Archive for the ‘DPRK organizations’ Category

First real estate auction held in Kaesong Industrial Complex

Sunday, July 18th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.10-07-15-3
2010-07-15

A real estate auction was held in the Kaesong Industrial Complex for the first time since the joint inter-Korean project was launched. According to the Kaesong Industrial District Development Committee, factory plots (20,472.7 ㎡) in the stage-1 area of the KIC were being auctioned off on July 12. A government source stated, “Land in the KIC has been sold before, but this is the first I know of land rights being auctioned off.”

The company currently on the plot was awarded land rights and permission to build a factory after signing a contract with the North Korean Central Special Development Guidance Bureau. The land rights being auctioned off run until April 12, 2054. It is not known why the land rights are being auctioned off, but it appears that the company currently holding rights to the plot have some financial difficulties, forcing them to sell.

The rights are estimated to be worth more than 1.37 billion won, and the auction is set to close on the 23rd of July. The sale is being handled by the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee. The committee is handling the sale in accordance with the rules set forth on May 10 by the KIC real estate management office. These rules established a seven-member committee of lawyers and other specialists to handle the auction and sale of real estate within the industrial complex.

After the sinking of the ROK warship Cheonan, Seoul authorized more flexible management of South Korean workers in the KIC in order to help companies avoid financial losses in the complex. The government also increased the amount of the inter-Korean cooperation fund from 50 trillion to 60 trillion won in order to ease financial concerns of South Korean companies operating joint ventures, and announced that loans to 183 companies involved in processing-on-commission, as well as 530 other trading companies, would be made at 2 percent.

This move by the government highlights the fact that South Korean companies in the KIC continue to tread on rocky financial footing, despite the announcement by the Ministry of Unification that emergency management stability funds would be made available.

Following the sinking of the Cheonan, the number of South Korea workers in the KIC on any given weekday was reduced from more than 1000 to around 500, and this has caused companies to produce less, have higher costs, and see lower buyer interest. While Seoul tries to keep the industrial complex open, it is also looking into the laws on the Mount Keumgang tourism project, seeking ways to aggressively assist companies involved in the joint scheme.

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Bronze Kim Jong il statue unveiled

Sunday, July 18th, 2010

First of all, here are the images (from the Daily NK web page):

3-stars-of-paektu.jpg  kim-jong-il-bronze-statue.jpg

The Daily NK also offers the following commentary:

A statue of Kim Jong Il has been revealed in a North Korean newspaper obtained by Open Radio for North Korea.

Open Radio managed to obtain a copy of the May 11th, 2010 “Chosun People’s Army,” the North Korean military’s own publication. That day, the publication ran a banner headline, “The greatest privilege and highest honor of the Mt Baekdu revolutionary army.”

“There has been an unveiling ceremony of statues of the ‘Three Mt. Baekdu Generals’ (Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Suk) dressed in military uniform at the Revolutionary History Museum of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces,” the front page article explained.

The report added that Chief of Staff of the Chosun People’s Army Lee Young Ho and First Vice-Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Army Kim Jung Kak took part in the ceremony.

Kim Jung Kak emphasized in his speech at the ceremony that the statue of Kim Jong Il is the first dressed in military attire, claiming, “It is the luckiest and most honorable thing in the world for the Chosun People’s Army to have this, the first statue of its highest commander dressed in military uniform.”

On the subject of the relative lack of Kim Jong Il statues, Cheong Young Tae, a researcher with the Korea Institute for National Unification, explained to The Daily NK today, “Kim Jong Il inherited the family’s ruling legitimacy by making his father the eternal ‘Suryeong’ (supreme leader). It seems, then, that the process of justifying and enhancing the legitimacy of the revolution now includes setting Kim up as the second ‘Suryeong’ in order to hand over power to the next generation.”

But while statues of Kim are rather rare, they do exist. Open Radio cited a defector as saying, “I’ve seen a Kim Jong Il statue at Kim Jong Il Political Military University in Pyongyang. However, most people do not know about it.”

“I think that is natural, because it is the only university which is named after Kim Jong Il. There is no Kim Jong Il statue in any other province or in official buildings, though” he added.

Additionally, a 2008 report asserted that a gold statue of Kim Jong Il can be found “in the area in front of the National Security Agency office building at the foot of Mt. Amee in Daesung district, Pyongyang.” This one, the report asserted, was erected on Kim Jong Il’s 46th birthday in 1988, but no photos exist to corroborate the claim.

Another, white plaster statue of Kim can be found at the International Friendship Exhibition at Mt. Myohang, north of Pyongyang, this one a stalwart on the North Korean tourist trail.

Additional information:

1.  An image of the Kim Jong-il statue at Myohyangsan can be seen here (link).  Scroll down until you see it.

2.  The Kim Jong il statue reminds me of the Laurent Kabila statue in Kinshasa (both made by the Mansudae Art Studio).

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Former DPRK railway minister reportedly executed

Thursday, July 15th, 2010

According to Breitbart (via Breitbart):

Former North Korean Railways Minister Kim Yong Sam was executed in March last year for failing to maintain locomotive trains that had been in store for wartime, Radio Free Asia, a nonprofit radio station, reported Wednesday on its Internet edition.

A source on North Korean affairs said Kim got into trouble during an inspection by the National Defense Commission for scrapping locomotive trains that were in store for wartime.

After the inspection, carried out after celebrations were held to mark the country’s 60th birthday on Sept. 9, 2008, Kim was handed over to the State Security Department, report said.

He had been railways minister for 10 years from September, 1998.

The Choson Ilbo has more:

A nationwide campaign is underway recently in North Korea to get rid of photos and publications of executed former senior officials, Radio Free Asia claimed Tuesday.

This campaign was ordered by leader Kim Jong-il on July 2. The North’s Press Censorship Bureau is reportedly destroying documents and materials collected from across the country.

According to RFA, the campaign’s targets include Pak Nam-gi, the former director of the North Korean Workers Party’s Planning and Finance Department who was executed in March over the disastrous currency reform, and former railways minister Kim Yong-sam.

“Railway workers suffering from the food shortage stole copper and aluminum parts from locomotive trains that were in store for wartime and sold them as scrap metal. As a result, about 100 locomotives were scrapped,” it claimed. “This was revealed in an inspection by the National Defense Commission in 2008.” Kim Yong-sam was then taken to the State Security Department and executed in March the following year, it added.

Kim Yong-sam was appointed railways minister in September 1998 but has not been seen in public since October 2008, when he was replaced by current minister Jon Kil-su.

A Unification Ministry official said rumors about his execution are “rampant.”

Read the full stories here:
Former N. Korean railways minister Kim Yong Sam executed: report
Kyodo (via Breitbart)
7/14/2010

N.Korea’s Ex-Railways Minister Executed
Choson Ilbo
7/15/2010

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DPRK soldiers change uniforms

Thursday, July 15th, 2010

According to the Choson Ilbo:

kpa-uniform-changes-2010-7-14.jpg

 

Click image for larger version

North Korean soldiers stationed at the border truce village of Panmunjom have changed their headgear again.

On Thursday, a day ahead of planned military talks about the sinking of the South Korean Navy corvette Cheonan between the UN Command and the North, they were seen wearing camouflage helmets (right).

They have worn them for 10 days, a South Korean military spokesman said. In late May the guards switched from their usual army caps (left) to steel helmets (center).

Read the full story here:
N.Korean Soldiers’ Changing Millinery Fashions
Choson Ilbo
7/15/2010

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KWP acsends in September

Wednesday, July 14th, 2010

UPDATE:  The Daily NK also offers some propaganda posters leading up to the event.

ORIGINAL POST: According to the Daily NK:

Hwang Jang Yop, President of the Committee for the Democratization of North Korea, believes the motivation behind the Chosun Workers’ Party (KWP) delegates’ conference, which is to be held for the first time in 44 years this September, is Kim Jong Il’s belief that the power of the Party needs to be increased since too much authority is currently concentrated in the National Defense Commission, and this could represent an obstacle to the establishment of Kim Jong Eun’s succession.

Hwang, who was speaking at a forum in Seoul on July 13th, explained, “Kim Jong Il relies on the military to reign, and the core of that power is the National Defense Commission, but he is trying to solve the succession issue by strengthening the authority of the Party.”

“Kim wants to return the National Defense Commission to its previous role, which was to devote itself to military duty,” he added.

Hwang stated, “Kim Jong Il believes that Kim Jong Eun’s succession cannot be same as his own, which was done through the military. He believes that Kim Jong Eun cannot manage the military as well as he could, and therefore, if Kim Jong Il dies with power concentrated in the National Defense Commission, stabilizing the succession will be difficult.”

“The military is difficult to control if there is a problem, and since Kim Jong Il understands this fact, he is intending to control the military through the Party. Also, Kim will want to announce the succession issue to the North Korean people through the Party rather than the military.”

“The previous Military Commission of the Chosun Worker’s Party served the role of an administrative organization,” Hwang reminded listeners. “Taking the opportunity offered by the Chosun Workers’ Party delegates’ conference, the functions of the Party will be acknowledged and strengthened, while the military will be refocused on military work.”

He also commented, “Kim Jong Il has threatened the international community through the military in difficult political and economic times, and run North Korea by directly mobilizing the army. However, the cultural and ideological unification of North Korean citizens is impossible through the military so, Kim Jong Il will actively use the Party in the establishment of the succession.”

“Kim Jong Il believes that only the Party can unite the North Korean people ideologically during the establishment of the succession, so therefore he is hosting the Chosun Workers’ Party delegates’ conference to begin the process by reinforcing Party authority,” Hwang concluded, returning to the main theme.

Previous posts on September conference here and here.

Read the full story here:
KWP to Take the Power Back in September
Daily NK
Kim Yong Hun
7/14/2010

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DPRK says upcoming party meeting will be historic

Tuesday, July 13th, 2010

According to Yonhap:

North Korea stressed on Tuesday the historical importance of its upcoming meeting of core ruling party delegates, urging the younger generation of party members to be as loyal to the leadership as their predecessors.

In September, the communist state will hold its first meeting of senior Workers’ Party delegates in 44 years, a move that observers say may be aimed at paving the ground for leader Kim Jong-il to transfer his power to his third son, Jong-un.

Kim, 68, made his first public appearance in a 1980 convention, considered to be more authoritative, and sealed himself as the successor to his father, Kim Il-sung, who founded the North and died in 1994.

In an editorial seen here on Tuesday, the Rodong Sinmun, the party’s daily, heaped praise on party members who died loyal to the founder and called on new members to “follow suit.”

The paper, considered to be Pyongyang’s main mouthpiece, also described the September meeting as one that will “shine as a notable event in the history of the holy Workers’ Party.”

Late last month, the paper said that the party will expand its role and function through the meeting, stressing the importance of the central party organ that had once served as a venue for Kim Jong-il to rise up the power ladder when he was young.

Kim is believed to be quickening his power transfer after suffering a stroke two years ago. Earlier this year, North Korea promoted Kim’s brother-in-law as a vice head of the National Defense Commission, the highest seat of power. Jang Song-thaek is believed to be the central figure behind the succession process.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea says upcoming party meeting will be historic
Yonhap
Sam Kim
7/13/2010

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Aidan Foster-Carter offers DPRK current events summary…

Thursday, July 8th, 2010

In the East Asia Forum:

June 2010 saw two major anniversaries on the Korean peninsula. On June 25 sixty years ago the Korean People’s Army (KPA) invaded the South launching a bitter three-year war. North Korea still denies culpability, claiming it was repelling a Southern invasion; despite overwhelming evidence, now backed by Soviet archives, that it was the aggressor. No less mendaciously Pyongyang nonetheless celebrates the July 27, 1953 Armistice which ended open hostilities as a ‘brilliant victory in the Fatherland Liberation War’ — even though this left the North bombed and napalmed to ruination.

China still formally backs the North’s version, but this year some brave soul decided to take seriously the late Deng Xiaoping’s instruction to ‘Seek truth from facts.’ The International Herald Leader, an affiliate of Xinhua news agency let the cat out of the bag. It featured interviews with Chinese historians telling the true story, and a timeline stating that ‘The North Korean military crossed the parallel on June 25 1950 and Seoul was taken in four days.’ Naturally, the article rapidly vanished from the web. But many Chinese now are openly critical of the DPRK, and embarrassed that Beijing continues to toe Pyongyang’s line.

North Korea itself sticks to the old tunes. On June 22 the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported what it headlined as ‘Revenge-vowing Meetings.’

Youth and students and agricultural workers gathered in Susan-ri… and in Sinchon … Tuesday to vow to take revenge upon the U.S. imperialists on the occasion of the ‘June 25, the day of the struggle against the U.S. imperialists’.

The reporters and speakers at the meetings recalled that the U.S. imperialists brutally destroyed cities, villages, factories and farms and killed innocent civilians…denouncing the Yankees as a herd of wolves in human skin and the Koreans’ sworn-enemy with whom they cannot live under the same sky…

They bitterly condemned the U.S. imperialists and the Lee group of traitors for totally negating the historic June 15 North-South Joint….

If the U.S. imperialists intrude into the DPRK even an inch, all the servicepersons and people will mercilessly wipe out the aggressors.

Rhetoric like the above is clearly intended to fan the flames of hatred.

A further KCNA item on June 24 purported to list the ‘Tremendous Damage Done to DPRK by US.’ The KCNA, with unusual precision, computed a total of nearly 65 trillion dollars for human and material losses inflicted from 1945 up to the present. Considering the state of US public finances, Kim Jong-il should not expect a cheque any time soon. There is also a degree of inflation; last time KCNA published such an exercise, in November 2003, the bill was a mere US$ 43 trillion. One can only wonder what is the point of such grandstanding.

So savage a mood has torpedoed a second anniversary; one which should have been happier. On June 13 2000 South Korea’s then president, the veteran democrat Kim Dae-jung flew to Pyongyang for the first ever inter-Korean summit with the North’s leader, Kim Jong-il. On June 15 they signed a North-South Joint Declaration; Kim Dae-jung was awarded that year’s Nobel Peace Prize. Thus began a decade of unprecedented North-South cooperation, albeit patchy and one-sided. This ‘sunshine’ policy was ended by South Korea’s current president, Lee Myung-bak, who insists that the North must give up its nuclear weapons first if it wants better ties with the South. That sounds fine in theory, but few expect it will ever happen.

North Korea made much of the June 15 anniversary, even while excoriating the ‘traitor’ Lee Myung-bak for trampling on it. Pyongyang warmly welcomed a South Korean radical priest, Han Song-ryeol, who made the trip illegally to mark the occasion.

South Korea by contrast played up the war anniversary more than the inter-Korean one. Lee Myung-bak used this occasion to once again call on the North to admit that it sank the ROK corvette Cheonan on March 26, and to apologise.

Will the Cheonan go unpunished?
Nevertheless, it looks increasingly like Pyongyang has got away with it. June brought Lee Myung-bak little joy on the issue, at home or abroad. Local elections in South Korea on June 2 saw his ruling Grand National Party (GNP) rebuffed. Many voters saw Lee’s tough first reactions, which roiled global markets, as adding to rather than reducing risk.

Abroad too Lee has met obstacles. Assured of firm US and other Western support he is struggling to convince Russia and China. That was predictable: for Beijing and Moscow, unwillingness to paint Pyongyang into a corner was always going to trump the facts. A Russian naval team visited Seoul to inspect the Cheonan wreckage, including DPRK torpedo parts, but is not expected to report until July. In this light the ROK government will be relieved that the G-8 summit in Canada on June 25 issued a strong statement on the Cheonan – after energetic lobbying by Japan’s new prime minister Naoto Kan, which will get his relations with Lee Myung-bak off to a good start. Connoisseurs of diplomatic wordplay noted that while the G-8 condemned the attack, noted that an international team had blamed it on Pyongyang, and called on the DPRK to avoid any attacks against the ROK, it did not quite join up all those dots; doubtless at Moscow’s behest. Lee may lobby similarly when he arrives for the ensuing G-20 summit; although since South Korea chairs the group and will host its next jamboree in Seoul in November, it may look bad if he were perceived as acting in too particularist a way.

Earlier, on June 4 South Korea formally referred the Cheonan incident to the UN Security Council (UNSC). On June 14 both Korean states briefed the UNSC, with the North as ever denying all responsibility and urging the Council not to consider the matter. No official response is expected until July. With Russia and China likely to abstain at best, whatever the Security Council eventually comes up with looks set to be a damp squib. South Korea has already said it will not seek further sanctions, on top of those already in force under earlier UNSC resolutions from 2006 and 2009 after the North’s two nuclear tests. But it would like a clear, resounding condemnation, preferably in the form of a resolution.

Looking ahead, it is not too soon to wonder how the two Koreas will get past Cheonan. Record numbers of DPRK workers at the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) – 44,000 as of June, according to the ROK unification ministry (MOU) – are seen in Seoul as a sign that at some level Pyongyang remains committed to this joint venture at least.

A big event in September
Meanwhile North Korea looks more preoccupied with the succession issue than in reaching out to South Korea.

On June 26 KCNA reported that ‘the Political Bureau of the WPK [Workers’ Party of Korea] Central Committee decides to convene early in September … a conference of the WPK for electing its highest leading body reflecting the new requirements of the WPK.’

Though nominally it is North Korea’s ruling communist party, and still an important tool of control at lower echelons, the WPK has seen its topmost organs atrophy under Kim Jong-il. Neither the rarely mentioned Politburo nor the Central Committee (CC) is known to have met at all in the 16 years since Kim Il-sung died. Kim Jong-il has favoured the army, ruling through the NDC and informally via a kitchen cabinet of trusted cronies. The dear leader is also of course secretary-general of the WPK, but he acquired that post irregularly: by acclamation at a series of local Party meetings, rather than being duly elected by the CC.

Hence while the precise nature of September’s meeting remains vague, like its exact date, it looks like a long overdue effort to restore a measure of due process to the Party. If this is in fact a full formal WPK congress, it would be the first since the Sixth Congress thirty years ago in October 1980. It was then that Kim Jong-il, hitherto veiled behind coded references to a mysterious ‘Party Centre’, was finally revealed in the flesh. The speculation is that this new meeting similarly will finally give the world a glimpse of the enigmatic Kim Jong-eun.

While all rumours emanating from Seoul should be treated carefully it’s hard not to link this news with reports that Kim Jong-il’s health is worsening. There are claims that on some aides including his son are duping him with Potemkin factories to hide from him how dire the economy really is. An already tardy succession can clearly brook no further delay, or else regime stability and continuity may be gravely imperilled.

The economy shrank again last year
If Kim Jong-il wants to know how his economy is really doing, he could look at the latest estimates from the enemy.

The (southern) Bank of Korea (BOK) published its latest estimates, covering 2009, on June 24, just in time for Seoul to crow about them as it marked the Korean War anniversary. By this reckoning North Korea’s real annual gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by 0.9 per cent last year. Unlike most other countries this had little to do with the global financial crisis. Rather it reflected local conditions, natural and man-made.

The gaps just get wider
The result is a huge and ever widening gap. North Korea’s gross national income (GNI) in 2009 was a mere 2.7 per cent of the South’s. BOK cites Northern GNI in 2009 was US$22.4 billion, compared to US$837 billion for the South. True, the South has over twice as many people. But the average North Korean per capita income too is a minute fraction of the South’s, with the ROK topping US$17,000 while the DPRK’s is a paltry US960. (Some experts, including a former unification minister, think even this is too high and posit a figure nearer US$300, putting North Korea among the poorest nations on earth.)

With trade figures the gap is even wider. This year inter-Korean trade will fall, since Seoul has banned most of it (except the Kaesong zone, which accounts for over half) as punishment for the Cheonan. Peanuts to the South, this has been crucial for the North: South Korea is its largest market, taking almost half of its meagre total exports. Last year inter-Korean trade like DPRK trade overall fell slightly, from US$1.82 to US$1.68 billion. Yet Northern exports crept up, from US$932 to 934 million.

In 2009 North Korea’s real trade totals were just under US$2 billion in exports and US$3.1 billion in imports. They are still dwarfed by South Korea’s respective figures of US$364 and US$324 billion – and this in a bad year for the South, due to the downturn.

Every year the gap widens further, yet still Kim Jong-il refuses economic reform. It is hard to fathom a mind-set which can inflict such disaster and tragedy on a once proud land and people – and whose idea of a way out of its self-dug hole is to fire a sneaky torpedo.

Good losers
It was left to North Korea’s footballers to remind the world that their country does not lack for talent and virtue. As one would expect, North Korea were a disciplined team. They kept to themselves and avoided the press – with one striking exception, Jong Tae-se. Born in Japan to a South Korean father and a pro-North Korean mother, and having attended schools run by Chongryun – the organisation of pro-North Koreans in Japan – he elected to play for the DPRK; although he still holds ROK nationality, lives in Japan and plays in the J-League for Kawasaki Frontale.

A young man whose talk is as uninhibited as his style of play, Jong cried when the DPRK anthem was played before the Brazil match. Yet his love for his adopted homeland is not uncritical. ‘Everybody thinks about our country as being closed and mysterious, so we have to change that,’ he told AFP. ‘We can change for the better if we are more open with the way we talk to people and it would make a better team.’

It would make a better country too. If North Korea’s fate must rest in the hands of an untried youth, better it were the warm-hearted and wised-up Jong Tae-se than Kim Jong-eun.

Read the full story here:
North Korea: Unhappy anniversaries
East Asia Forum
Aidan Foster-Carter
7/6/2010

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Burma-North Korea Ties: Escalating Over Two Decades

Wednesday, July 7th, 2010

According to the Irrawaddy:

A recent New York Times op-ed article by Aung Lynn Htut, formerly a high-ranking Burmese military intelligence officer who defected in 2005 while he served as an attaché at the Burmese embassy in Washington, shed new light on the history of the still murky relationship between Burma and North Korea, two of the world’s most isolated, secretive and oppressive regimes.

Burma broke diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1983, when North Korean agents attempted to assassinate the South Korean president on Burmese soil. But according to Aung Lynn Htut, shortly after current junta-chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe assumed power in 1992, he surreptitiously moved to renew ties with Pyongyang.

“Than Shwe secretly made contact with Pyongyang. Posing as South Korean businessmen, North Korean weapon experts began arriving in Burma. I remember these visitors. They were given special treatment at the Rangoon airport,” Aung Lynn Htut said in his June 18 article.

The junta kept its renewed ties with North Korea secret for more than a decade because it was working to establish relationships with Japanese and South Korean businesses, Aung Lynn Htut said. By 2006, however, “the junta’s generals felt either desperate or confident enough to publicly resume diplomatic relations with North Korea.” 

In November 2008, the junta’s No 3, Gen Shwe Mann, visited North Korea and signed a memorandum of understanding, officially formalizing military cooperation between Burma and North Korea. Photographs showed him touring secret tunnel complexes built into the sides of mountains thought to store and protect jet aircraft, missiles, tanks and nuclear and chemical weapons.

According to Aung Lynn Htut, Lt-Gen Tin Aye, the No.5 in the Burma armed forces and the chief of Military Ordnance, is now the main liaison in the relationship with Pyongyang. Tin Aye has often traveled to North Korea as well as attended ceremonies at the North Korean embassy in Rangoon.

In September 2009, The New Light of Myanmar reported that Tin Aye went to the anniversary celebration of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), held in a hotel in Rangoon. In February, Tin Aye, along with other senior officials, attended the birthday event of the Dear Leader of North Korea at the embassy.

Flights and ships from North Korea to Burma have been carrying more than just Burmese generals. Analysts, including Burma military expert Andrew Selth, say that for years Burma and North Korea have used a barter system whereby Burma exchanges primary products for North Korean military technologies.

In June 2009, a North Korean ship, the Kang Nam I, was diverted from going to Burma after being trailed by the US navy. Then in April, another North Korean ship, the Chong Gen, docked in Burma carrying suspicious cargo, allegedly in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which restricts North Korea from arms deals and from trading in technology that could be used for nuclear weapons.

In May, the seven-member UN panel monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea said in a report that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Burma with the aid of front companies around the world.

According to the UN report, a North Korean company, Namchongang Trading, which is known to be associated with illicit procurement for Burma’s nuclear and military program and is on the US sanctions list, was involved in suspicious activities in Burma.

The report also noted three individuals were arrested in Japan in 2009 for attempting to illegally export a magnetometer—a dual-use instrument that can be employed in making missile control system magnets and gas centrifuge magnets—to Burma via Malaysia allegedly under the direction of another company known to be associated with illicit procurement for North Korea’s nuclear and military programs.

The UN experts also said that the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation has handled several transactions involving millions of dollars directly related to deals between Burma and the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation.
 
With this string of events and the suspicions surrounding them as a dramatic lead in, on June 4, Al Jazeera aired a news documentary prepared by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) which was written by Robert Kelley, a nuclear scientist and former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The DVB report claimed that the ruling military junta in Burma is “mining uranium, converting it to uranium compounds for reactors and bombs, and is trying to build a reactor and/or an enrichment plant that could only be useful for a bomb.”

The IAEA wrote to Burma’s agency representative, Tin Win, on June 14 and asked whether the information provided in the DVB report was true. Burma, which is a member of the IAEA, a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a signatory to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, responded with a letter stating that the DVB report allegations are “groundless and unfounded.”

“No activity related to uranium conversion, enrichment, reactor construction or operation has been carried out in the past, is ongoing or is planned for the future in Myanmar [Burma],” the letter said.

The letter also noted that Burma is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the agency’s so-called safeguards agreement. “As stated in the safeguards agreement, Myanmar will notify the agency if it plans to carry out any nuclear activities,” the letter said.

The regime, however, has not signed the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, meaning that the agency has no power to set up an inspection of Burma’s nuclear facilities under the existing mechanism known as the Small Quantities Protocol.

Previously, on June 11, Burma’s state radio and television news had reported the Foreign Ministry’s denial of the allegations in the DVB report. The denial claimed that anti-government groups in collusion with the media had launched the allegations with the goal of “hindering Burma’s democratic process and to tarnish the political image of the government.”

The Foreign Ministry denial also addressed Nyapyidaw’s relationship with Pyongyang. “Following the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, Myanmar [Burma] and the DPRK, as independent sovereign states, have been engaging in promoting trade and cooperation between the two countries in the same way Myanmar is dealing with others,” the ministry said in its statement.

The regime did acknowledge that the Chong Gen docked at Thilawa Port near Rangoon in April. But the statement said the North Korean vessel was involved in importing cement from North Korea and exporting rice from Burma.

But in an article for Asia Times online, Burma analyst Bertil Linter noted that, “if carrying only innocuous civilian goods, as the statement maintains, there would seemingly have been no reason for authorities to cut electricity around the area when the Chong Gen, a North Korean ship flying the Mongolian flag of convenience, docked on the outskirts of Yangon.”

“According to intelligence sources, security was tight as military personnel offloaded heavy material, including Korean-made air defense radars. The ship left the port with a return cargo of rice and sugar, which could mean that it was, at least in part, a barter deal. On January 31 this year, another North Korean ship, the Yang M V Han A, reportedly delivered missile components also at Yangon’s Thilawa port,” Linter said.

Strategypage.com, a military affairs website covering armed forces worldwide, said, “Indications are that the North Korean ship that delivered a mysterious cargo four months ago, was carrying air defense radars (which are now being placed on hills up north) and ballistic missile manufacturing equipment. Dozens of North Korean technicians have entered the country in the last few months, and have been seen working at a military facility outside Mandalay. It’s unclear what this is for. Burma has no external enemies, and ballistic missiles are of no use against internal opposition.”

In his Asia Times online story, Lintner noted that on June 24, the DVB reported that a new radar and missile base had been completed near Mohnyin in Myanmar’s northern Kachin State, and he reported that work on similar radar and missile bases has been reported from Kengtung in eastern Shan State,160 kilometers north of the Thai border town of Mae Sai.

“Since Myanmar is not known to have imported radars and missile components from any country other than North Korea, the installations would appear to be one of the first visible outcomes of a decade of military cooperation,” Lintner said.

Lintner also reported that Western intelligence sources know that 30 to 40 North Korean missile technicians are currently working at a facility near Minhla on the Irrawaddy River in Magwe Division, and that some of the technicians may have arrived overland by bus from China to give the appearance of being Chinese tourists. 

North Korea has also issued adamant denials with respect to allegations regarding its relationship with Burma.

According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), on June 21 Pyongyang said, “The US is now making much fuss, floating the sheer fiction that the DPRK is helping Myanmar [Burma] in its nuclear development.”

The KCNA often highlights the close relationship between North Korea and Burma.

On June 20, the Pyongyang news agency reported that ex-Col Than Tun, deputy chairman of the Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Ltd., sent a statement cheering Kim Jong Il’s 46th anniversary at the Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea.

On April 18, Korean state-run- media reported that Than Tun also issued a statement cheering the 17th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s chairing of North Korea’s National Defense Commission.

“Kim Jong Il’s field inspection of KPA [Korean People’s Army] units served as a main source that helped bolster [North Korea’s] self-reliant defense capability in every way,” the statement noted.

Military sources said the Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Ltd, managed by the junta, is responsible for purchasing imported weapons for Burma’s armed forces, including transferring money to overseas banks such as Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation.

Meanwhile, in addition to its escalating relationship with North Korea, the Burmese military regime has recently boosted ties with Iran, which according to the UN report is also allegedly receiving nuclear and missile technologies from North Korea.

In recent years, Burmese and Iranian officials visited their counterparts homeland for the purported purpose of improving economic ties. Observers, however, said Than Shwe has made a tactical decision to develop relationships with other “pariah states,” particularly enemies of the US, to relieve Western pressure on his regime.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali Fathollahi met Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win and Minister of Energy Lun Thi during his trip to Burma on June 15-17.

“The two sides reiterated their desire to further expand the ties of friendship and economic cooperation and to increase cooperation in the regional international forums such as [the] United Nations and Non-Aligned Movement,” The New Light of Myanmar reported on June 18.

Fathollahi’s visit came three months after Maung Myint’s visit to Iran on March 8-11, when he met Iranian Foreign Minister Manochehr Mottaki and Deputy Minister of Petroleum H. Noghrehkar Shirazi.

Read the full story below:
Burma-North Korea Ties: Escalating Over Two Decades
Irrawaddy
Wai Moe
7/7/2010

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Life tough in Pyongyang

Tuesday, July 6th, 2010

According to the Daily NK:

The gap between the rich and poor in North Korea is growing as the number of people trying to sell their family home to buy food expands in the aftermath of last November’s currency reforms, according to a source from inside the country.

The source from South Pyongan Province told The Daily NK on Thursday, “An increasing number of homes are being sold to buy food, and now it seems like about two out of every ten people around here have lost their home.”

According to the source, the rich buy up the houses, demolish them and build new ones to sell for a profit. Those who have amassed dollars or Chinese Yuan from trading are now turning to the housing market.

Even in Pyongyang, where the public distribution system continues to function, there are homeless people on the street, according to the source, who added, “When I was in Pyongyang, there were homeless people sleeping in the subway in large numbers.”

The source went on, “People’s lives are very difficult. There are even some who rely on digging up 5kg of wormwood, walking three hours to sell it, and only getting 100 won per kg.”

Currently, 1kg of rice sells for 400 to 500 won in Pyongyang, and 500 to 600 won in other areas.

The source also explained, “While public distribution still functions in Pyongyang, there are strict restrictions on movement, and even with our salaries we can’t buy food because there is too little.”

Since the economy is so bad, the crime rate is also going up, he added, “There are now more and more pick pocketing cases, and these days, they not only use small knives to steal purses, but even tweezers to pick stuff from pockets.”

The source’s assertion that there was public distribution until mid-June contradicts the claim of one NGO, which said that on May 26 the authorities ordered each area to look out for its own food supply. The source, when asked about the decree, said he was unaware of its existence.

Read the full story here:
Life Even Tough in Pyongyang
Daily NK
Kim So Yeol
7/2/2010

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Bigwigs in North vie for power over investments

Monday, July 5th, 2010

According to the Joong Ang Daily:

Two men near the top of the North Korean power structure are competing against each other to become foreign investment czar for the cash-strapped country, according to sources with knowledge of North Korea.

North Korea experts say the contest could influence who eventually succeeds Kim Jong-il.

The sources told JoongAng Ilbo yesterday that Jang Song-thaek and O Kuk-ryol, both vice chiefs of North Korea’s National Defense Commission, are competing over who can attract more foreign investment to the North. The National Defense Commission, the country’s top state organization, is chaired by Kim.

“O Kuk-ryol dominated the foreign investment coming into the North because of his military power,” said one of the sources, “but he is in a hegemony struggle in that area with Jang Song-thaek, who thrust himself into foreign investment promotion later than [O Kuk-ryol].”

Jang is the husband of Kim Kyong-hui, Kim’s younger sister, and is one of Kim’s close confidants. Jang was also promoted to vice chairman of the National Defense Commission on June 7 at the Supreme People’s Assembly.

The sources said O, since being appointed a vice chairman of the National Defense Committee in February 2009, has capitalized on his position to expand his influence in attracting foreign investment.

O and his aides established Choson Kukje Sanghoe (Korean International Trading Company) as the organization solely responsible for foreign investment promotion and received approval for the organization from the presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly on July 1, 2009.

Meanwhile, Jang named Park Chol-su, a Korean-Chinese businessman, president of Korea Taepung International Investment Group, which he re-purposed to attract foreign investment.

The company initially belonged to the cabinet, but Jang absorbed it into the National Defense Commission and announced the establishment of the re-purposed company in a January 20 report from the official Korea Central News Agency. The news report said Kim Jong-il issued an “order” that the state guarantee that Taepung be able to attract foreign investment.

“O Kuk-ryol is very displeased that Jang jumped into the foreign investment business that he led,” said the sources. “Currently, Choson Kukje Sanghoe and Korea Taepung International Investment Group are vying against one another.”

The sources said that the power struggle is already being watched with concern by the State Security Department, the North’s supreme intelligence agency.

The agency, the sources said, suspects that China is behind Taepung and is trying to control the North Korean economy by injecting capital through Park and the group. The sources said the agency is hesitant to report its suspicions to Kim, given his close relationship to Jang.

Jang has cultivated power through economic projects Kim has entrusted him with, such as a project to build 100,000 houses in Pyongyang. Since he was promoted to vice chairman last month by Kim, he is thought to have increased his political clout as well.

Ri Je-kang, a rival with Jang, also died in a mysterious, recent traffic accident.

“If a rivalry between Jang Song-thaek and O Kuk-ryol, both key axes of North Korean power, becomes a full-fledged power struggle, it could have a subtle effect on a North Korean succession scenario,” said Kim Yong-hyeon, professor of North Korean Studies at Dongguk University.

Read the full story here:
Bigwigs in North vie for power over investments
Joong Ang Daily
7/5/2001

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