North Korean Economy Watch

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
7/17/2007

Only six, seven years ago, drugs inside North Korea secretly circulated among a portion of the upper-level officials and the specially affluent class, such as Chinese emigrants. Opium or heroine, produced in North Korea, were sold abroad to make foreign currency.

North Korea produces and exports drugs at the national level. Events where North Korean vessels and diplomats, through drug transport or charges of sales, are prosecuted by third-party countries is common. South Korean government, in the midst of North Korea’s breakdown in foreign currency supply in 1998, has deduced at one point that foreign-currency earners through illicit drug sales and illegal activities had amassed 100 million dollars.

From year 1970, North Korea’s drug sales, which secretly began on a small-scale, by the decree of Chairperson Kim Jong Il, rose in reality as a national enterprise and began official productions. In the August of same year, Chairperson Kim named the opium seed cultivation work as “White Bellflower Business.”

Further, he bestowed the appellation, “White Bellflower Hero,” to the person who sold over 1 million dollars of drugs, and ordered, “For the acquisition of foreign currency, export opium on a large scale (information reported by the National Intelligence Service, Lee Jong Chan former Chair at the inspection of National Intelligence Service on November 6, 1998).” As for North Korea’s drug production factories, the Nanam Pharmaceutical Factory in Chongjin and Hamheung’s Heungnam Pharmaceutical Factory are well-known.

Drugs, which are costly to average civilians preoccupied with making a living, were considered as a portion of the special class’ acts of aberration. The North Korean government, besides the foreign-currency earners, strictly inspected acts of drug circulations, so one could not even dream about this as a means of making money.

After the collapse of national provisions, drug sales also increase.

However, the food shortage brought a huge change to North Korea’s drug production and circulation. When the planned-economy system, where the nation was in charge of the provisions, broke down, the citizens started doing sales for survival. In North Korea where means of making money are not abundant, the place where one can smell money is at the market.

The revitalization of the jangmadang (black market) and general markets gave citizens in the cities a certain of opportunity to make a living. Further, they learned the mentality that money is best for survival. The custom began to spread where the citizens went through thick and thin if it meant working at a money-making job. Drugs infiltrated this opening.

Drugs that are most highly circulated in North Korea are philopon and heroine. The center of philipon productions is in Hamheung, South Hamkyung.

Hamheung is considered as a chemical industry synthesis base within North Korea where companies related to the chemistry branch can be abundantly found.

The representative place is the 2.8 Vinyl Chemical Complexes. Besides this, there are Hamheung Chemical Industry College (in its 5th year), the Heungnam Fertilizer Factory, and the Heungnam Pharmaceutical Factory, which are the providers of North Korea’s top chemical researchers.

The reason why Hamheung became the main place of philopon production

The raw materials for the vinyl complex are limestones of the Ounpo Mine in Hongwon-gun and the raw materials of the Heungnam Fertilizer Factory are ramrods of Huhcheon-gun and emulsified steel of the Manduk Mine.

For this reason, many chemistry-related researchers and workers are residing in Hamheung. The problem is that after the food provisions were cut off, they turned their eyes to Philopon production when making a living became difficult.

They can produce high-quality philopon, if they just have a good laboratory and raw materials. In particular, outside demand for Philopon was explosive in early 2000, when there were no huge restraints in the North Korea-Japanese trade and when the North Korea-Chinese trade became active.

Hamheung citizen Choi Myung Gil (pseudonym) said, “In the initial stage, if the businessmen provided raw materials and funds to researchers, they made high-quality Philipon and kept half of the profit. Do poor researchers have any money? They made them because businessmen received orders from China and Japan and sold them. Also, there was nothing to fear because bribes kept the mouths of the National Security Agency and the Social Safety Agency shut. There is nothing one cannot do with money, so what kind of a researcher would crush such a money-making scheme?”

Mr. Choi said, “The cost of production of philopon is no more than 3,000 dollars per kilogram in North Korea. If one sells this, he or she can receive 6,000 dollars on the spot. Manufactured Philopon can be handed over to middlemen or if it directly enters Shinuiju and is given to dealers, it can bring in from 9,000 to 10,000 dollars.”

He said, “My friend, who worked as a researcher in the Hamheung Branch Laboratory, also lived poorly, but became wealthy overnight by making philopon. I also am benefitting from him. There are many people who have become wealthy in Hamheung by making philopon.”

Ultimately, when the North Korea-Chinese traders bring the raw materials from China, the Hamheung chemical researchers make the philopon and the merchants take these to China for sale. In this process, the Chinese crime syndicate have also intervened.

New Zealand Herald (hat tip DPRK Studies)
David McNeill
7/13/2007

North Korea is set to take a potentially giant leap out of the intellectual cold with the construction of a new all-English language university staffed by academics from around the world and teaching the cream of the country’s graduate students.

Construction of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology is nearing completion on a 100ha plot leased by the People’s Army in the North’s capital. The Army has loaned 800 solders to build the campus, which is largely funded by a network of Christian evangelicals.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is believed to have personally ordered the site cleared for use and granted the university the right to hire staff from anywhere in the world.

The university is expected to eventually have 2600 undergraduate and postgraduate students and to help train a new generation of elite business executives and technicians.

The project’s leaders in South Korea and the United States are playing down its potential impact for fear of spooking the North’s jittery authorities, but agree that it represents potentially a seismic shift in the reclusive state’s largely frozen relations with the rest of the planet.

“It will be the country’s first international university,” said Professor Chan Mo Park, co-chair of the university and a prominent Seoul scientist.

“The North has good universities but they don’t communicate with the rest of the world. This will let everyone know that the capacity of their scientists is very high.”

Despite crumbling facilities, Pyongyang’s standards of computer science, software and applied mathematics are world-class, say experts, and its youth are bursting with pent-up business energy. The university is expected to generate spin-off businesses and eventually a Silicon Valley-style business park.

The faculty of 45 will offer an MA in business administration as well as courses on information technology and agriculture to an initial cohort of about 150 students recruited from the country’s top research institutions.

Given the scale of foreign involvement and the money poured into the new campus so far, those involved say they are confident it will open its first research laboratories this autumn and its doors to students next spring.

But the legendary unpredictability of the Kim Jong-Il government could still throw a spanner in the university’s works.

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
7/13/2007

Over the past couple of weeks, the small community of Seoul-based Pyongyang watchers was busy discussing a minor professional sensation. The Wolgan Chungang monthly, widely known for its good insights on all things North Korean, published a lengthy transcript of a speech, allegedly delivered last December, by a high-level Central Committee official. He was obviously talking to a group of prominent academics and engineers. The official’s name is cited as Chang Yong-sun, but he seems to be a complete unknown to the North Korea experts.

The authenticity of the transcript cannot be proved beyond doubt, but the Seoul expert community tends to believe that this tape was indeed secretly recorded somewhere in Pyongyang a few months ago and then smuggled to the South.

Being a former Soviet citizen, this author is inclined to believe this view as well. The tape rings true. This is how a high-level official would talk when lecturing lower layers of elite on the current situation, and such regular lectures were typical for many communist countries.

The semi-privileged met the bigwigs to get instructions on recent events, as well as some alleged insiders’ stories and anecdotes. The semi-privileged cadres felt themselves partaking in the enigmatic world of grand politics, and also learned something about the new trends in their leadership’s thinking about the world.

Most people who deal with “Chang’s lecture” concentrate on those parts of the lengthy presentation that deal with US-North Korea relations and the six-party talks on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, such issues are treated at great length by this document. Many others pay attention to rather unfavorable depictions of the Chinese or outbursts of threats against Japan.

However, I believe that there are more important things in the transcript than merely a North Korean version of what happened during former assistant secretary of state James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang or during the first rounds of the six-party talks. The tape allows us to have one more glimpse at the world view held by the North Korean elite or, at least, by its lower reaches.

What are the features of the world as seen from Pyongyang? First of all, the significance of North Korea is blown out of all proportion. Somebody would describe this as Pyongyang megalomania, but perhaps author Bruce Cummings found a better term when he talked about “North Korean solipsism”, an assumption that North Korea lies at the center of the world, and that the world itself surely must be aware of this.

The North Korean press now tells its readers that the major international conflict of the modern world is the ongoing struggle between US imperialism and heroic North Korea. Chang Yong-sun even told his audience that the development of North Korean missiles has produced a serious impact on the public-health issues in the US: “Nobody can intercept our missiles now. All the people in the US are aware of this.

“This is why all the people in the United States are completely allergic to missiles of our republic. Once they learn that we test-fired missiles, they become so worried about the rockets changing their directions and exploding over them and killing them, so they develop nervous diseases and nettle rash breaks out all over their bodies. This is what is happening in the United States.”

One should not feel too sorry about the bastards, however. According to the official North Korean world view, once again reiterated by Comrade Chang, the US is responsible for everything that goes badly in Korea, and the constant military threat from the warmongering Washington is the major fact of North Korean life.

The audience was reminded that in 1950 it was the Americans who attacked North Korea, bringing death and destruction to the country (this official version of 1950 events seems to be almost universally believed by North Koreans). This great crime of 1950 has not been avenged yet, Comrade Chang reminded his listeners.

Many people in the US want to believe that such hostility stemmed from President George W Bush’s policies, but Comrade Chang reminded his audience a number of times that there is no real difference between the Republicans and Democrats: both US parties are pathologically hostile to the Country of the Beloved General. The differences between them are of a purely tactical nature, Chang Yong-sun told his audience. He said Republicans rely more on brute force, while Democrats are more canny and more willing to use ideological subversion and economic pressures.

Chang Yong-sun repeated a number of times that the major threat from the US is not that of a sudden military attack. The imperialists are not that simplistic: these days their major weapon is internal subversion. He said: “Although it appears as if the Americans do good things to us, their real nature has not changed at all. Their primary objective is, from start to finish, to undermine us from within and melt us down by disarming us ideologically.”

Chang Yong-sun repeated the message that has been delivered countless times by North Korean leaders big and small: the ideological threat of the outside world constitutes a greater danger than all imaginable military threats. He alleged that the foreign enemies have designed some grand plan of subversion. Chang said specially designated think-tanks work on this issue day and night. If his fantasies are to be believed, one of such centers is somewhere in Washington and employs no fewer than 370 retired generals whose only job is to find ways to undermine North Korea from within.

Being an enthusiastic supporter of soft power, the present author knows perfectly well that there is no coordinated plan of applying soft pressure on Pyongyang. The amount of money and efforts spent on broadcasts aimed at North Korea, on support of refugee groups and other similar activities, is ridiculously small. It is a dream to have a US research center specifically dealing with North Korean issues and stuffed with even, say, five post-doctoral candidates (let alone with 370 ex-generals).

But this raises a question: If this the case, why do Pyongyang politicians keep repeating similar statements? Why do they refer to a non-existent threat? Perhaps because they know what they should be really afraid of. They know only too well how potentially precarious against such a challenge their position is, and they probably cannot even believe that their adversaries fail to appreciate the major vulnerability of Pyongyang and do nothing to exploit the related opportunities. Comrade Chang would be really surprised to learn how weak and disorganized are actual efforts of the “class enemies” in the area that he (perhaps correctly) considers decisive.

Some twists of Pyongyang’s official mindset might come as a surprise to many readers. For example, Comrade Chang found a source of great pride in the North Korean penchant for secrecy. He used one peculiar example to explain why this secretiveness is great. According to him, the Americans defeated the Iraqis because they imitated the voice of Saddam Hussein and then sent fake orders to Iraqi troops in his name.

However, as he proudly reminded everyone, Marshal Kim Jong-il had spoken in public only once, so Americans will never find enough material for their perfidious schemes. The entire secrecy is necessary to keep foreigners at a disadvantage: “A long time ago, the Great General taught us to make sure that our internal things appears to be hazy as if covered by fog when the Americans spy on us. So we have made sure that internal things of our country appear really hazy as if in a fog when our country was viewed from outside.”

It is remarkable that the country’s economic woes are explained in a novel way, which was made possible by the nuclear test. Until 2006, North Koreans were supposed to believe that the only reasons for the recent famine were huge floods that “might happen only once a century”. Now it is admitted that the government needed money for missile and nuclear development, and hence had no other choice but to sacrifice some people to save the nation.

Chang Yong-sun said: “To be frank with you, even if one sells 50 plants as large as Kim Ch’aek Steel Mill, the money is not enough to develop a missile. During the ‘arduous march’ [Pyongyang-speak for the famine of the late 1990s], if there [was] a bit of money, it had to be spent on developing missiles, even though the generals knew that factories did not work and people were starving. This is why we have survived, and were not eaten up by those bastards. Had it not been like this, the bastards would have eaten us a long time ago.”

This line of argument is psychologically more powerful than the earlier version. Nowadays, people’s suffering can be presented not as the result of some blind misfortune caused by nature, but as a part of heroic sacrifice. People died because their country was at war and needed everything to save itself from complete destruction by the brutal enemy. Their deaths were those of heroes.

Such a change of tune is indeed typical of North Korean propaganda during the past few months. However, it might have some political consequences. This propaganda line makes it more difficult to surrender nuclear weapons even if such a notion will ever be seriously entertained by Pyongyang. If North Korea chooses to give up its nuclear arsenal, these sacrifices will be rendered meaningless.

Another propaganda line is that now people should expect a certain improvement of their lot, since the major work has been done: “Now we have conducted a nuclear test and other things, so we have to improve the people’s living standards by concentrating on economic construction.”

Still, Comrade Chang does not want his audience to entertain an excessively optimistic picture of their country’s future. Improvement will be minor and, as one might guess from some other parts of the speech, is likely to be limited to, say, complete reintroduction of Kim Il-sung-era consumer standards, which were not exactly luxurious (550 grams or cereal a day, plus a few pieces of meat on special occasions, four or five times a year).

Chang Yong-sun explained that North Korean industry is surely capable of producing quality consumption goods but cannot do it, because the ever present threat of an imperialist attack deems austerity and sacrifices necessary. He also made clear that his listeners should not await serious improvement of their lot any time soon.

The statement resonates very well with what another life-long analyst of North Korean propaganda, Tatiana Gabroussenko, wrote recently: unlike earlier eras when masses were extolled to make sacrifices for the sake of some identifiable future, nowadays North Korean leaders tell their people that no significant improvement is in sight. Comrade Chang even made a joke of this: “Since the end of the Korean War, we have lived with our belts tightened … One thing I can assure you: we’ll have to live with our belts tightened until the day our country is unified. If we do not have any more holes in our belts, let us make them.”

However, the audience was reminded that in the final count it is again the foreign forces who are to be blamed for these hardships. To quote Comrade Chang once again: “It is not because we do not know how to live better that we are not well off. Who is responsible for this? The US imperialists are responsible for this. That is why we call the US imperialists our mortal enemy with whom we cannot live under the same sky!”

Most of the speech consisted of US-bashing and Japan-bashing, but what about South Korea? Here Comrade Chang used the new tactics that have become typical for North Korean propagandists since the 2002 inter-Korea summit. Brian Myers, another remarkable specialist on North Korean culture and propaganda (not quite distinguishable areas, actually), recently wrote at length about a change of tune in Pyongyang propaganda: South Korea ceased to be depicted as the living hell, the land of depravation. The new image of the South is that of the country whose population secretly (or even not so secretly) longs to join its Northern brethren in their happiness under the wise care of the Beloved General.

This society might be relatively affluent, but it is inherently corrupt and lacks integrity, so its population knows that the only way to regain the moral purity is to join the spiritually superior North Korean civilization. The only force that prevents the South from achieving such happiness is the brutal US occupation army and a tiny handful of traitors on the Central Intelligence Agency payroll, but even those perverts are losing control over South Korean society.

Sometimes Chang’s fantasies went positively wild. He said, for example: “A portrait of the General is [respectfully] placed on the wall of the Main Hall on the fourth floor at the [Seoul] Government Building. Right now!” Then the flight of fantasy goes even further: “These days, South Korean publications do not sell in South Korean society if they do not carry the images of the General … 45% of the entire population in South Korea say that in case of a war they will fight on the side of the General.”

The domestic situation did not attract much of Chang Yong-sun’s attention, but he still made some comments on these issues. He admitted that even last December, in spite of all the government’s efforts, it was impossible to provide rations for the entire population, and that most people had to rely on the market for their needs, which is not good but was unavoidable.

He also explicitly stated that growth of the markets is not compatible with the socialist system: “All the people’s talk is money and again money. Is this socialism?” It is remarkable, however, that the virtues of socialism were seldom mentioned in the speech: its rhetoric was overwhelmingly nationalistic.

Chang Yong-sun also admitted that some North Koreans are very rich, and that their fortunes are now measured as a few hundred million North Korean won (100 million won is roughly equivalent to US$50,000). He did not make a secret that under less critical conditions the government would strike these reactionary elements hard, but under the current circumstances such a radical solution is impossible because of ongoing economic difficulties.

In essence, he admitted that government is not capable of controlling society as tightly as it wishes (or as it used to in the good old days of Kim Il-sung’s ultra-Stalinist rule): “Those ideological perverts are no longer counted as our people. Why are we not able to strike [them]? We are not able to strike them because we are not able to provide rations to the entire population.”

So the picture is quite clear. North Korea as depicted by Comrade Chang is a small but proud state that lives under the constant threat of annihilation by brutal enemies, betrayed by money-hungry allies. It fights for a great goal of national unification. There are signs that this goal is getting nearer, but people should not expect too much: life will not become easy any time soon.

Compromise with enemies is impossible since they, especially the Americans, will never change their nature, will never stop dreaming about destroying the small and proud republic led by the Beloved General. However, the country has finally developed military means that make all enemies’ schemes powerless. This project required great sacrifice, but the people who died during famine were in essence soldiers: their deaths saved many more lives.

There are internal problems in this society, largely because the government lacks resources to make sure things move smoothly (and it is assumed that government should be ultimately responsible for everything). However, these problems should not distort the larger view of ongoing heroic struggle and new victories.

Dr Andrei Lankov is an associate professor in Kookmin University, Seoul, and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacifica and Asian Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea. He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.

Bloomberg
Bradley Martin
7/10/2007

A black Volkswagen Passat with smoked windows glides down a suburban Pyongyang road. Its license plate begins with 216 — a number signifying Kim Jong-il’s Feb. 16 birthday, and a sign the car is a gift from the Dear Leader.

Even without a 216 license plate, a passenger sedan bestows VIP status in a country where traffic is sparse and imports are limited by external sanctions and domestic restrictions alike.

Just across the border, South Korea is the world’s fifth-largest automotive manufacturer. To an ordinary North Korean, though, a private car is “pretty much what a private jet is to the ordinary American,” says Andrei Lankov, author of a new book “North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea.”

He estimates there are only 20,000 to 25,000 passenger cars in the entire country, less than one per thousand people.

Discouraging private car ownership is not just a matter of ideology in a communist country, Lankov said in a phone interview from Seoul, where he teaches at Kookmin University. The passenger car, usually black and chauffeur-driven, “is the ultimate symbol of the prosperity of high officials,” he says. They keep the vehicles scarce “so everybody knows they are the boss.”

Measuring, copying

North Korea moved early — shortly after the Korean War, and ahead of the South — to mass produce trucks and 4-wheel-drive Jeep-type military vehicles. Craftsmen took apart imported Soviet tractors, trucks and utility vehicles, measuring the parts to make copies.

The indigenous civilian passenger-car industry, too, mostly made knockoffs of models produced elsewhere. After importing a fleet of Mercedes-Benz 190s, the country produced replicas under local model names into the 1990s. Unfortunately, the domestically-made copies were dogged by reports about “terrible overall quality,” says Erik van Ingen Schenau, author of a new pictorial book, “Automobiles Made in North Korea.”

Lee Keum-ryung, a former used-car trader who defected from North to South Korea in 2004, agrees. The knockoffs came with “no air conditioning, no heater, and they’re not tightly built or sealed,” he says. “If you drive out of the city and return, your car will be full of dust. It’s like an oil-fueled cart.” Lee, 40, uses a pseudonym because he fears repercussions from North Korea.

Slow recovery

Material and energy shortages that accompanied a famine in the 1990s brought state-run factories to a halt. Recovery has been slow, and Schenau said he believes even domestic production of Jeep-style vehicles has been replaced by imports from Russia and China.

Imports have similarly come to dominate what passes for the passenger-car market. Used cars — mostly Japanese-made — are the mode of transit for many members of the new trading and entrepreneurial class that has emerged in the last couple of decades. Under a loophole in the country’s long-standing private-car ban, these vehicles typically enter the country disguised as gifts to North Koreans from their relatives in Japan’s Korean community, Lankov says.

Lee says “a relative abroad” helped him buy his first car when he was 23. “But as an ordinary person, I couldn’t keep it under my name, and I didn’t have a number plate of my own,” he says. “A friend was a high police official with many cars under him. I borrowed a plate.”

‘A very affluent life’

Lee had “a very affluent life” before he defected, importing 10-year-old cars from Japan and selling them both in North Korea and, for a time, across the border in China. “I had money, status,” he says. “I enjoyed everything people my age could have.”

A small passenger vehicle for which his agent paid $1,500 at the docks in Japan would sell for $2,500 to $3,000, Lee says. A bigger car — say, a Toyota Crown — might cost him $4,000 to $5,000; he would sell it for $8,000.

While Japanese trade figures show annual exports of some 1,500 passenger cars, mostly used, to North Korea in 2005 and 2006, the total for this year is zero. After Kim’s government tested a nuclear device last October, Japan placed passenger cars on a list of banned luxury exports.

Perhaps as a sign of displeasure with Japan’s sanctions, Kim ordered most Japanese cars confiscated, according to a February 2007 dispatch by South Korea’s Yonhap news agency. The order, if it indeed was issued, hadn’t been carried out by the time of a May visit to Pyongyang, when a number of Japanese cars could be seen.

German inroads

When a European-made import passes by, it’s often owned by the state, used by high officials and foreign dignitaries. Sweden’s Volvo had a hefty market share in the 1970s; Germany’s Audi and Volkswagen have made inroads lately. Mercedes is particularly well-represented in Kim’s personal fleet of hundreds of vehicles, according to Lee Young Kook, a defector who served in Kim’s bodyguard force.

In a 2003 Yonhap story, Lee said the security-conscious leader traveled in motorcades of identical cars to confuse would-be assassins and generally maintained 10 units each of any model so five would always be road-ready.

With the nation’s access to imports constricted, a relatively new player in the market, Pyonghwa Auto Works, has attempted to fill the gap. The company was created when Seoul-based Pyonghwa Motors, which began as a car importer affiliated with Rev. Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church, teamed up as majority partner in the 70-30 venture with the North Korean state-owned trading firm Ryonbong Corp.

Kits of parts

The first assembly line was set up in 2002 at the west coast port city of Nampo to produce, from kits of parts, a version of the small Fiat Siena, called the Hwiparam (Whistle) in Korean.

So far, the factory has built about 2,000 cars and pickup trucks, according to Noh Jae Wan, a spokesman in Seoul for Pyonghwa Motors, who said it is the only manufacturer now turning out passenger cars in North Korea. According to a February announcement by Brilliance China Automotive Holdings, Pyongyhwa has agreed to let Brilliance use part of the Nampo plant to assemble Haise minibuses.

While some news accounts have mentioned the possibility that the North Korean cars may eventually be sold in the South, “this will take time,” Noh said in an interview. “It can only happen when the two Koreas reach some significant agreement on trade or other international circumstances change.”

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
7/9/2007

Pyongsung, a city located in the province of South Pyongan has recently been targeted as a scientific city transformed into distribution hub.

In the late 1960’s, North Korean authorities established Pyongsung as an area for scientific research with a population of 300,000.

In Pyongsung, there are 25 scientific research centers beginning with a nature centre. Further, there is Pyongsung Scientific University and a training centre for scientists and engineers. Pyongsung lies on the outer-skirts of Pyongyang near the districts of Soonan, Samsuk and Yongsung.

Park Chan Joo (pseudonym) a North Korean tradesman on business in Dandong, China introduced the changes occurring in Pyongsung in a telephone conversation with reporters.

Park currently works as an employee for the Myungjin Trade Company and imports goods needed for everyday living into North Korea.

Park said, “All goods made from China pass through Shinuiju and are generally dispatched from Pyongsung to each region for sale. This includes eastern regions such as Hamheung and Wonsan. Of course traders from Sariwon, Haeju and Nampo in southern provinces also come to Pyongsung to receive their goods.”

Regarding Pyongsung which developed into a distributor of imports, Park said, “The delivery cost is double if goods made from China pass through Shinuiju and are delivered directly to eastern and southern regions. However, stopping over at Pyongsung can make a profit on time and cost effective.”

Further, he said, “It’s close to eastern regions and in the vicinity of southern regions. This area has increasingly become an intermediary wholesalers district with the rise of warehouses.”

Park said, “We are located right next to Pyongyang where the population is greatest. Also, many Pyongyang citizens with high standards of living compared to other regions come and buy the goods.”

“It only takes about one hour to travel from Pyongyang to Pyongsung via car or train. Tradesmen and citizens must obtain a travel permit to enter Pyongyang, but any North Korean citizen can easily come to Pyongsung with an ordinary identification card. Nowadays, you can travel to any special district (excluding Pyongyang and border regions) as long as you have an identification card” he added.

Also, Park said “There are more and more people wanting to living in Pyongsung because of trade” and informed, “All this happened as Pyongsung changed into a centre for wholesalers. Even up until a few years ago, it wasn’t so hard to live in Pyongsung, but now you have to pay thousands of dollars to move in the area to Pyongsung’s People’s Safety Agency (police).”

As Pyongsung emerged into a distributors haven, more and more long distance bus services have been operated connecting rural districts to Pyongsung city.

Kim Jong Hoon (pseudonym) a Shinuiju resident who came to Dandong to visit his relatives said, “People with money hire second hand buses made from China and register the vehicle at the traffic registry and operate the services while offering some profits” and “It takes 3 days to get from Shinuiju to Dancheon in South Hamkyung. It took me 3 days to go to Pyongsung, then from Pyongsung to Wonsan and then Wonsan to Dancheon.”

Presently, the only direct bus services in operation from Pyongsung are to Shinuiju, Wonsan, Sariwon, Nampo and Haeju.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-7-9-1
9/7/2007

The North Korean city of Pyongsung, situated in the South Pyongan province, is undergoing a transformation. Previously known as the center of North Korean scientific research, it is now becoming a distribution hub for goods imported from neighboring China. Pyongsung, with a population of approximately 30,000, was established by DPRK authorities in the mid 1960s in order to serve as a center for scientific studies. It is a satellite city on the outskirts of Pyongyang, bordering the Soonan, Samsuk, and Yongsung areas of the capital. The Institute of Natural Sciences and 24 other scientific research centers are located there, along with the Pyongsung College of Science and numerous scientific and technical training facilities.

These days, most Chinese imports being brought into the country through Shinuiju are coming though Pyongsung before being sold to various regions throughout the country. Traders from the east-coast cities such as Hamheung and Wonsan, as well as Sariwon, Haeju, Nampo and other areas regularly travel to Pyongsung in order to stock up on goods.

Located close to eastern cities and bordering southern provinces, Pyongsung is becoming the new distribution center of Chinese goods due to the considerably lower cost of delivering wares through Shinuiju and directly to these regions. This new route is much more lucrative in terms of both cost and time. Therefore, the number of wholesalers erecting warehouses and filling orders in the city has been growing quickly.

Pyongyang, the capital city with a population greater than any other city in the North and a higher standard of living than the rest of the country, is only one hour away by train or car, and so many Pyongyang residents have been purchasing high-end goods from there.

Traders and ordinary North Koreans need a travel permit with an approval number in order to enter Pyongyang, but anyone can easily travel to Pyongsung with only a general registration permit. In recent times, North Koreans can travel throughout the country with only a resident permit, with the exception of some particularly sensitive areas such as the border region or the capital city. Recently the number of people wishing to live in Pyongsung in order to trade has been on the rise. Only a few years ago, it was relatively easy to move to Pyongsung, but today someone wishing to relocate in this new market must hand over several thousand dollars. 

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
7/8/2007

Nowadays, the severity of famine appears to be a thing of the past _ at least outside Africa. Indeed, modern technology makes it possible to feed crowded cities almost effortlessly. Thus, any reports of famine nowadays can be argued to be the direct result of mismanagement and deliberate political decisions. The recent North Korean famine of 1996-2000 vividly demonstrates this and supports such a theory.

Stalinist agriculture has never been very efficient. The lack of incentive makes it sluggish and wasteful. However, in some cases, the heavy investments in machinery and fertilizers did, in fact, help to overcome some of the deficiencies created by the inept social system.

This was the case in North Korea. In the late 1950s all North Korean farmers were herded into the so-called “agricultural co-operatives.’’ While less restrictive than the “people’s communes’’ in Mao’s China, they imposed a harsher control than Stalin’s “kolkhozs.’’

The North Korean government invested heavily in agriculture. Its efforts produced a remarkably energy-intensive agricultural system. Electric pumps were running huge irrigation projects; chemical fertilizers and tractors were used on a grand scale. In attempts to reclaim arable land, steep hills were made into terrace fields. These fields, endorsed by Kim Il-sung himself, remained the poster image of North Korean agriculture until the mid-1990s.

Initially these efforts seemingly paid off. In the 1980s North Korea produced some 5-6 million tons of grain (largely, rice and maize) a year. Its population never enjoyed anything like the present-day South Korean abundance: meat or fruits were rare delicacies. Nonetheless, the 6 million tons of grain was sufficient to feed the country’s population. This was done through the rationing system. Depending on one’s position in the complicated hierarchy of social groups, daily rations varied from 500 to 900 grams per adult _ sufficient to provide enough calories.

But in 1991 the situation changed. The much trumpeted “self-reliance’’ of North Korea proved to be a complete fake. The Soviet decision to discontinue sales of oil and other goods at hugely discounted prices wrought havoc in the country’s economy. The agricultural sector was especially vulnerable, since without the heavy input of energy and resources it stood no chance of survival. Tractors required diesel oil, which was not forthcoming, and electric pumps could not operate when power stations were idle due to a shortage of spare parts.

In 1992-1993 the North Korean media began to argue the benefits of having only two meals a day as opposed to the traditional three, claiming the latter was unhealthy and excessive. By 1994, people in some remote areas could not get food for days at a time. They were issued the usual rationing coupons, but no foodstuffs were available in the shops. Rations were also cut. These were signs of things to come.

However, the North Korean government did not follow the example of China or Vietnam, where the return to private agriculture led to an instant revival in food production. In the early 1990s the Pyongyang leaders saw how the reformist Communist governments of East Europe had been wiped out, and they considered any reform potentially dangerous to their own survival. Thus, no reform was undertaken, and in the years 1992-1995 agricultural production continued its free fall.

And then the real catastrophe came. In July and August 1995 unusually heavy rains led to disastrous floods. The North Korean authorities blamed the floods for all subsequent developments. In the aftermath of the disaster, they even decided to break with the decades-old tradition of covering or playing down all the problems of their country. Pyongyang stated that some 5.4 million people had been displaced by the 1995 floods (the subsequent U.N. survey indicated that the actual figure was much smaller _ probably, by an order of ten). Politically, this was understandable: if the country was hit by a natural disaster of unprecedented proportions, the authorities were not to be held responsible!

There is, however, good reason to doubt these statements. After all, the Korean Peninsular is small, but impact of the very same floods on the South was negligible. However, the contribution of the flood to the disaster is undeniable. The already strained power grid was destroyed, and entire irrigation systems were wiped out. Most of the terrace fields, the pride of the “juche agriculture,’’ were simply washed away.

In 1996, the country harvested some 3 million tons of grain _ just above half the pre-crisis level. This meant famine. It was to last for four years and take between half million and one million lives.

Korea Times
Yoon Won-sup
7/3/2007

Kim Yun-kyu, who stepped down as vice president of Hyundai Asan, South Korea’s operator of inter-Korean business and tourism, due to illegal use of corporate funds in October 2005, is resuming work with North Korea.

Kim set up his own company for North Korean business last year, dubbed Acheon Global Corp., which imported 531 kilograms of caviar from North Korea via the East Coast train on June 21, and entered the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, according to the Unification Ministry.

The importing of the caviar is Acheon’s first business transaction with North Korea, which was finalized by Kim’s aide Yuk Jae-hee, vice president of Acheon and former executive of Hyundai, during Yuk’s visit to Mt. Geumgang in North Korea June 18 to 20.

Kim will visit Mt. Geumgang Thursday, the first time since his resignation, to discuss additional imports with North Korean government officials. His North Korean counterpart is a business association in charge of fisheries.

Kim is reportedly seeking to bring North Korean sand to the South. Accordingly, he visited Gaeseong June 19, and Yuk plans to visit Gaeseong soon for further discussion on sand importing.

However, the two CEOs of Acheon are not likely to meet senior North Korean government officials, though they previously have met with and will, again, meet with working-level officials on inter-Korean affairs, in Gaeseong and Mt. Geumgang.

“Kim got approval from North Korea to visit the country for trade of agricultural and fishery projects, and the discussion has been conducted according to the purpose of his visit to North Korea,” a South Korean government official said on condition of anonymity.

Kim already discussed imports of North Korean fisheries and sand to the South and the establishment of an office in Gaeseong, with Choi Seung-chul, vice chairman of Asia Pacific Peace Committee of North Korea.

In line with Kim’s plan, Acheon signed a contract with the Korea Land Corp. to rent 1,400 square meters of land in the Gaeseong complex.

A building is to be set up there to accommodate restaurants, coffeehouses and other facilities for workers in Gaeseong, but it is not yet decided what kind of facilities will be built by Acheon. A permanent office of Acheon also is likely to be set up in Gaeseong.

Some observers say Kim’s resumed activity may lead to competition with Hyundai Asan regarding inter-Korean business, but the dominant opinion is that the chance is slim for the time being.

Kim led the inter-Korean business with Mt. Geumgang tourism and Gaeseong complex under the confidence of late Hyundai Group founder Chung Ju-yung and his late son Mong-hun, former president of Hyundai Asan. Now Hyun Jung-eun, widow of Chung Mong-hun, leads Hyundai Asan.

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
7/3/2007

A North Korean insider source relayed on the 2nd that citizens’ complaints have been rising because the North Korean government recently gave guidelines to sell a portion of products which have been selling with popularity at the jangmadang (markets) only at state-operated stores.

This source, who resides in North Pyongan, revealed in a phone conversation with DailyNK, “Recently, plastic floors have been popular, so “plastic sales” is earning a lot of money. However, government authorities have mandated that the commerce office directly oversee plastic floors and that they be sold at state-operated stores.”

The insider relayed, “Families above middle-class have been showing a lot of interest in acquiring furniture. Besides floors, drawers on which TV can be placed and cabinets displaying wines and others are very popular.”

Previously, floors made of paper covered the floors of houses, but since North Korean civilians’ standard of living started rising recently, Chinese-made plastic floors decorated in flowers is drawing popularity.

He said, “Rumor has been leaking that pork (1,700 North Korean won per kg), the price for which has declined recently, is also directly managed by the commerce office, along with plastic floors.” “Besides this, the complaints of merchants have been rising since rumor starting circulating that the list of items to be overseen by the office will increase.”

He added, “Would they want to do any business given that individual sales are discouraged and turned over to national control when sales go even remotely well? There are grievances due to the fact that earning a livelihood through jangmadang sales is not even allowed, on top of the lack of provisions.”

Further, he said, “Regulations regarding people engaging in “Chapan-Jangsa (sales by trucks)” using privately-owned buses or trucks exceeding eight tons have begun. If one is caught, the vehicles become registered as national property and the vehicle owner receives a salary from the country instead.”

“Chapan Jangsa” refers to carrying out wholesale while ferrying the load on trucks. The “plastic floor” and “Chapan Jangsa,” along with what is popularly known as “ice (drug) sales” are counted are the top three business that brings in the most amount of money.

“The complaints of people are high, but the scope of regulation is wide-ranging, so there are people who think that the inspections will stop after several times.”

Even guideline to prevent wearing of wedding dresses

He also said, “Since October 2006, there were even guidelines to prevent wearing of wedding dresses at weddings. Not only wedding dresses, but wearing white gloves were also prohibited.”

In North Korea, wearing wedding dresses at weddings became a trend seven to eight years ago. Nowadays, many civilians are known to wear them. Even if they do not wear wedding dresses, North Korea’s general wedding culture is donning flowers on the chest part of dresses and on the head and putting on white gloves.

Additionally, the insider relayed, “The size of the flower of the groomsmen and the bridesmaids should not be bigger than the groom’s and the bride’s. The flower of the groom and the bride is fixed at 7cm and the flower of the groomsmen and bridesmaids fixed at 5cm. In the case with those who go against the orders and get their pictures taken after marriage, the photo volunteer in charge’s volunteer card (employment permit) can be revoked.”

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
7/1/2007

What is the “North Korean KGB?’’ This common question is actually rather meaningless _ not because North Korea does not have an analogue to the Soviet agency (it does), but because the structure of the North Korean “intelligence community’’ is remarkably complicated. In North Korea there are three major independent intelligence services _ and an array of minor sub-services.

Each service has its own field of responsibility and expertise, but in some areas they are compete fiercely. Presumably, such competition makes the North Korean leaders a bit less restive in their sleep: in a dictatorship, an excessive concentration of intelligence in one agency’s hands is fraught with danger.

Since we have mentioned the KGB, let’s start from North Korea’s closest analogue, the Ministry for Protection of State Security or MPSS. Back in the 1950s, the MPSS’s predecessor grew up absorbing a serious influence from the KGB. Like its Soviet prototype, the MPSS combines the functions of political police, counterintelligence, and political intelligence.

As a political police force, the MPSS runs a huge network of informers, manages the camps for political prisoners, and enforces manifold security regulations. As a counterintelligence agency, it does everything it can to prevent foreign spies from effecting infiltration into North Korea. And, finally, it is engaged in intelligence gathering overseas and, to some extent, in South Korea. A special role of this agency is emphasized by the fact that it is headed not by a regular minister but by Kim Jong Il himself. Yes, the “Dear Leader’’ is also the minister of his own security _ a wise arrangement, perhaps, taking into consideration the tendency of intelligence bosses to become too powerful.

However, the mighty MPSS is not very prominent when it comes to operations in South Korea. A North Korean peculiarity is the existence of the party’s own intelligence branch. The Korean Workers Party’s (KWP)own secret service is euphemistically called the Third Building _ after the number of the building in which the relevant departments are located. The Third Building bureaucracy consists of a few departments and bureaus, each with its peculiar tasks.

The KWP’s secret service has survived from the late 1940s when the party operated in both parts of the country. The Communist underground in the South, and the then powerful guerrilla movement, were managed by special departments of the KWP Central Committee. The South Korean Communist underground was wiped out in the early 1950s, but the related bureaucracy in the North survived and found justification for its existence (once created, bureaucracies are very difficult to kill). Its raison d’etre is the need to promote Juche/Communist ideas in the South, with the resurrection of the Communist movement as a supreme goal; a Communist-led unification is a more distant task. In the course of time, these goals were seen as more and more remote, but were never abandoned completely.

In fact, the Third Building is largely responsible for attempts to influence the South Korean political situation, and for gathering intelligence which makes such influence more efficient. The United Front Department, a part of the Third Building, is also responsible for clandestine operations in other countries where it strives to change the local attitudes in North Korea’s favor.

Since the Third Building should aim at starting local insurrections, many of its staff have undergone commando-style training. The only known political assassination in recent years was conducted by the officers of the Operational Department, which is a part of the Third Building. In 1997 they hunted down and shot dead Yi Han-yong, a relative of Kim Il-sung who had defected to the South and published some highly critical books about the North Korean ruling dynasty.

In addition to the MPSS and the Third Building, North Korea also has a military intelligence service whose operations largely target South Korea. Their major interest is the South Korean military and the USFK, as well as any intelligence which may be of use should a new war erupt on the Korean Peninsula.

Many people still remember the September 1996 incident when a North Korean submarine ran ashore on the eastern coast and was abandoned by the crew whose members became engaged in frequent clashes with the police and army. This was a routine operation of military intelligence that went wrong due to a navigational mistake. The commandos were supposed to survey the military installations on the coast, and then move back to the North, but it did not work as intended.

The efforts of North Korean intelligence services are concentrated on the South. But this does not mean that other countries are immune to their activity. The North Korean spies are especially active in Japan, and this was once again demonstrated by the dramatic events of 2001.

Daily NK
Kwon Jeong Hyun
6/26/2007

A source from North Korea reported on the 23rd that the election of the 12nd representatives of the Supreme People’s Assembly will be carried out at the beginning of August.

The North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly officially announced on the 19th that it plans to execute the elections of provincial representatives of the city, village, and district People’s Assemblies on July 29th. In North Korea, elections for city, village, and district People’s Assembly representatives are carried out every four years and in August 2003, 26,650 provincial representatives were selected.

On one hand, the election for the Supreme People’s Assembly representatives, according to North Korean constitutional law, has been carried out every five years. Accordingly, the normal timetable should be August 2008 for the upcoming election. However, due to the Kim Il Sung’s death in ’94, the ’98 10th representative elections occurred in eight years and three months.

The current 11th representative elections were held at the same time as provincial representative elections in August 2003.

The source said, “The government, starting beginning of June, gathered civilians’ residential cards and entered into composing a roster for the Supreme People’s Assembly’s representative elections. The People’s Safety Agency is currently in the middle of a secret investigation into the deceased, missing people, and those who have not reported because they have moved.”

The making of the election roster is also carried out for provincial representative elections.

Detailed evidence for whether the Supreme People’s Assembly elections and the provincial representative elections will be carried out at the same time has not been discovered yet. The North Korean government, through the Chosun (North Korea) Central News Agency, formally announced, “The city, village, and district representative elections will be carried out on July 29th, but a reference has not been made regarding the Supreme People’s Assembly elections yet.”

However, it is difficult to completely exclude the possibility of the simultaneous execution of elections as long as one can expect change in North Korea’s foreign relations and the economic sacrifice problem.

If North Korea simultaneously carries out the provincial representative elections and the Supreme People’s Assembly representative elections at the same time, the possibility is high that it will terminate the process of searching for missing citizens’ whereabouts which has continued these last 10 years as well as the defector issue and will spur building the solidarity of the domestic system.

Kim Sung Hoon (pseudonym, Chongjin, North Hamkyung), who defected in December 2006, explained, “In North Korea, failure to participate in elections is considered as a ‘political reactionary activity’ and if one does not participate in elections without ‘report his or her death,’ the official documents of history are submitted to the National Security Agency and that person becomes, in essence, a ‘public criminal.'”