North Korean Economy Watch

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
2/8/2008

On the 23rd of last month, six households were expelled from Haesan City in Yangang Province for the reason of “their families having fled to South Korea” and 25 households were simultaneously expelled under the charges of illicit trade along the North Korea-Chinese border, a North Korean inside source relayed on the 5th.

The source said, “6 of the 152 who were arrested at the inspection which was carried out from August to October of last year by the ‘5 divisions combined Anti-Socialist Inspection Group’ received a long-term prison labor camp sentence for the reason of ‘having secret communication with family members who defected to South Korea. When their sentence was confirmed, the expulsion of the rest of the family members ensued.”

The “5 divisions combined Anti-Socialist Inspection Group” carries out the duty of regulating the inspection of anti-socialist elements by temporarily transferring people and organizing groups from five organizations, such as the Party, the Central Procurator’s Office, the Central Court, the National Security Agency, and the People’s Safety Agency.

During this inspection, 152 people who possessed cell phones and are related to crossing the border were rounded-up, 50 received a long-term prison labor camp sentence, and 100 received a labor training corps sentence. Also, 25 households with charges of illegal trade along the North Korean-Chinese border and owned foreign films were expelled, which made a total of 31 households who were forcibly expelled.

According to the source, the North Korean authorities who were surprised by the inspection results of the Anti-Socialist Group formed the second group on December 19th and unfolded a concentrated investigation of cell phone possessions and connections to families who defected to China and South Korea in Hyesan, after having considered the gravity of illicit acts of civilians in the Yangkang Province border region.

The 31 households who were expelled were those who were detained in the first inspections which began in August, 2007 and another mobilized expulsion took place in the dead of the night under the order of the second-round Anti-Socialist Group.

The source relayed, “Those who were detained in the first-round of inspections mostly owned cell phones and were people who smuggled with Korean-Chinese people in China. The 2nd Anti-Socialist Group newly cast suspicion on receiving money from South Korean National Intelligence Service and handing over North Korean internal information.”

The Party committee of Hyesan, with the expulsion approaching, mobilized a general meeting per each people’s unit and gave the following order to civilians, “The people who are expelled are all relatives of the traitors who betrayed the country and are traitors who have sold our national secret. We must not help or sympathize with those who have participated in treasonous acts.”

Those who were purged were driven to a farmland far away from the border region without any means of basic survival and were forcibly moved to abandoned homes of those who had starved to death during the “March of Tribulation” or had become beggars.

The Party committees of the farming village held a meeting of farmers before the arrival of the expelled families and gave the order of “Those who are expelled are family members of those who committed ‘treasonous acts,’ so we must not help them.”

The source added, “The 31 households who were expelled were a part of the first round of purges and after February 16th (Kim Jong Il’s birthday), the number of households who will be expelled will increase. The cadres and Chinese emigrants who were detained in the first round of inspections were excluded from this expulsion.”

In the article below, Dr. Lankov makes a compelling argument that the North Korean government is now attempting to to re-stalinize the economy because the system cannot survive liberal economic reforms.

Altough the trend seems depressing, optimists should take note that Pyongyang’s efforts to reassert control over the economy parallel a decline in belief in the official ideology.  With a deterioration of this ideology, people’s acquiescence to the DPRK’s political leaders declines, and power dynamics are all that hold the system together.  Efforts to control the general population are increasingly seen by the people as self-interested behavior on the part of their leaders, calling their legitimacy into question.

Additionally, efforts to reassert control over the economy are bound to fail because the system has already collapsed, their capital has been stripped, and there are insufficient funds to rescue the system.

In other words, efforts to re-stalinize the economy are bound to fail from both an economic and ideological perspective.

North Korea dragged back to the past
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
1/24/2008

When people talk about North Korea these days, they tend to focus on the never-ending saga of the six-party talks and the country’s supposed de-nuclearization. Domestic changes in the North, often ignored or overlooked, should attract more attention.

These changes are considerable and should not encourage those optimists who spent years predicting that given favorable circumstances the North Korean regime would mend its ways and follow the beneficial development line of China and Vietnam. Alas, the recent trend is clear: the North Korean regime is maintaining its counter-offensive against market forces.

Merely five years ago things looked differently. The decade that followed Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 was the time of unprecedented social disruption and economic disaster culminating in the Great Famine of 1996-99, with its 1 million dead. The old Stalinist economy of steel mills and coal mines collapsed once the Soviets discontinued the aid that alone kept it afloat in earlier decades.

All meaningful economic activity moved to the booming private markets. The food rationing system, once unique in its thoroughness and ubiquity, collapsed, and populace survived through market activities as well as the “second”, or non-official, economy. The explosive growth of official corruption meant that many old restrictions, including a ban on unauthorized domestic travel, were not enforced any more. Border control collapsed and a few hundred thousand refugees fled to China. In other words, the old Stalinist system imploded, and a new grassroots capitalism took over.

The regime, however, did not approve the changes - obviously on assumption that these trends would eventually undermine the government’s control. Authorities staged occasional crackdowns on market activities, though those crackdowns seldom had any lasting impact: people had to survive somehow, and officials were only too willing to ignore the deviations if they were paid sufficient bribes.

By 2002 it seemed as if the government itself decided to bow to the pressure. In July that year, the Industrial Management Improvement Measures (never called “reforms”, since the word has always been a term of abuse in Pyongyang’s official vocabulary) decriminalized much market activity and introduced some changes in the industrial management system - very moderate and somewhat akin to the half-hearted Soviet “reforms” of the 1960s and 1970s.

The 2002 measures were widely hailed overseas as a sign of welcome changes: many Pyongyang sympathizers, especially from among the South Korean Left, still believe that only pressure from the “US imperialists” prevents Kim Jong-il and his entourage from embracing Chinese-style reforms. In fact, the 2002 measures were not that revolutionary: with few exceptions, the government simply gave belated approval to activities that had been going on for years and which the regime could not eradicate (even though it had tried a number of times). Nonetheless, this was clearly a sign of government’s willingness to accept what it could not redo.

However, around 2004 observers began to notice signs of policy reversal: the regime began to crack down on the new, dangerously liberal, activities of its subjects. By 2005, it became clear: the government wanted to turn the clock back, restoring the system that existed before the collapse of the 1990s. In other words, Kim Jong-il’s government spent the recent three of four years attempting to re-Stalinize the country.

This policy might be ruinous economically, but politically it makes perfect sense. It seems that North Korean leaders believe that their system cannot survive major liberalization. They might be correct in their pessimism. The country faces a choice that is unknown to China or Vietnam, two model nations of the post-Communist reform. It is the existence of South Korea that creates the major difference.

Unlike China or Vietnam, North Korea borders a rich and free country that speaks the same language and shares the same culture. The people of China and Vietnam, though well aware of the West’s affluence, do not see it as directly relevant to their problems: the United States and Japan surely are rich, but they are also foreign so their experiences are not directly relevant. But for the North Koreans, the comparison with South Korea hurts. Even according conservative estimates, per capita gross national income in the South is 17 times the level it is in the North; to put things in comparison, just before the Germany’s unification, per capita GNI in West Germany was roughly double that in East Germany.

Were North Korea to reform, the disparities with South Korea would become only starker to its population. This might produce a grave political crisis, so the North Korean government seemingly believes that in order to stay in control it should avoid any tampering with the system. Maintaining the information blockade is of special importance, since access to the overseas information might easily show the North Koreans both the backwardness of their country and the ineptitude of their government.

At the same time, from around 2002 the amount of foreign aid began to increase. The South Korean government, following the so-called Sunshine policy, began to provide generous and essentially unmonitored aid to Pyongyang. China did this as well. Both countries cited humanitarian concerns, even though it seems that the major driving force was the desire to avoid a dramatic and perhaps violent collapse of the North Korean state.

Whatever the reasons, North Korea’s leaders came to assume that their neighbors’ aid would save the country from the worst of famine. They also assumed that this aid, being delivered more or less unconditionally, could be quietly diverted for distribution among the politically valuable parts of the population - such as the military or the police, and this would further increase regime’s internal security.

So, backward movement began. In October 2005, Pyongyang stated that the Public Distribution System would be fully re-started, and it outlawed the sale of grain on the market (the ban has not been thoroughly enforced, thanks to endemic police corruption). Soon afterwards, came regulations prohibited males from trading at markets: the activities should be left only to the women or handicapped. The message was clear: able-bodied people should now go back to where they belong, to the factories of the old-style Stalinist economy.

There have been crackdowns on mobiles phones, and the border control was stepped up. There have been efforts to re-enforce the old prohibition of unauthorized travel. In short, using newly available resources, North Korea’s leaders do not rush to reform themselves, but rather try to turn clock back, restoring the social structure of the 1980s.

The recent changes indicate that this policy continues. From December only sufficiently old ladies are allowed to trade: in order to sell goods at the market a woman has to be at least 50 years old. This means that young and middle-aged women are pushed back to the government factories. Unlike earlier ban on commercial activity on men, this might have grave social consequences: since the revival of the markets in the mid-1990s, women constituted the vast number of vendors, and in most cases it was their earnings that made a family’s survival possible while men still chose to attend the idle factories and other official workplaces.

Other measures aim at reducing opportunities for market trade. In December, the amount of grain that can be moved by an individual was limited to ten kilograms. To facilitate control, some markets were ordered to close all but one gate and make sure that fences are high enough to prevent scaling.

Vendors do what they can to counter these measures. One trick is to use a sufficiently old woman as a figurehead for a family business. The real work is done by a younger woman, usually daughter or daughter-in-law of the nominal vendor, but in case of a police check the actual vendor can always argue that she is merely helping her old mother. Another trick is to trade outside the marketplace, on the streets. This uncontrolled trade often attracts police crackdowns, so vendors avoid times when they can be seen by officials going to their offices.

This autumn in Pyongyang there was an attempt, the first of this kind in years, to prescribe maximum prices of items sold in markets. Large price tables were displayed, and vendors were forbidden to sell goods (largely fish) at an “excessive price”. It was also reported that new regulations limit to 15 the number of items to be sold at one stall.

The government does not forget about other kinds of commercial activities. In recent years, private inns, eateries, and even bus companies began to appear in large numbers. In many cases these companies are thinly disguised as “government enterprises” or, more frequently, as “joint ventures” (many North Korean entrepreneurs have relatives in China and can easily persuade them to pose as investors and sign necessary papers).

Recently a number of such businesses were closed down by police. People were told that the roots of evil capitalism had to be destroyed, so every North Korean can enjoy a happy life working at a proper factory for the common good.

Yet even as the government pushes people back to the state sector of the economy, These new restrictions have little to do with attempts to revive production. A majority of North Korean factories have effectively died and in many cases cannot be re-started without massive investment - which is unlikely to arrive; investors are not much interested in factories where technology and equipment has sometimes remained unchanged since the 1930s.

However, in North Korea the surveillance and indoctrination system has always been centered around work units. Society used to operate on the assumption that every adult Korean male (and most females as well) had a “proper” job with some state-run facility. So, people are now sent back not so much to the production lines than to indoctrination sessions and the watchful eyes of police informers, and away from subversive rumors and dangerous temptations of the marketplace.

At the same time, border security has been stepped up. This has led to a dramatic decline in numbers of North Korean refugees crossing to China (from some 200,000 in 2000 to merely 30,000-40,000 at present). The authorities have said they will treat the border-crossers with greater severity, reviving the harsh approach that was quietly abandoned around 1996. In the 1970s and 1980s under Kim Il-sung, any North Korean trying to cross to China or who was extradited by the Chinese police would be sent to prison for few years.

More recently, the majority of caught border-crossers spent only few weeks in detention. The government says such leniency will soon end. Obviously, this combination of threats, improved surveillance and tighter border control has been effective.

The government is also trying to restore its control of information. Police recently raided and closed a number of video shops and karaoke clubs. Authorities are worried that these outlets can be used to propagate foreign (especially South Korean) pop culture. Selling, copying and watching South Korean video tapes or DVDs remain a serious crime, even though such “subversive materials” still can be obtained easily.

It is clear that North Korean leaders, seeking to resume control that slipped from them in the 1990s and early 2000s, are not concerned if the new measures damage the economy or people’s living standards when set against the threat to their own political domination and perhaps even their own physical survival.

Manifold obstacles nevertheless stand in the way of a revival of North Korean Stalinism.

First, large investment is needed to restart the economy and also - an important if underestimated factor - a sufficient number of true believers ready to make a sacrifice for the ideal. When the North Korean regime was developed in the 1940s and 1950s it had Soviet grants, an economic base left from the days of Japanese investment and a number of devoted zealots. The regime now has none of these. Foreign aid is barely enough to feed the population, and the country’s bureaucrats are extremely cynical about the official ideology.

Second, North Korea society is much changed. Common people have learned that they can survive without relying on rations and giveaways from the government. It will be a gross oversimplification to believe that all North Koreans prefer the relative freedoms of recent years to the grotesquely regimented but stable and predictable existence of the bygone era, but it seems that socially active people do feel that way and do not want to go back. Endemic corruption also constitutes a major obstacle: officials will be willing to ignore all regulations if they see a chance to enrich themselves.

It is telling that government could not carry out its 2005 promise to fully restart the public distribution (rationing) system. Now full rations are given only to residents of major cities while others receive reduced rations that are below the survival level. A related attempt to ban trade in grain at markets also failed: both popular pressure and police inclination to take bribes undermined the policy, so that grain is still traded openly at markets.

Even so, whether the government will succeed in re-Stalinizing society, its true intent remains the revival of the old system. North Korean leaders do not want reforms, assuming that these reforms will undermine their power. They are probably correct in this assumption.

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/10/2008

It was confirmed that the customs director of the city of Hoiryeong in North Hamkyung province was arrested last December for alleged corruption.

Multiple sources in Hoiryeong reported on the 8th that “The customs director of Hoiryeong was arrested at the end of last December on suspicion of assisting in the drug trade with China. It is known that a large sum of U.S. dollars was found in the customs director’s house.”

A source in North Korea reported through a phone call that, “The arrested customs director regulated small-scale merchants heavily and gave benefits to a couple of merchants who regularly gave bribes. Ultimately, the result was that access to commercial licenses in Hoiryeong was limited to the merchants who dominated the jangmadang.

Hoiryeong is one of the major crossing points along the North Korea-China border. Recently, cases of extortion in which the customs director demanded bribes in exchange for not confiscating goods were on the rise. Criticism had been rising.

The outcry from Korean-Chinese who regularly visit relatives in North Korea has been especially loud. Customs officers have required bribes from the Korean-Chinese who visit North Korea to deliver food, clothing, medicine, and daily necessities claiming them as customs fees. Such actions have become commonplace. (more…)

Good Friends claims that a prestigious local politician has been executed for his bourgeois lifestyle…

(excerpt)  A cooperative farm chief who was once honoured by North Korea’s founding president has been publicly executed for starting a private farm to support his luxurious lifestyle, a South Korean aid group said Thursday.

The unidentified man — said to be a member of the national legislature — and two colleagues were put to death by firing squad on December 5 in Pyongsong City, 30 kilometres (20 miles) north of Pyongyang, the Good Friends group quoted sources as saying.

The farm chief, his accountant and the local county’s party secretary were accused of selling produce from an unauthorised farming operation to lead a luxurious lifestyle, said a newsletter from the group which provides aid to the hardline communist state.

The farm chief was accused of failing to register 196 acres (79 hectares) of farmland that had been cultivated over the past decade. He allegedly fed retired soldiers with the produce and used them as his private bodyguards.

The man “acted like a king” in Mundok County and had been deemed untouchable because of his status and the gang of retired soldiers who followed him everywhere, Good Friends said.

All those put to death were said to have lived in upmarket two-storey homes and driven illicit cars.

Read the whole story in the AFP here
1/3/2008

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
12/11/2007

Several sources in China have relayed that it is rumored North Korean authorities are planning to take extreme measures to prevent the sale of industrial products at the jangmadang (markets) next year.

One Chinese merchant, whom DailyNK met in Dandong, China on the 6th, said, “Rumors are circulating that a measure preventing all kinds of Industrial products from being sold in the jangmadang will be implemented next year, making Chinese merchants involved in trade between North Korea and China nervous.”

He informed that “In place of industrial products, only farm produce from the fields of homeowners will be allowed to sell in the jangmadang. Marine products that up to now have been selling in the jangmadang will only be made available at appointed marine shops, meat products at food shops, and industrial products at state operated stores.”

The Chinese source also maintained that, “There are quite a few overseas Chinese who, not knowing what will happen, have bought loads of industrial products with the idea that this might be their last chance, and they have brought them into the North.”

The North Korean authorities began unfolding a series of market regulations immediately following the Inter-Korea Summit in October. These included such policies as limiting the types of items for sale and imposing a minimum age limit on female merchants. However, limiting the sale of industrial products themselves, after having abolished permanent markets, can be seen as a means of returning to “agricultural markets,” where farmers traded only vegetables and a surplus of produce.

According to other Chinese merchants with whom DailyNK met in Dandong on the 3rd, “Under the name of the North Pyongan Party Committee in Shinuiju, a three-day meeting was held between the Secretaries of the Party and of the Army and enterprise managers, from November 20th to the 22nd.”

They informed that “The meeting was held to discuss whether to prohibit jangmadang operations and put people who have been trading in the market to work at enterprises or factories, since regular provisions will resume starting next year.”

The recent efforts to regulate the markets have been analyzed as means to revert the standard of societal regulation to that of the pre-90s by restoring the provision system and normalizing factory operations. However, such an extreme measure is likely to give rise to serious civilian opposition, so there are doubts as to whether or not it can be realized.

The North Korean civilians, before the mid-90s, relied on a complete provision system supplied by the State, which included the provision of goods such as soap, clothes and other necessities. However, after the food shortage, the national provision system completely collapsed. As a result, civilians began acquiring most necessities, goods and food items through the jangmadang.

However, agricultural markets, where miscellaneous cereals, vegetables and other agricultural items raised in home gardens were traded, existed around the time when North Korea’s provision system was in normal operation.

Following the execution of the “July 1st Economic Management Improvement Measure” of 2002, the North Korean government established general markets which brought simple agricultural markets out in the open in February 2003. Since then, individuals leasing stands from the city mercantile department have been able to sell all kinds of industrial products as well.

One source in Chongjin stated in a phone conversation on the 6th regarding the recent rumors, “If the sources are Chinese merchants, than the rumor is not likely groundless. A majority of citizens sustain their livelihoods through the jangmadang.”

He agreed that “It is highly feasible that measures to toughen the regulation of industrial products in the market will be executed.”

Institute of Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-12-5-1
12/11/2007

North Korean authorities are increasing market regulation. Beginning December 1st, women under the age of 49 were prohibited from running businesses in Pyongyang. Age restrictions were placed on female merchants since the inter-Korean summit meeting in October, at first prohibiting those 39 years and under, but now includes anyone under the age of 49.

In North Korea, because males are officially required to be at their assigned workplace, women generally run the businesses. However, market regulations started being enforced in order to eradicate South Korean dramas, movies, and other so-called non-socialist elements from the marketplace.

According to the results from a Daily NK survey on the present state of the North Korean marketplace, although market activity has slowed, these new regulations are not being enforced aggressively outside of the cities, and businesses still continue to operate because the regulation officers are receptive to bribes.

Also, because of the direct link between business regulations and the issue of making a living, citizens’ voices of opposition are getting louder than ever. Let us explore the present state of the North Korean marketplace.

Although not an exact statistic, it seems that there are roughly two to four marketplaces within a city. In the case of the most-populated city, Pyongyang (19 districts), there is a marketplace in every district. Tongil-geori has two because of its large population. In Sinuiju, the bridgehead of trade between North Korea and China, there is one in South Sinuiju, and three in Sinuiju itself (Chaeha, Namjung, and Dongseo [The Peace Market]). In North Korea’s second largest city after Pyongyang, Chungjin, there are two marketplaces in the larger districts. In the case of counties, there is a town marketplace, and one to two smaller farmers’ markets.

The marketplace is generally active, except during the rice-planting and harvest period. However, it has become very stagnant recently due to the enforcement of restrictive measures like price regulations and age restrictions on merchants. For instance, in Pyongyang, there used to be around 50-60 merchants in one area, but now there are only 7 or 8. Now, It is that much more difficult to find good products at the market.

Stallholders’ daily earnings differ depending on their products. In the case of agricultural goods, merchants earn an average of 3,000 won per day, and around 5,000-6,000 won per day for marine products. Merchants who sell manufactured goods could make around 10,000 won.

In addition to the age restrictions, there are increasing measures regulating products sold at the marketplace. There are officers who patrol the marketplace enforcing regulations. Outside the marketplace, safety officers regulate the businesses. The level of control depends on the person, but if bribes are given, they tend to slack off.

With exception of large cities in North Hamkyong Province such as Hoeryeong, Musan, and Chungjin, market activity remains ‘business as usual’ in smaller cities and counties, despite the regulations.

Because everyone knows each other in small cities and counties, it is not possible for the regulations to be strictly enforced. Moreover, even in main cities, there are many merchants under the age of 40 who carry out their business, and if they are not able to in the marketplace, they are still able to sell products in alleys and other locations.

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
12/7/2007

In North Korea nowadays, individual-use PCs concentrated in Pyongyang and Chongjin, Shinuiju and other large-size cities have been gradually increasing. The trend has been rapidly increasing due to the propagation of computers by North Korean party organizations, the administrative committee office and middle schools.

The computerized citizen registration project by the North Korean village office was completed around the Local People’s Assembly representative elections last July.

A source from Shinuiju, North Pyungan said in a phone conversation with DailyNK on the 5th, “Provincial organizations and the village office are taking on computer-based projects. Large-city wealthy people are also acquiring computers left and right due to their children’s education.”

The new-rich class, who have made huge profits from recent trade with China, believe gradually that “The outer society cannot do anything without computers. Our children have to learn computers, too, to not get behind.”

A majority of computers provided to North Korea are Chinese and South Korean-made and have entered through official trade with North Korea, but a portion has been going through smuggling. South Korean computers, with the exception of Korean software, are permitted. North Korea uses North Korean word processors, such as “Dangun” and “Changduk.”

A portion of the upper-class use the new model computers smuggled from China, but a majority use secondhand Pentium IV-processor or below imported from China. In North Korea’s Shinuiju, a computer (Pentium II) which includes a used CTR monitor is 100~120 dollars and a computer which includes LCD monitor is 300 dollars. The offering price for a used laptop is around 300 dollars.

He said, “People cannot connect to the internet via computers, but can use most programs set up on computers. The resident registration computerization project has been completed and in Pyongyang, networks between libraries are in operation.”

North Korea is the single country in the world that is not connected to an internet cable network. North Korea, while being endowed with the national domain suffix, “kp”, does not operate a domain. People cannot use internet, but can use software programs set up on individual computers such as MS-Word, Excel, and Photoshop.

In North Korea, after 2000, the import of used and new computers from China, Japan, and South Korea through individuals and companies increased dramatically. Around 2001, around 2,000 Samsung, LG and TriGem Computer were provided to North Korea’s main colleges such as Kim Il Sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology.

Mr. Kim said, “Chosun (North Korea) people prefer LCD monitors, not CTR monitors. Computers that have been coming in North Korea are mostly made in China and South Korean computers such as Samsung, LG, and TriGem Computer have been widely distributed as well.”

Electronic Publications Service using Domestic Network Possible

North Korea prohibits internet, so computer education mostly focused on program usage are taught in colleges and high schools. In schools for the gifted and college computer majors nationwide, a new generation of software developers is being nurtured.

Major organizations in the area of software development are Chosun (North Korea) Computer Center (KCC), Pyongyang Program Center, and the Academy of Sciences.

Since 2002, North Korea has created a network connecting the libraries of Grand People’s Study House, Kim Il Sung University, and Kim Chaek University of Technology. The network has been expanded throughout Pyongyang and the provinces. Currently, a few high officials in Pyongyang can use reportedly the Grand People’s Study House’s electronic publications service at home.

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
12/4/2007

An internal source conveyed on the 30th that due to an extreme decree which prohibits all sales of medical goods, the suffering of citizens has been increasing.

The source maintained that “In August, the sale of medical products was banned, and by the start of anti-socialism inspections in September, no medical products could be found in the jangmadang.”

The North Korean authorities have long since stated its position in prohibiting the sale of medical goods, saying that the sale of medical goods in the jangmadang is a show of democracy that undermines the national medical system. However, regulations usually never went beyond formalities.

Recently, however, anti-socialism inspections have been conducted on a large-scale in Yankang with the theme of “Abolishing capitalist trends in the market.” Medical products, which are mostly from China and South Korea, have been regulated more aggressively. Some have said that the authorities have strengthened regulations due to frequent incidences involving Chinese sub-standard medical products.”

With the harbinger of regulation of medical products, pharmaceutical vendors have sold medical products to their acquaintances on a limited basis. The price has increased significantly as well. Chinese-made aspirin, “Zhengtongbian”, which costs 20 North Korean won per pill, has hiked up to 30 won. A bottle of anti-diarrhea medicine has increased from 150 won to 300 won and penicillin from 120 to 200 won.

Especially the smuggling of Electrolyte Solution, used in IV’s to hydrate hospital patients, has stopped due to regulations, causing a jump in price.

From mid-August to the end of October, the anti-socialism inspections in Hyesan, Yankang were cooperatively conducted by the central Party, the Prosecutor’s Office, the National Security Agency and the People’s Safety Agency. Along with the strict regulation of cell phones, the market, and capitalist “corruption,” the medical goods ban has cast a heavy burden on the civilians.

“Good Friends” reported in October that “Thirty people have been incarcerated as a result of the anti-socialism inspections in Yankang since mid-August, and regulations have tightened.”

When the sale of medical products completely ceased in the markets, citizens and doctors who must treat their patients have been extremely disgruntled.

The source said, “People have to go to the homes of pharmacists in order to buy medicine, but they cannot if the pharmacists do not know them personally. The price has increased dramatically due to the regulations of medicinal products.”

“Even hospitals do not carry medicine and there is no way to procure them, even at doctors’ request.” Doctors have complained, saying “Are we supposed to just sit by and watch the sick people?”

A majority of medical products that could be found in the markets were Chinese-made contraband goods. In some cases, Party leaders or army hospital leaders have illegally procured medicine as well.

The source commented that when civilian discontent rose, the Party Municipal Committee explained the cause of the cease in sale of medical goods as, “In a socialist society, hospitals have guaranteed medical goods, but during this temporary time of suffering, some immoral people have hoarded the national medical supply and are making a profit.”

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
12/3/2007

The North Korean authorities are intensifying efforts to crack down corruption and embezzlement prevalent among party cadres.

Lim Sang Il (pseudonym, 43), a native of Pyongyang, said, “The state excommunicated and dismissed both the chief secretary of the Party in the Daedonggang district and the head of the foreign currency-making activity organization. They were found to have embezzled money earned from cocoon business for the past ten years.” Mr. Lim, currently staying in Dangdong, China visiting relatives, said, “Words are circulating around that they extorted over 10 million dollars.”

Mr. Lim said, “The factory manager of the Sangwon Cement Complex located near Pyongyang took his life when he heard the news that he was suspected of corruption and the state inspection group against anti-socialist trends was about to come down to see him for inspection.”

“This manager was notorious for corruption. For years, he had extorted money from the factory and used it for his own use,” Mr. Lim said. “It was widely gossiped that this man killed himself because he knew that his would receive capital punishment considering the severity of his corruption.”

A source from Sinuiju in North Pyongan said in a phone conversation with DailyNK on the 28th of November, “The chief secretary of the local Party in Woonjeon, North Pyongan Province, was expulsed from the party and fired from his job after he was found to have extorted money allocated for public construction works.”

“There are constructions going on in Woonjeon, tearing down old houses and building new ones,” the source said, “However, no one has ever asked people’s permission for constructions in the first place and provided temporary housing for people until the completion of construction works, and that, of course, angered many people.”

“All of a sudden, those without money ended up being homeless whereas those with money became able to purchase two to three houses at affordable price,” said the source.

“Expressing their anger aggregated over time, the local people led by the old directly sent a written protest to the central Party and filed a complaint,” the source said. “After all, the inspection group had to come down to Woonjeun and dismissed the chief secretary of the local Party and head prosecutor.”

“The inspection group discovered that these men were hiding a significant amount of money in their houses,” the source said. “It was so much that the inspectors couldn’t count the money and had to weigh stacks of bills in the scales.”

“Conspiring with the construction manager, the chief secretary accumulated money by overpricing construction materials and selling newly constructed houses,” said the source. “The head prosecutor accepted huge bribe on condition that he should turn down pouring complaints and contesting reports from the locals.”

In regard to the recent incident where some machinery from the Suncheon Vinylon Complex was smuggled to China, the state has dismissed many high-ranking officials implicated in the smuggling such as the chief secretary of South Pyongan Province, the chief secretary of the local Party in Suncheon, the city’s public prosecutor, and director of safety agency and foreign-currency making organization of the city.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 07-11-27-1
11/27/2007

Following Kim Jong Il’s August 26 announcement that, “Markets have become anti-Socialist Western-style markets,” measures to increase restrictions on markets across North Korea have also restricted individuals’ ability to migrate.

The Central Committee of the (North) Korean Workers’ Party released a statement in October, revealing that Kim Jong Il had stated, “The current state of anti-socialism should not be moderately opposed. A strong and concentrated attack must be laid out in order to thoroughly eliminate [this anti-socialist behavior].”

According to the Daily NK, an informant inside North Korea revealed that authorities are “contacting people who have applied for permission to travel to other regions at their trip destination and setting up interviews in order to verify that interviewees are conforming with their [stated] intentions,” and, “ultimately, long distance wholesalers are restricted in their movements, cause a reduction in the amount of goods circulating on the markets.”

Good Friends, a South Korean NGO for North Korean aid, also reported, “In North Hamgyung Province, if someone is absent from work for two days or not seen in their neighborhood, that person’s actions are carefully investigated,” and, “if someone does not check out, each of their family members are called in for interrogation.”

After the ‘Arduous March’, as market activity grew in North Korea, the number of whole-saling ‘middle-men’ grew considerably. These traders received travel permits by applying under the guise of visiting authorities, family matters, special occasions, or other personal reasons. Long-distance traders need a travel permit. In order to get such a permit, cash or goods were frequently offered as bribes.

Now, as it is becoming more difficult to receive travel documents, not only long-distance traders but also even normal vacationers are facing growing difficulties. In particular, people who need to travel to China for family visits are especially worried due to the increasingly strict issuance of travel permits.

The insider reported, “As markets grow, because wholesalers are gaining power as they make large amounts of money, authorities seem to be strongly restraining them,” and “if a wholesaler is caught, his goods are taken, leading to difficulties for market traders.”

According to a North Korean defector in the South with access to DPRK information, university students in Pyongyang are also being subjected to increasingly strict personnel inspections and restrictions. Even when they go to the library, they must fill out an exit record and can only remain out for one day before student leaders pay a visit to their home.

Students not strictly obeying school policies have their bags and pockets searched while being put under investigation and being further restricted. Of course, in the past, as well, students with problems faced inspections of their dormitory or personal goods, but recently, inspections of even everyday students are on the rise.