chinainDPRK.pdf

Conclusion:
China’s investment efforts suggest that it has begun to engage North Korea economically. By investing, the Chinese leadership has attempted to push the North to embrace economic reforms, which in turn could improve the North Korean economy and reduce the country’s potential for political instability. In order to lead the North to embark on reform policies, Beijing has tried to provide it with seed money and technology by encouraging Chinese companies to invest. This suggests that despite expectations and allegations from the West that China might abandon its long-time ally, China is committed to supporting North Korea.

The Chinese investment, however, has increasingly been influenced by commercial considerations. Officials in Beijing have stressed that economic exchanges with the North must be mutually beneficial. Chinese companies, which have become responsible for the majority of the investment, have paid increasing attention to market share and natural resources. That China has increasingly tried to gain economic advantage in the North suggests that Sino-North Korean relations are being transformed from being ideology-motivated to interestmotivated.

Despite a stiff increase over the past couple of years, it is hard to say that Chinese investment is either full-fledged or irreversible. Because the instability of North Korea prevents Chinese entrepreneurs from fully embracing the country, Chinese investment must be seen as a pilot project, with Chinese companies and entrepreneurs testing the water. Looking to the future, Chinese investment in North Korea is likely to increase. Despite problems, the Chinese leadership will probably continue to encourage further investment in an effort to exploit developmental opportunities while simultaneously curtailing the flow of direct aid to the North. In addition, China’s dynamic economic growth will propel its overseas investment. As China’s capital account is gradually liberalized, cash-rich Chinese companies will look for markets and resources abroad to fuel their development. The potential appreciation of the yuan will further force firms to relocate factories producing low-end products to countries where the labor cost is lower. Seen from this perspective, North Korea is a good candidate for future Chinese investment—if there is no major turbulence in bilateral relations.

Highlights:
North Korea has been reluctant to follow China’s path of reform and opening because it worried that the policy may create political problems. In an apparent response to China’s recommendation in the late 1990s for reform, for instance, Kim asked Beijing to respect “Korean-style socialism.” But China’s support for reform is not unconditional. Although Chinese leaders have repeatedly urged the DPRK to embrace market-driven reforms (even taking Kim Jong Il is on tours to see the results of China’s economic reforms), when North Korea decided to set up a special economic zone in Sinuiju, apparently without prior consultation with Beijing, China aborted the project by arresting Yang Bin, whom North Korea had designated head of the zone, in October 2002.

China, however, does not want to see turbulence on the Korean Peninsula, which could not only lead to the economic and political collapse of a socialist regime on China’s border but could also threaten regional stability. China thus has tried to sustain the Pyongyang regime by providing economic assistance–believing that reform and opening would not only revive the North Korean economy but also reduce the need for regular aid to prop up the regime, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that the Chinese government would encourage more of its companies to invest and establish their businesses in North Korea.

For Chinese firms, the prime minister’s statement amounted to a government directive, with some entrepreneurs understanding that Wen’s statement was a signal for Chinese companies to invest.  Organizations were formed to smooth such investment, including the Shenyang Municipal Association of Entrepreneurs (Shenyangshi Qiyejia Xiehui), Dandong Municipal Economic Consultation Center for the Korean Peninsula (Dandongshi Chaoxianbandao Jingji Zixun Zhongxin), and Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company (Beijing Chaohua Youlian). They organized explanatory meetings on investment, drawing numerous applicants.

Beijing attempted to boost investors’ confidence by signing an “Investment Encouragement and Protection Agreement” with Pyongyang in March 2005 when Premier Park Bongju visited Beijing. The framework for economic and technological cooperation was made clearer through the signing of an “Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation” that October. Chinese officials have given financial incentives and guarantees to firms that invest in North Korea. China’s state-run banks have not only provided companies with investment capital but also have underwritten Chinese investment for joint ventures. Beijing granted preferential treatment to products processed in the North, allowing them better access to the Chinese market. Products that were processed in the Rajin area with Chinese materials and then imported to China, for instance, were labeled domestic trade and were thus exempted from customs inspection.

The deputy CEO of Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company, a Beijing company that helps Chinese companies invest in the North, has been quoted as saying that whether a company is able to invest in North Korea depended not on the company’s will but on whether the North would accept it or not. Foreign investors, he added, needed to meet the criterion of “political reliability.” In practice, concerns about political contamination limit North Korea’s economic cooperation with South Korea, whose government has eagerly pushed economic integration with the North. North Korea’s opening therefore means an opening toward China, and this in turn gives Chinese companies very rare advantages.

Labor costs in the DPRK are low [compared to China], running only 70–80 yuan (about US$10) per month.  Building a factory is very cheap, up to one million yuan (about $120,000).  Chinese entrepreneurs see that what North Korea needs is largely light industrial products. Because brand consciousness there is weak, these investors believe that many Chinese companies, even small- and medium-sized ones, can compete in the North Korean market.  The scope for making profits is bigger in North Korea than in China because manufacturers can charge more for similar products in the North. For example, the price of a cigarette lighter is three to five yuan ($0.36 to $0.60) in Pyongyang but only 0.5 yuan ($0.06) in Wenzhou, China.

Although big state-owned companies account for the majority of Chinese outward investments, they rarely invest in North Korea, leaving this to small- to medium-sized companies. In the past, most Chinese investors were Korean-Chinese merchants from two areas in China: Liaoning Province and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. They do not expect that they can make profits in the North Korean market right away; rather, they plan to be ready for when the North opens to the world, by moving into the market early.

Chinese investment projects in North Korea are not only small in number but also weak in scale. There are no detailed data available on their average size, but they likely are no exception to the fact that China’s outward investment is generally characterized by its small scale and low level of technology.

Although North Korea wants capital in such sectors as home appliances, construction materials, electronic communications products, and machine building, Chinese investment is heavily concentrated in the sectors where China’s needs lie, such as resource extraction, or where its companies can make a profit, such as service sectors. The official Chinese guideline for outbound investment, noted above, recommended investment only in such manufacturing sectors as textiles, clothing, and food products, leaving aside other sectors for which North Korea wants investment.

The North lacks basic frameworks needed for drawing in foreign investment. Policies, laws, and regulations about tax, for instance, are not in place. There is no well established market mechanism for running the economy. The government is still heavily involved in economic management; therefore, potential investors need to have personal networks to open doors, a point that worries potential Chinese investors.  North Korea lacks a sound political environment for enticing foreign investment. The country’s economic policies, especially those related to reform, shift continuously, raising questions about the official commitment to reform.

Pyongyang Department Store No. 1
Zeng Changbiao, chief executive officer (CEO) of the Zhongxu Group, in a much publicized deal in 2004, signed a contract to run Pyongyang’s Department Store No.1 for 10 years. He said his main motive for investing was to take over the North Korean market. He wants to be dominant in the North Korean retail business by securing and expanding market share. But it is not clear whether the contract was put into practice.  An article in a journal published by the National Development and Reform Commission, a ministry-level organization of the Chinese government, suggested that little had changed at the department store by the middle of 2005. South Korean officials also say that the store is still run by North Korea. Zhongxu Group’s Zeng received the lowest tax rate—5% income and 5% import—in the North Korean tax system.

This is one of three big department stores that were being run either by the Chinese alone or jointly.  Shenyang Municipal Association for Trade Promotion opened Daesong Market in Pyongyang, the first wholly foreign-owned company in a non-science sector.

Musan
China has shown an interest in joint resources development projects. The best known case is the project to develop the Musan iron mines. It is not easy to draw an exact picture of Chinese investment in the mines because many press reports suggest different stories. According to a Korean report, a Chinese company from Jilin Province planned to invest about $500 million in the mines. Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper, reported that three companies from Jilin—Tonghua Iron & Steel Group (Tonggang), Yanbian Tianchi Company, and Sinosteel Corporation (Zhonggang)—contracted rights to exploit the Musan iron mines for 50 years. According to the report, the Chinese companies were going to invest 7 billion yuan (about $865 million) and planned to produce 10 million tons of iron ore each year.  In the case of the Musan mines, 2 billion yuan (about $240 million) out of the 7 billion China committed to invest was allocated to building roads and railways from Musan to Tonghua in China. Sizable investment levels might help Jilin secure access to seaports in North Korea.

Similarly, the Chinese press has reported that the Musan iron mines development project was canceled by officials in North Korea, embarrassed by publicity over the deal because it highlighted the degree of foreign investment, a subject that Pyongyang would prefer to handle quietly.

Raijin
Rason International Logistics Joint Company-Rason International secured the exclusive rights to run the No. 3 and No. 4 piers of Rajin port for 50 years. In order to secure the rights, China committed to investing 30 million euros ($36 million) to build an industrial park, tourism facilities, and a road from the trade district of Rason city to Rajin Port. North Korea in turn committed to providing China with 5 to 10 square kilometers of land to build the industrial park.

The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond
International Crisis Group
10/26/2006
PDF Here: Perilous Journeys.pdf

Executive Summary

Scores of thousands of North Koreans have been risking their lives to escape their country’s hardships in search of a better life, contributing to a humanitarian challenge that is playing out almost invisibly as the world focuses on North Korea’s nuclear program. Only a little over 9,000 have made it to safety, mostly in South Korea but also in Japan, Europe and the U.S. Many more live in hiding from crackdowns and forcible repatriations by China and neighbouring countries, vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. If repatriated to the North, they face harsh punishment, possibly execution. China and South Korea have held back, even during the Security Council debate over post-test sanctions, from applying as much pressure as they might to persuade Pyongyang to reverse its dangerous nuclear policy, in part because they fear that the steady stream of North Koreans flowing into China and beyond would become a torrent if the North’s economy were to collapse under the weight of tough measures. While there is marginally more hope Beijing will change its ways than Pyongyang, concerned governments can and must do far more to improve the situation of the border crossers.

Even without a strong response to the 9 October 2006 nuclear test that targets the North’s economy, the internal situation could soon get much worse. The perfect storm may be brewing for a return to famine in the North. Last year, Pyongyang reintroduced the same public distribution system for food that collapsed in the 1990s and rejected international humanitarian assistance, demanding instead unmonitored development help. Funding for remaining aid programs is difficult to secure, and summer floods have damaged crops and infrastructure.

Hunger and the lack of economic opportunity, rather than political oppression, are the most important factors in shaping a North Korean’s decision to leave “the worker’s paradise”. A lack of information, the fear of being caught by Chinese or North Korean security agents and financial limitations are more significant barriers than any actual wall or tight security at the border. China compensates for the virtual absence of border guards with a relentless search for North Koreans in hiding. In

October 2006, Chinese authorities began to build a fence along the frontier and conduct neighbourhood sweeps to find and arrest the border crossers. Despite these formidable obstacles, the willingness among North Koreans to risk their lives to escape is growing stronger, and arrivals in the South are likely to hit a record this year. The most important pull factor shaping the decision to leave is the presence of family members in China and, increasingly, South Korea. The nearly 9,000 defectors in the South are able to send cash and information to help their loved ones escape. To a lesser but significant extent, information is beginning to spread in the North through smuggled South Korean videos, American and South Korean radio broadcasts, and word of mouth – all exposing North Koreans to new ideas and aspirations.

Most North Koreans do not arrive in China with the intention of seeking official asylum, but because Beijing is making it ever more difficult for them to stay, a growing number are forced to travel thousands of kilometres and undertake dangerous border crossings in search of refuge in Mongolia or South East Asia. The mass arrests of 175 asylum seekers in Bangkok in August 2006 and a further 86 on 24 October provide vivid examples of host country hospitality being stretched to the limits.

The vast majority of North Koreans who have made it to safety resettle in South Korea. In most instances, this is a choice motivated by language, culture and the promise of being reunited with family members. In a growing number of cases, the overly burdensome procedures for being granted asylum anywhere else is the deciding factor. With the exception of Germany, the governments that have pressed most vigorously for improving North Korean human rights, namely the U.S., the European Union member states and Japan, have taken in only a handful of asylum seekers.

A loose network of makeshift shelters focused on humanitarian aid has evolved into a politically-charged but fragile underground railroad on which some North Koreans can buy safe passage to Seoul in a matter of days, while others suffer years of violence and exploitation. If they are to minimise the exploitation of the most vulnerable and enhance the much-needed aid this network delivers, concerned governments must commit to a sustainable solution.

None of the policies proposed in this report would create unmanageable burdens for any government. Unless North Korea’s economy collapses completely, the numbers of its citizens crossing international borders will continue to be restricted by many factors, not least Pyongyang’s tight controls on internal movement and the financial cost of securing an escape route. However, it is time to back up strong words and resolutions about the plight of North Koreans with actions, both because humanity demands it and because if the international community cannot quickly get a handle on this situation, it will find it harder to forge an operational consensus on the nuclear issue.

From Joong ang Daily 
10/25/2006
Rah Hyun-cheol

The tour program to Mount Kumgang and the Kaesong Industrial Complex are certain to be affected by the crisis over North Korea’s recent nuclear test.

But they’re not the only ones ― South Korea has hundreds of smaller companies that have business deals with the North, with some actually operating inside the country.

And they were at a loss when the South Korean government announced it would “proceed with economic cooperation projects, but private companies are to decide on their own about their future investment plans in the North.”

According to the Ministry of Unification and the Korea International Trade Association, companies with records of trade with North Korea totaled 515 as of last year. That figure includes 379 trading firms and 136 companies that process imported materials, trading $420 million worth of products with the North. That amount accounted for 40 percent of South Korean trade with the North for the year, compared with 16.7 percent from the Kaesong Industrial Complex and 8.2 percent from the tour program to Mount Kumgang. Over the first eight months of this year, 395 companies have participated in trade with the North.

“It’s hard to predict what North Korea will come up with, and the South Korean government seems to be lost in its policy decision-making. Besides, the United States and China display different opinions. It’s nearly impossible to foresee the future,” said a head from one of those companies, who declined to be named. “I tried to grasp the real situation in the North by visiting on my own but had to give up the trip as China Southern Airlines shut down the route linking Beijing and Pyongyang.”

What the businesses fear the most is the possibility that trade with North Korea will be abruptly suspended if the North conducts additional nuke tests or economic sanctions against the country intensify.

A senior executive from Hanabiz.com, a firm in charge of dispatching North Korean workers in information and technology to Korean software companies in Dandong, China, said, “The recent nuclear test by North Korea has not dealt a serious blow yet to my company. However, it has become difficult to send cash to North Korean business partners after some Chinese banks restricted money transfers to the North.”

From the New York Times:
Jim Yardley
10/25/2006

[edited]Sanhe, China–Truckers carrying goods into North Korea across the sludge-colored Tumen River say inspections are unchanged on the Chinese side. Customs agents rarely open boxes here or at two other border crossings in this mountainous region, truckers and private transport companies say.

Nor are any fences visible, like the barrier under construction near China’s busiest border crossing at the city of Dandong. There were early reports that inspectors in Dandong were at least opening trucks for a look, but so far statistics and anecdotal reports in the Chinese news media indicate that, essentially, everything remains the same.

What is visible here, though, is the growing and, in some ways, surprisingly complicated trade relationship between China and North Korea. China remains North Korea’s most important aid donor and oil supplier, but, conversely, China is now importing growing amounts of coal and electricity from North Korea. Chinese entrepreneurs, meanwhile, are starting to buy shares in North Korean mining operations and, in one case, trying to gain access to the Sea of Japan by leasing a North Korean port as a potential shipping hub.

The upswing in Chinese economic activity — which is already raising questions about whether the intent is more strategic than commercial — is one of the reasons that China has sent mixed signals about how aggressive it will be in inspecting border trade to meet the United Nations sanctions. For now, at least, some truckers in this region say the only change in border inspections has come on the North Korean side, where customs agents are checking loads more carefully for items deemed contraband by Kim Jong-il’s government.

“We used to sit with North Koreans that we know and have a chat,” said Jiang Zhuchun, a trucker waiting to cross into North Korea on Tuesday afternoon. “But after the nuclear test, we are only allowed to sit alone in our trucks.”

The United States has praised China for approving the sanctions against North Korea, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used her visit to Beijing last week to emphasize the common desire to restart diplomatic talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. China’s leaders are said to be deeply angered over the nuclear test and have signaled they may take a harder line against their longtime ally. Last week, some banks in Dandong froze certain accounts and financial transactions with North Korea.

But the question of inspections along the 866-mile border between China and North Korea is a different matter. The sanctions authorized countries to inspect cargo entering and leaving North Korea and barred the sale or transfer of material that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Yet the sanctions are still less than two weeks old, and some details have still not been worked out. For example, the sanctions ban luxury goods without defining them.

The United States wants tightened border inspections by China as a tool for squeezing the North Korean economy and ensuring that North Korea cannot buy or sell nuclear materials. China is worried that destabilizing North Korea could begin an exodus of refugees and has resisted changing inspections. This week, with rumors swirling about a possible border crackdown, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, said China intended to comply fully with the sanctions, but also said inspections along the border would remain “normal.”

The Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region, the name of the sprawling district that includes the Sanhe border checkpoint, is not the primary trade route between China and North Korea; Dandong, with its more direct route to Pyongyang, the North’s capital, is by far the busiest. But the Yanbian area is wedged into a geopolitical hotspot where China, North Korea and Russia all come together.

In interviews and visits to three crossings from Yanbian into North Korea, truckers, transportation company agents, investors and others confirmed without exception that trade is continuing across the border much as it always has. Customs agents examine bills of lading but usually open shipments only when they are tipped in advance to someone trying to smuggle goods like beer or liquor without paying customs duties, several people said.

“No matter who you talk to, they will tell you there is not much difference,” said Jin Lanzhu, whose trading company is one of the largest in the region.

On Wednesday morning inside the Chinese customs yard in the border city of Tumen, small groups of North Koreans, each wearing their mandatory pins with images of either North Korean leader Kim Jong-il or his father, Kim Il-sung, waited to cross the bridge. They had nylon sacks stuffed with shoes and clothes, television sets, a refrigerator. Some carried bags of rice.

“How many bags do you have?” asked a female Chinese customs agent in a blue uniform. She looked them over and walked away without opening any. She did forbid the North Koreans to take several boxes of fruit because of a problem with worms. Then, the men began loading the sacks onto a flatbed truck operated by the customs office to carry smaller loads to the North Korean side. Two North Korean women complained to a local taxi driver that they had to pay 400 yuan, or about $50, for the service.

“They don’t really check over here,” one North Korean woman said of Chinese customs. “They do on the North Korean side.”

A similar scene unfolded later in the day at a smaller crossing in the dingy town of Kaishan, where the customs port is so small that trucks take a dirt road to a crumbling checkpoint. On Wednesday, a young soldier watched laborers load about 150 used televisions and boxes of medicine into a North Korean truck that had crossed the river to collect the shipment.

“I’m here for security,” the soldier said.

Trade between China and North Korea has grown rapidly in recent years — as has North Korea’s trade deficit with China, in part, because China no longer appears to be selling oil at a subsidized rate. China now accounts for almost 40 percent of North Korea’s total foreign trade; bilateral trade has more than doubled to $1.1 billion in 2005 from $490 million in 1995. In Yanbian alone, trade with North Korea jumped 82 percent in 2004 and another 20 percent in 2005, according to a local newspaper account.

Divining what the increased traffic says about the state of North Korea’s economy is a subject of debate. New research and interviews in the Yanbian region suggest that North Korea, a country that regularly suffers blackouts, is now exporting growing amounts of coal, minerals and even electricity to China, which is hungry for energy and raw materials. In exchange, North Korea is no longer importing as much raw material and machinery as it had in the past.

Instead, North Korea is importing food, clothes, daily sundries, outdated televisions and appliances and, of course, oil. The trend could suggest that North Korea’s recent experiments with private markets may be expanding, some analysts said.

A recent study by the Nautilus Institute, a San Francisco-based research group, used customs statistics to describe the trend, but also concluded that it might indicate that North Korea’s nonmilitary manufacturing industries were in sharp decline. One Chinese investor in a North Korean coal mine agreed. “They seemed to have stopped the factories,” said the investor, who asked not to be identified. He said doing business with North Korea was very risky and cautioned that numerous Chinese businessmen had lost money. “There are zero guarantees and protections.”

Even so, Chinese entrepreneurs and companies, both private and state-owned, are starting to buy interests in North Korean mines to export raw materials. The amount of investment is not clearly defined, but different Chinese proposals call for building truck routes between inland trade centers in northeast China to the North Korean coast, according to Chinese media accounts.

A Chinese property developer, Fan Yingsheng, told the Chinese news media that despite the nuclear test, he was still pursuing plans to develop the North Korean port of Rajin into a shipping center for goods from China. He said he would soon fly to Pyongyang to sign a final agreement.

The flurry of Chinese activity has not gone unnoticed by South Korea and others in the region, analysts say. Like China, South Korea has resisted harsh economic sanctions and refused to shut down its own trade deals with North Korea in part because of concerns about a swift collapse of the North Korean government. But South Korea is also positioning itself, to some degree against China, to be the dominant player in the future of North Korea.

China, meanwhile, has said the activity is not strategic positioning but natural economic outgrowth for a booming, entrepreneurial economy in need of resources. Li Dunqiu, a North Korea specialist with a research institute under China’s State Council, or cabinet, recently wrote that “laws of the market economy” were the driving force in Chinese investment in North Korea.

Along the border, it is easy to see how the daily traffic from China is a lifeline for North Korea. One woman from Yanbian said her family had recently come across to buy rice and other essentials. But Mr. Jin, the owner of the trading company, said charity was not at the essence of China’s trade with North Korea.

“The business interest is the most important thing,” he said. “Helping them comes after that.” Then, pausing to reflect on the potential and perils of trading with North Korea, he added: “North Korea is just like China in the past. It is a blank sheet of paper. You can draw wherever you want to. The question is whether the paper is going to be there at all times for you to draw on.”

Yonhap
10/23/2006 

North Korea plans to use a light-industry university in its border town of Kaesong to train technicians for an inter-Korean industrial complex in the town, a pro-Pyongyang newspaper in Japan said Monday.

“One of the demands by South Korean businesses operating in the Kaesong industrial complex is hiring competitive manpower from North Korea,” reported the Choson Sinbo, organ of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, citing an unnamed official of the Kaesong City People’s Committee.

“North Korea plans to nurture such talented people in Koryo Songgyungwan in Kaesong,” the official was quoted as saying.

To this end, the North is building a new campus to house more students on a site next to the existing Songgyungwan building, the newspaper said.

The industrial complex, located a few kilometers north of the inter-Korean border, is home to 15 South Korean companies that make goods for South Korean and foreign markets. They employed about 8,700 North Korean workers as of the end of last month.

As many as half a million North Koreans are expected to be working at the joint industrial complex by 2012, when it could likely house up to 2,000 South Korean companies, according to the Unification Ministry.

Seoul hopes its free trade agreement now under negotiations with the United States will recognize products made in Kaesong as South Korean-made, but Washington is against the idea.

Washington has also expressed skepticism about the inter-Korean project calling it a channel for North Korea to earn much-needed hard currency for its weapons of mass destruction development.

The Kaesong complex is one of the joint economic achievements the Koreas have so far made in the wake of their historic summit talks in June 2000.

From the Choson Ilbo:
10/23/2006

N.Korean Party ‘Takes 60 Percent of Kaesong Wages’
 
More than half the salaries paid to North Koreans working at the inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial Park go to the North Korean Workers’ Party, a document written by a team in charge of inter-Korean economic cooperation at the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy shows. The team reported to the unification minister.

Grand National Party lawmaker Kim Gi-hyeon made the document public on Sunday. According to the memo, US$30 out of the monthly pay of $57.50 goes to the Workers’ Party. With $17.50 spent on insurance and other costs, North Korean workers at the complex are left with only $10 a month.

The Unification Ministry has publicly claimed that workers get $66 on average, with 30 percent spent on benefit packages of workers, like housing and medial expenses, and 70 percent going to the workers. A Unification Ministry official on Sunday denied the report. “It is the first I’ve heard about $30 going to the party,” he said. “How could the Industry Ministry know about something that the Unification Ministry didn’t know? We have no idea.”

From the Korea Times:
10/22/2006
Kim Sue-young

Fines on Mt. Kumgang Tourists Rise

An increasing number of tourists have been fined this year at Mt. Kumgang in North Korea, the Ministry of Unification reported yesterday.

Some 1,177 fines were levied by North Korea from January to July, the highest figure to date with $16,800, being paid to the North’s officials according to the report. (more…)

USA Today
Barbara Slavin
10/22/2006

At a kindergarten in Hyangsan, a small city near North Korea’s capital, dozens of colorfully dressed children put on a calisthenics display this month for visitors from the U.N. World Food Program.

The children, full of corn porridge and high-protein biscuits provided daily by the aid agency, jumped, stretched briskly and looked healthy, said Jean-Pierre DeMargerie, the top program official in North Korea. Kids in the front rows looked especially good, he said. “Those 20-30 yards back were not as well groomed or dressed.”

“It’s always difficult to get a clear picture,” DeMargerie said. “The North Koreans don’t like to expose those that might be sick or weak. You build your assumptions on a relatively small sample.”

North Korea, one of the world’s most isolated nations, is a hard society to fathom even for the few foreigners who visit regularly. Whether it is on the verge of economic collapse or resilient in the face of decades of adversity and deprivation remains a matter of conjecture.

Little can be seen clearly

The shroud that keeps North Korea hidden makes it virtually impossible to judge whether the limited sanctions the United Nations imposed in retaliation for an apparent nuclear weapons test Oct. 9 will have any effect on the regime of Kim Jong Il.

The Bush administration hopes the sanctions and international rebuke, particularly from China, North Korea’s main source of trade and investment, will prompt Kim to halt his nuclear program and resume negotiations on a diplomatic solution. “I think (the North Koreans) were surprised by a 15-0” vote on sanctions by the U.N. Security Council, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Saturday. “We’ll see whether or not they are prepared.”

DeMargerie and a half-dozen others who visited North Korea recently say it is better off than a few years ago and may be able to withstand sanctions.

The sanctions could reduce the amount of hard currency North Korea receives, but market reforms in place since 2002 and stockpiling of excess cash, food aid and fuel may give Kim a cushion to defy the U.N.

In 2005, North Korea “received a surplus of a half-million to 600,000 tons of grain” from China and South Korea, said Kenneth Quinones, a former U.S. intelligence expert on North Korea who teaches at Akita International University in Japan. “It looks like most of that went into storage.” North Korea also had a decent harvest this year after two consecutive bumper crops, he said.

Marcus Noland, a Korea specialist at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, said millions of dollars in Chinese investment went into North Korea during the first half of 2006, more than the country could absorb.

Signs of progress are evident to Steve Linton, 56, who has made more than 50 trips to North Korea in the last 15 years. The son and grandson of Christian missionaries, Linton heads the Eugene Bell Foundation, which has delivered medical equipment to about 70 hospitals throughout the country.

“It used to be that people were visibly thinner in the spring,” when food from the previous year’s harvest had run out and new crops were about to be planted, said Linton, who last visited North Korea in May. Now, he said, “that distinction has pretty much disappeared.”

Linton has noticed that North Koreans are better dressed and that there are more bicycles in a country where a decade ago, nearly everyone traveled on foot. “It’s not lightning speed, but it’s gradual change,” he said.

Emerging markets

Pyongyang, a gloomy capital of bland concrete high-rises and little commerce a decade ago, has a few dozen shops and many sidewalk stalls selling ice cream, cookies, flowers, even videocassettes, said Simon Cockerell, manager for Beijing-based Koryo Tours, which organizes trips to North Korea.

Cockerell said there are four or five billboards for cars, the first commercial advertising in the country. Electricity blackouts, once common, are rare in the capital, he said.

Other indicators of an economic cushion include:

•A resumption of a state-run rationing system that hands out about half a pound of grain daily to city residents, who make up 70% of North Korea’s 22 million people. DeMargerie said North Korean officials told his organization that rationing, which collapsed during a famine in the 1990s, resumed last year. It provides corn or rice to make porridge, a mainstay of the North Korean diet.

•Diversification of oil suppliers. China provides about 80% of North Korean fuel, and Iran and Indonesia supply most of the rest, Quinones said. That gives supply alternatives should China carry out threats to restrict deliveries. Noland said North Korea also may have stockpiled diesel fuel that South Korea provided in 2004.

Noland, who spent several weeks in China last summer along the 880-mile border with North Korea, said economic progress is notable for one group of new entrepreneurs: managers of shuttered state-owned factories who are trading coke, coal and iron ore for cheap Chinese consumer goods and food, which they then sell to fellow North Koreans.

“A lot of small-scale activity in North Korea is done by state-owned enterprises,” Noland said. “They have transformed themselves into retailers. I call it the ‘Wal-Martization’ of the North Korean economy.”

Troubles remain

On the negative side, trade with China, which totaled more than $1.5 billion last year, is down about 30% this year because of the difficulty of transferring funds to North Korean bank accounts, said Nam Sung Wook, head of North Korean Studies at Korea University in Seoul. The problem stems from U.S. action last year to freeze North Korean accounts in a bank in the Chinese enclave of Macau linked to counterfeiting and money laundering.

“There is some confusion among traders in Dandong,” a Chinese city across the Yalu River from North Korea that has become a center of cross-border commerce, Nam said. He forecasts negative growth for the North Korean economy this year after 2.2% growth last year. Even so, new sanctions “will not collapse the North Korean economy,” he said.

Those likely to suffer most are salaried urban professionals, said Nam, who visited Pyongyang in July. He said he heard grumbling from technocrats and professors, whose average monthly pay comes out to about $33 at the official exchange rate but only $5 on the black market.

North Korea also has massive infrastructure needs that make it difficult to sustain economic gains. DeMargerie said only 20%-25% of households have access to clean running water, and the sanitation system is becoming a serious health hazard.

Still, Noland predicted, “They can make it through the winter. They are hunkering down and believe they can survive until the world accepts them as a nuclear power.”

Rice conceded that sanctions are no certain solution. “I think we’ll be at this for a while,” she said. “I can’t tell you how long.”