North Korean Economy Watch

Yahoo News
1/17/2006

North Korea’s state media said Wednesday that First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju congratulated the appointment of Nicaragua’s new foreign minister, a sign that Kang has become North Korea’s acting foreign minister after Paek Nam Sun’s death earlier in the month.

Kang “sent a congratulatory message to Samuel Santos Lopez upon his appointment as foreign minister of Nicaragua,” the Korean Central News Agency said.

Paek died Jan. 2. No announcement has been made regarding his successor.

Nautilus Institute
Bryan Port
1/17/2007

North Korea’s recent nuclear test clearly demonstrates that the Korean peninsula is the crux of Asian Security. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea’s official name, poses a range of challenges. Though the nuclear challenge appears to be the most extreme and urgent, developments in the DPRK could lead to violent conventional military spasms or humanitarian disaster, each with consequences as grave as those posed by DPRK weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Regardless of the challenges, Korea’s future has significant ramifications for the balance of power in East Asia and by extension on American security and prosperity. One day, DPRK leader Kim Chong-il will pass the keys to the kingdom and the nuclear launch codes to a successor. Kim’s choice and how he goes about the succession process will impact East Asia for decades and consequently requires significant consideration in US strategic planning.

Effective foreign policy requires an in depth understanding of the historical, social, and cultural context of other nations, their leaders, and their people. Though the DPRK is opaque, much is known about its history and even its people. From what we know we can develop significant insight. However, the balance of what we don’t know requires that we conduct considerable alternative analysis to define a range of possibilities to facilitate effective planning and policy development. Alternative analysis is imperative regarding the succession issue. Though it is nearly impossible to confidently predict who Kim will choose to succeed him, much less the successor’s prospects, analysts can define a range of plausible scenarios which can play a positive role in strategic planning, and leave the US a fighting chance of avoiding strategic surprise.

DPRK CONTEXT. Before analyzing scenarios for DPRK leadership succession, one must first consider the context and circumstances of the DPRK. The dearth of information available on the DPRK and its leaders can lead analysts to over emphasize a given aspect of the DPRK and through this narrow prism turn the DPRK into a caricature. We commonly see this in how the media and others portray Kim Chong-il. Analysts are also at risk of mirror imaging or applying one’s own cultural and historical frames of reference to the DPRK.

The DPRK is a deeply stratified society. An individual’s place in DPRK society is based largely on one’s family history (Songbun) and political reliability. Those with blood connections to Kim Il-sung or those who fought with Kim Il-sung against the Japanese (partisans), and their offspring, comprise the majority of the DPRK’s elites. It is rare for someone without this background to ascend to elite status in the DPRK. Some may gain a certain level of stability, power, or privilege, for example members of the military or scientists, however without the right bloodlines they will not climb to the pinnacle of power in the DPRK.

Despite its societal stratification, there is a shared societal and historical perspective that must be taken into account when thinking about North Korea or North Koreans. Understanding what the DPRK is, or understanding its leaders, requires placing oneself in the historical mindset of a North Korean. The DPRK is the most Orwellian society the world has ever known. The DPRK is not a communist nation; certainly not in the sense of Marx or the perversion of Marx that was the Soviet Union. North Korea has never known a pluralistic political system, much less democracy.

For nearly its entire history Korea has been a feudalistic society, constantly on the edge of survival at both the societal and individual level. Korea has been under constant threat of invasion. Koreans have struggled merely to subsist, with bouts of hunger or famine a common occurrence. Even in South Korea, stability, to say nothing of prosperity, is a recent development. It is only in the last 20 to 30 years that South Korea moved beyond its history.

Even for the most elderly of today’s North Koreans, the historical context is Japanese colonization, Korean War, emerging totalitarian state under Kim Il-sung, relative stability, Kim Chong-il’s accession to power, famine, and economic depression. North Koreans lack outside information and thus lack the basis for comparative thought about their society. Of course, comparative thought about politics presumes the freedom, sustenance, energy and time required to engage in political thought or activity. Only the elite in the DPRK are positioned to have the luxury of political thought, and they are the stakeholders in the current system.

Though it is difficult to understand from an American perspective, many in the DPRK, including its leaders, do genuinely fear the United States and for that matter other foreign powers including Japan and perhaps even China. This is based on Korea’s history of being subject to multiple foreign conquests and leads to the desire for self-sufficiency. Kim Il-sung very effectively manipulated this historical perspective and Kim Chong-il continues to do so.

DPRK CIRCUMSTANCES. The DPRK is in dire straights. A crumbling infrastructure, local ad hoc solutions to problems and corruption are the common denominators of government, economy, and society. Resources, privileges and even security are obtained through barter or by outright buying the services of a corrupt official. Almost everyone is corrupt from the lowest private in the Army to the senior members of the Korean Workers Party.

The DPRK remains a pervasive police state with a population that lacks even the most rudimentary elements of a functioning civil society. Though corrupt, the security services are powerful. While individuals within the security services are “for hire,” when the regime is threatened the security services can mobilize quickly and effectively against individual or group opposition, real or perceived.

Still, KCI cannot take for granted the continued effectiveness or loyalty of the security services. Although Kim has multiple security services to perform checks and balances, eventually the deterioration of ideological integrity, to say nothing of ruinous state of physical infrastructure and corruption, are emboldening entrepreneurial security personnel. More mischief is possible, and emboldened individuals are more likely to seek out other like-minded individuals, at first for profit, and then perhaps for power.

At this point it appears that members of the security services are happy to simply use and abuse their positions to survive, or in the case of senior members enrich themselves. However, the security services as a whole, and their individual members, will face tough questions about their futures deriving from succession. Some may still consider a successor in ideological terms. Is the successor worthy? Pure enough? Others may consider the successor in terms of their position in the security services and the maintenance of their privileged positions in society. Is the successor capable enough? Will they be demoted or purged? How the security services react to the successor issue will be a key determinant to the successful installation of a successor, and ultimately the stability of the DPRK.

DPRK ELITES. North Korea’s elites face a paranoid, schizophrenic existence. This is not to suggest that KCI, or other DPRK elites, suffer from mental disease. Though it is not unreasonable to believe that like people everywhere, even leaders, that some North Korean leaders suffer from mental illness. Rather, elites in the DPRK have much to loose in the event of political change and corresponding to the stakes are at best anxious and likely paranoid about maintaining their positions. The only person who is secure in his position in the current regime is Kim Chong-il.

Chang Song-taek is married to Kim Chong-il’s younger sister Kim Kyong-hui. Until 2003, Chang was considered the second most powerful man in the DPRK, and held the title of first deputy director of the Organization and Guidance Department. In 2003 KCI had Chang arrested. No one is certain as to the reasons for Chang’s fall from power, but speculation exists that Chang had been too overt in his support of Kim Chong-il’s oldest son, Kim Chong-nam, in the race for succession. Even though Chang has been rehabilitated and returned to a position of power, his situation shows that no member of the DPRK elite is secure. The security apparatus is ever present and mistakes often lead to a concentration camp or death.

North Korea’s elites face incredible challenges and pressure. They must at once protect their own interests and also take actions that preserve the regime, which is the source of their relatively privileged existence. These two goals are often at odds, and may even be mutually exclusive. North Korean elites must apply the filter of Juche ideology to their actions and/or be prepared to explain or justify actions in ideological terms.

Elites in the DPRK share in common with elites everywhere a calculating nature and wish to position themselves and their allies to survive and prosper in the future. For this reason, it is imperative for elites in the DPRK to analyze the succession issue, and conduct their affairs so as to maintain favor with KCI, but also be at the vanguard of a successor’s regime.

Some elites may reach the conclusion that Kim Chong-il’s successor has little chance of consolidating power. Such a determination requires not only confidence in predicting who KCI will choose, but also mandates determining who will be powerful enough to supplant the successor. Following is the even trickier task of currying favor with KCI, the individual they believe KCI will choose to succeed him, and the individual who they believe will actually take power.

At the top of the elite and the pinnacle of the succession issue is Kim Chong-il. Almost all of the analysis of the succession issue assumes that Kim will choose a successor and that it will be one of his sons. However, Kim has surprised us in the past and will likely do so again. Before moving on to consider a range of options available to KCI in terms of choosing a successor, it would help to more specifically consider the context and circumstances of Kim Chong-il.

KIM’S CONTEXT AND CIRCUMSTANCES. Even though we are not really able to understand how KCI views the world, we can roughly understand the context and circumstances in which KCI exists. Kim presides over a failed, if not collapsed, state. While North Korea’s military remains intact, it is not the existential threat to South Korea that it once was. Kim’s security services are effective, perhaps too effective. Kim must have multiple security services, not to produce the best intelligence or efficiently secure the state, but to watch one another.

China, North Korea’s one remaining ally of any significance, supports the DPRK for negative reasons. China doesn’t want to deal with the humanitarian consequences of a complete DRPK collapse. KCI and other DPRK elites must consider that China has significant potential to play an active role in the DPRK’s succession dilemma, and has ample motive to do so. Still, China is unlikely to be overt and direct in the application of its influence, knowing that doing so could prompt a backlash. However, China can indirectly bring its influence to bear on who KCI chooses as successor by providing access to resources and senior Chinese leaders to select North Korean elites. It is also likely not lost on DPRK elites that China has the capability to more directly intervene in North Korean politics should its vital interests be threatened.

South Korea is in much the same position as China in that it does not wish to deal with the humanitarian consequences of a complete DPRK collapse. However, South Korea has a significant financial stake and also a much more “personal” stake in the DPRK’s future. Collapse or violent military spasm on the part of the DPRK will be hugely costly to the South both in financial and human terms. Due to North Korea’s desperate situation, one cannot rule out that the DPRK could lash out, but truly North Korea’s only effective remaining leverage is the gun it holds to its own head (collapse) and the nuclear tipped missiles it claims to point elsewhere.

Although other countries disagree with US policy toward the DPRK, this does not mean they support the DPRK. Unfortunately for Kim, Japan, the one country that is most able to help the DPRK in the short term with cash and resources, is not inclined to do so for a variety of reasons, including the DPRK nuclear and missile threat to Japan, DPRK international criminal activity, and past DPRK abductions of Japanese citizens. About the only thing that may motivate Japan to reconsider its stance is the prospect of normalizing relations in the near-term to pay out its World War II reparations prior to a collapse of the DPRK to avoid potentially more responsibility in the event of a collapse and absorption of the North by the South.

KCI likely understands the Chinese, Japanese and South Korean perspective. Thus KCI likely appreciates not only the dire domestic straights of the DPRK, but also its grim international position.

NOT HIS FATHERS SON. Though Kim Il-sung (KIS) is not the man that DPRK propaganda portrays him to be, and though he is guilty of horrible crimes against humanity, Kim Il-sung did fight the Japanese and suffered in doing so. Through cunning and calculation, as well as brutality, KIS led the DPRK into existence. For much of the first half of its existence, the north outperformed the south. After the Korean War, life improved for many North Koreans under KIS and there was relative peace and the possibility of future prosperity. Still in spite of his power and the genuine love and respect of many in the DPRK, Kim Il-sung spent the better part of 20 years preparing to transfer power to KCI.

Kim Chong-il lacks the credibility and stature of his father. KCI never served in the military, much less fight in a war. Though he has displayed cunning and brutality, he did not overcome challenges on par with those faced by his father. Instead, whether it was completely his fault or not, since KCI assumed power in 1994, the DPRK has suffered military decline, economic failure, famine, and even in at least one case, organized resistance from the segment of society it most relies on, the military.

KCI faces significant challenges with respect not only to the succession issue, but generally with respect to running the DPRK. Conventional analysis assesses that KCI will choose a successor and that he will choose his second son Kim Chong-ch’ol. There is nothing that starkly contradicts the conventional wisdom, however, there is nothing that boldly confirms it either.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM. There are three acknowledged sons of Kim Chong-il. In order from oldest to youngest, KCI’s sons are Kim Chong-nam, Kim Chong-Ch’ol, and Kim Chong-un. The conventional wisdom holds that KCI will opt for one of his sons to succeed him, probably Kim Chong-ch’ol (KCC).

Until embarrassing his father in 2001 by being arrested in an attempt to visit Tokyo Disneyland, KCI appeared to favor Kim Chong-nam, even though there were few outward signs that a formal succession process had begun. Kim Chong-un is not considered a serious contender, if for no other reason than his age and the presence of two older brothers.

In the past year or so Kim Chong-ch’ol (KCC) has emerged as the front-runner. Indicators include Workers Party of Korea Central Committee Secretariat Instruction No. 0101 (Reported in South Korean Weekly Chosun magazine March 2006). According to this instruction, Kim Chong-ch’ol is the party’s nerve center.

There are several reports, conflicting in detail, but consistent in stating that KCC occupied a formal government position and that he has advanced to a more senior position. Pins and portraits of KCC have appeared, and the KWP has issued instructions on their wear and display. Additionally, some of KCC’s associates accompanied KCI on trip to China to observe economic development, and KCC himself has been in Europe on official business.

Even if KCI has resolved to anoint KCC as successor, that is not a guarantee that the succession itself will go smoothly or that KCC will be able to consolidate power. Many segments of the power elite will view KCC as weak. So long as Kim Chong-il remains a force to be reckoned with, opposition to KCC as successor would be controllable. However, as Kim becomes infirm or dies, challenges to KCC will mount. This will force KCC to share power or do the bidding of factions whose support he requires, presumably the security services or military.

Knowing that KCC may or will not be able to go it alone, KCI may opt to install KCC as ruler of the DPRK, but only as a front man for others who will actually wield power. There may be liberal elements of the power elite who favor Chinese like reform. Should they support KCC, they might be able to begin reviving the DPRK, particularly if they are willing to take steps to gain legitimacy in the international community. On the other hand, factions of the DPRK elite pessimistic about their status in a reformed DPRK, concerned that KCC is too weak to control factions hostile to them, or critical as to KCC’s ability to control the country as could seek to overthrow KCC or force him to keep the DPRK on its present course.

There are other mo[r]e Machiavellian possibilities. KCI may be using KCC to flush out dissent, in effect using KCC as a lightening rod. Due to Kim’s advancing age, questionable health, and the poor condition of the DPRK, many elites are likely questioning their future prospects in terms of not only prosperity, but also basic stability and even survival. At some point, for example if KCI should become infirm or seriously ill, the concerns of the DPRK elite could reach a tipping point. It would be prudent to flush out the most disaffected among the North Korean elite now, rather than later. To this end KCC could serve as a useful target and distraction.

ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS. KCI in his switch from Kim Chong-nam to Kim Chong-ch’ol demonstrated that he is flexible with respect to his choice of successor and has not taken any irreversible steps in designating KCC as successor. However, this will be the 2nd succession in the DPRK and thus there is little ground to talk about patterns or precedent. Conventional wisdom has often not held when analyzing the DPRK, making alternative analysis imperative.

It is important to remember that Kim Il-sung (KIS) spent 20 years preparing for KCI to assume power, and still upon Kim Il-sung’s sudden death in 1994 it took several more years for KCI to consolidate power. Between KCI’s health and the challenges faced by the DPRK it is not at all certain that KCI has 20 years to lay the foundation for one of his sons to assume power, assuming that this is what KCI actually intends and that it is possible to accomplish another hereditary transfer of power.

If not Kim Chong-Ch’ol then who? What other options are there for KCI? Is the choice entirely Kim Chong-il’s to make? KCI lacks the stature of Kim Il-sung and the DPRK faces significant challenges. Even Kim Il-sung faced resistance in installing his son as ruler. KCI will face challenges greater than those faced by his father, and from a weaker position in terms of his credentials, the current situation in the DPRK, and his very legitimacy.

North Korean society is still rooted in Confucian values, even though those values are distorted by North Korea’s ideology (Juche). Thus other Kim family members warrant consideration, including Kim Chong-il’s daughter Kim Sol-song, his half brother Kim P’yong-il, and Chang Song-t’aek or Chang’s children.

Kim Sol-song is Kim Chong-il’s daughter by Kim Yong-suk (Kim Chong-il’s official wife and the only one recognized by Kim Il-sung). There are reports that she currently handles important aspects of her father’s life, including his personal security. Even if not succeeding KCI she could act in a powerful supporting role, even key decision making role, to Kim Chong-ch’ol, or other successor.

Kim P’yong-il is KCI’s half brother. By some accounts, Kim P’yong-il is everything that KCI is not. P’yong-il was an active duty military officer that had genuine respect from many in the military. It is not entirely clear how KCI edged him out as successor, but it is conceivable that Kim Il-sung favored KCI, viewing P’yong-il as a threat. It is also likely that P’yong-il is not ruthless enough to rule the DPRK. Since 1988 P’yong-il has served in a series of ambassadorships, primarily in Europe.

Bearing in mind the North Koreans mindset, P’yong-il would make a good transitional figure. He carries the Kim name, and perhaps continuity with Kim Il-sung’s interrupted dreams for the DPRK. While he would certainly face opposition from segments of the elite, P’yong-il has a huge advantage in that he would likely garner the support of the military. There is a good chance based on his personal background that P’yong-il would change the course of the country. Of course KCI won’t choose P’yong-il, but in the event that Kim fails to entrench a successor, waits too long, or simply does not choose, P’yong-il becomes viable for segments of the elite concerned about their future status.

Chang Song-t’aek is married to Kim Chong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hui and has powerful family ties to the military. Though recently purged and rehabilitated, Chang has been and is now again a powerful player in the DPRK. Even if he is unlikely to succeed KCI, Chang can still influence the succession issue. KCI might have purged Chang due to Chang’s view on the succession issue, but a rehabilitated Chang will likely not have changed his mind on the subject, but now knows to be more careful.

Chang’s children carry as much of Kim Il-sung’s blood as the children of KCI. There are not presently any signs that Chang’s children are under consideration, at least as far as KCI is concerned. However, they are out there and should KCI loose control over the process, or should other alternative scenarios play out, Chang’s children are viable alternates, particularly as a figure head for a king maker.

BEYOND FAMILY. There are other forces beside Confucianism at work in the DPRK, thus requiring consideration of other succession scenarios including king maker/power sharing, alternate successors, and even that Kim may have no intention of choosing a successor.

Realizing that any one individual is not likely to be powerful enough to rule, KCI may intend to set up a kingmaker(s) to support his successor. KCI may even prefer that his successor require behind the scenes support. If his chosen successor will be too weak to supplant him, KCI can be confident that he can continue to exercise power out front or behind the scenes until his death. Further, KCI could co-opt some of the most effective challengers to his successor and reward them for present good deeds, helping to ensure loyalty.

It is conventional wisdom that KCI desires to anoint one of his sons, or at least a relative, as the next leader of the DPRK. What if he doesn’t? There are scenarios where it is not beneficial to KCI to see one of his blood relatives assume power.

KCI is almost certainly aware that his sons might not be competent enough or ruthless enough to run the DPRK. Even if KCI is still alive and active, he may be unable to stave off his opponents once a successor is appointed or operating. This could have dire consequences for KCI.

History weighs heavily on the minds of dictators, and the fate of other dictators, such as Romanian leader Ceausescu or Cambodia’s Pol Pot likely weigh on Kim’s mind. KCI could seek a successor with the requisite competence to ensure that he doesn’t meet a similar fate. This may lead Kim to choose someone other than his sons. Such a choice, though not comporting well with Confucian values, might ultimately serve KCI well.

Moving further along the spectrum of alternative analysis, what if the most prudent move for KCI is to not name a successor at all. The mere act of naming a successor creates a focal point for opposition. Ironically, at the same time, naming a successor could also set of[f] infighting to curry favor with the chosen successor at Kim’s expense drawing from Kim’s power base. Those patient and shrewd enough could hold fast making a power play at a point in time where KCI is weakening, but the successor is not strong enough to consolidate power.

Alternative power bases might not matter if the successor is not competent enough to consolidate power. The weakened state of the DPRK and Kim’s lack of legitimacy compared to his father could lead Kim to plan to die in office or abdicate at some point to avoid empowering and facing potential adversaries while still in office; something which could lead to his own demise.

One final possibility deserves consideration. KCI could die suddenly as did his father. For the US and the DPRK’s neighbors, the key concerns remain the same and center on DPRK WMD and the possibility of extreme instability that could result in outward military spasms or complete collapse.

Under a sudden death scenario, whatever steps had been made toward anointing a successor may not matter. Opponents to KCI’s choice may likewise be neutralized. It could all boil down to which of the key players learns of KCI’s death first, and whether or not they can control the news, acting quickly to capitalize on their first mover’s advantage. A particularly ruthless individual could quickly act against the key players most threatening to them, changing the whole power dynamic, regardless of whether they are ultimately successful in assuming power. It is difficult to analyze what KCI might do in terms of a deliberate succession process. It is close to impossible to analyze how a sudden death scenario would play out.

The recent nuclear tests serve to highlight the importance of the succession issue to the US and the DPRK’s neighbors. While external reasoning may have lead KCI to test a nuclear device, it is more likely that internal considerations are driving decisions not only on WMD development, but also on the issue of leadership succession in the DPRK. It is even possible that KCI conducted the nuclear test to shore up his legitimacy by doing something his father never managed to accomplish. Possibly due to concerns over succession or just internal dynamics, KCI may also have conducted the tests to strengthen his domestic powerbase and position with the military.

No matter what KCI decides in terms of succession, the consequences could include a twenty something year old leader with nuclear weapons or a collapsed state ultimately resulting in a re-unified nuclear Korea. Regardless of how the succession issue plays out, Korea will continue to be integral to US and East Asian security and prosperity.

Yonhap
1/17/2007

North Korea has failed to deliver on its promise to distribute food rations across the communist country on the occasion of the New Year, a civic aid group said Wednesday.

“Except for Pyongyang, no special New Year food rations were issued,” Good Friends, a Seoul-based civic relief organization, said in its latest monthly newsletter.

The group said that North Korean authorities had planned to provide food rations equal to the daily household consumption of rice across the country, but three days worth of rice and 500 grams of bean oil were distributed only for residents in Pyongyang.

“Mid-level officials living in Pyongyang received food rations to last a half month and electricity was provided for the city during the New Year,” it said.

North Korea has suffered from a chronic food shortage since the mid 1990s due to a series of natural disasters aggravated by an overall economic downturn. However, the North had always managed to prioritize food distribution to ensure the inhabitants of the capital Pyongyang do not go without it, experts say.

Heritage 2007 Index of Economic Freedom

North Korea’s economy is 3% free, according to our 2007 assessment, which makes it the world’s least free economy, or 157th out of 157 countries. North Korea is ranked 30th out of 30 countries in the Asia–Pacific region, and its overall score is the lowest in the world.

North Korea does not score well in a single area of economic freedom, although it does score 10 percent in investment freedom and property rights. The opening of the Kaesong industrial venture in cooperation with South Korea has been a start in foreign investment.

Business freedom, investment freedom, trade freedom, financial freedom, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom are nonexistent. All aspects of business operations are totally controlled and dominated by the government. Normal foreign trade is almost zero. No courts are independent of political interference, and private property (particularly land) is strictly regulated by the state. Corruption is virtually immeasurable and, in the case of North Korea, hard to distinguish from necessity. Much of North Korea’s economy cannot be measured, and world bodies like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are not permitted to gather information. Our policy is to give countries low marks for specific freedoms when it is country policy to restrict measurement of those freedoms.

Background:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has maintained its Communist system since its founding in 1948. A serious economic decline began in the early 1990s with the end of economic support from the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc countries, including China. Floods and droughts all but destroyed the agricultural infrastructure and led to severe famine and dislocation of the population during the 1990s. South Korean and Chinese investments in the economy have alleviated dire conditions. The government continues to rely on counterfeiting foreign currency and sales of missiles for money. That and the nuclear ambitions and isolationism of Kim Jong Il reinforce North Korea’s status as the hermit kingdom.

Business Freedom – 0.0%
The state regulates the economy heavily through central planning. The economic reforms implemented in 2002 allegedly brought some changes at the enterprise and industrial level, but government regulations make the creation of any entrepreneurial activities virtually impossible. The overall freedom to start, operate, and close a business is extremely restricted by the national regulatory environment.

Trade Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls all imports and exports, and formal trade is minimal. Data on North Korean trade are limited and compiled from trading partners’ statistics. Most North Korean trade is de facto aid, mainly from North Korea’s two main trading partners, China and South Korea. Non-tariff barriers are significant. Inter-Korean trade remains constrained in scope by North Korea’s difficulties with implementing needed reform. Given the lack of necessary tariff data, a score of zero is assigned.

Fiscal Freedom – 0.0%
No data on income or corporate tax rates are available. Given the absence of published official macroeconomic data, such figures as are available with respect to North Korea’s government expenditures are highly suspect and outdated.

Freedom from Government – 0.0%
The government owns all property and sets production levels for most products, and state-owned industries account for nearly all GDP. The state directs all significant economic activity. The government implemented limited economic reforms, such as changes in foreign investment codes and restructuring in industry and management, in 2002.

Monetary Freedom – 0.0%
In July 2002, North Korea introduced price and wage reforms that consisted of reducing government subsidies and telling producers to charge prices that more closely reflect costs. However, without matching supply-side measures to boost output, the result of these measures has been rampant inflation for many staple goods. With the ongoing crisis in agriculture, the government has banned sales of grain at markets and returned to a rationing system. Given the lack of necessary inflation data, a score of zero is assigned.

Investment Freedom – 10.0%
North Korea does not welcome foreign investment. One attempt to open the economy to foreigners was its first special economic zone, located at Rajin-Sonbong in the northeast. However, Rajin-Sonbong is remote and still lacks basic infrastructure. Wage rates in the special zone are unrealistically high, as the state controls the labor supply and insists on taking its share. More recent special zones at Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong are more enticing. Aside from these few economic zones where investment is approved on a case-by-case basis, foreign investment is prohibited.

Financial Freedom – 0.0%
North Korea is a Communist command economy and lacks a private financial sector. The central bank also serves as a commercial bank with a network of local branches. The government provides most funding for industries and takes a percentage from enterprises. There is an increasing preference for foreign currency. Foreign aid agencies have set up microcredit schemes to lend to farmers and small businesses. A rumored overhaul of the financial system to permit firms to borrow from banks has not materialized. Because of debts dating back to the 1970s, most foreign banks will not consider entering North Korea. A South Korean bank has opened a branch in the Kaesong zone. The state holds a monopoly on insurance, and there are no equity markets.

Property Rights – 10.0%
Property rights are not guaranteed in North Korea. Almost all property belongs to the state, and the judiciary is not independent.

Freedom from Corruption – 10.0%
North Korea’s informal market is immense, especially in agricultural goods, as a result of famines and oppressive government policies. There is also an active informal market in currency and in trade with China.

Labor Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls and determines all wages. Since the 2002 economic reforms, factory managers have had more autonomy to set wages and offer incentives, but the labor market still operates under highly restrictive employment regulations that seriously hinder employment and productivity growth.

Aidan Foster-Carter
Nautilus Institute
1/16/2007

Everyone is famous for 15 minutes, at least according to the late American pop artist and cultural icon Andy Warhol.

For Paek Nam Sun, that was literally true. North Korea’s foreign minister since 1998, who has just died, hit the headlines just once in all his 77 years – and then only on the inside pages, mainly of the regional press in Asia.

Coffee with evil in Brunei

That was in August 2002, when for a quarter of an hour Paek sipped coffee with his rather better known US opposite number at the time, Colin Powell. The place was Brunei; the occasion, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Senior American and North Korean leaders rarely meet at the best of times, which this was not. Earlier that year, President George W Bush had famously labeled Kim Jong Il’s regime, along with Iran and Iraq, as part of an “axis of evil”. So for his Secretary of State to dally thus with the enemy, even briefly, raised eyebrows in some quarters.

We know now, as suspected at the time, that Powell was keen to engage North Korea. But vice-president Dick Cheney was dead against, and Cheney had Bush’s ear.

Any hopes of renewed dialogue were dashed later in 2002. Accused by Washington of a second, covert nuclear programme, North Korea restarted its first one precipitating a crisis that continues, climaxing (so far) in its testing a nuclear device on October 9.

Paek low in the pecking order

With the nuclear crisis ongoing, we might have expected to see more of Paek Nam Sun. But they do things differently in North Korea.

A senior diplomat (and sometime ambassador to Poland) who had also been active in early contacts with South Korea since the 1970s, as foreign minister the genial Paek was a largely ceremonial figure: trundled out for occasions like the ARF. As such he was in Kuala Lumpur last July, where he reportedly also had medical treatment.

Serious negotiations, on the other hand, were and are the province of Paek’s nominal deputies: two above all. The better known is deputy foreign minister Kim Kye Gwan, who heads Pyongyang’s delegation to the on-off six party nuclear talks. A skilled and confident negotiator, Kim even gave an unscripted if brief press conference after the latest round of talks, held in Beijing last month, ended inconclusively.

But the real heavy hitter is first vice foreign minister Kang Sok Ju. He it was who negotiated the October 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework (AF); defusing an earlier North Korean nuclear crisis (plus ca change), back in the Bill Clinton era, which in mid-1994 had come perilously close to unleashing a second Korean War. If the six-party process ever gets anywhere, which is doubtful, Kang will be wheeled on again. For now, the more junior Kim Kye Gwan does the honours.

Puzzling pseudonymy

So Paek Nam Sun’s passing will hardly send a tremor through North Korea’s foreign policy. But it does shed light on the curious way they order matters in Pyongyang.

For one thing, what was his real name? The man who first showed up in the 1970s for Red Cross talks with South Korea was known as Paek Nam Jun. But after he became foreign minister, the J mysteriously morphed into an S.

Peculiar, but not unique. Ri Jong Hyok, Pyongyang’s current point man for ties with Seoul, was Ri Dong Hyok in the 1980s when he headed North Korea’s quasi-embassy in Paris. There are several other such cases. It’s hardly a disguise, so what gives?

(En passant, the French connection is intriguing. Nominally the last EU state to resist full recognition of the DPRK, in practice France has hosted a North Korean legation since the 1970s. And both Kang Sok Ju and Kim Kye Gwan majored in French: the traditional language of international diplomacy.)

Dying off

Another oddity: North Korean elites hardly ever retire. Like Paek, they mostly die in post, often at an advanced age. Communist regimes tend to gerontocracy: think China, at least until recently. But North Korea has taken this, like most things, to extremes.

Since Kim Jong Il succeeded his father Kim Il Sung as leader in 1994, the nominally ruling communist party, the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK), seems to be frozen – at least at the top. No new appointments to the Politburo have been announced in over a decade. Instead its ranks have been thinned by the remorseless march of mortality.

Latest to go was Kye Ung Tae, who as KWP secretary for national security wielded far more power than Paek Nam Sun. Kye died of lung cancer on November 23, aged 81. That leaves just six full Politburo members. One anti-Japanese guerilla veteran and honorary vice president Pak Song Chol passed 93 last September. Three others are over 80. Titular head of state Kim Yong Nam turns 79 on February 4, just before the “dear leader” Kim Jong Il a mere lad by comparison reaches his 65th birthday.

That would be retiring age in most normal countries. But Kim Jong Il has yet to name a successor, among several competing sons and other contenders. His health is said to be not of the best although such rumors have proved premature in the past.

A nuclear North Korea is indeed a worry, but it is not the only one. The world, and even Pyongyang, will take the death of Paek Nam Sun (who?) in its stride. But Kim Jong Il could go just as suddenly. In that case all bets for North Korea would be off.

KCNA
1/15/2007

Officials of the Ministry of Power Industry, with a sense of responsibility for a pilot in the building of an economic power, are working hard to make an epochal turn in the power production from the outset of the year. Pak Nam Chil, minister of the Power Industry, told KCNA:

The ministry is concentrating all the forces on operating the already repaired generating equipment at full capacity, while considerably raising the existing capacities of the thermal- and hydro-power stations across the country.

In particular, it is gearing up preparations for the general overhaul of facilities at the power stations with main emphasis on putting production of the Pukchang Thermal-power Complex and the Pyongyang Thermal-power Complex on normal track.

The workers of the hydropower stations are successfully carrying on the repair of hydraulic power structures, managing water well and operating them in a scientific and technical way. Great efforts are channeled to manufacturing highly efficient turbines so as to boost the turbine efficiency.

Along with this, they are taking various measures to make best use of the produced electricity. They are readjusting the power transmission system to reduce the line loss and distributing electricity in a rational way.

Officials, workers and technicians of power stations in different parts of the country including the Chongjin Thermal-power Plant have turned out in the increased production of electricity, solving the needed materials and equipment components with their own efforts.

Korea times
Andrei Lankov
1/15/2007

Some time in the late 1940s, a young Russian journalist made a tour of the Mt. Kumgang, accompanied by a local official. The numerous Buddhist temples scattered in the valleys attracted his attention, but the official assured the Soviet visitor: “Do not worry, we will take care of them. We will close most of them, and will find a good use for others _ like, say, resorts for the working masses.”

It is difficult to say what the journalist felt back then, but when he recalled this episode in the early 1980s in his memories, his disdain was palpable. But this is indeed what happened to many _ indeed, most _ Buddhist temples in North Korea.

For decades, the North Korean state was almost unique in its hostility to all forms of religion. Indeed, few if any Communist states ever came close to proclaiming and enforcing a complete ban on all kinds of religious activity _ aside from North Korea, such a ban existed only in Albania, another ultra-Stalinist state (Pol Pot introduced the same policy in his infamous “Democratic Kampuchea,” but he did not stay in power long enough).

In the late 1980s, a very limited amount of religious activity came to be tolerated, but for some 25 years, between 1960 and 1985, North Korea had neither temples nor officially recognized religious groups.

However, if all religions are bad for the North Korean authorities, not all of them are equally bad. Some of them are worse, while others were ranked as marginally more tolerable.

For the North Korean regime in its early years, it was the Christianity that was clearly seen as an embodiment of evil.

This attitude was prompted by the fact that Christianity was a recent introduction, with too, too strong connections to foreign powers, above all, to the United States. It was both “reactionary” (as every religion) and anti-national.

The most acceptable religion probably was Chondogyo, or the Teaching of the Celestial Way. Nowadays, this eclectic cult has somewhat waned and does not play a major role in either Korea, but for a century, from the 1860s to the 1940s, it was a important force in the spiritual life of the country.

Its leaders and activists were prominent in two major outbreaks of the nationalist movement _ the Tonghak Uprising of the 1890s and the March First Movement of 1919, and this tradition made the North Korean authorities somewhat more tolerant towards it.

Buddhism fell somewhere between. It could not boast the nationalist credentials of Chondogyo _ on the contrary, in the colonial era many Buddhists collaborated with the Japanese (as a matter of fact, some colonial administrators saw Buddhism as the “religion of empire” and actively promoted it). At the same time, it did not have Christianity’s close associations with “imperialist” powers.

The land reform of 1946, proclaimed by the North Korean authorities (but actually designed by the Soviet military) inflicted the first major strike on Buddhism, and all land holdings of religious institutions were confiscated. This left the monks without any means of existence and drove many of them from the monasteries.

To keep the Buddhists under control, the Korean Buddhist Union was created in late 1945 as an umbrella organization. It did not so much represent the believers as make them accountable to the emerging state bureaucracy. This was a standard device: Similar bodies were created for other religions as well.

While all Christian churches ceased to function immediately after the Korean War, services were held in some Buddhist temples until the early 1960s. It is even possible, even if not particularly likely, that some services continued through the dark age of North Korean religious history, the period between 1960 and 1980.

Of course, the former Buddhist monks were subjected to strict surveillance and numerous restrictions were placed on their social advancement. However, it seems that they fared better than former Christian activists and priests.

The Buddhist Union was quietly disbanded in 1965 _ at least, for years nothing was heard about this body for nearly a decade, and in all probability it fell out of existence for some time. However, from around 1975 the representatives of the North Korean Buddhist Association were again seen at international gatherings where they scorned the U.S. imperialist warmongers and their South Korean puppets, all the while explaining how happy the masses in their country were to be led by the “Great Leader.”

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a large-scale restoration of old Buddhist temples, and these days there are 63 officially recognized temples in North Korea. Some of them are allegedly used for religious services, but it is not clear when the services are real and when they are nothing but carefully staged performances for the sake of foreign visitors. It is known that nowadays there are some 300 monks in the North, all receiving their wages from the state and taking care of the temples.

Thus, by the standards of North Korean religious policy, the treatment of Buddhism was not particularly harsh. However, it seems that Buddhism is not positioned to experience a dramatic revival in future. It appears that the North will eventually go Christian, and this Christianity is likely to be of a radical, nearly fundamentalist, variety. At least this is what can be guessed from the study of the events of the recent decade.

Joon Ang Daily
Ser Myo-ja
1/4/2007

Since its founder Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, North Korea’s political landscape has been transformed dramatically, and military officials have solidified their standing in the power elite of the communist country.

They have elbowed aside civilian politicians and bureaucrats, a new analysis shows, and the data confirm that the North’s “Military first” political slogan is much more than rhetoric.

In 1994, North Korea published a list of 273 people making up a committee to plan the founder’s funeral. That list also contained the seating order for those dignitaries at the funeral ― an accurate reflection of the pecking order in the North’s hierarchy at the time.

A JoongAng Ilbo special reporting team, its Unification Research Institute and Cyram, a research firm specializing in social network analyses, compared that 1994 rank order with data drawn from profiles of 324 North Korean figures provided by the Unification Ministry and the National Intelligence Service. The researchers ranked the top 50 North Korean figures after Kim Jong-il, the current leader and son of the late president, and compared that new list to the data from 12 years ago. The 2006 rankings took account of the officials’ titles and their roles, how often they have accompanied Mr. Kim on his frequent “site inspection” tours, seating charts and ranks announced by Pyongyang last year for several political events and evaluations by specialists in North Korean affairs.

“Kim Yong-nam is the official head of state in North Korea, but he acts as a subordinate to Kim Jong-il at public events,” said Chon Hyun-joon, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification. “In order to find out who actually is capable of controlling people, money and policies in North Korea, we have to use a special approach.”

On the new list, Mr. Kim, whose official title is chairman of the National Defense Commission, sits atop the hierarchy. Jo Myong-rok, the first vice chairman of the defense commission, was ranked second and Kim Yong-nam, head of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, was ranked third. The Supreme People’s Assembly is the North’s legislative body, but it normally delegates most of its power to the Presidium, a core group of elected members.

Jon Byong-ho, a Workers’ Party secretary, and Kim Il-chol, minister of the People’s Armed Forces, are ranked fourth and fifth. The Workers’ Party has been the only party in the North since 1948, except for a few parties that exist on paper as counterparts for foreign social democrats, for example. The Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces is responsible for the management and operational control of the North’s military. It is directly controlled by the National Defense Commission, which Kim Jong-il heads.

Kim Yong-chun, the Army chief of staff, was ranked seventh on the new list, followed by Pak Pong-ju, the premier.

Comparing the new rankings with the 1994 list, only two people ― Kim Jong-il and Kim Yong-nam ― kept their top-10 posts in 2006. Among the top 51, only 16 still remain in power.

The comparison showed a clear shift in the job titles represented in the elite. During the Kim Il Sung era, members of the politburo and Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, the cabinet, the military, the Supreme People’s Assembly and some other organizations were all represented in the power elite. With the party at the center, the officials were balanced, presumably in an effort to avoid concentrations of political power and possible threats to Kim Il Sung’s leadership.

But North Korea under his son is dominated by the “Dear Leader,” as North Koreans refer to him, and the National Defense Commission members.

Military officials surged to the top over the 12 years. On the 2006 list, the top 50 North Koreans after Kim Jong-il include 12 military men, up from five in 1994. Ri Yong-mu, the vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, was ranked ninth in 2006, climbing from 55th on the 1994 list. Mr. Kim’s three favorite generals, Hyon Chol-hae, Pak Jae-gyong and Ri Myong-su, were added to the new top-50 list. They have appeared frequently at Mr. Kim’s side on his inspection tours throughout the past year. In addition to the 12 flag officers, five other men in the top 50 are also involved in military matters.

In 1994, 25 Workers’ Party members were ranked among the top 50 leaders; that number increased to 27 in 2006. People in charge of party organization and propaganda were prominent on the list. North Korea appeared to have put lesser value on bureaucrats and economists as the Kim Jong-il regime has progressed. Eighteen bureaucrats and economic officials were on the 1994 roster, but the number dropped to six in the new list. In 1998, the North revised its Constitution, dropping vice presidents and the prime minister’s staff. That change could be one of the reasons for the relative scarcity of administrative officials on the new list.

Some analysts had a different interpretation: The lack of bureaucratic power officials in the list, they suggested, reflected Kim Jong-il’s priority of defending his regime rather than rebuilding the nation’s shattered economy.

North Korea watchers also said Mr. Kim runs the communist country by directly controlling the military, the party and the cabinet by stacking those institutions with people personally loyal to him. “Since 1998, Mr. Kim has issued orders under the title of the National Defense Commission, but Pyongyang-watchers were unable to confirm that he was actually presiding at the commission meetings,” said Chon Hyun-joon of the Korea Institute for National Unification. “The North’s power is concentrated in Mr. Kim alone, and there is a limit on how much authority he can exercise directly. In recent times, Mr. Kim appears to have handed over some of his powers to his closest confidants.”

The research also showed that a complex network of blood, school and career ties weaves the top 50 leaders together. Of the 50, at least 30 are members of that network; no information was available on the family, schools and careers of 11 of the other 20; at least some are probably bound up in that web.

“During the Kim Il Sung era, the official ranking showed the strength of each individual’s power,” said Hyon Song-il, a former North Korean diplomat who is now a researcher at the National Security and Unification Policy Research Institute. “In the era of Kim Jong-il, becoming his confidant means power.”

The North’s top 50 people include six of Mr. Kim’s family members. School ties among Kim Il Sung University graduates were also visible; 22 are alumni of the North’s prestigious school.

The 35 vacancies on the list between 1994 and 2006 were all filled by Kim Jong-il loyalists. Among the absentees, 16 either died of natural causes or were executed. Oh Jin-wu, known as Kim Il Sung’s right arm, and Ri Jong-ok, the North’s vice president, died naturally; So Kwan-hi, the party’s agriculture secretary, was reportedly executed in 1997, along with other officials, to appease anger over the famine of the late 1990s.

Hwang Jang-yop, who was ranked 26th on the 1994 list, defected to South Korea. Kim Chol-su, the 22nd most influential person in the North in 1994, was later identified as Song Du-yul, a scholar who is now a German citizen, by intelligence authorities and prosecutors in Seoul.

There is little room for women in the North’s elite, both in 1994 and 2006. In 1994, two women were among the top 50 officials, but the number fell to one in 2006. Kim Kyong-hee, the light industry department head of the Workers’ Party, is Mr. Kim’s younger sister.

KCNA
1/11/2007

The Pyongyang Law Office, an independent corporate body, has started its operation to provide services for the solution of legal matters arising in various sectors. Ho Yong Ho, chief of the office, told KCNA that his office provides legal services upon application and assignment by foreign-invested businesses (equity or contractual joint ventures and wholly-foreign owned enterprises) and Koreans in overseas as well as by the institutions, establishments, organizations and citizens at home.

As for the categories of services, he said:

It introduces the laws and regulations of the DPRK on foreign-related matters, Kaesong Industrial Zone, Kumgangsan Tourist Zone and others.

It also holds legal consultations concerning the selection of the investment project, establishment and operation of foreign businesses, dissolution and bankruptcy of businesses, concerning documents of legal nature including feasibility study reports and memorandum of association, concerning trade, transport, finance, insurance, intellectual property, real property and concerning civil law relations between corporate bodies, corporate body and individual and so on.

Legal services are offered on the principle of fairness, promptness and legality and on the basis of the facts, laws and contracts, while the service performer is held accountable before the party concerned and the law for the service offered.

Application for the legal service may be made in person or written form, or by means of communications device. Foreign investors are well advised to consult the office prior to their investment in the DPRK, which will prove a wise choice for the guarantee of their investment security.

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
1/10/2007

“North Korea’s Idolization – 40% of National Budget”
Enshrining Kim Il Song’s body at Kumsu Mountain Mausoleum – $890m

[edited-I shortened it a bit and corrected the author’s cinfusion of Kim Jong Il with Kim il Sung]

As Kim Jong Il made his appearance on the scene as successor in the 70’s, within 10 years the entire nation was covered with statues, and even today construction has not stopped.

Recently, historical monuments to Kim Jong Il’s great deeds have been constructed. at Jakangdo Weewon Electric Power Plant, North Pyongan Province Changsong County, Yupyong; South Hamkyong Province Yonpo; North Pyongan Province, Hyangsan County, Sangso-ri; and Yomju County Yongbok-ri, Bakchon County, Dansan-ri.

At recently constructed monuments, mosaics of Kim Chong Sok (Kim Jong Il’s birth mother) made of colored glass, tiles, and natural stone are prevalent.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Il is not wasting money worthlessly by creating this idolization propaganda. The reason that the construction of these monuments has not stopped, even during a period of economic crisis, is because his intention is to use the vulnerabilities of citizens and young people to induce a spirit of sacrifice as they gaze on the Great Leader and the General (Kim Jong Il)

Of course, although among adults there are not many who like Kim Jong Il, he is the leader of the country and is still going strong, the intention is to arm the youth with a way of thinking that tells them it is wrong to betray the General.

140,000 Idolization Propaganda Items

The most representative of all of the idolization propaganda is [Kimil sungs] resting place at the Gumsusan Masoleum.

In addition to the Masoleum, if you include the entire collection of each type of Kim il Sung idolization statues, Revolutionary Spirit Institutes, Historical Places, Battlefields, On-the-Spot Guidance Memorials, Eternal Towers, Slogan Boards and Engraved Slogans, and (the Kim) family’s idolization propaganda materials, the figure reaches about 140,000.

There are about 70 statues of [Kim il Sung] nationwide, erected on the hill at Mansudae and at each Province location. While there are [Kim il Sung] statues in the gardens of each National Security Agency building, there are Kim Father and Son plaster figures at each of the Research Institutes.

Nationwide, there are 200 Kim Father and Son Research Institutes; one large scale facility in each city and county, one each at national government and cabinet level agencies, and one at each of the city and county offices subordinate to the People’s Safety Agency, Regional Public Security Office, and the National Security Agency have been constructed. The size, furnishings, and maintenance of these institutes are better than that found in museums in the South.

Additionally, although small in size, Kim Father and Son Research Institutes can be found at each village and labor district. As there are about 30 villages and labor districts in each city-county, nationwide there are about 6,000 (200 X 30 = 6,000) of these institutes. The condition and furnishings of these buildings are the best in North Korea.

In the villages or labor districts, one of these institutes can be found at each subordinate farm, large operational team, 2nd Class and higher agricultural enterprises, and at each North Korean Army battalion and larger size unit. Taking these into account, nationwide there appear to be tens of thousands of these Kim Father and Son Institutes.

In the countryside, one can find representative idolization and propaganda figures nationwide in the construction of Eternal Towers and Jongil Peaks at Kumgang Mountain, Myohyang Mountain, etc., and slogans idolizing Kim Father and Son can be found on natural rocks.

The Eternal Tower found at the center of every province, city, county, and labor district nationwide, is commonly referred to as the “Longevity Tower.” The tower was inscribed with “We respectfully wish for our Great Leader’s longevity,” however, after Kim Il Song’s death in July of 1994, the inscription was changed to “”The Great Leader is with us forever.”

During 1996-1997, when millions starved to death, the citizens complained loudly about the importation of granite and special cement from overseas for use in the construction of these towers.

Constructing Idols with Special Materials Imported from Overseas

The statues and gypsum figures found at the Kim Father and Son Institutes, as well as other art forms are created and maintained by Art Creation Companies located in each of the Provinces, including the Mansu Dae Creative Company, and the April 15 Cultural Creative Team.

Within the Mansu Dae Creative Company is separated by categories consisting of the Arts and Crafts Creative Team, the Business Art Creative Team, the Engraving Art Creative Team, the Cinema Creative Team, the Statue and Gypsum Creative Team, and the Chosun Paintings Creative Team, and specializes in creating symbols used to idolize Kim Father and Son.

Creations in the image of Kim Father and Son are made by Creative Branch Number 1. No one other than those assigned to Creative Team Number 1 can manufacture this type of art. Those assigned to this team have received special certification that allows them to draw the images of Kim Father and Son, only after having passed a political test and receiving certification from the Party, and certification of their skill.

While there are about 500 people working in the Mansu Dae Creative Company, the Art Creation Companies in each of the Provinces have about 30 in residence propaganda agitators in each of the cities and counties. The Special Finance Branch of the central government provides unlimited funding to cover the costs required to manufacture these items, and provides appropriations for purchasing high quality goods from overseas.

Covering tens of thousands of square meters in the Baekdu Mountain area, there are Grand Monuments at Bochonbo, Samjiyon, and the Hwangjae Mountain area where several thousand people manage idolization propaganda materials.

If Kim Father and Son have been to any of the Historical Revolutionary sites or battlefield sites, a museum is constructed there. For example, if Kim Father or Son has visited a farmhouse, persons at the farmhouse are no longer permitted to enter it, and personal effects are thereafter protected and managed by experts.

When Labor Party propaganda workers come up with a new competitive idolization idea, it is a happening that calls for a humorless presentation. When visiting Songjin Steelworks, Kim Il Sung used his hand to gauge the thickness of a steel plate and the very next day this several ton piece of steel was taken to the museum and placed on display. In this way, the competition among flatterers to display their loyalty has become a reason for the sharp increase in idolization propaganda.

Damaging Nature with Carved Slogans

At spots of beauty like Baekdu Mountain and Mohyang Mountain, etc., there are colossal carved slogans on the mountainsides.

▲ At Sobaeksu Valley, the professed hometown of Kim Jong Il, the six granite letters of the “Jong Il Peak” slogan placed on the mountain at Changsu Peak weighs 60 tons each and were put in place by helicopter.

▲ At Hyangno Peak on Mount Gumgang, the letters in the mountainside slogan “Chosun’s Famous Gumgang Mountain Is The World’s Famous Mountain. Kim Il Sung – September 27, 1947,” are 20 meters high, 16 meters wide with stokes of each character 3 meters, and a depth of 1 meter.

▲ On the rock at Mohyang Mountain’s Yusan Waterfall, the letters in the slogan “The Comrade Great Leader Kim Il Sung Is With Us Forever – July 8, 1994,” are 3 meters high, 2.3 meters wide and the letters “Kim Il Sung” are 3.2 meters by 2.5 meters.

▲ The letters at Gumgang Mountain Manpokdong and Bopguidong waterfalls reflecting “The Great Leader Kim Il Sung Is With Us Forever – July 8, 1994,” are 8 meters high and 5 meters wide.

▲ The engraved letters at Gumgang Mountain’s Waegum River Guryong Waterfall that reads “Chosun! Let’s Boast of our 5,000 Year History – Honored to Have Escorted the Comrade Great Leader Kim Il Sung – July 8, 1994,” are 4 meters high and 3 meters wide and the letters at Gumgang Mountain Gukji Peak saying “Hangil’s Female General Kim Chong Suk,” are 5 meters by 6 meters.

▲ Baekdu Mountain’s Hyangdo Peak’s “Baekdu Mountain – The Revolution’s Holy Mountain – Kim Jong Il February 16, 1992,” is done in embossed white lettering so that when it snow they won’t be covered.

▲ Gumgang Mountain’s Oknyo Peak lettering that reads “Gumgang Mountain is Chosun’s Driving Spirit – Kim Jong Il,” is 11 meters high and 8 meters wide.

In addition to this, Kim Father and Son idolization slogans on trees and engravings can be found in uncountable numbers at every well know place and tourist spot across the nation.