North Korean Economy Watch

Lankov writes in the Asia Times:

In early March, the United States State Department made a statement that attracted surprisingly little attention worldwide, estimating that government-sponsored narcotic production in North Korea seemed to have decreased considerably. At the same time, the statement made clear that the private production of drugs was on the rise.

This fits with what the present author has heard recently – often from sources inside North Korea; it seems that North Korea’s drug industry is changing, and this change might have important consequences for the outside world.

The story of North Korea’s involvement with the international narcotics trade began 35 years ago. In 1976, Norwegian police intercepted a large shipment of hashish in the luggage of North Korean diplomats. The same year, another group of North Korean officials was found in possession of the same drug by Egyptian customs; they had 400 kilograms of hashish in their luggage.

In both cases, diplomatic passports saved them from any formal investigation. Next year, North Korean diplomats were caught trying to smuggle drugs into Venezuela and India. In India, quite friendly to North Korea in those days, the 15 kgs of hashish was transported by the ambassador’s secretary. After that, such seizures became regular occurrences, usually once every year or two, and usually involving North Korean diplomats.

North Korea’s narcotics program has always appeared strange to outside observers – “strange” even if judged by the standards of Pyongyang, whose leaders do not care much about legal niceties and international reputation, and perceive international politics as a cut-throat, zero-sum game. On balance, state-sponsored drug production has done much more harm than good to Pyongyang.

Available estimates agree that the North Korean government didn’t earn much from pedaling illicit drugs. It is even possible that these risky operations were largely waged to sustain North Korean missions overseas – from the mid-1970s such missions were required to pay for their own expenses.

At the same time, the existence of this program inflicted serious damage on Pyongyang’s international standing, which was at rock-bottom anyway. Despite all denials of official involvement, the program could not really be hidden because seizures of narcotics carried by North Korean diplomats and officials happened far too often and sometimes in countries that were relatively sympathetic to the North.

So, if analysts at the State Department are to be believed, North Korea seems to have come to its senses and stopped or, more likely, significantly reduced its narcotics production. Indeed, this program seems to belong to the strange and slightly bizarre world of the foreign policy of North Korea in the 1970s. After all, those were the times when North Korean agents were busy kidnapping Japanese teenagers to become living tools for the training of agents (and when US$200 million was spent propagating the juche(self-reliance) ideology in the Third World).

However, this doesn’t mean the world should heave a collective sigh of relief and write off North Korea as a potential source of dangerous narcotics. If anything, the situation has become worse over the past five to six years. But this time, the North Korean regime seems to have little or no responsibility for the new boom in drug production.

The change in the North Korean drug industry essentially mirrors the wider changes that in the past two decades have occurred in the North Korean economy and society at large. The state-run Stalinist economy essentially collapsed whilst private business took over – usually unrecognized by the state, technically illegal in most cases, completely absent from official statistics, but powerful nonetheless. This happened in all industries, and drugs production was not an exception.

The author interacts with North Koreans quite frequently and most of my contacts are people from the northernmost part of the country, from areas adjacent to the Chinese border. They are unanimous: around 2005 to 2006, these areas experienced a sudden and dramatic upsurge in drug usage, hitherto almost unknown to the common public.

It’s true that some opium productive capacity existed in the northeastern parts of Korea since the early 1900s. This is also the region where secret state-run plantations were rumored to be located in the 1980s or early 1990s. However, in the North Korea of the Kim Il-sung era, surveillance was tight and exceptionally efficient, so drug problems were for all practical purposes non-existent within the country. The drugs were produced for export and medical purposes only.

Things began to change around 2005; by that time North Korea had undergone what is usually described as “grassroots capitalism” or “marketization from below”. The old state-run economy had come to a complete standstill, so most North Koreans started to make a living through all sorts of private economic activities – from cultivating private fields and working at private workshops to smuggling.

Official corruption became endemic, so officials became more than willing to turn a blind eye to all sorts of illegal activities as long as they received their cut. Arguably, North Korea nowadays might be described as the most corrupt country of East Asia: every interaction with authorities requires payment, and if the payment is sufficient, almost everything is possible.

This social and economic situation has made the large-scale private production of drugs possible. The new North Korean drug scene is dominated by “Ice” (crystal meth), a synthetic substance produced in numerous small workshops. It is frequently mentioned by defectors, while references to other drugs are quite rare.

Most of my North Korean interlocutors, some former Korean People’s Army officers, believe that methamphetamines were initially produced officially, but not so much as a drug in the strict sense, rather as a stimulant for elite military units. This seems to be plausible – after all, it was used as such during World War II by both the Axis and the Allies.

However, after around 2005 private production of Ice began and soon became large-scale. There are rumors about occasional state involvement with illicit production of drugs for export, but even if those rumors are true, the state-sponsored labs clearly produce only a small fraction of the total. Most of the labs are private nowadays.

Raw materials are often imported from China, and China has also become a major market for North Korean drug manufacturers. Since law-enforcement in North Korea is so lax (at least when no political issues are involved), it is easier and safer to run a drug workshop there, on the southern banks of the Tumen River.

The Ice-producing labs are difficult to hide since the production is smelly. Usually, such labs operate at some distance from living quarters, somewhere in the mountains or at a non-operational factory. (Admittedly, such factories are not in short supply in post-crisis North Korea).

In many cases, there are joint operations of Chinese and North Korean criminal groups: the Chinese provide the necessary supplies while the North Koreans use their territory as a safe haven to process drugs that are later shipped to China.

However, some narcotics remain in North Korea, where drug usage has increased dramatically. My interviewees say that at least in the cities of the borderlands a significant proportion of younger people have had some experience with Ice. A schoolteacher from a borderland city of Musan recently told me that in 2008-09 most of the students in their final years of high school tried Ice.

But the problem is not limited to the borderlands. A few months ago, a colleague of mine whilst visiting a prestigious college in Pyongyang spotted a poster that warned Pyongyang students about the dangers of drug use. Merely a few years ago, such a poster would be both unthinkable and unnecessary.

It seems this development has begun to worry the Chinese. In the past few years, Chinese media occasionally write about crackdowns on drug dealers in China’s northeast, often explicitly mentioning their Korean connection. Last summer, Chinese media reported that a fleet of high-speed boats, operated by the Chinese police, had begun to patrol the rivers on the border with North Korea. The task of this squad is specifically to fight drug smuggling.

The “new” North Korean drug problem is relatively local and small in scale, although it might have sufficiently grave consequences for North Korea itself, as well as for some adjacent areas of China and Russia. It also might be seen as an indication of a new type of problem that North Korea might create.

In the past, most troubles related to North Korea were caused by the North Korean government that demonstrated an inclination to flout international laws and conventions (sometimes this inclination was strengthened by remarkable adventurism). Nowadays, problems are increasingly caused by the inability of this government to control what is happening in the country – at least outside of Pyongyang and some major cities. In the long run, the lawlessness of uncontrolled private profiteers might prove more dangerous than the Machiavellian adventurism of dictators.

Read the full story here:
Narco-capitalism grips North Korea
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
3/18/2011

Pictured above: Samsu Dam construction (Google Earth)

According to the Daily NK:

Located at the base of Mt. Nokbong, near Hyesan in Yangkang Province, one particular village of 24 households saw its schools, public facilities and all other vestiges of welfare disappear following the construction of the Samsoo Power Station in 2004, which deprived the area of power.

And yet this village is now overflowing with people. They are here from all over the country, cramming homes and the nearby valley with one purpose in mind; searching for gold. Housewives, workers, university students, farmers, children, drifters, criminals, soldiers and bureaucrats; men and women alike from all different classes are living in this one place with the same aim.

The majority of people dig, without permission from the authorities and with only rudimentary tools. Their only wish is to avoid having to leave town and, hopefully, find some gold. The soldiers and bureaucrats, on the other hand, do not dig, instead using their authority to cream a share of others’ profits.

The daily mission of most people is to dig a hole to extract the ore, take it to the riverside to wash, and then sell it to buy food. With work clothes and a hammer, wash bowl, strong burlap sack, metal bucket, candles, shovel, rope, and a washcloth and drain (with a wooden partition to make it easier to trap gold), they enter the mine.

First the ore has to be dug out of the mine, at which point it can be taken up to the riverbank in the bucket and sprayed with water to remove stones and dirt, then the gold separated off with the washcloth.

Those who get on the wrong side of the bureaucrats or armed forces in this process have their tools confiscated, and any gold they have sweated for as well. Complaint is out of the question. Men who show the slightest resistance are flogged and women sprayed with water and sworn at. For this reason, many people consider bribes of cigarettes or alcohol to be a necessary cost of doing business there.

Those without money enter the mines under the cover of darkness, collect large quantities of dirt and take it away to clean.

As you would expect in these circumstances, accidents are commonplace.

On June 16, 2008, a 39-year old man from Hyesan who had carried more than 200 bags full of soil to the riverbank since dawn finally stopped for lunch, when he heard a cry for help from a person who had tried, and failed, to cross the river. The rescue mission became a tragedy when the man himself drowned.

That particular spot had been used to hunt for gold when the reservoir was dry; but now it was more than 10m underwater. The man, exhausted from hours of backbreaking labor, had been unable to get out. Other people who had been dealing with their own ore nearby tried to save him, but it was no easy task.

The security forces and army eventually combined to retrieve the man two days later. Two days after that, the deceased man’s widow returned to dig for gold on the same riverbank where she had lost both her husband and 9-year old son.

This is just one story that amply demonstrates the heart wrenching reality of life in North Korea. Even to the present day hunger continues to drive people to the foothills of Mt Nokbong. The struggle to survive goes on as ordinary people dig away at the riverbed, all the while hoping to avoid becoming a victim of the regime.

You can read previous posts on the impact of the Samsu Dam here.

Read the full story here:
A Modern Day Gold Rush
Daily NK
Kang Mi-jin
3-15-2011

According to the Daily NK:

This year, the North Korean authorities have been cracking down on the sale and distribution of products, tools and materials coming out of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. As a result, such Korean goods, formerly an expensive but popular choice in Hwanghae and South Pyongan Provinces, are now hard to find in markets.

A source from South Pyongan Province who spoke with The Daily NK in China explained, “Right up until last year, literally anything being made in the Kaesong Complex was available in the market, including clocks, metal, screws, clothes, underwear, toys and parts of electronics. However, the amounts have fallen dramatically since regulations were strengthened.”

The reason behind the regulations is unclear, however; the source suggested it could only be because of deteriorating inter-Korean relations.

Regardless, the source went on, “Nowadays, revealing the fact you sell those Kaesong Complex goods results in high fines and puts you in a bind” Therefore, he went on, “Only bread (Choco Pies), stainless steel or ceramic bowls and underwear are being sold.”

One consequence of the crackdown is that it makes the sale of other South Korean products smuggled in from China equally difficult. Albeit with some provincial differences, clothes and electronics cannot now be displayed on stalls, and must be sold in alley markets in secret.

A source from Shinuiju explained, “Market watch guards go around markets every day inspecting stalls with no notice; their investigation into South Korean products is really severe.” He explained, “If they find goods with Korean writing on, they confiscate them and give them back after two or three days later, after fines have been paid.”

“I hear there was a decree from above reinforcing crackdowns, but won’t this only lead to bribes?” the source pointed out.

Even when readily available, South Korean products are at the top of the price range, so most average families cannot afford them; one Choco Pie, a circular, individually wrapped chocolate cake made famous by the movie “JSA”, is between 180 and 200 won, a set of women’s underwear is 90,000 won, and a set of roughly ten plates, five or six small bowls and some coffee cups is around 250,000 won.

The source reported, “Due to the severe regulations, some traders sell them at home or in secret, hiding the goods behind the curtain.”

Interestingly, one South Korean official with the Kaesong Industrial Complex told the Daily NK that product leakage is not a problem at Kaesong, saying, “There have been almost no cases of complete products leaking out, but it is possible for stock, tools or things provided to workers like Choco Pies. However, the leaks are not enough to affect factory management.

And yet, one defector who used to be a worker in a shoe factory in charge of testing product quality explained that the siphoning off of materials, complete products, tools and other things is common among North Korean workers.

“The way they hide things and bring them out of the factory is really expert. I sometimes put up to 20 pairs of shoes on my body and came out of the factory. If you wear a long, thick winter coat then it is not so remarkable. Sometimes we did it in collusion with the factory manager.”

Read the full story here:
South Korean Products Disappear from Markets
Daily NK
Park Jun Hyeong and Mok Yong Jae
2010-3-10

According to the Choson Ilbo:

The North Korean regime in January launched a new surveillance bureau charged with snooping on its people, Radio Free Asia reported Thursday.

Quoting a source in the city of Hyesan, Ryanggang Province RFA said the bureau, named 118 Sangmu, combines forces from the State Security Department, the Ministry of Public Security, prosecutors’ offices and party organs, in accordance with leader Kim Jong-il’s instructions “to eradicate antisocialist elements.” Senior officials involved are baffled because the new bureau’s tasks overlap with those of an already existing bureau, 109 Sangmu, it claimed.

Since its launch in 2005, 109 Sangmu cracked down on drugs and DVDs of South Korean soap operas. Over recent years, surveillance bodies have mushroomed, including Bureau 27, an agency which monitors mobile phone use under the State Security Department; 111 Sangmu, which cracks down on child beggars; patrol units of the Ministry of Public Security; mobile strike forces; border guard posts under the Civil Defense Department; and worker inspectors.

The proliferation is already causing problems. On Feb. 24, a pitched battle broke out near the border in North Hamgyong Province between border guards and a security patrol over how to handle three smugglers, a man and two women, who were arrested by the patrol after border guards pursued them, RFA quoted another source in the province as saying. “It nearly led to a shoot-out between the two groups,” the source added.

Internal Surveillance Agencies Mushroom in N.Korea
Choson Ilbo
3/4/2010

UPDATE 3 (2/23/2011): According to Yonhap:

A recent survey of North Korean defectors in South Korea showed Wednesday that a large number of them use part of their resettlement money from the government here to help their families in the North.

In the survey conducted in November by the Organization for One Korea, a group run by unification activists, 71 percent of 350 respondents said they have sent money back to the communist country before. About 66 percent of the cash remitters said that they used part of their money received from the South Korean government.

In an effort to buffer the initial costs of resettlement, the government here provides each defector with a subsidy of 6 million won (US$5,330) and partly finances their housing.

More than 20,000 North Korean defectors have arrived in South Korea since the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce. The number does not account for the estimated tens of thousands hiding in China.

According to the survey that had a margin of error of 3.59 percentage points, about half of the cash remitters said brokers took away 30 percent of their money sent to the North as a fee, while only 65 percent believed the remainder was entirely delivered.

North Korean defectors are 17 times likelier to depend on government allowances, according to the Unification Ministry. Over 50 percent of defectors depend on a universal welfare program that pays them about 400,000 won (US$355) a month.

Defections began to accelerate after a massive famine swept through North Korea in the mid-1990s, killing an estimated 2 million people. North Korea considers defectors criminals punishable even by death.

Read previous recent stories about remittances below.
(more…)

Andrei Lankov writes in the Korea Times about the state of the North Korean economy.  Excerpt below:

The existing statistics are remarkably untrustworthy, being essentially educated guesses by analysts. Nonetheless, these statistics indicate a moderate growth of the North Korean economy.

But the present author talks to North Koreans quite frequently. So I don’t need statistics to confirm what becomes clear from my talks with refugees, smugglers, migrant workers and those Koreans who have illegal Chinese mobile phones. Throughout the last ten years the economic situation in the country has improved, even though this improvement was very moderate.

What does “improvement” in this context exactly mean? First of all, few if any North Koreans now face the threat of starvation, though malnourishment remains a widespread problem. Many (perhaps, a majority) of North Koreans don’t have enough to eat in spring. This has a seriously negative impact on their health and is especially bad for children. Nonetheless, unlike the 1990s, it seldom leads to death.

The average North Korean meal is a bowl of boiled corn with a few pickles. Meat or fish are eaten only on special occasions or by affluent people.

Indeed the last decade was a time when material inequality increased in leaps and bounds. Some of the new rich are officials who take advantage of their positions while others are successful entrepreneurs running all kinds of private businesses.

A successful North Korean entrepreneur nowadays might even openly own a car. For instance in a relatively small borderland city with a population of some 90,000 people there are officially three private cars. Much more frequently well-to-do North Koreans prefer to register their cars with state agencies. At any rate, ten years ago a private car was almost unthinkable.

The less successful entrepreneurs or craftsmen are still doing quite well as indicated by significant increase in the number of consumer durables owned by North Koreans. Fifteen years ago a fridge was a sign of exceptional luxury, almost as rare as a private jet in the U.S. Now it’s a bit like a luxury car, an item that 10-20 percent of households can afford.

What is also interesting is the spread of computers, including privately owned ones. In most cases these are old, used computers which are imported or smuggled from China. They are quite outdated but they are computers nonetheless. Recently I interviewed a group of school teachers from the countryside, and they said that nowadays every high school, even in remote parts of the country, is likely to have at least one computer (admittedly, this wonderful contraption is seldom switched on).

This does not mean of course that North Korea has become a consumer paradise. In spite of some improvements, the gap between the North and its successful neighbors continues to widen. However in absolute terms the North Korean economy is not shrinking any more.

There have been serious setbacks, the currency reform early last year is a perfect example. For a while, this failure almost paralyzed the economy and created serious food shortages across the country.

But what brought about this moderate growth? It seems that there are three major contributing factors.

First, North Korea has been quite good at begging and blackmailing the outside world into providing aid. The aid was initially provided by South Korea and the U.S., but now it comes almost exclusively from China.

Second, North Korea’s technocrats have learned how to run the country in its new situation. They are not very efficient at this, but, to quote Marcus Noland, “they are muddling through.”

The present author is inclined to believe that it is the third reason which is the most important of all. Over the last decade a relatively powerful private economy has developed in North Korea. North Koreans did not merely learn how to trade privately, they now produce privately as well and this growth of industry invisibly and privately, seems to have contributed to the growth described above.

The growth is moderate, and no breakthrough is likely. Nonetheless, it is real and palpable.

Read the full story here:
Between myths and facts
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
1/30/2011

Evan Ramstad at the Wall Street Journal: Korea Real Time interviews Marcus Noland:

Only a handful of outside economists spend the enormous time required to delve into the mysteries of North Korea.

Marcus Noland is one of them. With his research and writing partner Stephen Haggard, Mr. Noland has written several books about the North, including a definitive study on the famine that gripped the country from the mid- to late-1990s and resulted in the death of at least 1 million people and perhaps upwards of 2 million.

In a new book published this week, called Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea, Messrs. Noland and Haggard produce the results of interviews they and their researchers conducted with more than 1,600 North Koreans who fled the country. The interviews took place from 2004 to 2008 and involved people who left North Korea as early as 1991.

The book documents the remarkable changes inside the North through the eyes of people who lived through them. Of course, it’s a group that holds negative views of North Korea. But the economists do their best to take that into account.

Mr. Noland, who is based at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, discussed the book with us. Here’s an excerpt of the interview:

WSJ: Most books and studies on North Korea by people outside the country are focused on the nuclear weapons issue and the geopolitics around that. Why have you focused on refugees and the economy?

Mr. Noland: An understudied aspect of the North Korea story, we believe, is the really quite dramatic internal changes that have been going on in North Korea over the last 10 to 20 years. North Korea poses an analytical challenge in that access is limited and the conventional ways that one could go studying a country aren’t available. In this context, the diaspora of refugees leaving the country is an important source of information.

The refugees themselves constitute a first-order crisis. Most of these people, in a clinical setting, would probably be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Their mental health issues appear to be related not only to the difficult circumstances they faced in China but their experiences in North Korea.

WSJ: What is the cause of those stresses?

Mr. Noland: Specifically the loss of family members and family separations associated with the famine. The sense among many of them that they were abandoned in their moment of greatest need. The feeling that they were not given access to international humanitarian aid, which many of them believe was diverted to the military. And the experience of many of them of having been arrested and incarcerated in North Korea’s vast and sprawling penal system.

So the refugees themselves are an issue. They also provide us a window into North Korea.

WSJ: What did you learn from them?

Mr. Noland: Our book addresses three broad issues, which they illuminate.

The first is the underlying economic changes in the country. What we find is the economy has essentially marketized over the last 15 years or so, not as any kind of planned reform but rather as a function of state failure. What is extraordinary is the degree of marketization that the refugees portray when describing their daily lives. They describe a situation in which doing business or engaging in corrupt or illegal activities is increasingly seen as the way to get ahead in North Korea. And positions in the state or the party are still highly desired and seen as a way to get ahead, but not out of patriotism because these positions increasingly provide a platform for extortion of the general population.

Which brings us to the second big theme of the book and that is the criminalization of economic activity and the use of this vast penal system not only for its traditional use as a tool of political intimidation but for economic extortion. What we find is that changes in the North Korean legal code have criminalized vast areas of economic life, the sort of economic life that real people actually lead. In their daily lives, most if not all of North Korea’s non-elites run afoul of some of these statutes, which in effects makes everyone a criminal.

The fact that everyone is running afoul of some statute is combined with the fact that the police are given extraordinary discretion in who they arrest and who they incarcerate and for what period of time. We find that the North Korean penal system has four components. The worst and best known are the long-term political prisons, the North Korean gulag that was set up by Soviet advisors. There’s also a set of institutions that are effectively felony prisons, where you put the murderers and the rapists. Then there are a set of institutions that correspond to misdemeanor jails in other societies. What has developed since the famine period of the 1990s is a fourth set of institutions that have been codified. Those primarily house people who have made economic crimes, such as hiring labor for money or selling things in the market that you’re not supposed to be selling. We go through the enormous expansion of articles in the North Korean legal code to cover these crimes, such as illegally operating a restaurant.

This is a fantastic instrument for extortion. It means if you were engaging in entrepreneurial behavior, the police can come to you and say ‘You’re engaged in illegal activity. We can take you, take your spouse, take your kid and put them in this institution where you know horrible things happen.’ So the penal system not only serves its traditional function as a platform for political corruption but we find it is now a platform for economic predation as well.

We discovered something that we call the ‘market syndrome.’ It is a series of characteristics that seem to be linked with engaging in market activities. People who engage in market activities are 50% more likely to be arrested than their counterparts. They are more likely to harbor more negative appraisals of the regime than their counterparts. And in a society where people are afraid to express their opinions, these guys who are engaged in the market, who have been to jail and been released, are more likely to express their views to others. That is to say that the market is emerging as a kind of semi-autonomous zone of social communication and potentially political organizing. And in that sense, the regime is right to fear the market.

And that brings us to the final theme, and that is the political attitudes of these people and nascent dissent. What we find is people have very negative appraisals of the regime. That’s not surprising. We’re sampling from a group of people that have voted with their feet and one would expect them to have negative views, though we go through fairly elaborate statistical exercises to try to control as best we can for the demographic characteristics of the people we’ve interviewed.

People have very negative views of the regime. They are increasingly disinclined to believe the regime’s meta-narrative, which rationalizes their misery as a function of being held captive by hostile foreign forces. Most of these people hold the government itself as responsible for their plight.

WSJ: You two previously wrote one of the seminal studies on the North Korean famine (Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform), what did the refugees tell you about living through that?

Mr. Noland: Both Steph and I were really struck by was just how the famine experience reverberates. The famine was more than 10 years ago. It ended in 1998. A significant share of the people, I think about a third, reported separation from, or death of, family members during that process. You had people out scavenging to find food. People going to China. Family separation and death of family members just continued to reverberate.

We asked them: ‘Were you aware of the international food aid program?’ The numbers differ in our surveys, but significant numbers of people were unaware of the food aid program. It was astonishing to us.

Then, among the ones who were aware, we asked `Do you believe you were a beneficiary?’ Only a small minority responded yes. And when we run all the regressions, this status of knowing of the existence of the program but believing you were not a beneficiary, this is a profoundly demoralizing experience. These people feel they were abandoned at this time of need, when they were seeing their families and neighbors dying. They believe it’s going to the army and the elites. That group of people, when we run the psychological tests and ask them their views of the regime, this is an embittered group. The effect of that experience is bigger than being in the prisons.

We wrote a book on the famine, so obviously we’re interested in it. But we were surprised and we wouldn’t have guessed that this experience continues to reverberate among the people who lived through it.

Read the full story here:
Marcus Noland on NK’s Refugees and Economy
Wall Street Journal: Korea Real Time
Evan Ramstad
1/12/2011

According to the Choson Ilbo:

The North Korean regime appears to have started a new reign of terror to consolidate the succession of leader Kim Jong-il’s son Jong-un.

The South Korean government and a North Korean source on Wednesday said public executions more than tripled last year. And increasing numbers of North Koreans have been killed trying to cross the Apnok (or Yalu) or Duman (or Tumen) River after the regime gave a shoot-to-kill order. The party and military, meanwhile, are engulfed in a whirlwind of purges, observers believe.

Public Executions

A diplomatic source familiar with North Korean affairs Wednesday said there were 60 confirmed public executions in the North last year, more than triple the number of 2009. “Since last year, the regime has put a notice on bulletin boards warning that those who use Chinese-made mobile phones or illegally circulate dollars face public execution, the source said.

Another source familiar with North Korean affairs said, “It’s rumored that Kim Jong-un has called for ‘gunshots across the country.’ Kim Jong-il did exactly the same thing when he took power.”

Jang Se-yul of the North Korean People’s Liberation Front, a group of former North Korean soldiers and officers who defected to South Korea, said, “In Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province alone last year, at least six people were executed publicly on charges of human trafficking and robbery. People are executed publicly for crimes that would have sent them to prison for just a few years in the past.”

“The number of public executions had gradually dwindled in the North since the famine of the late 1990s,” said International security ambassador Nam Joo-hong. “But since last year, the regime has apparently relied increasingly on public executions to tighten control in the aftermath of the botched currency reform and complaints about the hereditary succession.”

‘Shoot-to-Kill’ Order Against Defectors

Observers believe the regime has issued a shoot-to-kill order against defectors. According to a high-level source in the Changbai region in the Chinese province of Jilin, five North Koreans were shot dead and two others wounded by North Korean border guards on the Chinese side of the border after they crossed the Apnok River on Dec. 14.

And the military is being purged of unreliable elements. Quoting an internal North Korean source last Saturday, Free North Korea Radio, a shortwave broadcaster in the South, said the number of inmates has soared at a labor camp under the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces in North Hamgyong Province. It said many of the inmates are former army generals who have been purged by Kim Jong-un.

The regime’s determination to tighten control is also reflected in the Workers Party’s new regulations, the first for 30 years. The regime recently added a new clause calling for all party members to abide by a new regulation requiring them “to oppose and fight against anti-socialist trends.”

A South Korean intelligence official said the phrase refers to elements of capitalism that have flowed in from South Korea. “The regime has paved the way to publicly execute even people who watch South Korean soap operas or dress in South Korean style, branding them as anti-party elements,” he said.

The Daily NK also reports some personnel changes:

North Korea has been replacing local Party officials with a younger generation since the Chosun Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference on September 28th, in preparation for Kim Jong Eun’s ascent to power.

In particular, North Korea replaced a great many officials in November and December of last year, a source from Chongjin has revealed, bringing in new provincial, municipal, and district institution officials and industrial complex Party committee members to replace those over 60 with people in their 30s and 40s.

The source commented, “After each Party committee’s annual evaluation meeting, the replacement of officials took place,” continuing, “For the stated purpose of raising the quality of the Party to make it a ‘young, vigorous, and ambitious party’, they are replacing aged officials with younger ones. Thus, recently some officials that people wouldn’t know if they tripped over them have been appearing.”

The policy apparently stems from Kim Jong Il, who is pushing the succession process forward relatively swiftly for reasons said to include his own health and North Korea’s external political environment. Of course, it is also a strategic move on the part of Kim Jong Il, to strengthen unity around Kim Jong Eun by bringing in new blood which will henceforth owe a debt of gratitude to him.

According to the source, Party committees organized a one-month short course for such young officials in October of last year, during which instructors dispatched from Pyongyang or the provincial Party center promoted the idea that youth, vigor and ambition, alongside iron loyalty to the dictator, would be necessary tenets of future party operations.

According to the source, officials emphasized during the lecture course, “Obeying Youth Captain Kim Jong Eun and working well are the kind of faithful actions which repay the trust we receive from the General,” and, “Officials need to strengthen the Party, following on from their predecessors.”

Adding detail to the Party reshuffling; the source said that graduates of Communist Colleges older than 60 are being relieved of their positions, and graduates of Kim Il Sung Senior Party College are filling the ranks in behind.

Those who have at least two-year career as secretary of a Party cell can enter a Communist College, a provincial entity managed by the provincial committee of the Party; after graduation they can work on a provincial committee of the Party.

However, Kim Il Sung Senior Party College, the so-called Central Party College, is a more elite institution in Pyongyang charged with fostering the Party’s core workers; it admits officials with a good family background who have been working for more than two years on a provincial committee.

According to North Korean defectors, once one graduates from Central Party College, one is on the road to a comfortable life. For example, in the words of one defector with experience of the system, any North Korean official with access to a vehicle is almost certain to have graduated from Central Party College.

Accordingly, using North Hamkyung Province as an example, people in ‘powerful’ departments like factory guidance units, the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Guidance Department of North Hamkyung Province Party Committee, the Ministry of Administration, factory and industrial complex Party committees (Guidance Department, Officials Department, Propaganda and Agitation Department, Party Member Registration Department and General Affairs Department) have been or are being replaced with graduates from the Central Party School.

Those who are being eased out are either destined for less powerful departments, the source said, citing the Party Inspections Committee or Labor Organization Department, or are being completely removed.

Quoting a common phrase relating to the holding of power, the source said that those about to be replaced are full of regret, saying, “If I had known this would happen, I would have done more to prepare for my future when I had glue on my hands.”

A similar process of replacing officials was conducted in the 1980s, prior to Kim Jong Il’s coming to power. In addition to which, this fits in with the overall propaganda rhetoric, which is justifying Kim Jong Eun’s succession by emphasizing youth and his regime’s concomitant ability to apply technology (CNC etc.) to solve North Korea’s chronic economic shortcomings.

The usual caveats apply.

Read the full story here:
N.Korean Regime Intensifies ‘Reign of Terror’
Choson Ilbo
1/13/2010

Youth, Vigor, Ambition, and Loyalty
Daily NK
Im Jeong Jin
1-12-2011

(Pictured above: Areas in Pyongyang where street stalls have reportedly become more numerous—via Google Earth)

Although we in the west note the proliferation of markets across the DPRK, the Daily NK reminds us that they still lack the institutions of capitalism: security of contract and property, rule of law, etc. According to the article:

Kim Sun Jung, who is a wholesaler in Pyongyang, talked to The Daily NK on Tuesday from the border region in North Korea. She said, “Wives of military officials and general workers should engage in trade in order to get by even in Pyongyang. Those who cannot get a stall in a permanent market (an allowed market, called jangmadang) sell goods in alley markets near the jangmadang, neighborhood alleys or on the banks of the Daedong River, but they always get trouble from PSM agents and community watchmen, who systematically squeeze money and goods from them.”

According to Kim, currently in the center of Pyongyang, the Pyongcheon and Jung districts on the west side of the Daedong River, and the Sunkyo, Dongdaewon and Daedong River districts on the east side, the number of street stalls set up along the river has been increasing greatly.

Traders selling goods along the river are chased every day by agents. If they are caught, they have to pay for the stalls. The cost is the same for a stall in permanent markets, 250 won per stall.

She said that, “In order to avoid paying the 250 won street tax, you often see traders clutching their goods while running this way or that way. Nowadays, agents use cell phones, so it is not so easy to get away.”

Besides the costs for a stall, agents regularly demand meat and alcohol in order to offer them to their cadres including the chairman of the PSM office. If they have not gathered as much as they want through bribes, they confiscate goods and impose fines, around 20,000 or 30,000 won, and offer the excuse that, “Trade is prohibited by those above.”

She said such despotism is directed not only at illegal trade but also at the jangmadang. She explained, “In a permanent market when the chief manager (of the market management office) comes to the site under the pretext of doing an inspection, after collecting as many goods as he wants, he leaves the market without having carried out any inspection.”

In addition, according to sources in the jangmadang, street vendors have been spreading recently. Agents help themselves to food and alcohol there without paying. The street vendors sell pork and alcohol until 11 in the evening and after agents eat there, they leave saying only, “Comrade, trade well.”

Lee Ok Rim, who sells goods in a market in Pyongsung, South Pyongan Province, explained another type of extortion, “Even though the authorities have been strictly monitoring the sale of South Korean goods, traders cannot give them up because they’re good. Accordingly, agents take advantage of this situation: they will confiscate all South Korean goods through a sudden crackdown, and then a few days later, if they get tens of thousands of won in fines, they give the goods back to the traders.”

She explained, “When wholesalers who smuggle South Korean goods through Shinuiju are caught, they must pay 100,000 won as a fine.” Once wholesalers are caught, they make the acquaintance of the agent in charge, offer bribes regularly, and then will not have any further problems in supplying South Korean goods. For agents who are in charge of monitoring wholesalers, this is a big business, so they generally put a lot of work into monitoring them because the scale of regular bribes from wholesalers is huge.”

Therefore, traders openly say that, “Agents are much higher than secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party,” according to Lee.

Read the full story here:
Bribery and Extortion Are Common in North Korean Commerce
Daily NK
Shin Joo Hyun
12/31/2010

According to the Daily NK:

North Korea’s National Security Agency (NSA) is trying to use smugglers to crack down on defectors, an inside source has revealed to The Daily NK.

The source from Yangkang Province told a Daily NK reporter on Tuesday, “The Yangkang provincial NSA office has ordered smugglers investigated recently to report those who cross the river for the purpose of going to South Korea.”

In many border regions, smugglers play the role of brokers in river-crossing defections. As of late November this year, the commission earned by a smuggler for facilitating a river crossing was about 4000 to 6000 Yuan per person. For 500 to 1000 Yuan, the smugglers were willing to convey goods back across the Yalu River, too.

The source said, “About two hundred people convicted of smuggling were called in by the NSA,” explaining that they were told, “If they report river crossers to the NSA, the NSA promised to guarantee their smuggling activities.”

The reason for the new policy, the source also explained, is that “while the government keeps strengthening border controls and orders punishment for river crossers, the number of defections is not decreasing, so they have formulated a new plan. It has met with modest early success; on December 16th, three people who were crossing the Yalu River from Huchang to Changbai (China) were arrested by the NSA.”

However, the source pointed out, “Since some smugglers are cooperating with the NSA now, the number of river crossers might decrease for a while, but it will come back to normal. Those smugglers who report to the NSA will lose customers, and those who don’t will have more.”

Read the full story here:
Smugglers Told to Shop Defectors
Daily NK
Kang Mi Jin
12/24/2010