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Fighting in the Streets

Tuesday, February 2nd, 2010

Daily NK
Park Sung Kook
2/2/2010

There has been an explosion in the number of casualties resulting from popular resentment at harsh regulation of market activities by the security apparatus across North Korea, according to various Daily NK sources.

For instance, in Pyongsung, North Pyongan Province, normally one of the key distribution centers in North Korea, there have been several incidents of agents from the People’s Safety Agency (PSA), the organization charged with cracking down on the smuggling of food and other officially “immoral” acts, being attacked by unidentified assailants.

A Daily NK source reported on Monday, “A group of agents who had just finished doing the rounds of the jangmadang and alley markets in Naengcheon-dong, Haksu-dong, and Cheongok-ri in Pyongsung were attacked by a number of people, who assaulted them and immediately ran away. As a result, PSA officials are feeling very tense these days.”

Commenting privately on these incidents, some people savor them as acts of revenge, but others are worried about the situation, according to The Daily NK’s sources.

There have been more examples unearthed in recent days, too. For instance, North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity (NKIS), a Seoul-based defector group, recently received news that “a fight broke out between agents of the PSA, who monitor the Hyesan jangmadang, and some residents. As the fight turned serious, one resident snatched an agent’s gun and fired randomly into the crowd. One agent, Choe, is in a critical condition.”

According to NKIS, the fight began after the PSA agents beat up a trader who was trying to avoid the crackdown, and that made other residents angry, so they attacked the agents in return. As the fight grew more serious, agents threatened residents, but this only added fuel to the flames.

Finally, a Daily NK source from North Hamkyung Province released one other incident: Cho, who used to work for the Prosecutions Department of the National Security Agency in the region, was apparently killed by a Chongjin Steel Mill worker called Jeung Hyun Deuk.

The source explained, “Jeung’s father, the chief of a foreign currency-generating company, was interrogated last July on suspicion of embezzling enormous amounts of property and foreign currency, and in January was sentenced to life in prison. However, a few days after being imprisoned, he died. Thereafter, Jeung held a grudge against his father’s interrogator, Cho, and eventually killed him.”

The source concluded, “Traders and residents have lost their property due to the redenomination and are pretty much being treated as criminals as a result of the NSA and PSA’s ‘50-Day Battle.’ Therefore, people are taking revenge on agents, since they feel so desperate that, regardless of their actions, they will die. As a result, social unrest is becoming more serious.”

On January 2, the National Defense Commission released an order entitled “On completely sweeping away hostile factions who attempt to demolish our Republic from the inside,” initiating the “50-Day Battle” crackdown by the PSA and NSA in every city, county, and province which was referred to by the North Hamkyung Province source.

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), National Defense Commission, Revolt | Comments Closed

New N.Korean Currency Sees Runaway Inflation

Tuesday, January 5th, 2010

Choson Ilbo
1/6/10

North Korea’s currency reform has apparently failed to tame inflation. The state has paid the first salaries since the shock currency reform late last year, with the State Security Department and the Ministry of Public Security, the frontline agencies dedicated to protection of the regime, paying soldiers 6,000 won each — 3,000 won in average monthly pay plus a 3,000 won bonus.

Soldiers usually received about 3,000 won in the old currency. That this effectively doubled means the currency reform, which exchanged old won for new at a rate of 100:1, has not been able to stop inflation.

Money is also apparently being distributed to workers on collective farms, who had a hard time last year because they failed to raise vegetables and other produce from their own patches to scrape a living for their families due to the “150-day struggle,” a campaign aimed at spurring them to work harder at farms.

According to recent defectors, cooperative farms distributed more than 100,000 won to each household in the new currency late last year to settle accounts and distribute profits. Workers at state-run enterprises were also given 1,000 to 2,000 won each, even though most of their operations are suspended.

One Korean Chinese, who visited Pyongyang recently, said, “Department store shelves are stacked with goods that the state confiscated from market traders in return for nothing on Jan. 1, and they are selling those goods at prices readjusted at the exchange rate of 100 old won for one new won. Huge crowds rushed to buy them, so they ran out of stock immediately.”

But commodity prices skyrocketed. Inflation is soaring as market traders are hoarding goods, anticipating that the real value of the new currency will plummet. According to a North Korean source, 1 kg of rice cost about 30 won right after the currency reform but is now closing in on 1,000 won. The U.S. dollar was exchanged at the rate of 75 won to the greenback right after the currency reform but soared to 400 won in late December. There is speculation that it is now only a matter of time before the rate will reach 3,000 won, the same as the unofficial exchange rate of the old won.

Market traders are angry as they have realized that they were robbed of nearly everything they earned. A former senior North Korean official said, “The latest currency reform is more cruel than the previous reform in 1992. It’s tantamount to the state confiscating 99 percent of people’s money.”

Authorities have been handing out food rations in Pyongyang and other regions since December, but North Koreans already know that the food cannot last them more than a month or two. Urban residents are experiencing particular hardship.

Posted in Black markets, Fiscal & monetary policy, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Labor conditions/wages, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

2008 Top Items in the Jangmadang

Thursday, January 1st, 2009

Daily NK
Park In Ho
1/1/2009

The marketplace has become an extremely important ground in North Korean people’s lives. 70 percent of North Korean households in the city live off trade, handicrafts and transportation businesses related to trade. If the jangmadang works well, people’s living situation is good, otherwise it is not. In the situation where the food distribution system has broken down, the whole economic existence of the populace is bound up in jangmadang trade.

Trade is bound to generate successful merchants but also failures, due to a lack of know-how or confiscation of products by the People’s Safety Agency (PSA), or simply because a competition system operates. These failures in the jangmadang do not have any second opportunity to rise again so they frequently choose extreme acts like defection, criminality or suicide. Failure is serious.

However, the revitalization of markets has caused great changes in North Korean people’s values. The individual-centered mentality among the people is expanding and the belief that money is the best tool is also spreading. Due to such effects, the North Korean communist authorities in 2008 made the regulation to prohibit women younger than 40 years old from doing business, but of course the people use all necessary means to maintain their survival.

Daily NK investigated the 2008 top ten items in the jangmadang, so as to observe developments in North Korean society.

1. Rice in artificial meat, the first instance of domestic handicraft

Since 2000, the most ubiquitous street food has been “rice in artificial meat,” which is made from fried tofu with seasoned rice filling. This food is found everywhere on North Korean streets. One can find women who sell this snack in alleys, at bus stops and around stations. It costs 100 to 150 North Korean Won.

Meanwhile, the most popular street food is fried long-twisted bread. Individuals make the fried bread at home and sell it on the street. The length of the fried bread is around 20 centimeters and it sells for 100 won.

In around 2005 corn noodles were popular on the streets, but now street-stands for noodles have largely disappeared due to the existence of a permanent store controlled by the state.

These days, if one can afford to eat corn noodles, at approximately 1,000 won for a meal, one can safely say that one is living comfortably.

2. Car battery lights North Korea

The reason why North Korean people like car batteries is that the authorities provide a reliable electricity supply during the daytime, when consumption is less than at night, but at night they don not offer it. The authorities shut down the circuit from around 8 PM to 9PM, and from 12 AM to 2 AM: when the people watch television the most.

As a result, the people charge their car batteries during daytime and use it at night. A 12V battery can run a television and 30-watt light bulb. If they utilize a converter, they can use a color television, which needs more electricity.

Ownership of batteries is a standard of wealth. Officials use electricity from batteries in each room. They usually draw thick curtains in their rooms, to prevent light shining through that might draw attention to their status.

3. The strong wind of South Korean brand’ rice-cooker, Cuckoo

A South Korean brand pressure rice-cooker called Cuckoo appeared as a new icon for evaluating financial power among North Korean elites.

It has spread from the three Chinese northeast provinces into North Korea. In North Korea, Chinese rice and third country aid rice, dry compared to Korean sticky rice, generally circulates, but if the lucky few use this rice-cooker, they can taste sticky rice the way Korean people like it.

There are Cuckoo rice-cookers from South Korean factories that arrive through Korean-Chinese merchants, and surely other Cuckoo products from Chinese factories. These two kinds of rice-cookers, despite having the same brand name, sell for different prices.

The Chinese-made Cuckoo sells for 400,000-700,000 North Korean Won (approximately USD114-200), while the South Korean variety costs 800,000-1,200,000 (approximately USD229-343). A Cuckoo rice-cooker tallies with the price of a house in rural areas of North Korea. According to inside sources, they are selling like wildfire.

4. An electric shaver only for trips

The electric shaver is another symbol of wealth.

It is not that they use electric shavers normally, because one cannot provide durability. At home, North Korean men generally use disposable shavers with two blades made in China or a conventional razor. However, when they take a business trip or have to take part in remote activities, they bring the electric shaver.

There are North Korean-made shavers but most are imported from China. Among Chinese products, you can see “Motorola” products and fake-South Korean products with fake labels in Korean. A Chinese-made electric shaver is around 20,000-40,000 North Korean Won.

5. Chosun men’s fancy shoes

Dress shoes are one of the most important items for Chosun men when they have to participate in diverse political events, loyalty vows or greeting events at Kim Il Sung statues on holidays. Right after the famine in the late 1990s, it was considered a symbol of the wealth, but now general workers, farmers and students are wearing dress shoes.

The shiny enameled leather shoes with a hard heel cannot be produced in North Korea because of a lack of leather. The North Korean authorities provide the National Security Agency (NSA) and officers of the People’s Army with dress shoes, which are durable but too hard and uncomfortable.

Shoes for general citizens and students are mostly made in China and some are produced in joint enterprises in Rajin-Sunbong. The price of shoes ranges from 30,000 to 100,000 Won depending upon the quality.

6. Cosmetics prosper despite the economic crisis

Cosmetics and accessories for women are getting more varied. Lately, false eyelashes have appeared in the jangmadang in major cities. Chinese cosmetics are mainly sold, alongside fake South Korean brands. In Pyongyang, Nampo, Wonsan and Shinuiju Chinese and even European cosmetics are on sale.

“Spring Fragrance,” a North Korean luxury cosmetics brand, is famous for being Kim Jong Il’s gift that he presents to women soldiers or artists when he visits military units or cultural performances. It costs more than 200,000 North Korean won.

Lotions for women, made in China, are approximately 2,000-4,000 won, foundation cream is 3,000-5,000 won, and lipstick is from 500 won to 2,000 won. Hand cream is 3,000-5,000 won.

7. Hana Electronics recorder, the biggest state-monopoly production

“Hana Electronics” was originally set up to produce CDs and DVDs of North Korean gymnastic performances or other artistic performances, so as to export them foreign countries. The company has been producing DVD players since 2005.

Due to the state monopoly, the DVD player of the Hana Electronics dominates the market. North Korean people call a VCR and a DVD player a “recorder.” Since around 2005, after the booming interest in South Korean movies and dramas, the players have been selling very well.

At the beginning, North Korean visitors to China brought the DVD or CD players into North Korea, but as they got popular among the people, Chinese-made players were imported from China and since 2006 they have been really popular in every jangmadang.

Accordingly, since 2006, the authorities have started blocking the importation of the Chinese player and are selling the Hana Electronics players, which sell for around a 20 or 30 percent higher price than Chinese players in state-run stores. Now, they can be sold in the jangmadang by private merchants and comparatively free from inspection by the PSA. The prices are 130,000-150,000 won.

8. Bicycles are basic, the motorcycle era is here now

In major cities, numbers of motorcycles are increasing. Especially in border regions where smuggling with China is easier than in other cities, motorcycles are common.

The motorcycles are ordinarily used for mid or long distance business. Most motorcycles are made in China and some are Japanese second-handed products, which sell for 1.5-2.5 million won. 125cc new products are over 5 million won. The cheapest second-handed motorcycle is 500,000 won.

9. Vinyl floor covering for the middle class and vinyl for the poor

Demand for vinyl floor coverings and vinyl has been increasing since the late 1990s, when residential conditions improved. In the late-1990s people had to use sacks of cement or Rodong Shinmun (newspaper) as a floor covering, but now they are using vinyl floor coverings.

Uses for vinyl are unimaginably diverse: from a basic protection against wind and cold to when people take a shower at home in the vinyl tunnel hung on the ceiling of the bathroom.

Depending on the thickness and width, there are four or five kinds of vinyl in the jangmadang for from 150 to 500 won. Vinyl floor covering is a Chinese product selling for from 3,000 to 10,000 won.

Posted in Agriculture, Black markets, Clothing, Cosmetics, Economic reform, Electricity, Energy, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Manufacturing, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Price liberalization, Television | Comments Closed

The NSA Smuggling Ring

Wednesday, December 17th, 2008

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
12/17/2008

Recently in the North Korea-China border region, North Korean smuggling groups associated with the National Security Agency have been actively operating.

A source from Yangkang Province relayed in a phone conversation with the Daily NK on the 16th, “On the 9th in Songjeon-ri, Kim Jong Sook County in Yangkang Province, a van ferried on a raft fell into the water, so the border guards and the National Security Agents tried to get it out in the middle of the day. The van was being smuggled from China by the ‘national smuggling group.'”

The “national smuggling group,” or “NSA smuggling group,” which earned its epithet from the North Korean citizens, is directly operated by the National Security Agency and is composed of soldiers, well-to-do merchants, Chinese emigrants, and Chinese relatives of officials.

The group was organized in the fall of last year and has been in operation since then. The source added that its size, members, and range of traded items have significantly increased.

The source stated further, “In Hyesan alone there were at least three smuggling groups by the end of the summer, but with the passing by of the fall harvesting season, there are now about seven in operation. With the National Security Agency making profit from these groups, the No. 8 Bureau of the Chosun (North Korea) People’s Army (in charge of mobilizing war supplies) even formed a group last summer.”

In particular, it has become known that the No. 8 Bureau, under the patronage of the National Security Agency, sold a massive supply of medicinal herbs secured in North Korea to the Chinese merchants in exchange for Chinese rice.

The source emphasized, “Usually, there are four or five active members of a smuggling group. In the past, they only smuggled at night, but the groups have lately been taking advantage of quiet places during the day to hand over goods.”

He said, “When the groups engage in smuggling, the commander or vice-commander of the border guard unit will go on duty. After the National Security Agency calls the border unit, the smuggling group(s) goes out at a pre-determined time and hands over the goods.”

Goods that are currently handled by the groups are not only marine products or scrap iron, but are increasingly high-priced goods such as gold or drugs, because they can be traded for cash.

The source explained, “The smuggling groups have to give approximately 30 million North Korean won (approximately USD8,500) per person a month to the state, but ordinary smuggling does not suffice to make such a sum of money. The state severely punishes trading drugs or gold, but given the exorbitant sum which has to be paid to superiors, there has been a tendency to engage in the trading of such goods.”

He noted, “Nowadays, each unit acquires the necessary goods, so the border smuggling channel created by private individuals for trading has also been used by the national organization.”

Posted in Black markets, Economic reform, Illicit activities, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD) | Comments Closed

Kim Jong il asserts control of border regions

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

As reported earlier this year by the Daily NK, Kim Jong il’s brother in law, Jang Song Taek, was leading an anti-corruption campaign in North Korea’s northern provinces along the Chinese border. Aside from controlling financial leakages, these efforts could be interpreted as attempts by Kim to gain control over military-owned trade companies.

According to a past report:

The inspection group withdrew all trade certificates with exception of those certificates belonging to the families of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters, and those certificates issued by the Ministry of Finance or the Shinuiju Municipal Administrative Committee. Therefore, presently at Shinuiju Customs, all import items without trade certificates issued by the above mentioned three groups have to be sent back to China.

Jang’s efforts, though seemingly effective at reasserting financial control of the region, had apparently taken their toll on local commerce:

In Hyesan, Yangkang Province, markets have been significantly reduced in size and scope recently, due to the anti-socialist group’s inspections[.]

[T]he merchants were at unease when under inspection by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other governmental organizations which govern the jangmadang [markets].

For example, transportation of goods by traders has withered away since last year, as the authority of the People’s Safety Agency (PSA) [controlled by Jang] rose and [it] launched [] a strict crackdown on traders’ belongings.

The source explained the situation in Hyesan, that “Hyesan had become the city where Chinese goods were traded for the cheapest value because Chinese goods [enter the country] at Hyesan[.] [During] the (PSA) inspection period [goods] could not be transported inland due to the inspection of trains and cars. Lives of the common people became even tougher than before, since goods could not be circulated through the jangmadang in spite of their low prices.”

“The more stringent the regulation became, the more bribes cadres received and worsened were the lives of people,” the source added.

(NKeconWatch: I have “cleaned up” some of the grammar here to make it more readable. If you want to see the original version, click here.)

And in Sinuiju:

The intensive inspection of Shinuiju, in which over 70% of Chinese-North Korean commercial traffic occurs, caused several aftereffects inside North Korea: commercial traffic passing through Shinuiju and Dandong decreased by half compared to the past, and the aftermath of the inspections in Shinuiju added fuel to the fire of price rises in jangmadang goods across the country.

For instance, sugar, which is a raw material for doughnuts or candies that are consumed the most by average civilians in the jangmadang, carried a price of around 1,500 won per kilogram before the inspections, but in mid-May, it rose to 2,100 won and vegetable oil hiked from 5,500 to 7,500 won per kilogram. Such an increase in prices also caused a significant threat to the survival of citizens who made a living off the jangmadang trade.

But the final result of the evaluation of the Shinuiju inspection, which caused quite a stir externally, has purportedly been negligible.

The source said, “The volume of trade has decreased over several months and the number of visitors to China has also been reduced by half. The results of the inspection have not produced too much difference, except for the execution of 14 corrupt officials.”

The source further noted, “The only change which has been visible to the eye is the rise in the cost of bribes offered to North Korean customs from 40 to 80 dollars per hundred kilograms of goods. There was a rumor that the loading volume carried into the North would be fixed at 120kg, from 360kg, but this has not been done yet.”(Daily NK)

The Daily NK now reports that in the wake of these developments, Kim Jong il’s National Defense Commission (NDC) has moved in and directly taken over the inspections—and economic conditions have improved:

[Markets] have become lively again in the past few days as inspections by the National Defense Commission (NDC) have gotten underway.

A source in North Korea reported to Daily NK on Friday that “Merchants in Hyesan these days are fish in water. They say that they would not mind at all going through such inspections for an entire the year!”

Part of the reason for the turn around has been a change in focus. Whereas Jang’s work hit many “ordinary” North Koreans (particularly those working for the wrong trading companies), NDC inspections are focused on controlling the mid- to upper-level cadres. It is entirely speculatory to ask whether Kim’s strategy was to unleash Jang to get control of the region and afterwards assert direct control himself, or whether complaints from locals forced the NDC to end Jang’s campaign.

Of course this is all unverified information from inside North Korea, so who knows how much of it is correct!

Posted in International trade, Military, Ministry of Administration, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Inspection, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy, Worker's Party | 1 Comment »

The People’s Safety Agency’s Authority Is Strengthened

Tuesday, June 17th, 2008

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
6/17/2008

The Central Committee of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party recently commanded the People’s Safety Agency (PSA) to increase its authority.

A source from North Korea reported in a telephone interview with Daily NK on the 11th that “According to a document from the Central Committee of the Party, the legal authority of agents of the PSA is being strengthened.”

The source explained that “From now on, agents of the PSA can investigate every criminal offense committed by the military, the National Security Agency, the public prosecutors and cadres of courts. This command from the Party was delivered to the cadres’ lectures over the country on May 10.

The most remarkable part is that in every field except anti-nation or anti-regime crimes the PSA can inspect and search the houses of suspects from the military, the Party, the NSA and the public prosecutor’s office.

Through this, control over the military, which abused its power and was acknowledged as a public enemy by average residents for a decade under the military-first policy, is being systematized.

The document stated clearly that the PSA has the right to detain anyone who disobeys the agents’ onsite inspections in their homes and even to arrest them, according to the source.

One proviso only was added that when the agents undertake a house search of the cadres of the Party, they have to receive prior approval from upper levels within the PSA and they do not have the authority to arrest cadres of the Party on the spot as a suspect.

The source explained that up to this point general crimes committed by soldiers were just dealt with by the military police or the Defense Security Command of the People’s Army. Since the Shimhwajo Case in 1998, the PSA has not examined the cadres of the NSA or prosecutors.

The source relayed that regulations regarding punishment towards agents who intentionally overlook an inspection or who leak information on an inspection are specified in the document.

Since Jang Sung Taek, a brother-in-law of Kim Jong Il, led the Ministry of Administration of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party, the political authority of the PSA accordingly started being strengthened. The source explained that “In the past, the PSA was not able to intervene in any case without the permission of the prosecutors, but since October 2007 the agents of the PSA were granted the authority to deal with the arrest of criminals and with sending them to court themselves.

The position that Jang Sung Taek took in October 2007 was that the Director of the Ministry of Administration of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party is responsible for general public security organizations such as the National Security Agency, the People’s Safety Agency, the Central Prosecutor Office and the Special Court.

The source analyzed that “The Party did not push legislation on the expansion of the authority of the PSA, because political conflicts with other governmental organizations would be brought out.”

Some say that the background to the promotion of the PSA stems from Kim Jong Il’s fear that the authority of the NSA and of the military were too big while the Party’s power was extraordinarily weakened.

One other source said that “Although the military or information organizations have attempted many coups in human history, the police force has always sided with the government. Therefore, Kim Jong Il drastically strengthened the authority of the PSA.”

The source added that “Regarding the promotion of the PSA, the cadres of the Party took concrete examples of assassinations such as Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania and Park Chung Hee of South Korea, emphasizing the Romanian police’s fight against the military in order to protest Ceauşescu.”

“The People’s Safety Agents,” which is a newspaper circulated just in the PSA, and lecture materials for the PSA lately describe the PSA as the “escort warrior for the General” or “the second Escort Bureau,” the source explained, regarding the change of the PSA’s state.

Posted in Cabinet, Central Committee, Korean People's Army, Ministry of Administration, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy | Comments Closed

The end of ‘Songun’? Part II

Saturday, April 5th, 2008

Three weeks ago, the Daily NK specualted that preparations for North Korea’s political succession are leading to an end of “Songun” and a resurgence of the Korean Workers Party. A recent story in the Donga Ilbo seems to be reinforcing this claim, noting that several assets in the military’s portfolio are being moved to various state institutions and ministries (where the Worker’s Party and probably Kim’s key supporters exercise more oversight).

Here is an excerpt from the story:

A knowledgeable source on North Korea said yesterday, “[Leader] Kim Jong Il has ordered the military to transfer its foreign operations to his cabinet and is implementing radical reform of military authorities.”

Kim ordered to reduce the number of executives and the size of the ruling Workers’ Party, government and military by 30 percent at the end of last year.

The source also said officers in the chain of command including the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, the National Security Council, the Ministry of State Inspection and the General Staff Department began retiring in January.

The North Korean leader is also reportedly streamlining troop distribution. The North’s Border Guard Brigade has removed regiments and the role of the minting agency has shrunk.

The Ministry of People’s Security, considered the North’s main police organization, is seeing its status rise. No longer under the control of the prosecution, the ministry can now probe corruption in the prosecution and civilian damage caused by the military.

An Anti corruption campaign and purges might also be a part of this transition.

Read the whole story here:
N.Korea Changing ‘Military-First’ Policy
Donga Ilbo
3/12/2008

Posted in Cabinet, Korean People's Army, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Inspection, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Worker's Party | 1 Comment »

NSC’s Detection of Cell-phone Usage Is Strengthening

Tuesday, October 16th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
10/16/2007

Several inside sources reported that a National Security Agency inspection group consisting of 40 agents was dispatched to Shinuiju on October 1st to keep control over the usage of cell-phones.

Mr. Kim, who resides in Shinuiju said that “An inspection group from Pyongyang is censoring the usage of cell-phones among citizens, staying in the office of the Province-Security Agency. They are tracing the frequency broadband of Chinese mobile communication to find users.

“At the beginning of last week, the agents unexpectedly entered several houses around 11p.m. in Bonbu-dong in order to arrest suspected cell-phone users. It looked like a spy roundup project. Although it failed to catch users, the citizens’ fear of the inspection group was quite enormous.”

He relayed that “If they find the numbers of the South Korean country code recorded in the confiscated cell-phones, the owners of the cell-phones will be severely punished.”

In 2003, North Korea planned to construct a mobile communication system on a nationwide scale, but it ceased abruptly for fear of damages to national security in 2004. China-North Korea traders and residents in the border areas have been using the Chinese mobile communication system for their businesses, but the control of the mobile usage has been strengthening since 2006.

Another source informed us that “the device that the Security Agency uses for detection is produced by ‘Rohdesch,’ a German company. No one can use cell-phones because the device can reportedly pick up the signals easily when the agents, allegedly carrying the device in their pockets, approach areas where people are using cell-phones.

The company mentioned by Mr. Lee is Rohde & Schwarz, a German company which produces broadcasting devices, radio communication systems and other precision gauges and devices.

An affiliate of the wireless radio wave detection department under the Ministry of Information and Communication said in a phone conversation with DailyNK that “it is difficult to find radio waves from a cell-phone if you are not adjacent to the cell-phone user. I presume that NSC may ransack only the limited area where the Chinese mobile communication’s signal can reach, that is, within a few kilometers of the border, to search for cell-phone users.”

An affiliate in charge of the Networking Device of SK Telecom explained that “the mobile phone detection device can catch phone signals when the phone is on and in use, just within a 2km radius. But even then, it is difficult to find the exact location of the user.”

The rumor seems not true that the National Security agents are searching for cell-phone users by carrying the detection device in their pockets.

Our source, Mr. Lee, said that “along the border areas, the only group of people who can use mobile phones legally are Chinese merchants. However, the authorities have asked them not to use the cell-phones, or if they must, use them only with the permission of the NSC.”

He added that “If someone is caught, the degree of punishment depends on to where he or she attempted to call. If they called someone in China, a $300 fine would be sufficient; but if the call was made to South Korea, they may be sent to long term reeducation camps following heavy interrogation from the NSC.

He said, “What did the South Korean President come here for? The Chosun (North Korea) regime’s attitude has never changed.”

Posted in Cell phones, Communications, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD) | Comments Closed

North Korea Concentrates Energy on Regulating Citizens during Provincial Elections

Tuesday, July 24th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
7/24/2007

The North Korean government, with the approaching Provincial People’s Assembly delegate elections on the 29th of this month, stepped-up one level the management of citizens and regulation of cell phones.

Kang Ki Ok (pseudonym), a civilian of Hyesan in Yangkang Provicne, said in a phone conversation with the reporter on the 20th, “Nowadays, I am afraid to turn on my cell phone. The People Safety agents and the National Security agents inspect us with fury in their eyes. People who use cell phones during the election season are punished, so there are people who bury their phones by putting them into jars.”

The North Korean government, when the People’s Assembly election season comes around every four or five years, concentrates on regulating the society by observing the movement of citizens and examining the registration cards.

The members of the elections preparations committee, composed of National Security agents, chairmen of People’s Units, and head officials of each provincial unit, are ordered to strictly investigate illegal acts occurring in their regions and to control them. Illegal acts are punished at the end of the elections.

According to Mr. Kang, the outflow of information has been secured at the border region with the upcoming delegate elections, so concentrated cell phone regulation were carried out. Further, the control of the border has been toughened recently, so the escape fee has skyrocked to the North Korean currency of 1 million won (approx. US$1,075).

Another source relayed, “Safeguarding Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il statues and research offices have been toughened by inspection units composed of each organ and enterprise farming laborers. Further, they are making sure that historic places and vestiges of battle are not destroyed.”

This source said, “Youth Leagues have also organized inspection units and are regulating unemployed persons and are strictly making sure that juveniles do not watch South Korean dramas and listen to illegal CDs and South Korean songs.”

On one hand, related to election preparation, each city, district, and county candidates were posted at the election site and citizens over 17 have gone into preparations such as conducting voter registrations through the election committee.

The source also relayed that the People’s Safety Agency have actively stepped up inspections by summoning civilians who have gone out to foreign sites to catch clam and mine gold for survival.

When the movement of the North Korean authorities to strengthen the solidarity of the regime was presented through this election, the citizens, in fear of being punished as trial cases, have produced a cautious atmosphere.”

At the time of the Supreme People’s Assembly elections in 2003, when thefts or acts of violence occurred, perpetrators were stringently punished regardless of whether or not they were members of the Workers’ Party. Further, in the case that teenagers got into fist fights, the parents were disciplined and jointly held responsible.

Mr. Kim, who defected in 2006, said, “At the time of the 1991 provincial elections, in the province where we were living, teenagers got into a fist fight. One of the gangs who started the fight accused the opponent of “stirring a political event destroying elections” and went to the parents and got compensation for damages by threatening them.”

Posted in Cell phones, Civil society, Communications, Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy, Supreme Peoples Assembly | Comments Closed

Spies in Triplicate

Tuesday, July 3rd, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
7/1/2007

What is the “North Korean KGB?’’ This common question is actually rather meaningless _ not because North Korea does not have an analogue to the Soviet agency (it does), but because the structure of the North Korean “intelligence community’’ is remarkably complicated. In North Korea there are three major independent intelligence services _ and an array of minor sub-services.

Each service has its own field of responsibility and expertise, but in some areas they are compete fiercely. Presumably, such competition makes the North Korean leaders a bit less restive in their sleep: in a dictatorship, an excessive concentration of intelligence in one agency’s hands is fraught with danger.

Since we have mentioned the KGB, let’s start from North Korea’s closest analogue, the Ministry for Protection of State Security or MPSS. Back in the 1950s, the MPSS’s predecessor grew up absorbing a serious influence from the KGB. Like its Soviet prototype, the MPSS combines the functions of political police, counterintelligence, and political intelligence.

As a political police force, the MPSS runs a huge network of informers, manages the camps for political prisoners, and enforces manifold security regulations. As a counterintelligence agency, it does everything it can to prevent foreign spies from effecting infiltration into North Korea. And, finally, it is engaged in intelligence gathering overseas and, to some extent, in South Korea. A special role of this agency is emphasized by the fact that it is headed not by a regular minister but by Kim Jong Il himself. Yes, the “Dear Leader’’ is also the minister of his own security _ a wise arrangement, perhaps, taking into consideration the tendency of intelligence bosses to become too powerful.

However, the mighty MPSS is not very prominent when it comes to operations in South Korea. A North Korean peculiarity is the existence of the party’s own intelligence branch. The Korean Workers Party’s (KWP)own secret service is euphemistically called the Third Building _ after the number of the building in which the relevant departments are located. The Third Building bureaucracy consists of a few departments and bureaus, each with its peculiar tasks.

The KWP’s secret service has survived from the late 1940s when the party operated in both parts of the country. The Communist underground in the South, and the then powerful guerrilla movement, were managed by special departments of the KWP Central Committee. The South Korean Communist underground was wiped out in the early 1950s, but the related bureaucracy in the North survived and found justification for its existence (once created, bureaucracies are very difficult to kill). Its raison d’etre is the need to promote Juche/Communist ideas in the South, with the resurrection of the Communist movement as a supreme goal; a Communist-led unification is a more distant task. In the course of time, these goals were seen as more and more remote, but were never abandoned completely.

In fact, the Third Building is largely responsible for attempts to influence the South Korean political situation, and for gathering intelligence which makes such influence more efficient. The United Front Department, a part of the Third Building, is also responsible for clandestine operations in other countries where it strives to change the local attitudes in North Korea’s favor.

Since the Third Building should aim at starting local insurrections, many of its staff have undergone commando-style training. The only known political assassination in recent years was conducted by the officers of the Operational Department, which is a part of the Third Building. In 1997 they hunted down and shot dead Yi Han-yong, a relative of Kim Il-sung who had defected to the South and published some highly critical books about the North Korean ruling dynasty.

In addition to the MPSS and the Third Building, North Korea also has a military intelligence service whose operations largely target South Korea. Their major interest is the South Korean military and the USFK, as well as any intelligence which may be of use should a new war erupt on the Korean Peninsula.

Many people still remember the September 1996 incident when a North Korean submarine ran ashore on the eastern coast and was abandoned by the crew whose members became engaged in frequent clashes with the police and army. This was a routine operation of military intelligence that went wrong due to a navigational mistake. The commandos were supposed to survey the military installations on the coast, and then move back to the North, but it did not work as intended.

The efforts of North Korean intelligence services are concentrated on the South. But this does not mean that other countries are immune to their activity. The North Korean spies are especially active in Japan, and this was once again demonstrated by the dramatic events of 2001.

Posted in Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Operational Department, Political economy, Third Building Secret Service, United Front Department | 3 Comments »

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