Archive for the ‘Foreign direct investment’ Category

South Korea cuts Kaesong subsidies with predictable results

Wednesday, April 30th, 2008

The Daily NK reports that South Korean businesses have delayed moving into the zone, or canceled their plans outright:

78.5 percent of those firms which received lots at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the second round of the first stage of distribution in June last year have not begun construction of their facilities. 62.4 percent of them have not even hired a firm for construction,” said the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSB) in a report released on April 27. For the report, the KFSB selected 85 firms out of all those firms which received lots and conducted a survey on how these firms are preparing their move into the Complex.

Companies distributed with lots in June last year are required to begin construction of their facilities within two years after the initial distribution contract. It is true that these firms have enough time to build their facilities. However, a number of firms have expressed that they would not move into the Complex.

The report says, “13 out of a total of 167 firms have already told the KFSB that they would not move into the Complex, and five of them have canceled the contract.”

59 percent of the firms including those 13 said that they would relinquish their rights to move into the complex because they are unable to raise enough money. 64 percent of these firms said that the reduced government funding has contributed to their financial difficulties.

Read the full article here:
South Korean Firms Postpone Their Move into the Kaesong Industrial Complex
Daily NK
Choi Choel Hee
4/28/2008

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Is South Korea’s engagement hindering the growth of North Korea’s markets?

Saturday, April 26th, 2008

On April 23, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)hosted, “The Lee Myung-Bak Administration’s Policy toward North Korea: Denuclearization or Disengagement.”  In this seminar they essentially answered this question with a ‘yes’.

According to the Daily NK coverage of the event:

[Dong Yong Seung, the Chief of the Security and Economics Department of the Samsung Economic Research Institute stated,] “While economic exchange between North Korea and China has been business-to-business, in the case of Kaesong, the exchange has been controlled from a single control tower, the North Korean regime. That is, the condition has been set up for government-to-government economic exchange to facilitate North Korean government’s planned economy. Economic cooperation in the style of South Korea’s has been obstructing North Korea’s rational transformation.”

In a sense, he is arguing that South Korea’s support for the Kaesong Zone yields results more similar to foreign aid than private economic exchange.  If this is the case, South Korea, and just about everyone else, could learn from China’s strategy for investing in North Korea.

As Judge Posner put it:

All the problems that foreign aid seeks to alleviate are within the power of the recipient countries to solve if they adopt sensible policies. If they do not adopt such policies, then foreign aid is likely to be stolen by the ruling elite, strengthening its hold over the country, or otherwise squandered. What we can do for poor countries is reduce tariff barriers to their exports. With money saved from eliminating foreign aid, we could compensate our industries that would be hurt by import competition from poor countries and thus reduce political opposition to tariff reform.

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Haggard-Noland on North Korea’s economic integration

Tuesday, April 8th, 2008

Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland published a piece focusing on North Korea’s economic integration.  Download it here: petersoninstitute.pdf

Although not the focus of the piece, here is an excerpt:

A first corollary of the injunction to avoid top-down approaches is that any collective development assistance must be extended in support of economic reform. Experience throughout the developing world demonstrates that assistance will have only marginal effects and may even have negative consequences if not coupled with policy changes. It is not simply that aid sustains the regime; since aid is fungible, even purely humanitarian aid will have that effect. The problem is that too much aid can delay or even undermine the reform process. Whatever the multilateral mechanism that ultimately emerges, it should encourage reform and economic opening in the North.

A second corollary of the injunction against top-down approaches is the importance of engaging the private sector: through trade, foreign direct investment, private capital flows (including remittances), and sheer expertise. Economic rehabilitation will require investment in social overhead capital, which will be led primarily by the public sector. But if North Korea is to evolve toward a self-sustaining market-oriented economy, private-sector involvement will be crucial. Participation of foreign firms means that projects are subject to the market test of profitability, and it encourages North Korean authorities to think of economic engagement in terms of joint gain rather than as political tribute.

(and)

North Korea is in need of depoliticized technical assistance for a whole panoply of issues running from the mundane but critical, such as developing meaningful national statistical capabilities, through basic agricultural and health technologies, to social infrastructure of a modern economy. This infrastructure includes policy mechanisms to manage macroeconomic policy, including through reform of the central bank; specify property rights and resolve commercial disputes; regulate markets, including financial markets as they emerge; establish and implement international trade and investment policies; and so on.

Read the full paper here:
A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension
Staphen Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Policy Brief
April 2008

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South Korean firm gets exclusive rights in Nampo

Tuesday, April 1st, 2008

Acheon Global Corp.  has obtained the exclusive right to use the Ryongnam Ship Repair Factory in the western port city of Nampo

The right to enable the firm to gain domestic and overseas investment in its ship repair and steel-structure manufacturing businesses in North Korea, Acheon officials said.

According to KCNA (12/29/2006), the site has been recently refurbished:

The Ryongnam Ship Repair Factory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been reconstructed on an expansion basis. The factory successfully constructed a large dock, three wharves to repair big cargo ships, a combined repair workshop, an acetylene generating workshop, oxygen generating workshop, a heavy oil power plant, a wind and solar power station over the last four years.

The newly built Dock No. 2 can repair several ships of tens of thousands of tons simultaneously.

The repair processes are automatized and controlled by computer. There are in the dock a horizontal jib crane, gantry crane and general control room. It is divided into the main sluice, operated by computer, and the middle one.

The combined repair workshop which covers the floor space of over 17,000 square meters specializes in making ship-body pipes while repairing propellers and power system.

The acetylene generating workshop does not produce any industrial spent water.

The wind and solar power station turns out stabilized electricity for the general control room, dwelling houses and cultural welfare facilities. Its expansion on a modern basis has consolidated the material and technical foundation for developing water transport.

Read the full article here:
Local firm to use N.K. ship repair yard
Yonhap
3/23/2008

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Escalation run down (and reasons not to panic)

Monday, March 31st, 2008

The DPRK is sending a barrage of signals that it is not happy with the policy changes that are on the new South Korean government’s agenda (denuclearize and account for all nuclear activities, reform, repatriate missing South Korean citizens, etc):

1. February 25, 2008: the DPRK increases fighter jet maneuvers near the DMZ. (Source: N.K. flight maneuvers rise near border, Korea Herald, Jin Dae-woong
4/1/2008

2. March 27, 2008: the DPRK expels eleven South Korean officials from industrial zone. (Source: South Koreans kicked out of North Korea’s Kaesong industrial centre, The Times of London, Leo Lewis, (3/27/2008)

3. March 28, 2008: the DPRK test fires missles off its coast. (Source: North Korea sends a missile warning, Asia Times, Donald Kirk, 3/29/2008)

4. March 30, 2008: the DPRK issues blunt statements about deteriorating relations and suggesting complete destruction of the South if it is attacked. (Source: Pro-North Korea newspaper says relations with South at lowest since after nuclear test, Associated Press, 3/31/2008)

5. April 1, 2008: The DPRK breaks its silence on direclty challenging South Korea’s new president, labeling Lee Myung Bak a “traitor” and a “sycophant toward the U.S.” (Source: North Korea Calls South Korean President a `Traitor’, Bloomberg, 4/1/2008)

6. April 3, 2008: North Korea accuses the South Korean Navy of violating its territorial waters, “The South Korean military’s warmongers have sent three battleships deep into our territorial waters in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) at around 11:45 am (0245 GMT) on April 3,” and “South Korea’s military should clearly bear in mind that an unexpected countermeasure will follow if they continue to push battleships into (our waters) and raise tensions.” (Note here they are trying to pin the military escalation on South Korea) (Source: North Korea accuses South of entering its waters, Reuters, 4/3/2008)

7. April 3, 2008: North Korea announces it is suspending all dialogue with South Korea and closing the border to Seoul officials, its toughest action in a week of growing cross-border tensions. (North Korea cuts contacts with South, The Austrailan, Park, Chan Kyong, 4/3/2008)

8. DPRK violates NLL three times (Yonhap) 5/22/2008

Reasons not to panic:

1.  Although eleven South Korean officials have been expelled from the Kaesong Zone, Some 48 South Koreans and five North Koreans still work at a separate inter-Korean management committee overseeing the industrial zone, where about 800 South Koreans work along with more than 25,600 North Korean laborers for 69 South Korean companies.  In other words, it is still business as usual for the most part. (Source: Pro-North Korea newspaper says relations with South at lowest since after nuclear test, Associated Press, 3/31/2008)

2.  DPRK statements about about attacking the South are a response to statements aired in public by General Kim Tae-young at a National Assembly hearing on his nomination as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff where he claimed his people had plans for use any time it was deemed necessary to take out the North’s nuclear facilities. (Source: North Korea sends a missile warning, Asia Times, Donald Kirk, 3/29/2008)

3. While all of this was going on, 159 CEO’s of small- to medium-sized South Korean enterprises toured North Korea in search of investment opportunities. (Source: 159 CEOs Begin Trip to North Korea, Korea Times, Kim Sue-young, 3/19/2008)

4. Tourism to the DPRK continues unhampered.

5.  The Pyongyang International Trade fair in May is on and business delegations are still welcome.

6. April 3, 2008: The South’s unification ministry said it did not believe civilian exchanges would be affected. Two Seoul-funded projects in the North – the Kumgang resort and the Kaesong industrial complex – are major hard currency earners for the impoverished nation. (North Korea cuts contacts with South, The Austrailan, Park, Chan Kyong, 4/3/2008)

7. Inter korean trade this year is up! (Yonhap)

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DPRK-Oracsom mobile phone deal update

Wednesday, March 12th, 2008

From Reuters

[Naguib Sawiris, CEO] said he was “astonished” how quickly the North Korean authorities wanted the service to start and he had high hopes for business in the country.

“We firmly believe that in the next three or four years we will be having a couple of million subscribers there and we will be seeing ARPUs in the range of $12 or $15 (a month),” he added.

Sawiris said that of the $400 million the company plans to invest in North Korea over the next three years, about $200 million would probably come in the first year, with $100 million in each of the two subsequent years.

Read the full story here:
Egypt’s OT seeks 100,000 N Korean subscribers from May
Reuters
3/12/2008

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Russian auto plant KamAZ in DPRK

Thursday, March 6th, 2008

A couple of days ago, we had an interesting exchange in the comments that I want to make sure readers have an opportiunity to see:
———————–

Werner Koidl Says: 
 
In that Asia Times report Dr. Petrov wrote:
“… Last year the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line in North Korea, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96″. …”

I would be interested in more details about that KAMAZ truck assembly line in North Korea ! Where ?, joint venture ?, size ?
———————–

Leonid Petrov Says: 
 
Concerning the “Taebaeksan 96″ truck assembling plant, the KamAZ set it up last year (2007 or Juche 96) in the town of Pyeongseong. The terms of this deal with NK were really “friendly” and last year KamAZ was having no or very little profit. The production volume last year was very limited (45 or 48 trucks). However, it’s just the beginning of such cooperation.

There is one technician-representative from KamAZ who manages the assembling process. He stays in Pot’onggang HTL and commutes to Pyeongseong. Many North Korean drivers and technicians seem to be technically ignorant (i.e. not knowing how to change the engine oil, etc.), so they need a new technological culture to be introduced. Russians train them well and the North Koreans are grateful.
———————–

Gag Halfrunt Says:

Now that explains the brochure for the Taebaeksan 96 I’d noticed on the Korean Friendship Association’s exports page. I was wondering how anyone could be making money from sticking badges on KamAZes and trying to sell them on. In any case, the export potential for the Taebaeksan 96 must be close to zero, since anyone outside the DPRK who wants a KamAZ can buy one assembled by KamAZ itself.

Trying to drum up interest in the DPRK as an investment destination, the KFA say, “All business made directly with the government, state-owned companies. No middle agents.” This is amusing, because, on the Pyeonghwa car brochure on the KFA website, they’ve sneakily deleted Pyeonghwa’s own contact details and replaced them with the KFA’s email and web addresses. I think this qualifies them a “middle agent” standing between Pyeonghwa and any potential export customers…
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Werner Koidl Says:
 
The link “brochure for the Taebaeksan 96″ given by Gag Halfrunt seems to indicate that the KamAZ Taebaeksan-96 is assembled in a joint venture with Ryongwang [Ryongbong] Trading Company of North Korea. Ryongwang Trading is also the joint venture partner of Pyeonghwa Motors (Unification Church) to assemble the “Whiparam” in Nampo. And Ryongwang Trading company is also business partner of “Kohas” company from Switzerland. And because of its connections to Ryongwang this Swiss company got in troubles with the US administration.

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Germans break ground in Kaesong

Thursday, March 6th, 2008

According to Business Week German auto parts manufacturer, Prettl, became the first non-Korean firm to start building a plant inside a joint inter-Korean factory complex in North Korea–breaking ground Wednesday.  Kim Min-kyung with the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee claims the factory will be open in December and employ 550 North Koreans.

Other facts:

Two Chinese companies also signed contracts last year to run factories in the area but have not started construction, Kim said.

A total of 69 South Korean companies are currently operating in the zone, employing some 23,220 North Korean laborers, according to the management committee.

The full article can be found here:
German firm breaks ground in North Korea
Business Week
3/5/2008

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Stratgeic alliances in North East Asia: Railways, ports, and energy

Tuesday, March 4th, 2008

Writing in today’s Asia Times, Dr. Leonid Petrov analyses the complexity of Russia, Rok, DPRK, and Chinese relations:

Russia and North Korea:

Territorial claims, in one form or another, involve almost all countries adjacent in this region with the exception of Russia and Korea. The Joint Russian Federation-DPRK Commission for the Demarcation of State Borders has recently completed its work by documenting and marking the 17-kilometer frontier. This strip of uninhabited and swampy land in the mouth of the Tumannaya (Tuman-gang) River plays an exceptionally important geopolitical role. It not only provides the two countries with land access to each other, but also prevents Chinese access to the East Sea (Sea of Japan).

China and North Korea: 

Here, some 50km north of the small port that forms the core of North’s Rajin-Seonbong Special Economic Zone, the interests of Russia and China are now at stake. Russia is rapidly repairing the railroad track, and China (in a similarly speedy manner) is constructing a new automobile highway, both leading from their respective borders to the port of Rajin. Russia, investing at least 1.75 billion rubles (US$72 million) into this project, seeks to strongly connect Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian Railroad. China, in turn, hopes to divert the growing cargo traffic to its own territory, offering the efficient network of railroads for delivery of South Korean and Japanese goods to Central Asian and European markets. What position will the government of North Korea take in this clash of ambitions?

Russia and South Korea (energy and trade):

In 2007, the volume of the export of “black gold” from Russia to South Korea reached 38.13 million barrels (2.7 times more than in the previous year). The relative proximity of the Russian oil and gas fields is an attractive factor for Korean companies who actively search for alternatives to Middle East oil suppliers. This year South Korea will for the first time start importing natural gas from Russia. The expected volume of delivery during 2008 is 1.5 million tons (or 5.1% of South Korea’s annual demand).

and

Trade relations between Russia and Korea are steadily growing. According to customs statistics, last year Russia recorded the sharpest increase of South Korean imports (56.2% more than in 2006). Due to the inflow of “petro-dollars” the new class of nouveaux riches in Russia began actively buying Korean automobiles, cell phones, television sets and LCD monitors. South Korea exported to Russia goods worth US$8.1 billion (including $3.296 billion of automobiles, $859 million of mobile phone equipment, motor vehicles and spare parts worth $659 million). As for trade with North Korea, in 2006 Russia occupied third place after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports.

More on Russia/South Korea energy talk here. 

The whole article deserves reading here:
Russia lays new tracks in Korean ties
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
3/5/2008

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More on the DPRK anti-corruption campaign…

Sunday, February 24th, 2008

Details are starting to emerge on North Korea’s recent anti-corruption drive.   

North Korean authorities have been investigating the chief of a North Korean committee in charge of inter-Korean economic cooperation for months after seizing $20 million from his house, a report said Friday.

Quoting an unidentified Chinese source informed on North Korean affairs, the Dong-A Ilbo newspaper said Pyongyang authorities are intensifying their investigation into Jung Woon-eop and 80 other officials of the committee over where the money came from.

It is possible that this is just a good old fashoned purge.

It is also possible that this campaign is the first stage in a policy shift.

The full article can be found here:
NK Official Suspected of Embezzling Funds From Seoul
Korea Times
Jung Sung-ki
02-22-2008

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