Archive for the ‘Foreign direct investment’ Category

Atlantic Eye: Investing in North Korea

Monday, April 2nd, 2007

United Press International
Marc S. Ellenbogen
4/2/2007

The most effective way to influence the future of North Korea is through economic development and incentives. The 500 million euro North Korea Investment Fund exists to economically engage the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. While the six-party talks continue — which they should and must — Global Panel and the Prague Society will continue to grow this fund.

At the 4th Session of the North Korea Initiative in Bratislava just weeks ago, there was a consensus that growing the NKIF is a good strategy for engaging the DPRK. The NKIF will be used for entrepreneurial ventures, to provide micro loans, for knowledge transfer, healthcare and for building, energy and infrastructural projects.

The biggest task facing Pyongyang is converting one of the worlds most centrally planned and isolated economies into something remotely resembling a free market. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and shortages of spare parts. Industrial and power output has declined as well. The development of former East Germany cost 1.2 trillion euros. It is calculated that the redevelopment of the DPRK will cost 5 trillion euros. Pyongyang will only allow development if it can simultaneously protect its power position.

In the 1980s companies failed to predict the collapse of the centralized Soviet system. They were wholly unprepared and certainly had few dedicated funds in place (George Soros was an exception) when the changes in Central Europe came about. The NKIF seeks to remedy this mistake by having funds in place that can be used to aid a changing North Korea at the point change takes place. The NKIF targets investors who know a return of investment is years in the future but recognize the need for such a fund.

A prerequisite for the fund’s future success is confidence-building measures. General Dieter Stockmann, the former NATO deputy commander, made comparisons to China. As the head of the bilateral German-China security talks, he noted that “we need access to human resources.” He was quick to point out that the DPRK military will play an indispensable role in the DPRK’s economic future.

Paul Beijer, Sweden’s special representative on Korean peninsula issues, noted that the Australians have experience with micro-loan projects. Others observed that Sweden, Switzerland and the European Union have separately held conferences in Pyongyang focused on economic reform. There have been both government and private — through international foundations — conferences in the DPRK.

Poverty is out of control in the DPRK. The World Food Program and the Carter Center have calculated some 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Even the nascent micro-markets have virtually collapsed. The gap between the wealthiest and poorest is staggering — amongst the most dramatic on earth.

Previously, there had been a period when small and middle-sized entrepreneurs had done fairly well in North Korea. Tapping into these existing entrepreneurs must be a key goal of the NKIF. The NKIF must provide educational training for this entrepreneurial class and help it grow. Training, also of those doing the training, will be a specific area to add value.

The selection process will be difficult, and nearly impossible without a physical presence in the DPRK. North Korea is a huge market for the development of a financial infrastructure and financial services. Companies interested in participating in the future can aid in these trainings and seminars, which would give them a chance to get their foot in the door.

One expert commented that the DPRK government is highly compartmentalized and that it is extremely difficult to get the different agencies to sit together. It was suggested that a conference in Pyongyang focusing on a narrow topic — modern accounting, microfinance — might be of value. Eduard Kukan, until recently the long-serving Slovak foreign minister, cautioned that Pyongyang remains very weary of outsiders and that even good intentions could very likely be seen as interference.

Any investment must be linked to certain performance benchmarks. It must be linked to practical steps and an action plan. A critical component must be systems in place to monitor outcomes. At the moment, this is virtually impossible with the DPRK. Many who criticize the concept of engagement believe monitoring to be the weakest link. They argue one cannot make sure investments are being used solely for intended civilian economic and industrial purposes.

It is difficult to engage a country that is essentially disinterested in being engaged or only interested in doing so under very strict conditions.

Even the government in Pyongyang cannot ignore basic facts. It recognizes the problems that exist but fears losing its power base. Any solution must convince the current elite that the future is good for it. This, on the other hand, is a very difficult sell to many who wish to punish the current DPRK government.

Regardless, before the NKIF is put to use, a monitoring process should be in place. And this allows time for the fund to grow and to find its niche.

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Mobilizing Transnational Korean Linkages for Economic Development on China’s Frontier

Saturday, March 31st, 2007

Japan Focus
Outi Luova
1/1/2006

China’s coastal regions have received impressive financial and organizational resources through overseas Chinese networks and international capital generally. China’s land borders are also linked to transnational communities, thanks to the networks of ethnic minorities who live there. This article introduces the mobilization of the Korean minority’s transnational ethnicities in the service of local economic development. China’s well-established structure for the utilization of overseas Chinese resources serves as a frame of reference. The analysis focuses on foreign investment, donations, and remittances—resources that are widely regarded as the most important development input provided by the overseas Chinese. The regional focus is on Yanbian, a Korean autonomous prefecture in Jilin Province in Northeast China, which has enjoyed a measure of success in attracting Korean investment in step with burgeoning China-South Korea economic and political ties. But it has also faced significant challenges.

The Yanbian Koreans and the Transnational Korean Community in Northeast Asia

The current Korean population in China is of rather recent origin. A wave of migration from the Korean Peninsula began in the 17th century. However, most of the migrants arrived during the tumultuous decades between the middle of the 19th century and the end of the Second World War. Northeast China was first a refuge for poor peasants and later a base for Korean nationalists, who fought against the Japanese colonial rulers in the period 1910–45. After Japan annexed Northeast China in 1931, hundreds of thousands of Koreans migrated to the new Japanese-dominated state of Manzhouguo, including many forcibly sent to work in factories and mines. However, the vast majority of migrants from Korea came allured by the promise of land.

When Japan was defeated in 1945, there were 1.7 million Koreans in Northeast China. When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, some 600,000 Koreans returned to the Korean Peninsula, while 1.1 million remained in China. China’s ethnic Korean minority presently totals roughly two million people. Most live in Northeast China, with a dense Korean population in Yanbian on the North Korean border. The number of ethnic Koreans in Yanbian is about 200,000, 38 percent of the prefecture’s population. An estimated 80 percent of the Yanbian Koreans have their roots in contemporary North Korea, and 20 percent have their roots in South Korea.

While the current Korean-Chinese population mainly originated in these recent waves of migration, both Chinese and Korean kingdoms earlier ruled and fought over the area that is now Yanbian. The historical dispute over the area continues even today among historians and politicians: Both South Korea and China claim historical antecedence with respect to the Kingdoms of Gaoguli (Chinese)/Goguryeo (Korean) and Bohai (Chinese)/Balhae (Korean), which ruled over the area from 37 BCE to 926 CE. Another historical dispute concerns the region of Jiandao (Chinese)/Gando (Korean), which is roughly congruent with contemporary Yanbian. Some Korean nationalists continue to demand that Jiandao, which they regard as a part of Korea, be restored to Korea. [1]

Yanbian has two pools of Korean resources abroad: Koreans, and Korean-Chinese who possess Chinese citizenship. The Koreans include, from a Chinese point of view, Koreans living on the Korean Peninsula and the some 3.7 million people of Korean origins residing throughout the world, mainly in Japan, the United States, and the former Soviet Union. There are three overlapping categories of overseas Koreans who maintain relations with Yanbian: The first group comprises Koreans (including people of Korean origins) with relatives and acquaintances presently living in Yanbian. A second group is comprised of Koreans whose life history is linked to Yanbian; these Koreans, or their parents, were born or lived part of their lives in Northeast China. Many who left China in 1945 have ties to the region where they, or their parents, lived; however, compared with the overseas Chinese, their linkages are more tenuous, since their ancestral homeland is on the Korean Peninsula, and Yanbian can be seen to have constituted only a temporary home. Finally, the third and broadest category of overseas Koreans who maintain ties to Yanbian consists of all overseas Koreans whose sympathy and interest in Yanbian is rooted in blood ties, ethnicity, and culture. Overall, Overseas Koreans remain critical to Yanbian attempts to mobilize transnational Korean resources.

As for overseas Korean-Chinese, there are currently over 150,000 living in various parts of the world. Besides Yanbian, Korean-Chinese from other parts of Northeastern China have migrated to South Korea. Han Chinese migrant workers in South Korea in 2001 included more professionals than did Korean-Chinese (638 versus 268) but fewer trainees (8,629 vs 13,243) and undocumented migrants (38,000 vs 57,000). [2] An estimated 50,000 Yanbian Koreans live in South Korea, including professionals, workers, trainees, students, and wives of South Korean men.

The Opening Up of Yanbian

Direct trade between China’s coastal provinces and South Korea flourished starting in the late 1980s, despite the lack of official relations between the two countries. Indirect trade began around the time of the Asian Games, which took place in Seoul in 1986; China’s participation in the games signalled a changed attitude towards South Korea. South Korean investments were soon directed toward southern China, the region then most open to foreign investment. Following the Seoul Olympics in 1988, direct trade between the two countries began, and South Korea investments moved northward, mainly to Shandong and Liaoning provinces, which are closest to South Korea.

Jilin’s border and barter trade with North Korea were restored in 1982, having been frozen since 1970 in the aftermath of the radical period of the Cultural Revolution. The first direct South Korean investment in Northeast China was made in Heilongjiang as recently as 1989 and in Jilin in 1990, and direct trade with South Korea was restricted to these provinces until 1990. Hence, despite the presence of an ethnic Korean population, Yanbian did not receive much South Korean investment in the 1980s. A partial explanation lies in particular features of the economy and history of China’s northeast. Conservative party officials had sought to limit foreign economic penetration there, in part to protect inefficient state-run industries. Economic cooperation was also restricted for political reasons. In particular, Japanese and South Korean investments evoked concern; Japanese investments revived memories of colonial domination of an earlier area, and South Korean investments were a sore point for China’s ally North Korea. Thus, while allowing trade to expand elsewhere in China, the central government prevented the northeastern provinces from drawing closer to South Korea. For Yanbian, with its close political and ethnic relationship with North Korea, it became particularly important to keep its distance from South Korea. Beijing used Yanbian as a political card to assure North Korea of China’s support.

In the latter part of the 1980s, the Yanbian elite was divided into two camps, one opposing contacts with South Korea and the other favouring opening up to South Korea and other capitalist countries. The pro-South Korea camp lobbied the central government to grant Northeast China preferential trade rights. Both groups included Han Chinese as well as Korean-Chinese. Thus, not only national-level policies but also divisions among local factions hampered the opening up of Yanbian.

Although small-scale trade associated with tourism was lively by the late 1980s, official trade contacts between Yanbian and South Korea were few before 1991. Yanbian Koreans first developed transnational bonds with North Koreans and Korean-Soviets. Yanbian Koreans frequently visited relatives in North Korea and the USSR and created close ties with kin and friends there. The local authorities supported these visits partly because of the profitable small-scale trade conducted during the visits. In particular, the shuttle trade with North Korea was profitable: In the early 1990s, the annual value of this unofficial trade was estimated to exceed RMB 100 million.

In 1991, Yanbian emerged as a center of international cooperation as the UNDP-backed Tumen River development program was inaugurated. The bold initial plan of this program was to turn the Sino-Russian-North Korean border area around the mouth of the Tumen River into a new international commercial hub with intercourse extending to South Korea, Mongolia and Japan. After the establishment of China-South Korean official relations in 1992, Yanbian was fully integrated into a regional, transnational Korean ethnic community, and state-supported transnational activities expanded especially to South Korea.

Organizing Activities for the Promotion of Ties

Since the mid-1980s, Yanbian’s contacts with South Korea and other countries have gradually expanded through unofficial channels drawing on ethnic and family ties. The first business contacts were created by associations, individual scholars, artists, and athletes. The first to “break the isolation” was a Yanbian University professor who visited West Germany and Sweden in 1982. Unofficial cultural exchange with South Korea began in 1989, when a famous Yanbian Korean poet visited several South Korean universities and a song and dance troupe from Yanbian performed in South Korea. In the mid-1980s, the Party-affiliated Yanbian Overseas Union hosted members of the Sino-Canadian Association for Economic and Cultural Exchange of the Korean People and the Friendship Association of Korean People in China and the United States. In 1988, the Yanbian Overseas Union paid a return visit to Canada and the United States, paving the way for economic cooperation. Members of this same association had also visited South Korea even before the establishment of Sino-South Korean diplomatic relations. In 1990, the Yanbian Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation set up a Chamber of International Commerce to build unofficial ties with South Korea.

Once official Sino-South Korean relations were established in 1992, the local government launched a full-fledged mobilization of Korean linkages. It openly encouraged Yanbian Koreans to visit South Korea and contact Koreans living abroad. In addition to associations, businessmen, and officials, ordinary people were also encouraged to link up with South Koreans and visit the country. Yet, the foreign trade administration of Yanbian was ill-prepared for large-scale international economic cooperation. In this situation, unofficial channels inevitably took the lead.

Different types of associations helped widen business contacts and act as middlemen. The Yanbian Overseas Union played a decisive role in attracting five foreign investments, and the Association of International Public Relations drew two factories to the area. Ethnic Korean members of these two associations also supported foreign trade officials when business negotiations encountered difficulties. For example, when negotiations between officials and investors deadlocked, the associations sometimes persuaded investors to start businesses in Yanbian. In the 1990s, the role of ethnic Korean middlemen became crucial for the additional reason that the state-owned companies were staffed mainly by Han Chinese, who lacked appropriate cultural and social capital.

The role of the above associations and other ethnic Korean middlemen in business promotion subsequently diminished. Following the early 1990s, when the foreign trade administration struggled in the face of insufficient resources, contacts, and experience, the administration expanded and gained strength. The administration and local companies established wide and stable international contacts, as well as additional resources to facilitate international cooperation. Now, the associations were mobilized in campaigns that focused on student exchange, labour export, and charity work, to mention a few.

In order to reinforce the emerging cooperation, leaders of the prefecture as well as lower-level units invited South Korean businessmen to discuss cooperation and celebrate the Spring Festival, the New Year, and China’s National Day in Yanbian. South Korean foreign students, politicians and artists were also invited to participate. At these events, important South Korean partners were granted honorary citizenships and other honours. Local governments were also active in establishing ties with cities, prefectures and counties elsewhere. By 1999, the Yanbian capital Yanji had created friendly relations with 11 cities and districts in five countries. Of these locations, five were in South Korea. In addition, Yanji had friendship cities in Australia and Russia.

One form of official business promotion activity was the arrangement of international Korean cultural events. Some of these events had a purely commercial character, while others sought to bring the Korean-Chinese community to the knowledge of Koreans abroad and portray them as potentially valuable partners. Important occasions included international trade fairs and the anniversaries of the autonomous prefecture, which were celebrated grandiosely every fifth year. These celebrations were organized by the prefectural government. The First Korean Cultural Festival, which Yanbian Prefecture organized in August 1992 to celebrate the prefecture’s 40th anniversary, provides a good example of these cultural-trade events. The organizers of the First Korean Cultural Festival invited ethnic Korean guests from 10 countries, among them over 500 businessmen with a Korean background. During the festival, representatives of Yanbian companies negotiated with the business guests and agreed on participation in over 40 projects.

In addition to holding festivals with an ethnic Korean character, Yanbian also tried to attract overseas Koreans’ attention by building up a permanent exhibition on Korean-Chinese folk customs, and by reconstructing several traditional villages. Cultural activities of this kind echoed the practices of China’s minority policy. China has emphasized the cultivation of minorities’ folk customs, such as traditional festivals, the performing arts and clothing, often adapted to Chinese sensibilities. Koreans in China have managed to maintain their folklore rather well, and they enjoy a high level of education, mainly in the fields of literature, history and the performing arts. This background has provided a solid basis for the arrangement of ethnic cultural events and exhibitions.

The above attempts to elevate the Koreanness of Yanbian can be interpreted as a way to strengthen “diffuse solidarity” in the transnational community. This type of solidarity creates affinity within larger entities such as territorial and symbolic communities, in which participants largely lack face-to-face contact. [3] Yanbian tried to deepen the interest and affection of foreign Koreans toward Yanbian by highlighting its cultural Koreanness. At the same time, it aimed to control politically sensitive claims on commonality. For example, the officials suppressed all statements of Yanbian being a part of Korea historically or in terms of nationhood.

Building Ties

The first joint venture in Yanbian was established in 1986 between an American subsidiary of a South Korean company and the prefecture of Yanbian. Before the establishment of Sino-South Korean official relations, most foreign investments came from Korean-Americans or American affiliates of South Korean companies. By the end of 1992, a total of 131 of the 212 wholly or partly foreign-owned companies in Yanbian, sanzi qiye, were run by ethnic Korean capital. The greatest part, consisting of 72 companies, had absorbed South Korean capital, and 10 had taken up North Korean capital. In all, 49 companies were partly or wholly financed by ethnic Koreans from other countries such as the United States, Japan and Canada. At least in these 49 cases, it could be reasonable to argue that ethnic and family ties had played an important role in the investment decision. In 1996, an official in the foreign trade administration informed me, foreign investors from countries other than South and North Korea were mainly ethnic Koreans.

The year 1996 can be seen as a turning point in Yanbian’s foreign economic cooperation. The number of enterprises receiving South Korean investments rose to 393, including large-scale investments. Between 1996 and 1997 the total volume of implemented foreign investment more than doubled. The financial crisis which hit the South Korean economy in the latter years did, however, precipitate a nosedive in South Korean foreign direct investments. South Korea recovered quickly from the crisis, but the number and value of the absorbed FDI would not quickly return to 1996 and 1997 levels. Still, by 2002, total South Korean direct investment projects had risen to 515, which was 74 per cent of all FDI in Yanbian. Their average value (US$790,000) was rather small compared with the average value of FDI from Hong Kong (US$2.7 million), Taiwan (US$1.02 million) and Japan (US$1.01 million). A report compiled by a leading cadre of the Tumen Programme Office, however, revealed disappointment with the type of investments Yanbian had received. Although the number of investments was relatively high compared with other parts of Jilin Province, and South Korean investment accounted for more than two thirds of international investment in Yanbian by 2002,the level of technology, scale, efficiency and compatibility was said to be low. Moreover, the companies experienced huge losses and failed to invigorate the local economy. [4]

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Compared with South Korean investment in other parts of China, interest in Yanbian was limited. Shanghai, Tianjin and the coastal provinces Shandong, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang ranked highest in South Korean investment. Investment decisions were guided principally by profitability, not by emotions. By comparison to leading coastal provinces, Yanbian’s infrastructure was meagre, hence South Korean interest in investment low. In addition, South Korean companies could readily recruit Korean-speaking workers from Northeast China to their factories situated in the coastal regions.

The amount of FDI in Yanbian rose gradually in the early 1990s, but foreign trade did not. Yanbian’s foreign trade declined between 1993 and 1996. In the early 1990s Yanbian’s main trade partner was North Korea, which faced mounting economic difficulties leading to a sharp drop in trade in 1993. The other reason for the crash was the establishment of Sino-South Korean official relations. North Korea responded by cutting back on trade. The low quality and narrow selection of Yanbian’s main export products in the early 1990s—cereals, coal, tobacco, sugar—also hindered development of trade with the emerging new trade partners, Japan and South Korea. Yanbian’s foreign trade plummeted from a peak value of US$467 million in 1993 to US$155 million in 1995.

Yanbian responded by launching, in cooperation with South Korean investors, new export products: textiles, yarn, timber, and wooden products. One third of the South Korean-invested companies were engaged in textile manufacturing. Yanbian also imported timber from Russia and North Korea in order to manufacture wooden products for South Korean markets.

In 2003, the value of Yanbian’s trade with North Korea was nearly equal to its trade with South Korea: US$117 million versus US$116 million. Yet two years later, trade with North Korea had expanded to double the value of trade with South Korea. The economic reforms initiated in North Korea in 2002 were presumably one of the main reasons for this increase. In addition, the visit by China’s leader Jiang Zemin to North Korea the same year probably boosted trade relations. However, compared with other regions in China, Yanbian’s trade with neighbouring countries remains small. By comparison, the border city of Dandong in Liaoning Province handles over two-thirds of China’s trade with North Korea.

In reality, Yanbian’s trade with North and South Korea and Russia, like its trade across other land borders, has been much more extensive than official numbers show. Many of the companies involved in foreign trade with North Korea were not registered. Thus, their trade remains outside of the statistics. Similarly, the vibrant shuttle trade with the bordering countries, South Korea included, is not visible in the statistics.

Trade and investment flows between China and the two Koreas have been most intensive in China’s Bohai region, which stretches from Liaoning to Shandong; Yanbian, due to its remote location and less developed infrastructure, has remained a backwater by comparison. Nevertheless, although the Korean investments in Yanbian are relatively few, and registered trade with the two Koreas low, the role of overseas Korean ties in the development of the Yanbian economy has been crucial. China’s central government has provided Yanbian with several preferential polices [5], but it has provided only limited funds to create a solid economic foundation. Supported by preferential policies, Yanbian’s development has largely been financed by South Korea. Today, as Yanbian’s economic structure has become consolidated, domestic companies are showing increasing interest in Yanbian, further supported by the state-sponsored campaign to rejuvenate the economy of Northeast China. This new development could reinforce Yanbian’s position in the Northeast Asian circle of ethnic Korean capital flows.

The patterns of ethnic Korean investments in Yanbian show similarities with overseas Chinese investments in China’s coastal regions. The investments have been small and have not involved high technology. Rather, they have concentrated in the service sector. Cooperation with South Korean companies has provided an important learning process for inexperienced Yanbian Korean companies, helping them to adapt to international cooperation. In southern China, overseas Chinese investments have paved the way for other foreign investors; in Yanbian, overseas Korean investments have created conditions which facilitate the flow of both foreign and domestic Chinese investments into the area. In this way, the foreign investments have in fact supported Yanbian’s integration into China’s domestic economy.

Compared with overseas Chinese community investments in China, the Korean transnational community has been less inclined to invest in South Korea. To a great extent this is the product of South Korea’s restrictive policy on foreign direct investments. South Korea made the first attempts to mobilize its Korean diaspora for economic purposes only in 1997, when the Overseas Koreans Foundation was established. Since 2002, the Foundation has convened annual “World Korean Business Conventions,” which aim at building a global Korean business network in support of the South Korean economy. As South Korea has liberalized foreign investment rules, ethnic Korean investment has started to increase. Yanbian has been ahead of South Korea itself in its organized attempts to mobilize the transnational ethnic Korean community.

Attracting donations and remittances has been a central part of building ties between China and overseas Chinese. By comparison with overseas Chinese donations in Guangdong, overseas Korean donations in Yanbian and elsewhere have been few.

There have, however, been donations directed to schools, institutes and universities, as is the case with Chinese contributions to their hometowns in Guangdong. Some foreign Koreans who lived in Yanbian in their childhood have donated to their alma maters. Donations have included technical equipment, books, periodicals and grants. During fieldwork in Yanbian in 2004, I met with a South Korean businessman who had recently made a donation to a technical institute in Yanbian. Although he was investing in other parts of China, he had chosen Yanbian for his donation because his father and mother were born there.

During the 1990s, Yanbian received institutional donations worth US$10 million. High taxes imposed on donations, as well as corruption, were mentioned as reasons for limiting donations. Remittances to relatives tended to flow out from Yanbian rather than in, as local Koreans helped their relatives in North Korea; indeed, my local contacts emphasized that the main flow of economic support was from Yanbian to North Korea, not from South Korea to Yanbian. Rather than sending money, many South Korean relatives preferred to give generous gifts when they met with their Yanbian relatives. By contrast, significant flows of Korean capital were directed from Yanbian to North Korea. Yanbian Koreans supported relatives and friends in North Korea both financially and by providing clothes and food. Yanbian also served as a channel for South Korean remittances to North Korea. Both South Koreans and North Koreans who lived outside their home country used Yanbian Korean brokers to deliver money to their relatives in North Korea.

Finally, the remittances sent by Yanbian Korean labour migrants from abroad to Yanbian were significant. In 2003, migrant remittances are said to have reached US$650 million. This sum was double the local budget, and fifteen times higher than the value of realized foreign investments in 2003.

Korean Ethnic and Family Ties in the Service of Economic Development

Without a doubt, Korean ethnic ties have given impetus to Korean investors to start businesses in Yanbian. Firstly, ethnic affinity led some investors to invest in Yanbian. Some South Korean researchers of China-South Korean trade have mentioned the Korean population of Yanbian as being advantageous for South Korean investors; for example, the South Korean economist Si Joong Kim assumes that cultural proximity has attracted South Korean small- and medium-sized firms to China’s Korean areas. [6] Yanbian has also attracted Korean interest in its capacity as a link with North Korea. As Yanbian Koreans can easily enter North Korea, information from and about North Korea is readily available there. Local companies can also act as middlemen with North Korean companies. Thus, some investors see Yanbian as a springboard for future investments in North Korea.

The Complexity of Transnational Ethnic Ties as an Economic Resource

Overseas Korean networks have not, however, provided comparable resources to Yanbian as the overseas Chinese networks have provided to Southern China. China’s coastal region possesses a long tradition of entrepreneurship, and the overseas Chinese community is highly business-oriented, factors which have contributed to the rapid economic growth on China’s southern coast. Yanbian, by contrast, was predominantly agrarian, and due to its remote position adjacent to North Korea, its economy has been less developed. The high level of education of the Korean-Chinese has not led directly to economic cooperation with foreign countries, as the highly educated Korean-Chinese have mainly pursued studies in history, literature and the arts. Moreover, they have tended to be oriented toward careers in government, in the performing arts and literature, or in the media. Hence, compared with the overseas Chinese, the Korean transnational community has been less well positioned to invest in Yanbian.

A closer look at certain elements of Koreanness that Yanbian wished to rely on reflects the complexity of ethnic ties as a resource for promoting economic cooperation. Ethnic background or family ties do not automatically generate business. When the Yanbian Koreans won the opportunity to visit South Korea, they were surprised at not receiving a warmer welcome there. Indeed, South Koreans tended to look down on them. For political and cultural reasons, North Koreans were held in even lower esteem in South Korea. As Korean-Chinese were often mistaken for North Koreans when visiting South Korea, due to similar dialect and appearance, they often met rather harsh treatment.

As contacts between Korean-Chinese and South Koreans intensified, the differences in their habits and values also became quite clear. Korean-Chinese and South Koreans had drifted apart during forty years of separation. The resulting differences led to conflicts over values and other misunderstandings between the two groups. According to sociologist Hyun Ok Park, the Korean-Chinese had turned from “long-lost relatives of blood-kin” to a cheap labour force which faced discrimination, arrests, crackdowns and deportations. [7]

Family networks did not provide wide access to business, because the majority of the Yanbian Koreans had their relatives in North Korea. Close ties between the Yanbian Koreans and North Korea constituted a hindrance to trade with South Korea in the mid-1990s. According to one Yanbian Korean contact, those who wished to maintain trade relations with North Korean companies were often unable to seek business partners in South Korea, for fear that the North Korean side would break off the relationship. Although trade with North Korea had become less and less profitable by the mid-1990s, many Yanbian Korean businessmen avoided business contacts with South Korea in order to maintain their partnerships with North Korean companies. Some Yanbian Koreans also feared that cooperation with South Korea would put their relatives in North Korea in a difficult situation.

Loyalty to China

Some Chinese government officials also wanted to avoid the problems which contacts with South Koreans might create. This, especially, seems to have hindered cadres of Korean origin. Due to the strong South Korean connection with Yanbian, and the pan-nationalistic activities aimed at creating a united Great Korea, including Yanbian, Yanbian was classified as one of the four sensitive regions in China where the Central Government fears separatism. [8] The fear is that pan-nationalistic South Koreans might infiltrate Yanbian in the guise of economic cooperation. Some officials, who wished to render their career secure by avoiding all trouble, chose to block cooperation with South Koreans and other foreigners.

The activities of the associations that were pursuing people’s diplomacy with overseas Koreans were closely monitored. One article in the journal of the local Party School stated that strengthening party guidance was essential for people’s diplomacy, and urged close cooperation between associations and the Party. The article even called for Party cells in associations in order to assure that they follow the Party line. [9] In this environment, the prerequisite for an internationally oriented association to be active seemed to be a chairperson who was a trusted Party member.

Similar views were presented in articles prepared by the national-level Ethnic Affairs Commission, Minwei. [10] Korean-Chinese were generally regarded as a patriotic group, having participated in the Civil War on the side of the Communists, and later in the Korean War in the ranks of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. The starting point in these articles was that the Korean masses should be trusted; leaders should have faith in the Koreans and trust that their political consciousness is strong enough to resist the influence of foreign infiltrators. The second point was that international economic cooperation is essential for Yanbian, so ties with foreigners should be developed. Still, social stability, national unity and border security remained priorities.

There was also concern for the eventual reactions to strong condemnation of Yanbian Koreans as unpatriotic or unreliable. The labelling of Yanbian as a sensitive area (mingan diqu) would convey a lack of trust to local Koreans. It was feared that this would create opposition and disappointment, which could push the Korean-Chinese to the side of infiltrators. There was a clear need to find an appropriate balance between flexibility and control, in order not to obstruct positive economic transfers from the Korean transnational community to Yanbian.

At the same time as concern for the loyalty of Yanbian Koreans arose, exclusivist tendencies in South Korean society produced a counter-force in favour of China. Many Yanbian Koreans became disillusioned because of the discrimination they encountered in South Korea. This strengthened their bonds with China. In addition, in China, they could anticipate rising living standards and could feel pride in belonging to the Korean-Chinese community. Thus, the question of the loyalty of Yanbian Koreans involved multiple contradictory factors.

The Role of Religion

In addition to political ideas, religious activities spread through transnational ties. Christianity was not only perceived by the Chinese leadership as a threat to the “Chineseness” of the Yanbian Korean culture, but Christian congregations were considered to be a disguise for political infiltrators who aimed to disintegrate the country through peaceful means. South Korean missionaries worked not only among Korean-Chinese but also among North Korean migrants and refugees. While in South Korea, many Korean-Chinese encountered Christianity. Until the 1980s, the role of religion had been limited among Korean-Chinese, while in South Korea, one-third of the population were Christians. One contact assumed that the Korean-Chinese migrants were initially attracted to Christianity when they got support from South Korean believers while working under adverse social and economic conditions: Christian organisations provided practical help, like free medical treatment, as well as social and political support. Christian organisations also won support by backing Korean-Chinese demands that South Korean authorities guarantee humane treatment.

Korean churches worked among Korean-Chinese actively not only in South Korea but also in China. They sent both money and personnel to local churches and ran welfare projects. Some churches had established congregations in Yanbian and other areas of China. Many returning migrants joined a local Christian congregation. By the year 1996, the Christian community in Yanbian had grown to include nearly 10 percent of the ethnic Korean population. In addition to return migrants, these congregations also appealed to locals who looked for support in the midst of deteriorating socio-economic conditions.

In order to counteract foreign political and religious infiltrators, three measures were taken in Yanbian in the late 1990s. Firstly, education emphasizing patriotism, socialism and religious policy was intensified. Secondly, leadership was strengthened. Thirdly, control of foreign religious activities was intensified.

Government-Imposed Limitations to Transnational Activities

Yet, various issues remained salient. A report on the new tasks of nationality work from 2001 stated that unequal and slow economic development worked against the cohesion and “centripetality” of minority nationalities. Furthermore, certain international factors and religious activities posed a latent threat to the ethnic unity and social stability in some areas. Yet, this particular document did not provide any policy proposals beyond the routine phrases of training ethnic minority cadres in the spirit of the “three representatives” (sange daibiao). [11] This dilemma will persist as long as the Sino-Korean border exists.

Overall, at the grassroots level, unorganized transnational activities have been allowed to operate freely, but organized activities have only been approved if under the guidance of the Party. At a higher level of institutionalization, whether controlled by individuals, government units, or companies, transnational activities have been required to proceed only according to a strict code of operation. Hence, central tenets of Yanbian’s approved transnational policies can be summarized into two key concepts, viz: trustworthy relations with the centre, and ethno-politically disciplined organizations.

Conclusion

In the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, Yanbian Koreans were gradually linked to the Korean transnational community. Their relationship to this community has since evolved from a fervent Korea-fever to disillusionment. Bernard Vincent Olivier has drawn interesting parallels between the interaction of Yanbian Koreans and North Koreans in the 1960s and the interaction of Yanbian Koreans and South Koreans in the 1990s. In both cases, close interaction initially generated euphoria but later resulted in strengthening the Chineseness of Yanbian Koreans. [12] This tendency was also evident in the early 21st century. Contrary to the fears of China’s leaders, transnational ethnic relations do not necessarily undermine the loyalty of cross-border ethnic groups. Indeed, deeper contacts with ethnic kin abroad may even strengthen minority groups’ ties to the home country.

Although trade and investment flows between China and the two Koreas have been most intensive in China’s Bohai region, the role of overseas Korean ties in the development of the Yanbian economy has been crucial to the locality. As Yanbian’s economic structure consolidates, its position in the Northeast Asian circle of ethnic Korean capital flows might become more significant.

Drawing on traditions of overseas Chinese work, the Yanbian administration was able to mobilize ethnic Korean resources for prefectural development. The mobilization of the Korean transnational community by Yanbian officials was similar to that in overseas Chinese-connected areas such as coastal Guangdong and Fujian, but on a smaller scale. The administration of transnational relations of the ethnic minorities is, however, politically more sensitive in Yanbian than in coastal China since transnational ethnic relations raise questions about border security and separatism. Nevertheless, transnational ethnic relations have been allowed to expand and deepen in relatively unrestricted ways, compared, for example, with those involving the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. This suggests the possibilities of ethnicity-based cross-border economic activities in China.

The mobilization of transnational linkages has provided China with substantial resources that have contributed to China’s rise. While this has been widely recognized with respect to the Chinese diaspora, far less attention has been paid to linkages with Koreans abroad. Yet China has clearly embarked on major efforts, both at the center and in localities, to draw in overseas resources to support China’s rise.

Editors’ note: This article refers to Chinese persons of Korean descent as Korean-Chinese (Korean-Chinese in Yanbian are frequently termed Yanbian Koreans). Other English-language literature, including the author’s PhD thesis, refers to Korean-Chinese as Chinese-Koreans. Chinese usage is closer to “the Korean nationality” or “the Korean minority nationality.”

Outi Luova is a senior researcher at the Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Turku, Finland. Her PhD thesis dealt with the attempts of the Yanbian government to utilize transnational Korean ethnic capital for the economic development of Yanbian. She can be contacted at outi.luova@utu.fi. This article is a revised version of an article that appeared in China Information 2006:1. Many thanks to Mark Selden for comments on earlier drafts of this article.

On Gaoguli/Goguryeo (or Koguryo), see “Competing Nationalisms: The Mobilisation of History and Archaeology in the Korea-China Wars over Koguryo/Gaogouli,” “The Legacy of Long-Gone States: China, Korea and the Koguryo Wars,” and other Japan Focus articles searchable using the keyword “Koguryo.” On border politics and cultural politics, see “Dance or Else: The Politics of Ethnic Culture on China’s Southwest Borders.”

Notes

[1] Ahn, Yonson (2006). “Competing Nationalisms: The Mobilisation of History and Archaeology in the Korea-China Wars over Koguryo/Gaogouli.” Japan Focus, February 9.

[2] Dong-Hoon Seol and John D. Skrentny (2005). “South Korea: Importing Undocumented Workers.” In Cornelius W. et al., eds., Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 489.

[3] Faist, Thomas (2000). The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 106, 109.

[4] Sun Xingbiao ( 2001). Guanyu Yanbian duiwai kaifang wenti de sikao. A report by the deputy director of the Tumen Programme Office (no date available). In Zhu Hongqi, ed., Zhongguo dangdai juece wenku. Yanbian Chaoxianzu zizhizhou lingdao ganbu diaocha lunwen ji. Shang juan. Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 274.

[5] These policies include preferential policies for ethnic minority regions: the Tumen River Development, the Development of the West, and the Development of the Old Industrial Basis of the Northeast.

[6] Si Joong Kim (1994). “Korean Direct Investment in China: Perspectives of Korean Investors.” In Sumner J. La Croix, Michael Plummer, and Keun Lee, eds., Emerging Patterns of East Asian Investment in China: From Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 205.

[7] Park, Hyun Ok (1996). “Segyehwa: Globalization and Nationalism in Korea.” In The Journal of the International Institute 4:1. www.umich.edu/~iinet/journal/vol4no1/segyeh.html.

[8] The other sensitive regions are Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet.

[9] Jin Yongwan (1999). Shilun shehui zhuyi xiandaihua jianshe he minjian waijiao. Yanbian dangxiao xuebao 1. CNKI Database.

[10] Yanbianzhou Minwei (1997). Duiwai kaifang duinei gaohua zhashi gongzuo cujin bianjiang de wending he fanrong. Speech given by a cadre in a responsible position in the Yanbian Minwei at a national meeting on Minwei’s work in border areas. Minzu gongzuo 5; Wang Tiezhi & Li Hongjie 1997. Duiwai kaifang yu zhongguo de chaoxianzu. Minzu Yanjiu 6

[11] Han Changzhen (2001). Dangqian wozhou minzu gongzuo minlin de yixiang xin renwu. Report by deputy head of the Standing Committee of the People’s Government in the Yanbian Prefecture (no date available). In Zhu Hongqi, ed., Zhongguo dangdai juece wenku. Yanbian Chaoxianzu zizhizhou lingdao ganbu diaocha lunwen ji. Shang juan. Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 286.

[12] Olivier, Bernard (2001). “Ethnicity as political instrument among the Koreans of Northeast China, pre-1945 to the present.” Korean and Korean-American Studies Bulletin 12:1.

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Rival parties differ on Kaesong in Korea-U.S. FTA

Wednesday, March 28th, 2007

Yonhap
Kim Hyun
3/28/2007

South Korea’s major opposition Grand National Party showed flexibility Wednesday in dealing with the United States over an inter-Korean industrial park in North Korea as negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA) go down to the wire.

The Kaesong industrial complex is one of the sensitive issues dividing Seoul and Washington in their final negotiations, which end Friday. Seoul wants to have goods produced in the joint industrial complex treated as South Korean-made products, but Washington is against it.

The pro-government Uri Party has been prioritizing the country of origin issue in the talks, while its conservative rival, the Grand National Party (GNP) says the dispute over the Kaesong project “is not a big problem.”

The made-in-Kaesong label will make its way abroad when North Korea earns its international credit, and should not be treated as crucially as the issues of rice or beef in the negotiations, the GNP said.

“When inter-Korean relations get on a normal track, it will naturally become much easier (for the South) to operate the Kaesong industrial complex,” Rep. Yun Kun-young, the leader of the party’s special committee on the free trade talks, told reporters.

In a tougher stance, the pro-government Uri Party has put the inter-Korean project as the No. 1 item on its must-have list. In a letter to the main U.S. representative in the talks, Susan Schwab, on Tuesday, the liberal party asked Washington to accept the Kaesong complex in the deal, along with other key demands, such as the exclusion of rice.

“We stress that ratification of the Korea-U.S. FTA in the National Assembly will be determined by the manner that the above demands are integrated into the agreement,” the party said in the letter.

The Kaesong complex, just a few kilometers north of the inter-Korean border, is one of two flagship projects the South operates in the spirit of reconciliation with the North following their historic summit in 2000. Over 11,000 North Korean workers are employed by dozens of South Korean companies producing garments, utensils and other labor-intensive goods. Another reconciliation project is the operation of tours to the North’s scenic Mount Geumgang.

South Korean companies operating in Kaesong say the inclusion of the goods in the FTA is crucial, as this will open the doors for their exports to the world’s largest market and will also affect future trade deals with other countries.

The Assembly is expected to vote on ratifying the deal in August or September if it is signed as scheduled this week. Currently, a majority of lawmakers support the proposed deal.

Sources say the South Korean government has agreed with the U.S. to include the Kaesong complex in a “built-in agenda” in the deal, allowing both sides to hold further negotiations on the issue after reaching a deal.

The issues that the two biggest parties agree are not open to negotiation in the FTA deal are the exclusion of rice, the immediate and complete lifting of tariffs on South Korea’s key exports, such as cars, and the assurance of customers’ rights in medicine and sanitary areas.

Aside from the main parties, however, dissenters and members of minor parties are protesting the FTA. A group of liberal lawmakers, including some presidential hopefuls, have gone on a hunger strike against the deal.

“I cannot possibly sit by idly watching the government unilaterally push for the negotiations and ignore the national interest,” said Rep. Kim Geun-tae, a former health minister and a presidential contender from the pro-government Uri Party, launching his hunger strike at the parliament on Tuesday.

Moon Sung-hyun, chairman of the progressive Democratic Labor Party, continued a hunger strike Wednesday in front of the presidential office that has entered its 21st day.

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S. Korea to prepare for 2nd-stage development of N.K. industrial complex

Sunday, March 25th, 2007

Yonhap
3/25/2007

South Korea will begin preparations for the development of a 2.5-million-pyeong area in the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong, North Korea in the second half of this year, the Unification Ministry said Sunday. One pyeong equals 3.3 square meters.

The government will measure and conduct a geological survey of the land in the western North Korean border town for the second-stage construction of the industrial complex, the ministry said.

The construction project aims to build a 20-million-pyeong industrial base in three stages for South Korean companies by 2012. The complex, if completed, is expected to employ as many as half a million North Koreans to work for about 2,000-3,000 South Korean manufacturers.

The government originally planned to embark on the second-stage project last year, but had to put it off amid inter-Korean tension caused by the North’s missile and nuclear tests.

The ministry also said it plans to parcel out a 530,000-pyeong lot for South Korean manufacturers late next month. The land is the remainder of the 1-million-pyeong lot the South and North Korean governments have been jointly developing in the industrial complex.

The Kaesong industrial complex is one of the two major cross-border projects that South Korea has kept afloat in spite of U.S. opposition. The two Koreas also run a joint tourism project at the North’s scenic Mount Geumgang.

In the industrial complex, South Korean businesses use cheap but skilled North Korean labor to produce goods. Currently, 21 labor-intensive South Korean factories employ about 11,160 North Korean workers.

But U.S. hard-liners criticize the complex, claiming that the factories where North Korean workers earn about US$60 a month are actually channels to funnel much-needed hard currency to the tyrannical North Korean regime.

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Firms venture into North Korea

Tuesday, March 13th, 2007

Asia Times
3/13/2007

Chinese auto maker Brilliance Auto recently signed an agreement with PMC of South Korea on jointly launching an assembly plant in North Korea.

The North Korean facility will be Brilliance Auto’s third after its operations in Egypt and Vietnam.

Brilliance Auto is neither the first nor the most active of the Chinese auto makers making direct investments abroad. Quite a few have already done or are doing so. Among them are Chery, Geely, Jianghuai, Chang’an, Great Wall, and BYD Auto, which have launched greenfield auto plants abroad, and Shanghai Automotive and Nanjing Automotive, which have invested abroad through merger and acquisition.

Chery is a leader in this regard, making great efforts on building CKD (complete knockdown) factories abroad in recent years. Aside from the existing assembly plants in Iran and Russia, it is looking for such opportunities in Egypt, Romania, Turkey, Indonesia, Italy and Argentina. Its Argentina joint-venture project with the local Socma group, involving investment of US$100 million, will be controlled by Chery. If it goes ahead, it will be the first China-invested auto venture in South America. Chery plans to own 12 assembly plants worldwide within a short time.

Geely also has been active in going global. It has invested in Malaysia and is preparing for another new factory in Russia.

Jianghuai, meanwhile, has established light-truck assembly plants in Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia.

Industry analysts hold that excessive capacity in the domestic market after rapid expansion in recent years is prompting Chinese auto makers to look for overseas markets. However, they are often hit with tariff barriers from the importing nations. For instance, Russia levies about a 25% tariff on complete vehicle imports, but only about 3% on knockdowns.

Direct investment overseas is regarded as a solution to such barriers.

So far, the overseas investments of Chinese auto makers have been concentrated in emerging markets such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa.

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The Choson Development Fund

Sunday, March 11th, 2007

The Chosun Development & Investment Fund is a privately structured Limited Partnership Fund incorporated in the United Kingdom and based in London.

Specifically designed for investment in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”) or (“North Korea”). Chosun Fund is now beginning to seek subscriptions from qualifying investors. This follows the authorisation of Chosun Fund’s Fund Manager, Anglo-Sino Capital Partners Limited on 19th May 2006 by the UK Financial Services Authority.

Chosun Fund will concentrate entirely on the DPRK and will channel external investment into the economic development of that country.

The exclusive Investment Advisor to Chosun Fund Fund manager is Hong Kong based Koryo Asia Limited (“Koryo Asia”) whose team of principals has over 25 years experience of commercial & financial dealings with the DPRK and in Asia generally.

The principals working with Chosun Fund will initially be concentrating on those areas of the DPRK economy with which they are familiar and which they believe can be developed quickly and efficiently to generate foreign exchange cash flow for the DPRK.

As a completely private initiative it is intended that Chosun Fund is a fully transparent financial vehicle that will assist the DPRK develop its legitimate economic activities along internationally accepted lines and also provide an attractive return to investors.

This first-to-market fund has the capability to deliver a significant return on investment in the near term and considerably enhanced returns after the expected resolution of the current nuclear issue and other problems. This should result in a substantial expansion in the economy of North-East Asia’s last emerging economy.

About the Fund

The idea of an investment fund specifically for The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) began at a conference in July 2000 held by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, and entitled “Engagement and Development in the DPRK” , to which Colin McAskill (McAskill), the originator of this project, was invited because of his experience in dealing with the DPRK.   The conference was also attended by Mr. James Kelly, prior to him joining the US State Department as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the first George W. Bush administration.   Following the conference McAskill was called to the US State Department by a special adviser in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (in the administration of President Clinton), who wished to talk to him about realistic prospects for business in the DPRK – an issue of concern at the time since the “Perry process” held out foreign investment and business as one of the benefits of the DPRK’s engagement with the outside world.

McAskill said that he had come to the conclusion that a private initiative to set up an investment fund, which could initiate or participate in repeated dealings in the DPRK, and thus be seen by the ruling hierarchy as too important to alienate through non-performance, could avoid many of the pitfalls of investing in, or dealing with, the DPRK.   The State Department Official agreed with his analysis and encouraged McAskill to set up such a fund.

Partners were gathered and engaged to set up such a fund. Aware that although this was completely a private business initiative it engendered a certain political sensitivity, McAskill met with US Assistant Secretary Kelly in September of 2001 to brief him on progress.   Kelly had no objection to such a fund as long as it kept within the parameters of US law and asked to be kept informed. By the autumn of 2002 a fund based in the US was ready to be launched but, with the serious deterioration in political relations between the US and the DPRK in October 2002, several partners in the US asked if they could postpone their active participation.

As a result of this, the planning of the fund was reconstituted with the emphasis deliberately shifted to North East Asia, with new partners in Hong Kong and China as well as with experienced fund managers in London.

McAskill has kept the US government informed of the Fund’s progress. Similar to the close contact kept with the US State Department, McAskill has also kept both the UK Foreign Office and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) government fully informed, the latter through contact with the South Korean Ambassador in London as well as the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Unification in Seoul. McAskill’s partners in China have similarly informed the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China).

While the organisers and participants in the Fund fully understand the decision to keep relevant governments informed as a matter of courtesy, and to comply with any laws or regulations by those governments that affect the Fund, it should be emphasised that the Fund is a purely private business initiative. Its establishment in London, and the authorisation and regulation of its Fund Manager by the UK Financial Services Authority will ensure complete transparency.

McAskill has been involved in business dealings with the DPRK since 1978 (his first visit to the DPRK was in 1979/1980), primarily in coordinating the emergence of parts of the DPRK’s business community into western markets. This included the certification and sale of DPRK bullion and other minerals in the London market, and also in assisting other significant DPRK state entities in their dealings with western institutions, especially European banks, over their defaulted debts. Dealings with the DPRK became somewhat moribund in the 1990s due to internal political developments there, coupled with the natural disasters that overran the country causing widespread damage and a general contraction of the DPRK economy. During this period McAskill continued to maintain contact with senior associates in both business and banking institutions in Pyongyang.

The DPRK leadership has officially declared that it will pursue a controlled opening to commerce and is seeking foreign capital. In 2002 it introduced internal reforms that allowed the economy to become more market orientated. The reforms are now entrenched and gradually expanding to a point where most outside experts on the DPRK believe they have become irreversible.

The management, partners, and directors of the Fund understand the risk inherent in dealing with the DPRK, but also believe that the Fund can achieve returns commensurate with that risk. The Fund will seek initially to deal with and invest in key areas of the DPRK economy that have been known to operate successfully in the past, concentrating on transactions in sectors that were proven hard currency exporters into Western markets, mainly minerals, but have been subject to recent performance constraints.  Later dealings will take advantage of a wide variety of opportunities that are expected to become available as the DPRK economy opens and develops.

The DPRK government is aware of these developments, at first via senior DPRK officials engaged in the six-party talks in Beijing whom McAskill met with in July 2005. This was followed by meetings in Beijing in December 2005 and again in Asia in April 2006 with a special envoy sent from Pyongyang to establish direct contact. And, as a result of the earlier meeting, McAskill’s partner and management team member in China was invited to meet the DPRK Ambassador in Beijing on 15th August 2005.

The creation of the Chosun Fund and the authorisation & regulation by the UK Financial Services Authority of Chosun Fund’s Fund Manager has now formally been announced to the DPRK government.

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Chinese Entrepreneurs Poised to Pounce on North Korean Border

Thursday, March 8th, 2007

Bloomberg
Bradley Martin, Allen Cheng
3/6/2007

Chinese entrepreneur He Ho was burned by his first North Korean investment, a bakery in the shabby border city of Sinuiju. He lost his entire $20,000 when the plan to make the city a special economic zone stalled in 2003.

If another opportunity comes along, though, “I’ll be the first to go in,” the 34-year-old said in an interview in Dandong, the bustling Chinese city facing Sinuiju across the Yalu River. “North Korea’s a good investment because so many things are lacking.”

Business executives in Dandong, one of the main conduits for trade in and out of North Korea, see opportunity in the recent six-nation agreement to end Kim Jong Il’s nuclear-weapons program. They think the 65-year-old North Korean leader will now focus on fixing his country’s nearly flattened economy and may revive plans for a special economic zone — an area designed to promote foreign investment, with fewer rules and regulations than elsewhere in the country — on the western border with China.

“Most of North Korea’s trade with China is via Dandong, so a special zone in this corridor could make sense,” said Marcus Noland, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “This could be the North Korean equivalent of the Chinese coastal SEZs in the early years of the Chinese reform.”

No Guarantee

There’s no guarantee against another disappointment for entrepreneurs like He Ho, said Peter Beck, Seoul-based Northeast Asia project director for the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based organization that works to resolve crises around the world.

“The eternal optimist in me hopes that Kim will see the light and recognize the direction in which he needs to lead the economy,” Beck said in a telephone interview. “But the jury’s still out.”

At the same time, “the North Koreans have been talking about putting a special economic zone in the far northwest aimed at China for a decade,” said the Peterson Institute’s Noland. “If they get the politics right, this venture could work.”

China is North Korea’s top trading partner, with 2006 exports of $1.23 billion and imports of $468 million, according to its Ministry of Commerce.

A little over a year ago, Kim visited six booming Chinese cities, including the special economic zone of Shenzhen, bordering Hong Kong. North Korea’s Central News Agency described the nine-day trip as a visit to places “where the cause of modernization is being successfully carried out.”

Executives’ Speculation

Business executives in Dandong speculate that North Korea will develop a new zone in Cholsan County, a peninsula on the east side of the mouth of the Yalu some 50 to 60 kilometers (31 to 37 miles) south of Dandong and Sinuiju. China’s commerce and foreign ministries and North Korea’s embassy in Beijing didn’t respond to faxed requests to comment on their plans.

In 1991, North Korea built a special economic zone at Rajin-Sonbong, in the remote northeast of the country, which has failed to attract much foreign investment because of its location.  Another zone near the southern border at Gaeseong, only 60 kilometers from Seoul, has proven more popular, especially with South Korean manufacturers in search of low-cost labor.

In 2002, North Korea announced plans for the zone in Sinuiju, which would have included export factories and casinos to lure gamblers from China. Kim named Dutch-Chinese businessman Yang Bin governor of the zone. China, which hadn’t given its approval, squelched the plan by arresting Yang and jailing him in 2003 on charges of fraud and illegal land use.

Strained Relations

Kim’s test of a nuclear device in October, which strained relations with the Beijing government, didn’t halt commerce on the border, according to Shen Yuhai, general manager of Dandong Jade Ocean Trade Co. “We didn’t stop trading at any time,” he said in a recent interview.

Shen’s office overlooks a busy parking lot where Chinese customs officials examine trucks departing neon-lit, high-rise Dandong for the run-down and darkened Sinuiju.

The trucks cross on the Friendship Bridge’s single lane in the morning with manufactured goods and return in the evening, either empty or carrying minerals, silkworm cocoons and seafood, Shen said. Four trains a week cross in each direction, connecting the North Korean capital of Pyongyang with Beijing.

China is supplying its neighbor with “daily necessities, home electrical appliances and, in this season, farming tools and chemical fertilizer,” said Shen.

While business is booming, he said he’s still cautious about the risks. He requests payment in yuan, dollars or euros, not North Korean won, and accepts bank transfers only after business relations have been established.

Even then, he said, “sometimes we are cheated.”

–With additional reporting by Hideko Takayama in Tokyo and Lee Spears and Dune Lawrence in Beijing.

For a copy of a list of banned goods to North Korea: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/76138.htm

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Koreas to hold Red Cross talks to resume construction of family reunion center

Thursday, March 8th, 2007

Yonhap
3/8/2007

Red cross officials from South and North Korea are to meet this week on resuming the construction of a family reunion center on the North’s scenic mountain bordering the South along the east coast, South Korean officials said.

The one-day meeting, slated to be held at the North’s Mount Geumgang resort on Friday, will also address the next family reunions via video link to be held on March 27-29.

Last week, the two Koreas agreed to resume reunion events for families separated by the border since the end of the Korean War. The next face-to-face family reunions will be resumed in early May.

Shortly after the North conducted its missile tests in July, the South suspended food and fertilizer aid. In retaliation, the communist nation immediately suspended inter-Korean talks, family reunions and the construction of the family reunion center.

“The construction has been put on hold for about eight months, so we will have to resume construction after checking whether there are technical problems. The construction will likely be completed next year, far later than the originally scheduled April of this year,” a South Korean Red Cross official said on condition of anonymity.

High on the agenda will be discussions on when to resume construction, how to check the facilities needed for construction, and how to provide supplies and dispatch engineers, the official said. The South Korean delegation will be headed by Hwang Jeong-ju, while Pak Yong-il will lead the North Korean team.

The two sides started the construction at a village near the scenic mountain resort in August 2005. The envisioned 12-story building will house two reunion halls and serve as the venue for family reunion events.

The two Koreas have held 14 rounds of family reunions. More than 90,000 people from South Korea alone have remained separated from their loved ones since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War.

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Chinese Merchants in North Korea – Cure or Poison to Kim Jong Il?

Wednesday, March 7th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
3/7/2007

90% daily goods made in China, 50% circulated by Chinese merchants

While some prospect that North Korea may be an affiliated market of China’s 4 provinces in the Northeast, the real focus is on the merchants who actually control North Korea’s markets. Recently, North Korean citizens have been asserting that markets would immobilize if Chinese merchants were to disappear.

Lately, Chinese merchants are nestling themselves with their newly found fortune in North Korea, undeniably to the envy of North Korean citizens.

In a recent telephone conversation with the DailyNK, Kim Chang Yeol (pseudonym) a resident of Shinuiju said “Most of the tiled houses in Shinuiju are owned by Chinese merchants in Shinuiju are upper class and the rich.” Unlike Pyongyang, tiled houses in Shinuiju are greater in value than apartments. In particular, the homes owned by Chinese merchants are luxurious and impressing.

Kim said “At the moment, 90% of daily goods that are traded at Shinuiju markets are made in China.” What Kim means by 90% of goods is basically everything excluding agricultural produce and medicinal herbs. Apparently, about half of the (90% of) supplies are circulated by Chinese merchants.

Kim affirmed that the market system could be shaken if supplies were not provided by the Chinese merchants. Hence, Chinese merchants have elevated themselves in North Korea’s integrated market system, to the extent that the market could break down without their existence.

In addition to this, Chinese merchants are playing a vital role in conveying information about the external world into North Korea. Even in 2004, it was Chinese merchants to first telephone China through mobile phones relaying the news about the Yongcheon explosion. As a result, rumors say that the movement of Chinese merchants can either be a “cure” to the economic crisis in which the North Korean government seems unable to fix, or “poison,” as more and more foreign information flows into the country.

How many Chinese merchants are there in North Korea?

A report by China’s Liaoning-Chosun Newspaper in 2001 sourcing data from North Korea, states that immediately after WWII, approximately 80,000 overseas Chinese were residing in the Korean Peninsula. Then following the Korean War and the formation of a Chinese government, the majority of people, approximately 60,000 Chinese, returned home. In 1958, statistics show that 3,778 families of overseas Chinese were living in North Korea, totalling 14,351 people.

These Chinese engaged in business related to farming, home made handicrafts and restaurant business, and in the late 50’s, lost all this due to the implementation of economic planning and dictatorial regime. Since then, the majority of merchants continued to return to China until the early 80’s.

In 2001, Liaoning-Chosun Newspaper confirmed that approximately 6,000 Chinese were living in North Korea. Of this figure, more than half were residing in Pyongyang, approx. 300 families living in North Pyongan and approx. 300 families residing throughout Jagang and northern districts of South Hamkyung.

At present, there are 4 middle and high schools for children (11~17 years) of Chinese merchants, located in Pyongyang, Chongjin, Shinuiju and Kanggae. In addition to these schools, there are a number of elementary schools (for children aged 7~11 years) located sporadically throughout each province.

Wang Ok Kyung (pseudonym) a resident of Shinuiju attended Chongjin Middle School for children of overseas Chinese in 1981~86. Wang said “At the time, there were about 40 students in each year. Now there is only about 5~6 students.” Nowadays, many Chinese children complete their elementary studies in North Korea, but the general trend is to send the children to China for middle school. She said “In order to enter a Chinese university, students must have completed their middle school studies in China and must be fluent in Chinese. He/she can also go to private institutes in China.”

Fortunes made through trade between North Korea-China during the food crisis

Even until the early 80’s there were no such thing as a wealthy North Korean-Chinese merchant. They were no different to North Korean citizens.

However, in the 80’s, many people began importing and selling goods such as socks, handkerchiefs, hand mirrors and cards from China, literally through their sacks. As the 90’s approached North Korean-Chinese merchants began to experience great wealth, the time where North Korea-China trade fundamentally kickstarted.

Today, Son Kwang Mi (pseudonym, 52) falls under the top 10 wealthiest Chinese merchants in Dandong, characterizing an unique rags to riches story. In the past, Sun lived in Chongjin and was one of the first figures to trade with China in the 80’s.

In the beginning, Son was so poor that she had to sell her watch received as a wedding gift in order to buy goods to sell.

Fortunately, Son found her money smuggling gold. In North Korea, gold is considered a public good or simply put Kim Jong Il’s personal inheritance, so private trade of gold is strictly regulated. Nonetheless, there are still some laborers who export gold secretly and a great number of people still collect gold through dubious ways. In particular, after the 80’s as North Korea began to experience economic decline, more and more people sold gold secretly.

Hence, a small number of Chinese merchants infiltrated the market of secretly trading gold with China. Chinese smugglers were able to take advantage of North Koreans by greatly raise their market margins, as the supply of gold and North Koreans wanting to sell their gold was high yet the demand in North Korea low.

Son said “Of the Chinese merchants in North Korea, 60% earned a great fortune at that time through illicit trade.”

She says that there were two opportunities for overseas Chinese to make a great fortune. The first was in 1985~89 through illicit trade of gold and the second, during North Korea’s mass food crisis in 1995~98.

“During the mass famine, everything in North Korea was in shortage and so Chinese merchants began to provide the daily necessities of life. At the time, if you brought large amounts of goods such as fabric and sugar, you could make a profit of 1 million Yuan (US$137,000),” she said.

Son was fortunate enough not to miss these two opportunities which led her to great wealth and allowed her to possess a fortune of 50 million Yuan (US$6.31 million).

Chinese merchants can relatively enter and exit China freely. Also, with the ability to speak Chinese fluently and the possibility of staying in the homes of many relatives in China, the occupation possesses ideal conditions.

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Outlook for Inter-Korean Business Bright

Wednesday, March 7th, 2007

Korea Times
Park Hyong-ki
3/7/2007

The outlook for inter-Korean trade this year seems bright, as North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs at the six-party talks in Beijing last month.

According to a survey conducted by the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), about 45 percent of South Korean companies doing business with North Korea were optimistic that the volume of inter-Korean trade will grow this year. The survey was conducted on 150 firms in February.

Some 35 percent believe that the bilateral trade will remain the same as last year’s, while only 15 percent showed negative responses toward this year’s trade, saying that the volume will “drastically” decrease.

Only two companies said they will pull out of North Korea this year, while five companies were undecided.

Last year, inter-Korean trade amounted to about $1.3 billion, up 28 percent from 2005. Key trading commodities were agricultural, chemical and textile products.

Despite North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests as well as chilly inter-Korean relations last year, South Korean companies operating in the Kaesong Industrial Complex saw their sales grow 69 percent to $298 million.

The Kaesong site is one of the major cross-border projects symbolizing economic ties between the two Koreas, which utilize North Korea’s cheap labor and South Korea’s technological skills.

The Ministry of Unification is hoping to attract about 2,000 manufacturers to Kaesong by 2012. Currently, there are 55 South Korean firms operating in the joint economic zone, which account for 22 percent of overall South-North business, according to the trade association.

The other joint business _ the Mt. Kumgang tour managed by Hyundai Asan _ suffered from the aftermath of North Korea’s nuclear weapon test. The tourism project recorded only $57 million in sales, down 35 percent from the year before.

Specifically, a total of 477 South Korean companies participated in inter-Korean trade last year, down from 523 firms in 2005, due to heightened risks following Pyongyang’s nuclear test.

About 44 percent of those surveyed said that the test had negatively affected their business with the North. The report showed that only 39 percent reaped a “little” profit last year while doing business with North Korea.

Half of firms upbeat for North trade
Joong Ang Daily
3/8/2007

Almost half of South Korean companies doing business with North Korea said they have a bright outlook for inter-Korean trade this year due to expectations for better ties with the North, a poll said yesterday.

According to a survey of 67 companies conducted by the Korea International Trade Association, 45 percent of the respondents said inter-Korean trade will likely increase this year. Thirty-five percent expected trade to remain at the same level as last year while 15 percent said it will likely decline.

The poll also said 75 percent of local companies operating in the industrial park in the North’s border city of Kaesong had an optimistic outlook for trade. The industrial complex, mainly for smaller South Korean firms, is considered a model for reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas. Currently, 21 garment and other labor-intensive South Korean plants are operating there, employing about 11,000 low-paid North Korean workers.

The survey said among the firms that forecast inter-Korean trade to rise, 17 percent said their continued trust in North Korean firms was the reason for their upbeat outlook, while 16 percent and 14 percent said it was a rise in new orders and expectations for inter-Korean reconciliation. The survey was conducted before a deal on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program was reached, reflecting that local firms have maintained a positive view toward inter-Korean trade. The agreement calls for Pyongyang to shut down and disable its main nuclear reactor and dismantle its atomic weapons program.

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