North Korean Economy Watch

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
10/26/2007

There is a prospect of the rise of “second food crisis” next year because of the flood disaster and the resulting food shortage.

A senior researcher at Korea Rural Economic Institute, Kwon Tae Jin said warningly, “Unless North Korea comes up with a special plan to secure food supply, there will come another food crisis next year, which is as severe as the one in the mid and late 1990s.”

Kwon anticipated that North Korea would need 5.2 million tons of grain for domestic consumption. Unfortunately, it is expected that North Korea would produce around 3.8 million tons of grain. This means there will be a shortage of 1.4 million tons of grain.

The statistics indicates there is a real possibility of a food crisis. North Korean authorities announced that the flood inundated about 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland, which accounts for 14 percent of the country’s farmland. It is estimated that 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland produces at least 500,000 tons of grain.

However, another prospect says that although food shortage is inevitable, it will not lead to mass starvation in North Korea as it did in the mid-1990s. Most of defectors from North Korea said, “Since the mid-2000s, things have changed. There won’t be any serious starvation.” They said that the current situation is different from that of those days under the central food distribution system. They added that the Jangmadang (markets) economy has changed a way for life among North Korea people.

◆ The amount of demand for food is overestimated

It should be double-checked whether North Korea really needs a minimum of 5.2 million tons of grain. There is criticism that the estimate of food demand which was calculated by some South Korean experts on North Korea and relief organizations is unrealistic. It is also pointed out that the estimate is calculated based on the nutrition standard of South Korea.

Defectors said that mass starvation would not have occurred if North Korea had at least a half of 5.2 million tons of grain in the mid 1990s.

Although the international standard for daily nutritional intake is between 2,000 and 2,500 kcal/day, North Korea sets the standard at 1,600 kcal/day, which amounts to 450 grams of grain.

It is easy to estimate the minimum amount of food demand needed in North Korea. Let us say every individual including children and the elderly needs 550 grams of grain per day, which is equal to the daily amount of food distributed to every adult by the state. With the population of 22 million in North Korea, the country then needs 12,100 tons of grain each day and 4.4 million tons of grain per year.

It is known that the North Korean government provides 550 grams of grain for adults and 300 grams for both children and the elderly. According to CIA’s World Fact Book 2004, the population aged between 15 and 64 in North Korea is around 15 million, which accounts for 67.8 percent of total population. This means the population of children and the elderly together reaches about 7 million. If we do the math, we come into conclusion that the amount of food needed in North Korea every year is 3,777,750 tons of grain.

Recall that North Korean people had received the aforementioned amount of food through the state food distribution until early 1990s. Of course, the country did not suffer from mass starvation back then.

The mass starvation during the mid-1990s resulted from huge decrease in food production between 1994 and 1998. In those years, North Korea produced about 2 million tons of grain, which fell far below the needed levels of food production. Hwang Jang Yop, former secretary of the Worker’s Party also testified that in the fall of 2006, while he was still in North Korea, he once heard the secretary of agriculture Seo Kwan Hee worrying about extremely low food production.

Therefore, it is correct to estimate the minimum amount of food needed in North Korea at 3,777,750 tons of grain. If the food production decreases below 3 million tons, then the food prices will skyrocket, and the possibility of mass starvation will be increased.

◆ A New way of life among North Korean people helps prevent them from falling victim to starvation.

North Koran people do not believe in the state authorities any more. The people know that they suffered from horrible starvation because they relied on the state and its food distribution system. During the crisis, many people had desperately waited for food to be distributed until they collapsed and died. Nowadays, North Korean people find a means of living by themselves at Jangmadang.

“There is no free ride” is the words on everybody’s lips in North Korea, which means that everyone must work hard in order to make a living. The lowest class became a day laborer.

The mass starvation of the mid-1990s has brought a significant change into North Korean society. Except a few, most of North Korean people do not rely on the state’s food distribution system. Instead, they have come up with a variety of survival techniques such as engaging in business, illegal trade with China or real estate transactions, receiving support from defected family members, and house sitting.

In that manner, North Korean people make money and use it to buy rice. An affiliate at the Bank of Korea who studies price trends of North Korea said, “Since the adoption of the July 1 Economic Improvement Measure, the price of rice and corn has increased the least.” If the prices go up, people would tighten their belts and decrease their spending on every item except rice. This means they are not that vulnerable to starvation as they used to.

◆ Businessmen are good at securing food.

Recently, a number of rich businessmen have emerged. Some have tens of thousands dollars, and others as many as several million dollars. Groups of Jangmadang businessmen have been organized with these rich businessmen as the leaders.

These businessmen come and go to China as they please and supply food and goods to Jangmadang in North Korea. If the rice price in North Korea is expensive than in China, they buy Chinese rice and sell it at Janmadang. In this way, they help balance supply and demand at the market.

Furthermore, Chinese residents in North Korea and Chinese businessmen also joined the North Korean businessmen as providers at the market. They too sell food produced in China at Jangmadang when food prices go up in North Korea. If possible, they even sell rice reserved for the People’s Army. There was an accusation that the state authorities supplied food aid from overseas for the People’s Army while collecting food produced in North Korea at the same time.

Of course, some businessmen could deliberately keep a hold on food supply anticipating an increase in food prices. However, that kind of unfair activity is temporary. Although it is too early to tell, the “invisible hand” of the market, however small it is, is operating in North Korea and acting as a preventive measure against starvation.

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
10/19/2007

A study reveals that market prices have skyrocketed in North Korea since the massive flood disaster in August.

According to the study conducted by DailyNK in late September this year, the rice price in the northern part of North Korea increased by 500 North Korean won on average between early July and September. In the market in Sinuiju of North Pyongan Province, the rice price rose from 980 Won/kg to 1,400 Won/kg.

The price of imported rice from China also went up to 1,250 won/kg. The rice from South Korea was sold at 1,450/kg. In Gwaksan of North Pyongan Province, the domestic rice was sold at 1,370/kg, the rice from China at 1,500/kg, the rice from South Korea at 1,300/kg.

In Hoiryeong of North Hamkyung Province, the price of domestic rice was 900 won/kg in July but rose to 1,250 won/kg. In Kilju of North Hamkyung Province, the domestic rice was sold at 1,200 won/kg. This shows that the rice price in North Hamkyung Province did not increase as highly as the price in Sinuiju of North Pyungan Province. In Hoiryeong, the price of rice has been rising steadily from 820 won/kg in March.

The rice in Hoiryeong is cheaper than in Sinuiju because demand for corn is relatively high and food distribution is partly being operated in Hoiryeong.

Between July and late September, the price of wheat also rose from 900 won to 1,200 won, and the price of noodles from 1,000 won to 1,600 won. However, the price of whole corn, the staple food for the low-income families remained stable for the same period.

It was believed that the surge in food prices resulted from the massive flood damage which stroke North Korea in early and middle August. When vast areas of land in South Pyongan and Hwanghae Province, the major granary of North Korea, were submerged during the flood, it was expected that domestic crop production would decrease.

After the food crisis in 1990s, the demand for rice increases in every fall during which rice price is low and people tend to purchase in advance one-year supply for food. In this fall, however, the price of rice greatly rose because the shortage of food was anticipated.

Meanwhile, the surge in rice price illustrates that overseas food aid was not distributed to the people of North Korean. The illicit sale of rice originally distributed to the party cadres or People’s Army has not been fully activated in the market. In addition, the rise in rice price was triggered by the fact that the number of wholesalers stocking up rice in advance increased with the news that there would be a shortage of food.

In early August, the price of rice once surged to a high of 1,950 won/kg in the market in Sinuiju. Thereupon, there was a rumor going around that the rise in rice price resulted from the state’s ban on rice sale and had nothing to do with the flood. Anyhow, the rice price has been on the decrease since then, and in September it had remained at around 1,500 won/kg.

As opposed to the rise in rice price, the price of corn, the main diet for the low-income families remained stable. This means the possibility of massive starvation in North Korea is low this year. Moreover, that the corn price remained moderate when rice price went up by 500 won reflects that the economic situation of middle class has been stabilized over the years.

Along with the rise in food prices, the prices of industrial products or others have been soaring sharply. The price of pork increased from 2,300 won/kg to 3,000 won/kg, and the price of frozen Pollack from 3,500/fish to 4,800/fish

The prices of brown seaweed or fruit juice went up to around 2,000 won each. The price of the popular imported cigarettes, Cat, rose by 200 won being sold at a cost of 1,500 won.

As winter is coming soon, the heating fuel price increased. Brown coal was sold at a cost of 1,300 won for 20 kg, gasoline at a cost of 3,000 won/liter

The exchange rate also increased from one dollar to 3,100 won to one dollar to 3,300 won.

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwui
9/17/2007

According to the inside source in North Korea, it was revealed on 13th that there has been partially a rationing in Chongjin, North Hamkyung since August.

This is the first time to have checked about nation rationing in Chongjin since the first Summit held on June 15, 2000.

This rationing has begun even before the flood occurred, which was prior to August. This is strong evidence that the North Korean food shortage was not in serious state. There has been acknowledgement that there has been food rationing even after the flood in the beginning of September.

There has been a case of rationing in Moosan, North Hamgyung and some other regions during the first Inter-Korea Summit in 2000. There is high probability that this rationing could have relation to the upcoming 2nd Summit in October.

The insiders spoke on the phone that, “All of a sudden the Chongjin distribution center opened and started supplying to the workers and their families, an old and feeble persons and wounded soldiers with a 15-days-worth of food since August.”

The special rationings that occurred on special occasions, like the birthdays of Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung was only given through the factories or People’s Units. The distribution center were often closed or usually used as the place for selling Chinese merchandises. The reason why the rationing has restarted through the distribution center is that the authorities are thinking of long-term rationings.

According to the inside source, the distributed food include corn, wheat and rice. It is hard to tell whether the rice was produced in the South or North because the rice was immediately packaged after it’s been produced from rice-polishing machines.

The inside source said that “Civilians are not in belief that there will be a continuance of rationing even in October, because there was just a 15-days-worth of rationing being distributed in September.” The rationing was only given to people who worked at particular factories which made profits.

Kim, who resides in Chongjin, staying in Hwoiryeong for his export business, claims that, “We have to get our attendance ballot stamped every day in our factory. For people who skip work for no particular reason, they are being ferreted out by the factory manager, and even the secretary of the Party. In the morning, there are so many meetings and conferences being held that it is difficult for us to think straight.”

Also, factories that had stopped functioning due to the electricity and resource loss, made workers show up at work and emphasized the importance of production culture and lifestyle culture, reinforcing the projects of fixing the buildings and cleaning the buildings.

“Our attendance is being reported on daily basis, so if we don’t go to work for several days, we are automatically taken to People’s Safety Agency immediately.”

For people who have made their livings through business are becoming increasingly dissatisfied by having to work in an inefficient factory. Some claim that, “Are we going back to how we used to be,” raising more concerns.

Kim states, “It’s not like they’re giving us abundant supply of food. We were able to breathe a little bit by doing our own business, but now it’s suffocating us to death.”

He added “We are now so strictly controlled with only a 15-days of rationing; can you imagine how much worse it can get if the rationing continues to supply fully in the future?”

The background of rationing has not been clear as of yet.

Kim Jong Il visited North Hamkyung for the onsite inspection in the beginning of August. This could be a temporary remedy taken by Kim Jong Il, to increase the effect of his visit. Furthermore, it could be his ways of increasing control on Hamkyung area, where the commute and trade with foreign countries is active.

The North Korean defector who came to South Korea in 2005, Park Jeong Chul (pseudonym) said, “The rationing can be a temporary remedy to appease the public anxiety with the upcoming Inter-Summit in October. It’s because North Korea has enough provisions for the army and there is pressure from the international society for North Korea to become more transparent, North Korea is pretending to oblige.”

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
8/19/2007

Sometimes even Stalinist propaganda tells the truth. When the North Korean newspapers occasionally told grossly exaggerated horror stories about South Korean inflation, they stressed that nothing like that could possibly happen in North Korea. This was the case indeed. For nearly half a century, from the late 1950s to the late 1980s retail prices in North Korea remained essentially unchanged. One kilogram of rice cost 0.08 won in 1960. It was still the same price in 1990.

This was possible because almost nothing was actually “sold’’ in North Korea. Communist states often rationed goods distributed through retail trade, but in most cases it was only a handful of most prestigious goods that were subjected to rationing _ like, say, cars. North Korea went much further: by the early 1970s, retail trade in the North ceased to exist, being completely replaced by an elaborate public distribution system. Rations depended on a type of work performed, but also on one’s position within a complicated hierarchy of social groups, as well as one’s place of residence (inhabitants of major cities, and Pyongyang in particular, enjoyed much better rations than those in the countryside).

There were some markets, of course, barely tolerated by the government. But until the late 1980s markets were small, with their trade volume being almost negligible. It seems that most people were reasonably satisfied with what they could get from the state distribution system _ of course, it helped that they knew next to nothing about the situation in other countries, so they could not compare.

The situation began to change around 1990 when the old distribution system collapsed under the pressure of an economic crisis. From 1993-94 there were increasing problems with rations, and from around 1996 rations pretty much stopped altogether. Some food was still distributed in major urban centers, but even there the distributed amount was so meager that nobody could survive on rations alone. A large-scale famine ensued, with at least half to one million dead (the oft-cited figure of three million victims seems to be an exaggeration).

People turned to trade and handicrafts, and with this arrival of a market economy inflation became a North Korean phenomenon as well. Even in the 1980s market prices exceeded the official prices in the state shops. By the mid-1990s, the difference was much greater. In theory, rice still cost 0.08 a kilo, but by 2000 its price on the market reached 45-50 won. Official wages remained unchanged, however, so around 2001 the average salary was approximately 20 times less than the income necessary for physical survival. People had no choice but to augment their income.

The government understood that there was no way to restore the old system: a decade of economic crisis had undermined the basic machinery of distribution and obviously the system was beyond repair. Thus, in 2002 the much trumpeted “July 1 Reforms” were introduced.

It’s difficult to describe these measures as “reforms”–the government simply gave official recognition to the situation which had existed for quite a few years.

The distribution system (long defunct) was curtailed. There was a dramatic increase in the retail prices of basic goods and services _ obviously in an attempt to approximate the prices of the market. Thus, that one-kilo of rice which cost 0.08 won since July cost 44 won.

Wages increased as well. Obviously, the wage increase was not even, and some groups have gained _ or lost _ more than others. It was estimated that the average increase in wages has been approximately 2500 percent (that is, 25 times). At the same time, prices have increased 3000-4000 percent (that is, 30-40 times). This necessitated the issue of 1000 won bills _ the largest denomination in North Korean financial history since the 1959 currency reform. Later, 5000 won bills were issued as well.

But the measures had another effect. The increase in salaries meant that the market was instantly flooded with cash. Needless to say, the only outcome could be inflation. Some people speculated that this was the intention of the Pyongyang leaders who hoped to kick-start the economy in such a way. Perhaps. But I would not be surprised if in 15 or 20 years down the track we learn from interviews and talks with the planners of this reform that they did not really expect inflation. Pyongyang economic managers have not had much exposure to market theory, and are sometimes very naive in their understanding of these questions.

Indeed, by October 2002 the market price of rice had increased to 120 won per kilo. In 2003, the price doubled to 250-300 won, and now it is about 1000 won. Inflation has become a part of North Korean life.

What will happen next? Will the North Korean leaders manage to stabilize the situation, or will a new wave of economic crisis wipe out the entire North Korean system? We do not know yet. But it is clear that there is no return to old days when a kilo of rice could be had for 0.08 won _ that is, if you were lucky enough to live in an area where they distributed grain rations in rice, not in maize.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
7/8/2007

Nowadays, the severity of famine appears to be a thing of the past _ at least outside Africa. Indeed, modern technology makes it possible to feed crowded cities almost effortlessly. Thus, any reports of famine nowadays can be argued to be the direct result of mismanagement and deliberate political decisions. The recent North Korean famine of 1996-2000 vividly demonstrates this and supports such a theory.

Stalinist agriculture has never been very efficient. The lack of incentive makes it sluggish and wasteful. However, in some cases, the heavy investments in machinery and fertilizers did, in fact, help to overcome some of the deficiencies created by the inept social system.

This was the case in North Korea. In the late 1950s all North Korean farmers were herded into the so-called “agricultural co-operatives.’’ While less restrictive than the “people’s communes’’ in Mao’s China, they imposed a harsher control than Stalin’s “kolkhozs.’’

The North Korean government invested heavily in agriculture. Its efforts produced a remarkably energy-intensive agricultural system. Electric pumps were running huge irrigation projects; chemical fertilizers and tractors were used on a grand scale. In attempts to reclaim arable land, steep hills were made into terrace fields. These fields, endorsed by Kim Il-sung himself, remained the poster image of North Korean agriculture until the mid-1990s.

Initially these efforts seemingly paid off. In the 1980s North Korea produced some 5-6 million tons of grain (largely, rice and maize) a year. Its population never enjoyed anything like the present-day South Korean abundance: meat or fruits were rare delicacies. Nonetheless, the 6 million tons of grain was sufficient to feed the country’s population. This was done through the rationing system. Depending on one’s position in the complicated hierarchy of social groups, daily rations varied from 500 to 900 grams per adult _ sufficient to provide enough calories.

But in 1991 the situation changed. The much trumpeted “self-reliance’’ of North Korea proved to be a complete fake. The Soviet decision to discontinue sales of oil and other goods at hugely discounted prices wrought havoc in the country’s economy. The agricultural sector was especially vulnerable, since without the heavy input of energy and resources it stood no chance of survival. Tractors required diesel oil, which was not forthcoming, and electric pumps could not operate when power stations were idle due to a shortage of spare parts.

In 1992-1993 the North Korean media began to argue the benefits of having only two meals a day as opposed to the traditional three, claiming the latter was unhealthy and excessive. By 1994, people in some remote areas could not get food for days at a time. They were issued the usual rationing coupons, but no foodstuffs were available in the shops. Rations were also cut. These were signs of things to come.

However, the North Korean government did not follow the example of China or Vietnam, where the return to private agriculture led to an instant revival in food production. In the early 1990s the Pyongyang leaders saw how the reformist Communist governments of East Europe had been wiped out, and they considered any reform potentially dangerous to their own survival. Thus, no reform was undertaken, and in the years 1992-1995 agricultural production continued its free fall.

And then the real catastrophe came. In July and August 1995 unusually heavy rains led to disastrous floods. The North Korean authorities blamed the floods for all subsequent developments. In the aftermath of the disaster, they even decided to break with the decades-old tradition of covering or playing down all the problems of their country. Pyongyang stated that some 5.4 million people had been displaced by the 1995 floods (the subsequent U.N. survey indicated that the actual figure was much smaller _ probably, by an order of ten). Politically, this was understandable: if the country was hit by a natural disaster of unprecedented proportions, the authorities were not to be held responsible!

There is, however, good reason to doubt these statements. After all, the Korean Peninsular is small, but impact of the very same floods on the South was negligible. However, the contribution of the flood to the disaster is undeniable. The already strained power grid was destroyed, and entire irrigation systems were wiped out. Most of the terrace fields, the pride of the “juche agriculture,’’ were simply washed away.

In 1996, the country harvested some 3 million tons of grain _ just above half the pre-crisis level. This meant famine. It was to last for four years and take between half million and one million lives.

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
7/3/2007

A North Korean insider source relayed on the 2nd that citizens’ complaints have been rising because the North Korean government recently gave guidelines to sell a portion of products which have been selling with popularity at the jangmadang (markets) only at state-operated stores.

This source, who resides in North Pyongan, revealed in a phone conversation with DailyNK, “Recently, plastic floors have been popular, so “plastic sales” is earning a lot of money. However, government authorities have mandated that the commerce office directly oversee plastic floors and that they be sold at state-operated stores.”

The insider relayed, “Families above middle-class have been showing a lot of interest in acquiring furniture. Besides floors, drawers on which TV can be placed and cabinets displaying wines and others are very popular.”

Previously, floors made of paper covered the floors of houses, but since North Korean civilians’ standard of living started rising recently, Chinese-made plastic floors decorated in flowers is drawing popularity.

He said, “Rumor has been leaking that pork (1,700 North Korean won per kg), the price for which has declined recently, is also directly managed by the commerce office, along with plastic floors.” “Besides this, the complaints of merchants have been rising since rumor starting circulating that the list of items to be overseen by the office will increase.”

He added, “Would they want to do any business given that individual sales are discouraged and turned over to national control when sales go even remotely well? There are grievances due to the fact that earning a livelihood through jangmadang sales is not even allowed, on top of the lack of provisions.”

Further, he said, “Regulations regarding people engaging in “Chapan-Jangsa (sales by trucks)” using privately-owned buses or trucks exceeding eight tons have begun. If one is caught, the vehicles become registered as national property and the vehicle owner receives a salary from the country instead.”

“Chapan Jangsa” refers to carrying out wholesale while ferrying the load on trucks. The “plastic floor” and “Chapan Jangsa,” along with what is popularly known as “ice (drug) sales” are counted are the top three business that brings in the most amount of money.

“The complaints of people are high, but the scope of regulation is wide-ranging, so there are people who think that the inspections will stop after several times.”

Even guideline to prevent wearing of wedding dresses

He also said, “Since October 2006, there were even guidelines to prevent wearing of wedding dresses at weddings. Not only wedding dresses, but wearing white gloves were also prohibited.”

In North Korea, wearing wedding dresses at weddings became a trend seven to eight years ago. Nowadays, many civilians are known to wear them. Even if they do not wear wedding dresses, North Korea’s general wedding culture is donning flowers on the chest part of dresses and on the head and putting on white gloves.

Additionally, the insider relayed, “The size of the flower of the groomsmen and the bridesmaids should not be bigger than the groom’s and the bride’s. The flower of the groom and the bride is fixed at 7cm and the flower of the groomsmen and bridesmaids fixed at 5cm. In the case with those who go against the orders and get their pictures taken after marriage, the photo volunteer in charge’s volunteer card (employment permit) can be revoked.”

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
5/9/2007
“If you have a second child, your rations become equivalent to a family of 4”…citizens respond apath 
 
North Korean authorities have been scrutinizing over the decreasing number of birthrates by young couples and as a result have proposed to increase the amount of rations to families having children.

If a couple gives birth to a second child in the district of Hamheung, South Hamkyung, the whole family will receive 6 months worth of distributions, a source informed. If a third child is born, the rations increase all the more.

After giving birth to a child in a hospital, a married woman from Hamheung can obtain a birth certificate, which is then submitted to the local district office, to receive distributions equivalent to a family of 4. These proposals resemble policies implemented by local district offices in South Korea.

Though Hamheung city has made efforts to increase the birthrate with distributions, the people’s response is all but cold, the source said. How many people would really have a second child just to scavenge off a few months worth of distributions.

One of the main reasons that the birthrate is decreasing in North Korea is due to the fact that women are avoiding giving birth, informed the source.

The source said, “Nowadays, North Korean women engage in businesses and are the breadwinners of the family. They are not satisfied with just having children and bringing them up” and added, “Everyone knows that it is hard enough to live and even harder if you have a lot of children.”

North Korea’s birthrate has continued to decline since the late 1990’s. The average birthrate in North Korea in 1993 was 2.1 births per family and in 2002, 2.04. Comparatively, in South Korea the birthrate per family in 1970 was 4.53 and 1.19 in 2003. Within a period of 33 years, the number of childbirths per family had reduced to 3.34 persons.

In an interview with the Jochongryeon last December, Kang Nam Il, head of the North Korea Population Research Center said, “The decrease of birthrates in our country (North Korea) is no different to that of other nations” and remarked, “Women want to have 2 children, though in the cities women have either 1 or 2 children.”

The source said, “There may be slight differences in each district. Nonetheless, most of the larger cities have adopted this proposal” and added, “This policy was implemented as North Korean authorities are finding it difficult to reach the quota for conscription and the number of students enrolling in schools.”

Yonhap
4/10/2007

North Korean authorities have scaled back their country’s food rationing system and allowed rice to be bought and sold at open markets in major cities, sources here said Tuesday.

In July 2002, the communist country reduced food rationing and introduced an economic reform program under which wages were raised and farmers’ markets were expanded so that people could buy food. But the policy has zigzagged on the purchase and sale of cereals and rice. 

“Since last year, rumors have spread about the sale at state-run stores as the food rationing system did not function well. Currently, not only corn but also rice is being traded at the markets,” a government source said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the issue.

The source added that North Korean authorities permitted the sale of imported rice at state-run stores. “The authorities hope to clamp down on high rice prices at black markets by diversifying the sources of rice distribution,” the source said. On the North’s black market, the product costs about 20 times more than rice at state-run stores. 

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
3/29/2007

North Korean inside source informed that authorities had been asserting control over illegal selling and use of mobile phones at the markets near the border regions. National Security Agents have also been conducting in-depth investigations on illegal acts such as drug smuggling and slave trade.

In a telephone conversation with a reporter on the 28th, Park Jong Run (pseudonym) of Musan, North Hamkyung said, “Authorities came to the People’s Units and said furtively, ‘Rations will be distributed in April. In future, you will live a good life. So, stop engaging in illegal trade.’ Why would we listen to them when they tell us to stop selling especially since they aren’t going to give us distributions anyway?”

Park relayed, “They said, don’t sell our confidential information about our country through the mobile phone. People already in possession of mobile phones will be forgiven if they self-confess at the National Security Agency.” Since last year, North Korean authorities have been keeping a close watch on mobile phone use particularly in the border regions.

He said, “They threaten us with a declaration, so that we will report cases of illegality or corruption such as slave trade and drug trade.” For example, large amounts of drugs were found in the home of a Chairwoman for the Women’s Union of Hoiryeong City, late February.

According to Park, authorities will directly carry out the procedures at Jangmadang (markets) themselves, with assistance from Hoiryeong Security Agency and various police departments. Some goods found to be linked to illegal trade are in part taken away by the sudden wave of control. In particular, these authorities have a keen eye for goods made overseas such as Chinese items.

National Security Agents and the police confiscate the items arguing that, “now we have a gap between the rich and poor, as well as the richer getting richer and vice versa, because you, tradesmen have tasted some money. Now, socialism has been infected by capitalism.” However, even the security agents are acting tactful by removing only some of the goods as a mere example of punishment.

Goods confiscated are locked up at the security agency and kept in provision. The endless lines in the waiting rooms of the security agency make up the people ready to pay a fine and recollect their items, says Park. Nonetheless, security agents are reluctant to return the goods back to the traders and so bribes must be ready at hand also.

“I barely got my goods back after bribing them with 10 packets of cigarettes, but there was only half the goods left remaining in the bundle” Park criticized and said that the security agents sarcastically remarked, ‘Hey, let us eat and live a little.”

Following the nuclear experiment, authorities have been trying to gather regime support and elevate the nation’s pride arguing the nation had become a strong militaristic country. They proclaim, “The world is cooperating with us and is throwing their goods at us. In future, you will live well.” It will be difficult for North Korean authorities to prohibit trade, especially with the people’s strong will power to make money.

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
3/18/2007

In socialism, the laborer and the peasant dominate the nation and society. However, since the late `60’s, the role of the laborer and peasant has decreased with the bureaucracy taking power, to the extent that a country can no longer remain in traditional socialism.

Currently, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Il with a minority of the central class surround this core power. In North Korea, the laborers and peasants are rather subject to extortion.

Amidst a North Korean market economy, a middle class is being established. The middle class comprises of people who have assets that the average citizen cannot afford and own medium-sized businesses or engage in wholesale trade.

Undoubtedly, this group of people are dominating the middle class as well as playing a vital role in the lifeline of North Korean citizens and market, a fact that could not have been fathomable in North Korea’s past.

Until the 80’s, North Korea’s economy was a planned economy. Supply and demand of goods was distributed according to the national plan. However, in the late-80’s, small holes began to emerge in the socialist planned economic system and with a lack of daily necessities, people began to rely on the black market.

Arising from the major cities, goods were secretively traded in the black market and eventually the majority of North Koreans acquired their needed goods through this system. This system operated evading the control and regulation of North Korean authorities, but when caught, a person was condemned to severe punishment and the goods confiscated.

However, the mass food crisis of the mid-90’s completely collapsed the remnants of a socialist planned economy that had subsided unto the time. What had happened was the end of the national food distribution system.

In particular, the collapse of the food distribution meant the death sentence. Tens and hundreds of thousands of North Koreans began to die of starvation and as a means to live, people became active in the market and trade began to emerge in different regions of North Korea.

Mass starvation which created expert tradesmen

The immobilization of a socialist planned economy activated Jangmadang (North Korea’s integrated markets) which then led to the formation of a new class within North Korea’s own expert tradesmen. North Korean authorities who had no other countermeasures had little choice but to comply as the lives of the citizens were now left to the hands of trade.

In the mid-90’s, North Korean authorities approved personal trade to occur between North Korea and China and then permitted markets to exist along the border districts. Simply put, the mass food crisis created a new class which actually gave North Koreans an opportunity to trade.

At first, people would sell goods that they already had such as household appliances, television, recorder and bicycle. Furthermore, any type of stock accessible, particularly clothing, candy and other foods coming from China such as rice, flour and corn were also traded.

As people gained more experience and came to know the basics of marketing, tradesmen became more specialized. People who sold rice, only sold rice, whereas people who traded fabric only sold fabric.

North Koreans began to realize that specializing in a particular field was the way to make money and the people who were unable to assimilate to this culture broke away penniless.

Accordingly, the market gradually became a center for specialized tradesmen to provide goods and daily necessities. The goods sold by these tradesmen eventually became the mark for the middle class merchant. During this time, stabilized distributors began to dominate the market and more individualized entrepreneurs surfaced.

People skilled at cooking, baked decorative and delicious bread in their homes and then sell them at the markets. In addition, candy distributors have made a mark at the markets with candy making having become an advanced skill. People who once made candy in their homes now brag that they have been able to produce a small-scale sugar factory. In particular, clothes making and candy making has become enterprises leading to great money.

Today, 50% of candy, home-made clothing and 30% of uniforms, sold at North Korean markets are products made from home. Through goods such as these, Chinese merchants, tradesmen and the middle class are earning money through North Korea’s markets supplying the customers, the majority of the lower class.