North Korean Economy Watch

According to Choson Exchange:

As we mentioned recently, Ri Chol, the broker of the Orascom deal, has moved on from JVIC. Where he has gone is not yet certain, but the choice for his replacement is interesting.

Ri Gwang Gun is the new head of JVIC and was introduced as such to the CEO of Orascom last week. Ri Gwang Gun has held various positions related to trade, including executive positions at state owned enterprises and as Minister of Foreign Trade. He apparently reports to Kim Yang Gon.

He was (is?) a Daepung Investment Group man. We’ve speculated that the existence of both Daepung and JVIC reflected a kind of “competition at the top” for influence in attracting and managing investments. They were both formed around the same time in 2009/2010 and have similar charges. Therefore, Ri Gwang Gun’s promotion could indicate a potential harmonizing of this competition.

Of course, the contours of this are difficult to see. Daepung, with stronger ties to the NDC, could be construed as taking over the JVIC from the top; perhaps the military has been able to exert itself to make sure that in the new leadership era, it does not get shut out of the investment game. (JVIC has become the more active and influential of the two groups.)

It could also be seen as a victory for JVIC, with Daepung being left to crumble and the top talent from that group being brought across. It remains to be seen if there will be some kind of exodus from either group.

Perhaps, also, it is some kind of compromise and a merger of sorts, with competing groups of elites ‘buying in’ to a unified system of investment management under the JVIC brand. They may see this as a way to increase effectiveness, avoid the negative outcomes of unfettered intra-elite competition and therefore encourage stability overall.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2012-1-18

North Korea is continuing to put forward new laws for the special economic zones (SEZs) such as Rajin-Sonbong and Hwangumpyong Island. Recently, North Korea announced special guidelines for the tax investigations of foreign businesses in the zones.

North Korea’s Academy of Social Science Newsletter Volume 4 (published on November 2011) released an article titled, “Suggestions to Improve Tax Investigations in the Special Economic Zone,” which included detailed instructions for the policy improvement for tax investigation for SEZs. Here, particular emphasis was placed on the enhancement of the tax investigation system — to be accurate and rational — for the foreign investment companies.

The article explained, “Based on the principles of equality and reciprocity for the construction of powerful economic state, the tax investigation system in the SEZ must be improved especially at the present time when SEZs are being constructed and expanded to increase economic trade with other nations.”

It also stressed tax officials must be equipped with, “comprehensive knowledge and experience who accurately understand the entire process of business management. They must be capable of creating new tax investigation methods and be able to discern the various forms of tax evasions.”

For the qualifications of the tax officials, the article recommended that the officials be selected based on their knowledge and experience; ability to develop techniques for tax investigation; awareness of rules and regulations of tax laws and bylaws, and regulations of rights and responsibilities of taxpayers; and capability of conducting research on foreign tax investigation policies.

The Academy of Social Science is a government agency of the DPRK, and the recent article on the tax investigation reflects that the government has already begun the process of implementing the tax investigation guidelines and laws in the SEZs.

The article emphasized establishing a tax investigation system acceptable to foreign companies. One can construe this as North Korea’s effort to attract more businesses to the SEZ, which is currently suffering from poor performance.

In addition, North Korea is believed to be placing weight on the tax investigation based on its past experiences with the South Korean companies in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). In the past, the officials of the Central SpecialDirect General Bureau toured the industrial districts in China and showed keen interests in the tax management.

On December 8, 2011, the KCNA reported that the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) has adopted the Economic Zone Act for Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands. The law was revised and supplemented to include the Free Economic and Trade Act of Rajin-Sonbong. However, the details of these laws were not disclosed and some experts are predicting that these laws are likely identical to the Chinese laws in China’s flourishing SEZs.

However, on January 11, 2012, Yonhap News Agency of South Korea reported that China rejected the new Special Economic Zone Act of the DPRK because it is “not business-friendly.” The news reported, “China said the law was not business-friendly, telling North Korea that the law had some problemsregarding taxes, accounting, remittance of profits and stability of investment.” It is reported that North Korea is working on the revision of these laws and likely for a new special zone act to be passed by the Standing Committee of the DPRK’s Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA).

Pictured above (Google Earth) is Changsong Town in North Pyongan Province. This town is the home of the Changsong Joint Conference which was held in August 1962.  This meeting was referenced in the DPRK’s most recent Cabinet plenary meeting on the DPRK economy.

According to KCNA (2012-1-22):

An enlarged Cabinet plenary meeting was held.

Present there were Premier Choe Yong Rim and cabinet members.

Attending the meeting as observers were senior officials of the organizations under direct control of the Cabinet, directors of management bureaus, chairpersons of provincial, city and county people’s committees, chairpersons of provincial rural economy committees, chairpersons of provincial planning committees, directors of provincial foodstuff and daily necessities management bureaus and managers of major factories and enterprises.

Prior to the meeting, the participants paid silent tribute to the memory of leader Kim Jong Il.

The meeting reviewed the fulfillment of last year’s national economic plan and discussed how to implement the decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, joint calls of the WPK Central Committee and the Central Military Commission and the militant task put forward in the joint New Year editorial.

Vice-Premier Ro Tu Chol made a report to be followed by speeches.

The enlarged meeting set it as a priority task for this year to direct efforts into developing light industry and agriculture to improve the people’s livelihood and successfully carrying out the WPK’s prosperity-oriented strategy in the pilot domains and basic industries of the national economy upholding the flames of South Hamgyong Province. It also indicated the tasks and ways for it.

Also discussed was an issue of raising higher the flames of great innovation of South Hamgyong Province in the light industrial and agricultural fields.

The meeting mentioned the need to produce quality consumer goods favored by the people in the field of light industry and effect a decisive turn in development of local industry this year marking the 50th anniversary of the historic Changsong joint conference.

It also stressed the need for ministries and national institutions to help Changsong County in its industrial development.

Also discussed at the meeting were such issues as fulfilling the assignments for grain production for 2012 both in lowland and mountainous areas, making the best use of modern stockbreeding and poultry bases and large fruit and fish farms as well as the tasks for ministries and national institutions to preferentially supply materials, equipment and electricity to farming processes.

The meeting drew attention to the tasks for the industrial fields of electric power, coal, metal, railways and machine and construction and building materials, etc.

The meeting tabled the tasks for all ministries, national institutions and provincial people’s committees to lay their own scientific and technological foundations for stepping up the work for turning the economy into one based on technology in a forward-looking manner as required by the industrial revolution in the new century.

It also discussed the tasks for the fields of education, literature and art, public health, sports, capital construction, land management and urban management.

The meeting stressed the need for all economic officials to preserve the socialist principle and ensure profitability in economic management, operate and manage the economic work on the basis of detailed calculation and science as well as the need for ministries, national institutions and industrial establishments to set up strict order regarding planning, financial dealings and administration.

Relevant decisions were made at the meeting.

As premier of the Cabinet Choe Yong-rim has made quite a few prominent appearances in the DPRK media in the last two years which highlight his official efforts to improve the North Korean economy. His most recent public appearance (January 12) is reported to have been at the Jenam Coal Mine.

Kim Jong-un, however, is not a member of the Cabinet, so he did not attend the meeting. To date his legitimacy is being established through his relationship to Kim Jong-il/Kim Il-sung and as a leader of the KPA—rather than as a leader in the government or even the party (at least so far).

As a result, Kim Jong-un’s guidance visits have consisted almost exclusively of visits to KPA units.  In this month alone, he has visited the 105 Tank Brigade, KPA Unit 169, KPA Unit 3870, KPA Unit 354, KPA Unit 671, and the KPA soldiers constructing the Pyongyang Folk Village on the outskirts of Pyongyang. Uriminzokkiri has also credited him with spearheading the DPRK’s nuclear tests.

UPDATE: Here is Yonhap coverage of the meeting.

“Changsong Joint Conference”
The KCNA article prompted me to look into the “Changsong Joint Conference”, a term that did not ring a bell. The most recent reference I can find to it is this blurb from a March 2011 article in Korea Magazine:

The Changsong Joint Conference of Local Party and Economic Officials was held in August 1962.

The conference marked the beginning of developing the local industry throughout the country.

In recent years the county has made strenuous efforts to carry out the plan of the Workers’ Party of Korea for the building of a thriving nation and achieved many successes.

Hundreds of hectares of forests of raw materials and timber forests including pine-nut, wild-walnut and larch forests have been newly created.

The Changsong Foodstuff Factory gathers in scores of kinds of wild fruits including acorns, wild grapes, fruits of Actinidia arguta and Crataegus pinnatifida every year in mountains.

Recently its officials and workers have modernized all production processes including wild fruit drinks and wines as required in the IT age to produce foodstuffs in time.

Wines made from the fermented juice of wild grapes, fruits of Actinidia arguta and other wild fruits, Crataegus pinnatifida, Rubus crataegifolius, carbonated Actinidia arguta and other fruit juices, dried bracken and sliced bracken and other wild vegetables preserved in soy sauce are in great demand for their peculiar flavour.

The Changsong Textile Mill which started operation with six housewives has been turned into a modern fabric producer. As a treasure mill, it makes a great contribution to the improvement of the people’s standard of living. It produces quality fabrics, woolen knitted goods and quilts and blankets with local raw materials.

The Changsong Paper Mill produces paper from ground pulp. It has streamlined the equipment to improve the qualities of goods.

Looking round the local-industry factories in Changsong County in November last year, Kim Jong Il kindled the flame of developing the local industry throughout the country after the model of Changsong.

Changsong County stands at the head of development of local industry. Now its people work harder to change further the looks of their home village.

Another blogger seems to have located a single page of a book on the Changsong Joint Conference. Fortunately, he typed out the introduction:

The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung had made a farsighted plan for bridging the gap between town and country and between regions and raising equally the living standards of all the working people. For this Changsong County had been taken as a model.

The great leader who had long pushed preparations for rapid improvement in the livelihood of the mountain peasants, studied deeply the state of affairs in this part of the country, and through his several on-the-spot guidances, paved the shortest cut to establish a socialist paradise.

In August 1962, in order to spread the example of Changsong across the land he convened the historic Changsong Joint Conference of Local Party and Economic Functionaries. There he put forward a new policy and overall ways and means to enhance the role of the county and develop local industry and agriculture, so as to improve radically the people’s living conditions.

In 1974, our people erected in Changsong the historic monument to the on-the-spot guidance of the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, out of their wish to retell throughout generations the profound care of the fatherly leader who had shown the bright future of mountain villages and transformed that area into a people’s paradise fine to live in.

Kim Jong-il last visited Changsong in November 2010 where he visited the Changsong Foodstuff Factory, Changsong Textile Mill, and Changsong House of Culture. The first two locations are the shining examples of the success of the Changsong Joint Conference.  The Changsong House of Culture is where the meeting was officially held in 1962.

But if the goal of the conference is to reduce the disparity in the DPRK’s living standards, Changsong is probably not the best place to start. Changsong is home to one of the North Korean leadership’s most well-known luxury retreats.  This is because it was was extensively photographed by Kenji Fujimoto while he was working as Kim Jong-il’s personal chef.   See a satellite image and Mr. Fujimoto’s pictures of the compound here. You can see the Taegwan leadership train station Kim used to visit the compound here.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2012-1-12

The adoption of Act No. 1194 by the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK was recently confirmed. “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Corporate Law” or the “Corporate Law” was reported to have passed more than a year ago in November 11, 2010.

The “Corporate Law” is evaluated as an important indication of the direction of the economic policy of North Korea since Kim Jong-un was appointed as the next successor at the Third Party Conference held on September 28, 2010.

The law consists of five chapters: 1) Basic Principles of the Corporation; 2) Organization of the Corporation; 3) Management Organization of the Corporation; 4) Business Management Activities of the Corporation; and 5) Projects of the Corporation.

The first article of this act “The Mission of the Corporate Law” states that the law was enacted to, “contribute to the development of the people’s economy and to secure the management system of the socialist corporations by establishing the system and order for the organization and management activities.”

The second article, “The Definition of Corporation” defines a corporation as an “economic unit that operates as an organization that directly handles the labor, facilities, equipment, materials, and finances for the production or volunteer activities.”

Article 9, “The Legal Rights and the Legal Protection Principles,” indicates that the “legal rights and interests of the corporations are protected by the government.” Article 10, however, specifically states that this particular law does not apply to the special trade zones and the foreign investment companies.

Article 18, “The Organization of the Corporation,” has a clause that states “the managing organization has the jurisdiction to close down corporations for unreasonable or lack of prospects that does not meet the standards and the demands of the national policy and reality.”

Article 21 depicts a manager as a “person representing the corporation and responsible for the entire business.” The manager, chief engineer, and assistant manager’s specific responsibilities were also explicated. The hierarchy was clearly indicated where the assistant manager was to report to the chief engineer and the manager while the chief engineer has to report to the manager.

Article 29 affirms that a business is to be managed based on established business and corporate strategies in which every year a draft of the people’s economy plan must be submitted to the appropriate authorities. The written economic plan must be followed on a daily, monthly, quarterly, and by index basis (Article 30).

Articles 31 to 37 include specifics on the improvements of production technology while Articles 38 to 43 include regulations to enhance the management system.

In particular, Article 42 stipulates that the corporation must promote sales based on supply plans and contracts. Those sales that do not follow the plan and the contract cannot be sold.”

Article 44 states, “The appropriate amount of labor is scientifically determined and managed based on the socialist distribution principles and a precise socialist wage system must be implemented.”

In other words, socialist principles will be applied to both the sales of merchandise and wage system. While the corporation will receive autonomy in many areas, clear regulations are provided for sales in addition to evaluation and incentive system for labor.

In recent years, North Korea has continuously passed economic laws for economic construction and enhancing the lives of the North Korean people. Such laws include the following: The Agricultural Law passed on November 3, 2009; Real Estate Management Law on November 11, 2009; the Country of Origin for Export Law on November 25, 2009; and Comprehensive Equipment Import Law on November 11, 2009.

According to the Daily NK:

Since Kim Jong Eun arrived in public life, North Korea has been handing out preferential promotions to the children of high cadres in the Party and military to secure the loyalty of the elite to Kim Jong Eun by creating a shared sense of destiny.

According to a well-informed source in Seoul, the children of former senior cadres continue to emerge into top leadership positions while the children of current cadres arrive at the core of Party affairs.

Many of the most recently appointed Party secretaries and departmental vice directors are the sons and son-in-laws of former or current high officials.

For example, International Secretary Kim Young Il and Tae Jong Su, the General Affairs Secretary in the Department of Administration, are sons-in-law to former State Inspection Committee Chairman Jeon Moon Seob and former Deputy Prime Minister Jeong Il Ryong respectively. Also, Oh Il Jung, who was made Vice Director of the Chosun Workers’ Party at just 50 or so years of age, is the son of former Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces Vice Director Oh Jin Woo.

Elsewhere, Choi Yong Hae, the son of former Vice Director of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces Choi Hyun, as well as being a Party secretary has also been made a military general and elevated to the Party Central Military Commission.

In the cabinet, Baek Yong Chun, who presides over Chosun Central Bank, is the son of former Foreign Minister Baek Nam Sun, and Trade Minister Lee Yong Nam is the nephew of People’s Safety Agency Vice Director Lee Myung Soo. Both have advanced to the Party Central Committee under the watchful eye of Kim Jong Eun. The brother of Kim Ok, Kim Jong Il’s fourth and final partner, has also been elevated on the younger Kim’s watch.

There are many more examples, the source said, going on, “The reason behind these high-speed promotions is that their parents or father-in-laws are in high positions,” before noting one more good example, “Lee Yong Ho’s father Lee Myung Jae was a close confidante of Kim Jong Il, having served as Vice Director of the Party’s Propaganda and Agitation and Guidance Departments, and in Kim’s secretarial office.”

◆ Current high speed promotions for relatives a dangerous game

However, while the close relationship between family history and promotion will serve these young leaders well, it could turn into a double-edged sword.

The source pointed out, “The special treatment these children get is not because their performance or skills are better than anyone else but because their high official parents have or had special relationships with Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. In recent years, this tendency to ‘pass down’ has expanded due to Kim Jong Eun’s succession using it as a way to ensure loyalty by tying them together as a ‘group sharing a common destiny’.”

However, he commented, “Forming these special privilege groups will increase the complaints from the people and of course from other officials, and in the end weaken the cohesiveness of the entire system.”

The Korea Times also reports some similar information:

North Korea has handed out decent jobs to children of former and current North Korean elite in what could be an attempt to help ensure the dynastic power succession goes smoothly, a source familiar with the isolated country said Tuesday.

Jang Yong-chol, a nephew of Jang Song-thaek, became North Korea’s ambassador to Malaysia in 2010 before fully serving out his term as Pyongyang’s top envoy to Nepal, the source said.

Jang Song-thaek, a four-star general and brother-in-law of late leader Kim Jong-il, has long been considered a key official in helping Kim’s son, Kim Jong-un, consolidate power.

Kim Jong-un has recently become the supreme commander of the country’s 1.1 million-strong military as part of his moves to strengthen his power base following his father’s sudden death last month.

Top North Korean officials repeatedly swore their loyalty to the young leader, calling him “the brilliant commander” and “another peerless patriot.”

Children of Workers’ Party secretary Kim Yong-il and Vice Premier Kang Sok-ju, a veteran negotiator and key foreign policy advisor to the late leader, have been dispatched to North Korea’s overseas diplomatic missions, the source said.

Meanwhile, Ri Son-il, son of Ri Yong-ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, and Cha Dong-sup, son-in-law of the People’s Armed Forces Minister Kim Yong-chun, are engaged in works to either earn foreign currency or attract foreign investment, the source said.

The nepotism appears to be the North’s attempt to secure the loyalty of the elite to make sure the third-generation power transition goes smoothly, the source said.

The late leader also assumed power in 1994 when his father, the North’s founding leader Kim Il-sung, died of heart failure at the age of 82. (Yonhap)

Read the full stories here:
Nepotism Running Riot in Kim’s NK
Daily NK
Kim Yong-hun
2012-1-11

Children of NK officials receive job favors
Korea Times 
2012-1-11

According to Choson Exchange:

[The] Choson Ilbo has just reported that Ri Chol has left his post as head of the Joint Venture and Investment Committee (JVIC).

As we argued last fall, the name of the game for Pyongyang’s elites is securing trade and investment deals. Two main investment organs exist, the JVIC and the Daepung Investment Group. We have in the past heard rumors of other similar international investment organizations being under consideration, also. From these overarching groups, down to smaller State Owned Enterprises, there is considerable competition to show that one’s organization can deliver.

Ri Chol was a close ally of Kim Jong Il’s and the organization he came to be associated with, JVIC, rose to prominence after he helped put together the Orascom deal and was given stewardship. He was even with Kim on his last official visit, to a joint venture supermarket in Pyongyang.

He also spent most of the 1980’s and 1990’s in Switzerland in various diplomatic capacities, not the least of which was acting as a minder to Kim Jong Il’s children as they studied at private school.

What might his departure portend?

A few possibilities come to mind.

– Has the JVIC fallen out of favor with the new leadership? If this is the case, Ri might be tasked with building a new organization, perhaps with a similar focus. It would seem redundant to add another, rather than reform this one, but redundancy is hardly unheard of in planned economies.

– Has Ri himself fallen out of favor? Is he being put out to pasture? Again, it is impossible to know, but it seems that such a long term friend of the Kims, who has a personal relationship with Kim Jong Un from his school days would be a key ally at this time, especially since his deals are driving economic growth in North Korea. (Though who knows? Perhaps Kim the Younger has never liked him.)

– If not an issue with Ri personally, the move could be a part of a factional reshuffling. Bartering and dealmaking for control of the commanding heights of the economy is no doubt underway as the new government consolidates its power. It might have been deemed necessary to grant control of the JVIC to another group of Pyongyang movers and shakers – of which Ri Chol is not a part.

– Also very possible is that the very top leadership is planning to give Ri some new responsibility elsewhere. JVIC may have been judged to be running smoothly enough that Ri’s skills would be more effectively used another important organization.

This of course is highly speculative. All we really know is that Ri Chol, with a track record of securing investment, has left the JVIC. Whatever the case may be, he is worth watching in the coming months, as Pyongyang is compelled to keep investments from China and elsewhere coming.

You can read a longer bio on NK Leadership Watch.

Joseph Bermudez, now a Senior Analyst with DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center and author of The Armed Forces of North Korea, has posted the latest issue of KPA Journal. You can download the PDF here.

Topics include: M-1979/1989 170mm SPGs (Part 1) and and article on the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly by Michael Madden.

UPDATE 1 (2014-1-21): See more recent data here and here.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-11-6): According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s mineral exports to China have tripled this year compared to a year ago, a study showed Sunday.

A joint study of Chinese data by Yonhap News Agency and Seoul-based IBK Economic Research Institute showed that China imported 8.42 million tons of minerals from North Korea from January to September this year, worth US$852 million.

Over the first nine months of last year, China brought in 3.04 million tons of minerals from the North for $245 million.

Most of the minerals were anthracite coals, the data showed. This year, of 8.42 million tons, 8.19 tons were anthracites.

China is the sole major ally and the biggest economic benefactor for North Korea, a reclusive regime under international economic sanctions following its nuclear and long-range missile tests.

Cho Bong-hyun, an analyst at the IBK institute, said North Korea may be trying to earn much-needed hard currency as it aims to become a powerful and prosperous country by 2012.

“Last year, North Korea ordered its institutions to meet their goals in foreign currency income by this year,” Cho said. “Since exporting minerals is a military business, we can see that the military is trying to meet its target. In addition, the steep mineral export growth was attributable to the lifting of the cap on the amount of mineral exports, as ordered by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.”

China appears to be trying to stockpile mineral resources at affordable prices, Cho added. North Korean anthracites were traded at an average of $101 per ton, whereas the international standard for quality anthracites is $200 per ton.

“Given that North Korean coals are of very good quality, trade with China must have been made at a fairly low price,” Cho said.

Meanwhile, sources said North Korean authorities last month entirely halted its coal exports, as the impoverished country fears a shortage of energy resources during the upcoming winter.

From January to September this year, China exported 732,000 tons of minerals to North Korea, most of them crude oil.

Here is the IBK web page.  If anyone can find a copy of this report and send it to me to post, I would appreciate it.

Additional information:
1. The economics lessons: A. The more isolated the DPRK’s economy from the global trade and financial system, the greater monopsony power Chinese firms can exert on their North Korean trading partners. B. The rents earned in the current DPRK-China trade regime are visible and have organized constituencies.  Unfortunately the much greater gains that could be reaped if the North Korean economy was more open, integrated, and dynamic remain unseen and their potential beneficiaries remain unknown and unorganized.

2. The Nautilus Institute published a very interesting paper by Nathaniel Aden on China DPRK trade back in June. See it here.

3.  Here is the most recent US Geological Survey report on the DPRK’s mineral sector.

Read the Yonhap story here:
N. Korea’s mineral exports to China tripled from last year: study
Yonhap
2011-11-6

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-10-5

Dai Yulin, secretary of the Dandong Committee of the Communist Party of China, said in his interview with the China Daily on September 28 that concrete plans for the joint development projects between China and North Korea in the Hwanggumpyong and Rajin-Sonbong regions will be announced at the end of the year.

This past June, Dai stated both countries agreement to jointly develop Hwanggumpyong and Rajin-Sonbong as an economic development zone and reported smooth progress in its plans.

According to Secretary Dai, “The joint management committee between China and North Korea has already been formed to promote the Hamggumpyong development project. Both countries are getting up steam to advance the project.”

In addition Dai explained, “China has secured 10 square kilometers of national land to be used to support the joint development of Hamggumpyong.” He also added, “A think tank comprised of 72 experts was also established to advise and buttress the project.”

When DPRK Cabinet Premier Choe Yong Rim visited China last month, Dai commented, “Choe’s visit to China is underlined with North Korea’s strong interest in economic reform. All the high level officials in the economic sectors accompanied him on the trip.”

While visiting China for five days, Choe met with Premier Wen Jiabao and expressed strong motivation for strengthening trade and cooperation with China, especially to improve its infrastructure. He stated, “For those Chinese companies investing in North Korea, we will provide special accommodations to encourage more investments.” In response, Wen Jiabao commented, “China will do all it can to support North Korea, so that they may seek development method most appropriate for them.”

After the meeting between the two top officials, the two nations came to an agreement to cooperate in trade, investment, and infrastructure, resources and agriculture development.

Prior to meeting with Wen, Choe visited Lanxing Chemical Industrial Machine Co. After he paid his courtesy visit to President Hu Jintao of China in Beijing, he continued to make economic related visits to Baoshan Steel Group, Bailian Xijiao Goods Purchasing Center, and industrial facilities in Jiangsu Province.

After North Korea designated Hwanggumpyong Island as a free trade zone, China has signed a 50 year-lease agreement to develop the island. Despite being a “joint development” in name, in actuality, China has the exclusive development rights based on Chinese capital.

However, North Korea is requesting for revision of the name to “co-development between China and the DPRK,” a request that China is expressing some uneasiness over. The initial agreement was to “lease Hwanggumpyong Islands to China,” which gave exclusive and autonomous development and management rights to China in the zone.

China has articulated on many occasions the Hwanggumpyong project must be strictly based on market principles and expressed apprehension that Chinese businesses may be unwilling to invest in the area if North Korea continues to pursue to change it as a joint development.

Geoffrey See and Andray Abrahamian (both representatives of Choson Exchange) wrote an article in the Harvard International Review which asserts that economic successes are becoming more important to the political narratives that reinforce the DPRK leadership’s claims to legitimacy. Below is an excerpt from their article:

North Korea’s most important domestic policy statement comes each New Year, when the major newspapers publish a joint editorial. The editorial often signals where government priorities will be in the coming year. In 2010 the newspapers spoke of “Bring[ing] about a decisive change in the people’s lives by accelerating once again light industry and agriculture.” Similar themes were echoed in 2011. This is opposed to the joint editorials of the past few years, which have focused on the more traditional themes of military strength, revolution, and socialism.

Another public sign of a shift towards focusing on economic issues is the type of official visits and inspections carried out by Kim Jong Il. Following in the footsteps of his father, Kim uses these visits to signal emphasis or encouragement of specific industries, activities, and policies. According to a report by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, the first six months of 2011 have seen Kim exceptionally busy, participating in 63 official activities. Unlike previous years, however, the number of military visitations has dropped off: only 14 visits were military related, the lowest number ever recorded. By contrast, 28 visits were economic related.

In terms of policy, North Korea has been haltingly experimenting with Special Economic Zones (SEZ) since the mid-nineties, but has recently built a bit more momentum in this area. Rason, an SEZ in the far northeast, is finally seeing some basic infrastructure upgrades that were long talked about but always delayed. Government investment bodies have started to promote the idea that Rason will be the “next Singapore,” an ambitious marketing claim to anyone who has been to Rason. With both Russia and China leasing port space, it seems more likely to be transformed into a regional transportation hub. Meanwhile, along the Chinese border in the northwest, the Hwanggumpyong SEZ recently held a groundbreaking ceremony, attended by high-ranking North Korean officials and Wang Qishan, China’s commerce minister.

Senior politicians in North Korea are increasingly judged by their ability to bring in foreign direct investments. These efforts appear to be competitive rather than coordinated. North Korean leaders associated with the National Defense Commission, the highest level policy body, have been meeting with visiting foreign investors. In 2009, the Daepung International Investment Group was re-purposed along the lines of a holding company model as a vehicle for attracting foreign direct investment l with “27 joint ventures planned and to be managed by the Group.” Daepung Group is backed by specific high-level individuals. Jon Il-Chun, reportedly the Director of Office 39, a murky international trade and finance organ, is definitely involved with the Daepung Group. Media reports also indicate that Kim Yang Gon, Director of an organization tasked with managing contacts with South Korea, the United Front Department of the Workers’ Party, is also behind the group.

In July of the same year, the Joint Venture & Investment Commission (JVIC) was established. Instead of a holding company model, JVIC is a government institution modeled as a “one-stop shop” for investors – that is, JVIC is meant to “seek out investments and assist investors in setting up operations in North Korea.” While multiple institutions claiming to hold such authority have always existed in North Korea, many of these institutions have been merged into JVIC and long-time investors have been directed to liaise with JVIC as their primary government contact. JVIC’s nominal and public head is Ri Chol, a high-ranking North Korean government official.

In August of 2010, we received credible reports that foreign investors were approached to help set up a group similar to Daepung that would be backed by another member of the National Defense Commission. Given this proposed initiative’s similarities to Daepung, the prior establishment of JVIC, and that all three groups do not appear to communicate with each other, we surmise that these various groups have a competitive relationship with the support of different patrons. Investment officials with whom our teammates have met confirm that the relationship between the agencies is “very competitive.” If this is the case, it is a signal that influential groups in Pyongyang sense that future power bases will require the ability to attract and deploy capital.

The full article is worth reading here:
Harvard International Review
Geoffrey K. See and Andray Abrahamian
August 23, 2011