North Korean Economy Watch

Korea Times
Lee Jin-woo
2/9/2007
 
A group of 17 people including high-level executives from Moody’s Investors Service and Goldman Sachs made a half-day visit to the joint industrial complex in the North Korean border city of Kaesong on Friday, the Ministry of Unification said.

Three executives from each company were accompanied by officials from the Ministry of Finance and Economy as well as the Ministry of Unification.

The short trip was part of the foreign rating agencies’ annual meeting on South Korea’s sovereign rating.

During the visit, they received a briefing from officials of the Kaesong Industiral District Management Committee, which manages the site’s development process, and looked around the first completed district of the industrial complex.

The government has had to hold off its plan to sell the first batch of some 1 million pyong (3.3 million square meters) of land to South Korean companies that wished to move into the industrial complex.

The plan was initially scheduled in June last year, but was suspended indefinitely due to signs of a North Korean missile test. Pyongyang pushed ahead with its plan and test-fired seven ballistic missiles on July 5, which was then followed by its first-ever nuclear test on Oct. 9.

Moody’s upgraded South Korea’s rating to A3 in March 2002, its seventh-highest investment grade.

Officials, however, were cautious about the chances for a higher sovereign rating.

“It remains to be seen whether Moody’s will upgrade South Korea’s credit rating, but it’s true that they react quite sensitively to geopolitical issues related to North Korea,” said a ranking official of the finance ministry.

Another official expected a positive effect from the visit, saying “The outcome of the ongoing six-party talks in Beijing is most important without a doubt, but this trip will help officials of the foreign rating agencies have a better understanding of our efforts and faith in inter-Korean business projects.”

The number of North Koreans working for the 18 South Korean firms at the industrial complex surpassed 10,000 late last year.

By 2012, the complex is expected to house about 2,000 South Korean manufacturers employing about half a million North Koreans, according to the Ministry of Unification.

Korea Times
Lee Jin-woo
2/6/2007

High-level executives from Moody’s Investors Service and Goldman Sachs will visit a joint industrial complex in the North Korean border city of Kaesong on Friday, the Ministry of Unification said Tuesday.

The delegation includes Thomas Byrne, a senior credit officer for Korean affairs at the global credit appraiser Moody’s.

Three executives from each financial company will visit the Kaesong Industrial Complex accompanied by officials from the Ministry of Finance and Economy.

The half-day visit is part of the foreign rating agency’s annual meeting on South Korea’s sovereign rating. The Moody’s delegation will visit Seoul from Feb. 9-14.

The visit is aimed at observing North Korea’s economic situation and attitude toward economic reform, sources said.

North Korean officials are positive about the visit, a source said. The Stalinist state has not issued an invitation for the delegation as of 2 p.m. Tuesday.

Moody’s delegates will meet with officials from the Finance Ministry, the National Assembly, the Bank of Korea and other government offices in Seoul from Feb. 12-14.

In the meetings, the two sides will discuss South Korea’s macroeconomic policies, fiscal stability, ongoing negotiations on a U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement and the North Korean nuclear issue.

Moody’s upgraded South Korea’s rating to A3 in March 2002, its seventh-highest investment grade.

Moody’s Investors Service is a credit rating, research and risk analysis company. It has more than 9,000 customer accounts and employs more than 2,400 people, including more than 1,000 analysts, according to its Web site.

The Seoul branch of Goldman Sachs did not provide much detail on the scheduled visit.

The number of North Koreans working for the 18 South Korean firms at the industrial complex surpassed 10,000 late last year.

In 2012, the complex is expected to house about 2,000 South Korean manufacturers employing about half a million North Koreans, according to the Ministry of Unification.

Yonhap
2/5/2007

The United States may recognize goods produced at a joint industrial complex just north of the border as South Korean if there is a change in circumstances, the top U.S. diplomat here said Monday.

In a one-hour meeting with Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung, U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow said that while it is unrealistic to recognize the goods made in the border city of Kaesong as South Korean, there is room left to negotiate within the proposed free trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries, Unification Ministry officials said.

“Lee stressed that U.S. recognition of the goods produced in Kaesong as South Korean will contribute to bringing about a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Vershbow said ‘if,’ but he did not elaborate on what kind of change under what kind of circumstances,” said a ministry official who was present at the meeting, but who asked to remain anonymous.

So far, the U.S. has avoided placing the issue on the official agenda of the FTA negotiations, so Vershbow’s remarks could be construed as a slight change in U.S. strategy toward forging a free trade deal with South Korea.

In spite of United Nations sanctions on the North following its nuclear weapon test in October, South Korea has kept two major cross-border joint projects afloat: an industrial complex in Kaesong just north of the border, and a tourism program at the North’s scenic Mount Geumgang.

In the industrial complex, South Korean businesses use cheap North Korean labor to produce goods. Twenty-one South Korean factories employ about 11,160 North Korean workers in Kaesong.

The six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, involving the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia, will reconvene in Beijing on Thursday.

US May Accept Kaesong Goods
Korea Times
Ryu Jin
2/5/2007

The United States might recognize goods made at a joint industrial complex in the North Korean border city of Kaesong as South Korean products in a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) if there is a change in circumstances, the top U.S. diplomat in Seoul said Monday.

U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Alexander Vershbow said in a meeting with Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung that, although it seems unrealistic at the moment to recognize the Kaesong products as South Korean, there is room left to negotiate within the proposed FTA.

“Lee stressed that U.S. recognition of the goods produced in Kaesong as South Korean will contribute to bringing about a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula,” a ministry official said after the meeting. “Ambassador Vershbow said `if,’ but he did not elaborate on what kind of change under what kind of circumstances.”

Vershbow’s remarks could be interpreted as a sign of change in U.S. strategy since Washington has so far refused to deal with the issue as an official agenda item in the ongoing negotiations for a South Korea-U.S. FTA.

Inter-Korean ties have soured in recent years in tandem with the deteriorating North Korea nuclear standoff. But the six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear program is expected to see a substantial progress in the coming round of negotiations.

South Korea has kept afloat its major cross-border projects with North Korea, including the joint industrial park in Kaesong and a tourism program at the North’s scenic Mt. Kumgang, even after Pyongyang’s nuclear test in October.

South Korea has exerted much effort to have its counterparts in FTAs, such as Southeast Asian countries, recognize the Kaesong products as “made in Korea” because it has a significance to further promote the joint industrial project.

A total of 21 South Korean factories are operating in the Kaesong industrial park at present, employing over 10,000 North Korean workers.

Korea Herald
Kim Yoon-mi
2/5/2007

Eight years have passed since the late Chung Ju-yung, the former chairman of Hyundai Group, initiated the first inter-Korean tourism business with Hyundai Asan Corp., which operates tours to North Korea’s Mount Geumgang resort.

Since Hyundai Asan’s tour businesses have been held back by the North’s mixed messages and frequent changes in Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang, they plan to attract 400,000 South Korean tourists and fast-track the official launch of tour of the North Korean city of Gaeseong, Hyundai officials said yesterday.

Hyundai Asan president and CEO Yoon Man-joon on Saturday paid a tribute to the family graveyard of the late Chung Ju-yung and Chung Mong-hun with Hyundai Asan executives. Yoon asked them to put forward their best efforts to meet the 2007 business target, Yonhap News reported.

“Although we had some difficulties last year, I’m doing my best to do better. We will see a good result this year if every one gets proactive,” Yonhap News quoted Yoon as saying.

Hyundai Asan’s tourism plan in Gaeseong was dampened when North Korea requested to sign a deal with another Korean company Lotte Tours Co. in August 2005, despite the earlier contract with Hyundai Asan.

In January this year, North Korea seemed turning to the original contract with Hyundai Asan when Seoul’s Unification Minister Lee Jae-young and Hyundai Group chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun visited an industrial complex in Gaeseong on Jan. 24.

However, Pyongyang media once again denied South Korea’s local reports that the North will promote Gaeseong tourism with Hyundai Asan.

The biggest blow to Hyundai Asan last year was North Korea’s nuclear test on Oct. 9. With the tension created on the Korean peninsular after North’s nuclear test, the number of Mount Geumgang tourists plummeted, causing the failure of Hyundai Asan to meet the initial target of 400,000 vivitors. The number reached only 240,000 last year.

Hyundai Asan’s posted sales of 235 billion won ($249 million) and an operating profit of 2 billion won last year, which is a disappointing performance according to experts.

This year, Hyundai Asan said it will beef up its profitability by launching a new tour package to inner Geumgang, a golf course at the mountain resort, and offering a Gaeseong tour.

According to the company, it will open a new tour of inner Geumgang in April, have a test round at the golf course in June and open it in late October, aiming to attract more tourists.

For the Gaeseong industrial complex, Hyundai Asan said it will complete laying the ground work on the 3.3 million square meters of land by June and start working-level meetings on the second-phase development of the area with North Korean officials later on.

“The urgent issue for our company this year is to establish a solid profit structure so that it won’t be shaken by North Korean issues,” Yonhap quoted an official at Hyunda Asan as saying.

Yonhap
2/2/2007

China has made little investment in North Korea since the North conducted its first nuclear device test in October last year, but their two-way trade volume rose 21.6 percent year-on-year over the past few months, informed sources said Friday.

“Over the three months since the October test, China made no investment in the North except in some low-budget mining development. But North Korea’s dependence on China in terms of trade increased sharply,” a senior government official said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the information.

Another source said from October to November in 2006, the trade volume between North Korea and Japan declined 75 percent year-on-year to US$7.9 million, illustrating the full range of the impact from United Nations sanctions over the North’s surprise nuclear test, they said.

Japan has shown the strongest response to the North’s nuclear test and long-range missile launches last year, banning North Korean goods and citizens from entering the country as well as barring its ships from Japanese ports.

In all of 2006, the trade volume between North Korea and China rose 7.5 percent year-on-year to $1.69 billion, while two-way trade between North Korea and Japan decreased 34 percent to $119 million in the first 11 months of last year, the source said.

“North Korea can make financial dealings only via Russia and a few other countries because it has a lot of trouble in doing financial transactions and wooing investments since the United States imposed financial sanctions on the North in September 2005,” he said.

The U.S. cut off Macau-based Banco Delta Asia’s access to the U.S. financial system, alleging that North Korea used the bank to counterfeit U.S. dollars and engage in other financial wrongdoing.

North Korea boycotted the six-party talks on its nuclear disarmament until December, saying that the U.S. should discuss ways to lift the sanctions on the sidelines of the six-nation talks involving the two Koreas, the U.S. China, Japan and Russia.

Japan Focus (Hat Tip Gregor)
Ruediger Frank
1/31/2007

Abstract
The starting point of this paper is the assumption that North Korea is de facto a well-defined nation-state, home to a national economy and inhabited by individuals that bear the same basic economic and social characteristics as individuals elsewhere. Despite the obvious specifics of the economic system and institutional structure of the country, standard economic theory should be applicable to the question of North Korean economic development. The article seeks to prove this as broadly as possible, showing that economic theory as diverse as classical and neoclassical, Marxist, Keynesian, institutional, developmentalist, neo-liberal or structuralist, dependency analysis-based and many others, including regionally centered approaches, can be utilized to explain the North Korean case with useful results, although the latter will inevitably vary depending on the chosen framework. Without arguing against or in favor of any of the available theoretical methods, this article advocates further research on North Korea as another case of development in East Asia, rather than as a mystical exception to the rule. This is particularly important in light of the tendency to describe North Korea as unpredictable, bizarre, and incomprehensible. This is clearly not the case.

Full paper below the fold

(more…)

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
1/26/2007

The “first-runners” are first-tier wholesalers who connect Chinese manufacturers and North Korean market owners in large cities such as Sinuiju, Hyesan, Hamheung or Chongjin. The goods transported by the first-runners to metropolitan markets in NK are met by second-runners in smaller cities.

South Pyongan province’s Pyongsong, Sunchon and Nampo are the hub for those second-runners, who move imported commodities to further deep into countryside of North and South Pyongan provinces and Hwanghae province.

Moon, a 38-year old shopkeeper in a market in Sunchon, South Pyongan, said “As soon as we hear the news that first-runners brought goods, we go to them with money right away. Since they run a huge amount of money, ordinary buyers can’t even meet them.”

Moon said that for second-runners including herself it took about half million NK wons (180 US dollars) to buy goods for one time. She buys merchandise from first-runners and sells it back to local storeowners.

For second-runners, it is crucial to procure enough high-quality goods with low price. If one buys bad products, he or she loses money. Same rule applies to first-runners.

Second-runners also hand over raw materials to manufacturers. The diminutive North Korean industry relies partly on them.

Chinese sugar and flour turn to bread and candy, and imported clothing materials are manufactured in home factories. Most of the manufacturers who buy raw materials from second-runners are individual handicraftsmen.

Lee, a clothing producer in Hamheung, sells her homemade clothes in market. Lee has had good relationship a number of second-runners, who trade Chinese fabric, so she can even buy stuff on credit.

Throughout the March of Tribulation in late 90s, North Korean people had depended on home industry for their basic necessities. And now it is estimated that significant amount of industrial products in North Korean markets are home-produced.

Those with little capital or without a stand in local market go to the most remote regions in high mountains or countryside and sell their handicrafts via train. Although it is not North Korean business slang, such activity can be classified as “third-running.”

The so-called “third-runners” trade their home-manufactured goods with country people’s corn, bean or rice, since it is rare to own a lot of cash in rural area.

In sum, once persecuted North Korean private markets are now reflecting every aspect of capitalist economy.

Korea Times
Na Jeong-ju
1/26/2007

If at least one member of a North Korean household moves to South Korea after reunification, more than 3 million from the North may head south if the two Koreas are reunited, the Bank of Korea (BOK) said Friday.

According to the BOK’s Institute of Finance and Economy, if such an exodus takes place in North Korea after reunification, the South may face serious economic consequences, the report said.

If Koreas adopt a German model, in which West Germany extended financial support to East Germany before and after reunification, South Korea would shoulder a total of $500-$900 billion in reunification costs. If the money is spent appropriately, it will take 22-39 years for North Korea to top $10,000 in gross national income, the report said.

The institute proposed South and North Korea try to reduce economic gap through economic cooperation programs. If the South supports the North through development programs, using its capital and the North’s cheap labor, it can reduce reunification costs considerably, it said.

“It is desirable for the two Koreas to designate special economic zones to reduce their economic gap and conduct programs to develop the North Korean economy,’’ the report said.

With the development programs, the South can spend much less than adopting the German model, the report said. The reunification costs will be cut to $300-500 billion, while the period for North Korea to see a GNI of $10,000 will be shortened to 13-22 years, it added.

Korea Times
Chang Se-moon
1/23/2007

Obviously, it is important to know the correct answer to this question. Sanctions that have no impact on North Korea’s economy will not change the behavior of North Korean leaders. If sanctions do have a significant impact, the possibility that North Korean leaders may be tempted to resolve the pending security issues through negotiations exists.
In answering the question, however, we need to keep in mind what the British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) said: “The theory of economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking which helps its possessor draw correct conclusions.’’ In plain English, Keynes stressed an unbiased economic way of thinking that could help us draw correct conclusions. In other words, until we review all the facts with an open mind we should not make up our minds.

This is exactly what we will do by assessing the impacts of economic sanctions on North Korea.

The first question that comes to mind is which sanctions are we talking about. If we review U.S. sanctions on North Korea since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, there would be too many sanctions imposed on North Korea to be practical. There are three important sanctions that are still in effect, however. One is the U.S. denial of a Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status on North Korea’s exports.

This sanction was imposed on North Korea’s exports to the United States on September 1, 1951, following the outbreak of the Korean War. MFN tariffs are the lowest tariffs that are levied on imports to the U.S. Over 99 percent of imports to the United States qualify for the MFN tariffs. Without MFN status, tariffs on North Korean exports to the United States are so high that North Korea simply cannot even imagine exporting anything to the United States.

The second of the three important sanctions stemmed from the bombing of Korean Air 858 by North Korean agents on November 29, 1987. The explosion killed 115 innocent passengers and crew members. On January 20, 1988, North Korea was placed on the list of countries that supported international terrorism according to the U.S. Export Administration Act of 1979.

The importance of this sanction is that placement on the list has made it impossible for North Korea to borrow money from international financial institutions including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Like the denial of MFN status, the placement of North Korea on the list of countries supporting international terrorism continues to this date.

The third of these three key sanctions relates to tightening of North Korea’s illegal financial transactions, which culminated in Banco Delta Asia’s termination of business dealings with North Korea as of February 16, 2006. You may know that Banco Delta Asia had long been suspected of handling North Korea’s illicit activities overseas such as laundering of counterfeit U.S. dollars and sales of illegal drugs

Banco Delta Asia is located in Macao, which is a Special Administrative District of China. Tightening of North Korean financial transactions was extended to North Korean trade during 2006. This added pressure on North Korea originated from U.N. Resolution 1540 following North Korea’s test-launching of long-range missiles on July 5, 2006, as well as from U.N. Resolution 1718 which followed North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006.

Are these sanctions having an impact on North Korea’s economy? Perhaps, a more accurate question is whether these sanctions are placing enough pressure on North Korean leaders to reconsider the possibility of returning to the negotiation table?

One aspect is the status of North Korea’s trade deficit. As you probably know, North Korea buys from other countries much more than it sells to other countries. When the amount of imports exceeds the amount of exports it’s called a trade deficit. North Korea’s annual trade deficit averaged about $800 million from 2003 to 2005. This figure does not include North Korea’s trade deficit against South Korea, since South Korea appears to consider any financial support to the North as a long-term investment rather than a trade deficit.

How has North Korea been paying for the trade deficit? The ways have been unique. Almost the entire deficit appears to have been financed by weapons sales, illicit activities, and funds flowing from South Korea through joint projects.

In fact, a study by the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis indicates that full implementation of U.N. Resolution 1718 would cause North Korea to lose just about the same amount ($700 million to $1 billion) by stopping exports of weapons and illegal drugs and counterfeit money.

The Economist Intelligence Unit is quoted to have estimated in 2003 that “North Korea earned as much as $100 million a year from counterfeit money, while in 2005, a U.S. task force estimated that “$45 million to $60 million in Pyongyang’s counterfeit currency (primarily in U.S. $100 bills) is in circulation,’’ reportedly, including some in Seoul’s Namdaemun Market.

Assuming that recently added sanctions will cause North Korea to lose about $800 million that it has been earning overseas each year, the next interesting question is how North Korea will pay for the annual trade deficit of $800 million in the future? If North Korea does not pay for its imports, other countries will refuse to sell products to North Korea and the North Korean economy will suffer.

North Korea cannot borrow from world financial institutions because of the 1988 U.S. sanctions that branded North Korea as one of countries supporting international terrorism. They cannot use the money from foreign direct investment because China and Korea are the only two countries that have been willing to invest in North Korea, but the combined amount is not even close to paying for the annual trade deficit.

Think of it this way. If you borrow money every year, and lenders believe that your ability to pay off the debt is rapidly declining, will lenders continue to lend you money? Not likely. With sanctions adversely affecting North Korea’s ability to pay for imports, North Korea will find it increasingly difficult to buy what it needs. The breaking point may not be imminent, but the future is predictable.

This is what I think will happen. North Korea will ask China to increase its foreign direct investment in North Korea by giving China more incentives for such investment. These incentives may include low taxes and free land. North Korea will ask South Korea to send more money.

For instance, as of July 1, 2004, Hyundai Asan and North Korea set the entrance fee to Mt. Kumkang at $10 for a day trip, $25 for a two-day trip and $50 for a three-day trip. On May 1, 2005, these fees were raised to $15, $35, and $70. On July 1, 2006, these fees were raised again to $30, $48, and $80. This is just one way.

North Korea may also ask South Korea to lend it a large sum of money with an empty promise of paying it back. This explains in part why it is so important for North Korea to have leaders of the South Korean government who are friendly to North Korea.

These desperate acts are likely to be very short of paying for the majority of the annual trade deficit. If sanctions continue to be effective, the likelihood of North Korea returning to the negotiation table increases. Economics is rarely boring, especially when it deals with real problems.

Yonhap
1/22/2007

North Korea will put strong emphasis on inter-Korean economic projects this year as the communist state insinuated that it is suffering from economic difficulties, a state-run think tank said Monday.

In its new year commentary, Pyongyang partially admitted that its economy is in bad shape and said its highest priority for 2007 is boosting the sagging economy, the Korea Development Institute (KDI) said in a report.

“Unlike in previous years, when the North placed political ideology, the military and the economic sector, in that order, as its three key areas of importance, North Korea set the economic sector ahead of those two other sectors in the commentary this year,” the KDI said.

“The North also skipped over commenting on a series of economic achievements, except for saying that it has secured a foothold for a new leap. … In addition, it said that it has gone through the ‘worst adverse situation’ in the past 10 years, showing that the economy was still suffering from difficulty in 2006.”

To boost the economy, the North may actively push for inter-Korean economic projects and depend on the South for increased economic support as its economic cooperation with other nations such as the United States and Japan has come to a near halt, the institute said.

In the commentary, the North also used a slogan, “put an importance on the Korean people,” a comment indicating increased inter-Korean cooperation, the KDI said.

Every Jan. 1, the communist nation releases its new year commentary on three state dailies, including the Rodong Sinmun, one of the only sources of information on the country’s economic policy plans.

Under the title, “Create a prosperous era of the Songun (military-first) Choseon,” the North urged its people to make concerted efforts to solve the economic problems in 2007 and make the country an economic power as a socialist nation.

According to many analysts, the North’s annual economic growth may have fallen below 1 percent last year, down from an estimated 1 percent growth in 2005 and 2.2 percent in 2004. A variety of global economic sanctions against Pyongyang could have contributed to the slower growth in 2006, the institute said.