North Korean Economy Watch

UPDATE 4 (4/13/2011): The Street adds some more information:

A delegation of 12 North Korean economic envoys flew back to Pyongyang on Sunday after spending two weeks touring companies that “represent main strands of the U.S. economy.”

The group visited Google (GOOG), Home Depot (HD), Bloomberg, Citigroup (C), Qualcomm(QCOM), Sempra Energy(SRE), Union Bank, and Universal Studios, as well as a mushroom farm, a seafood wholesaler, and the Port of Los Angeles, where they leaned about trade infrastructure.

Journalists were not permitted access to the visitors (they entered the Googleplex through a back entrance under tight security), and no mention of the trip appeared in the American media. I stumbled upon the story after striking up a conversation with a DPRK official at the North Korean embassy in Berlin, Germany.

Located on Glinkastraße, an avenue in what was once East Berlin, the North Koreans built an 87,788 square foot compound during the 1970s. After the Cold War ended, staff numbers were significantly reduced, and, according to the surprisingly friendly official I spoke with through the embassy’s rear gate, two of the DPRK’s three buildings were leased out to private companies.

In nearly-unaccented English, he pointed out the main tenant — a youth hostel which opened for business in 2008. Though the North Korean flag flies out front, the decision to become landlords was strictly capitalistic, as years of economic sanctions have taken a tremendous financial toll on the DPRK.

After learning I was an American, the embassy official told me that a group of North Koreans happened to be in the States at that very moment.

Before I could inquire further, he was gone.

One of the few sources providing any details regarding the affair, South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo, managed to obtain a copy of the delegation’s itinerary.

According to the report, “Six director-level officials were in the group, including the delegation’s head, Yon Il, a director at North Korea’s trade ministry. The other directors work for the trade ministry, agriculture ministry, finance ministry and industry ministry.”

Other delegates included lower level North Korean directors and managers, two advisors, and a researcher from a North Korean trade bank.

While Russian news outlet ITAR-TASS maintained that “[T]he initiator of these meetings is unknown,” the North Koreans were in fact invited to the U.S. by Susan Shirk, director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, “to see firsthand what improved relations with the United States might mean in terms of economic cooperation.”

From 1997-2000, Shirk served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs from 1997-2000, and is the head of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, an organization engaged in “track-two” diplomacy.

As described by Tong Kim, a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, the track-two approach “refers to contact, exchange of views, and other conduit activities between civilian organizations or individuals of two countries that are in dispute with each other.”

An email to Shirk seeking further details of last week’s visit was met with a terse “Sorry, no comment.” But sources say the North Koreans attended lectures at Stanford University and NYU, where they learned about “the market economy, consumer protection, what a CEO does, corporate strategies in the U.S., and an overview of the western legal system.”

This is one of the pillars of the track-two strategy. In “North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement,” a December, 2009 policy paper from an independent task force chaired by Dr. Shirk and Charles Kartman, former director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the case is made that:

The United States should adopt a long-term strategy of economic engagement with North Korea. North Korea’s attitude toward the world is closely related to the underlying structure of its domestic political-economy: a closed, command economy that favors the military and heavy industry and is isolated from the sweeping economic and political changes that have transformed the Asian landscape in recent decades. Encouraging a more open and market-friendly economic growth strategy would benefit the North Korean people as a whole and would generate vested interests in continued reform and opening, and a less confrontational foreign policy. In other words, economic engagement could change North Korea’s perception of its own self-interest. China’s economic transformation stands as an important precedent, showing how a greater emphasis on reform and opening can have positive effects on foreign policy as well. Economic change has the potential to induce and reinforce the D.P.R.K.’s peaceful transition into a country that can better provide for its people’s welfare and engage with other countries in a non-hostile manner.

Some, more hawkish Korea-watchers brush aside track-two diplomacy as a rube’s game being played with a staunchly anti-American entity that already knows far more about the outside world than it lets on.

However, there aren’t many other options in this increasingly unstable era, as a North Korean power handoff from Kim Jong Il to his son, Kim Jong Eun, is said to be in the offing.

Professor John W. Lewis of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, who has been involved in track-two negotiations with North Korea since 1986, told the Stanford News Service, “They would definitely prefer to have these talks and meetings with American officials. But since American officials won’t talk to them, we’re the only game in town. We have this weird access.”

A wholesale transformation of the North Korean political-economy would surely reap unprecedented benefits for the world at large. Of course, it would also benefit tremendously the foreign business concerns that manage to be first to market.

In this instance, Susan Shirk’s deep connections in Washington certainly bear mentioning. Shirk is a Senior Director at the Albright Stonebridge Group, a “global strategy firm that helps corporations, associations and non-profit organizations around the world meet their core objectives in a highly competitive, complex and ever-changing marketplace,” which happens to be led by former National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger, former Senator Warren B. Rudman, and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright — the first American official ever to visit North Korea.

The company “address[es] challenges for clients in any country, and work[s] with them to develop and implement winning strategies for long-term growth and success” — something that dovetails nicely with the goals of Albright Capital Management, an “emerging markets investment firm” of which Albright Stonebridge is “a significant shareholder” and “strategic partner”, “leveraging collective networks and skills to enhance each firm’s ability to serve as a trusted advisor in the emerging markets.”

The kind of access someone like Madeleine Albright provides cannot be understated.

“We see a lot of potential in emerging markets for economic growth,” Jelle Beenen, a portfolio manager at Dutch investment firm PGGM, told Bloomberg in 2007. “The reason that investing there is always a problem is there are issues like fraud and political instability, so that’s why there’s value in political-risk management and the involvement of Secretary Albright is a valuable one.”

Could the “DPRK 12” be sending a signal that the North “is finally getting serious about introducing more market-based economic reforms?” JoonAng Ilbo asks. “Has the reformist message that China, its closest ally, has been hammering home for years finally gotten across? Or is the envoys’ mission just a conciliatory gesture to try to woo food aid from the U.S. amid a deepening food crisis?”

The short answer is, no one knows.

David Straub, a former Senior Foreign Service Officer who spent 30 years focused on Northeast Asian affairs declined a request for comment, but in a recent paper, asserted that, “The fact of the matter is that no one, not even in Pyongyang, really knows what is going to happen there. I believe there could be dramatic change in the regime in North Korea even as you are reading this, but I also believe it is possible that the regime could last many decades more.”

Henry Rowen, Co-director of Stanford’s Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Director emeritus of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution who gave a presentation to the North Koreans, said in an email that he knew “very little about the group and its mission,” though he added a caveat that, “My hunch is that it was less significant than you suggest.”

Most optimistic of all seems to be Dr. Siegfried Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory (1986-97) and current co-director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Hecker, who has been granted access to North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex, told an audience about an experience he had during a recent visit to Pyongyang.

As Hecker entered a subway station in the capital city, he encountered a young man “wearing a backwards baseball cap with a Nike(NKE_) swoosh.”

“When he gets to be 21 years old, they’re gonna have a hard time keeping him down on the farm,” Hecker said.

“Where there is ‘swoosh,’ there is hope.”

UPDATE 3 (4/2/2011): The Delegation spent the day in Silicon Valley touring Google headquarters and attending a talk at Stanford University.  According to Yonhap:

A delegation of North Korean economic officials toured Silicon Valley on Friday, as their rare two-week trip to the United States was heading to a close.

The 12-member delegation, comprising mid-level officials from the trade, agriculture and other ministries, has been in the U.S. since March 19 at the invitation of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at University of California, San Diego.

The group also had visited New York earlier this week.

On Friday, the North Koreans toured Silicon Valley which included a visit to the world’s largest Internet firm, Google, for about an hour and 40 minutes amid tight security. The delegation got into the building through a backdoor, and security guards restricted journalists from accessing the visitors.

Officials from the San Francisco-based Asia Foundation accompanied the North Koreans.

After the visit to Google, the delegation moved to Stanford University and attended a lunch seminar organized by the school’s Asia-Pacific Research Center.

The two-hour seminar was about industry-university cooperation and also drew well-known U.S. experts on North Korea, such as nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker and former Defense Secretary William Perry, according to a participant who requested anonymity.

The North Koreans were scheduled to leave for home on Sunday.

It is rare for North Korean officials to visit the U.S. The North and the U.S. fought in the 1950-53 Korean War and have no diplomatic relations. The two sides have also been at odds over Pyongyang’s nuclear programs and a series of provocations.

The Choson Ilbo also covered the visit to Google and Stanford–including a rather funny photo.

UPDATE 2 (3/27/2011): (New York, NY) According to Yonhap:

A delegation of North Korean economic officials arrived in New York on Sunday, saying that they want to explore the possibility of economic cooperation with the United States

The 12-member delegation, comprising mid-level officials from the trade, agriculture and other ministries, flew from San Diego, where they had stayed after arriving in the U.S. on March 19 at the invitation of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at University of California, San Diego.

The delegation’s trip to New York was organized by the Asia Society.

It is rare for North Korean officials to visit the U.S. The North and the U.S. fought in the 1950-53 Korean War and have no diplomatic relations. The two sides have also been at odds over Pyongyang’s nuclear programs and a series of provocations.

But the trip came amid recent talk of the possibility of the U.S. resuming food aid to the impoverished nation and as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter is preparing to visit the communist nation to broker rapprochement between the two Cold War foes.

“We’re an economic delegation. We’re here to discuss and look for the possibility of economic cooperation between us and the United States,” one member of the delegation said, without giving his name.

Washington has downplayed the significance of the North’s delegation, stressing that their visit is a privately organized event in which the government has played no part.

“Our assessment is that they are not here for talks between the North and the U.S., considering the agencies they belong to and their ranks,” a source here said. “It’s difficult to fathom the real intentions of the North, but for the U.S., it might have seen no reason to reject the North’s delegation coming to learn about the capitalist economy.”

In New York, the North Korean officials are expected to attend an Asian Society seminar and visit media firms and Wall Street. The Asia Society has strictly barred reporters from access to the North Koreans, saying their trip is part of private-level exchanges.

UPDATE 1 (3/26/2011): (San Diego, California)  According to the Joong Ang Ilbo:

A tour bus with black tinted windows pulled up to a hotel in La Jolla, San Diego, at 5:30 p.m. on Monday and from it stepped out 12 strangers from a strange land.

The 12 were so-called “economic envoys” from North Korea who, according to their host, came to learn about American-style capitalism for one week.

Susan Shirk, director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at the University of California, San Diego, invited the envoys, all North Korean officials in charge of economic affairs.

The IGCC is one of the United States’ influential, private diplomatic channels for dialogue with the communist country.

The U.S. government calls the envoys’ mission a private trip, but some North Korea watchers are trying to read more into it.

Could it be a signal that the North is finally getting serious about introducing more market-based economic reforms as leader Kim Jong-il searches for substantial achievement to smooth his relinquishment of power to his youngest son Jong-un? Has the reformist message that China, its closest ally, has been hammering home for years finally gotten across? Or is the envoys’ mission just a conciliatory gesture to try to woo food aid from the U.S. amid a deepening food crisis?

One of the 12 North Koreans admitted to JoongAng Ilbo reporters that they came to the U.S. to study the market economy. But none answered why they wanted to.

The attempt to interview them was cut short when the North Koreans got nervous. The reporters only could ask one additional question about whether the envoys knew about the democratic movements in the Middle East.

“We are not deaf,” one replied.

For the week, they will study capitalism at the IGCC building, 10 minutes away from the hotel.

ORIGINAL POST (3/4/2011): According ot the Korea Times:

A North Korean economic delegation will visit San Diego and New York City for two weeks from March 20.

Susan Shirk, director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, San Diego, invited the ten-member delegation who will learn about Western economic systems and theory during their stay, the Voice of America (VOA) reported.

Between 1997 and 2000, Shirk served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the East Asia and Pacific Affairs bureau, and went to North Korea last year as a director of the institute, to discuss North Korea-U.S. cooperation on a private level.

Read the full story here:
N. Korean delegation to visit NY
Korea Times
Kim Se-jeong
3/4/2011

According to the Rumsfeld Papers there were 69  North Koreans serving active duty in the US armed services in April 2003.

Source here (PDF).

Much more discussion in the comments.

(h/t to a colleague)

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on March 1st titled, “Breaking the cycle of North Korean provocations”.

All of the video and printed testimony can be found here.

Panelists included:
The Honorable Kurt Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Department of State
(Download testimony)

The Honorable Stephen Bosworth
Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Department of State
(Download testimony)

Mr. L. Gordon Flake
Executive Director
The Mansfeild Foundation
(Download testimony)

Download Testimony
Dr. Marcus Noland
Deputy Director
Peterson Institute for International Economics
(Download testimony)

Download Testimony
Dr. Robert Carlin
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
(Download testimony)

According to the Korea Times:

Dr. Stephen Linton, founder of the Eugene Bell Foundation, says his group’s program to combat multidrug resistant TB (MDRTB) has cured its first patients after four years of working to establish adequate care in the North.

“We’re making progress,” Linton, 60, said in a phone interview. “It has been a tremendous learning curve for the North Koreans on a very short time frame. It takes most nations decades to put together a good MDRTB program because the treatment is so intensive.”

A growing health concern worldwide, MDRTB emerges when regular TB is inadequately treated, creating bacteria resistant to first- and sometimes second-line drugs. Half of those who do not get treatment, which can take up to two years to complete, die.

The problem is compounded in poor countries not properly equipped to diagnose the disease and where malnutrition makes the body more susceptible to TB.

The organization’s hopeful outlook follows its most recent trip to the North in November last year, when it found a steadily-increasing rate of patients testing negative for the strain ― meaning they are no longer infective.

It also comes as the international community wrestles with how to help the impoverished country ― which has called in recent weeks for humanitarian assistance ― without supporting its provocative behavior.

In the case of treating MDRTB, the doctor says the breakthrough would be impossible without meaningful contributions on both sides of the tense border that divides the Koreas.

Powerful medicine

By 2007, Linton had been travelling to the North to treat TB for more than a decade, so he was braced for the news when caregivers complained that first-line drugs were not helping some patients.

“I knew it was going to be a real headache,” he said of the undertaking. “But the commitment of our donors and the desire to treat the people in most need ― that was a powerful incentive.”

Later that year, Linton and his team took sputum from 19 patients, brought the samples to a South Korean hospital for analysis, and returned six months later with medicine. On subsequent trips, the number of patients wanting the test grew.

By 2009, as an indication of the worsening health situation but also the growing trust in the program, Eugene Bell was overwhelmed by crowds of people at its testing centers.

The program now accommodates upwards of six hundred patients at six specialized centers across the country’s northwest.

Linton, who spent his childhood in South Korea, says the process requires significant “buy-in” from North Koreans, beginning with the health authorities.

In their biggest show of cooperation, the government agreed to Eugene Bell’s recommendation that treatment take place in centrally-located MDRTB centers, despite reluctance over the logistics.

It also needs the dedication of health care providers, who must vigilantly keep patients on their programs. If not, they can become resistant to MDRTB medications, opening the door for the emergence of XDRTB, which Linton calls “virtually incurable.”

But the biggest commitment comes from patients, who are prescribed with a harsh cocktail of drugs. Some need to learn to trust outside help, not always an easy task in the isolated country.

“This is a very rigorous and rough treatment program. It takes a lot of very strong, toxic medicines to treat MDRTB. Patients suffer a good bit,” said Linton, who counted nausea, vomiting, temporary deafness and psychosis as side effects.

If after eighteen months, a patient’s sputum tests negative for MDRTB, they are effectively cured. But if after a year they still test positive, the treatment is considered a failure.

“Most of those people know, because they are still coughing up phlegm,” the doctor said. “But failing people is terrible. This work can be very dramatic at times.”

You can read previous posts about the Eugene Bell Foundation here.

UPDATE: On February 24th the Korea Economic Institute held a conference with Dr. Sharon Perry, DPRK Tuberculosis Project, Stanford School of Medicine.  You can see the video of the conference here: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4. The paper is here (PDF).

Read the full sotry here:
Aid group engages N. Korea in fight against TB
Korea Times
Kim Joung-jin
2/21/2011

According to the Choson Ilbo:

The U.S. State Department cut the entire budget for promoting democracy in North Korea from a 2012 budget proposal submitted to Congress on Monday. Since 2008, the department allocated US$2.5-3.5 million a year to the Economic Support Fund to support organizations working for democratization and human rights there, but it did not allocate a penny to the fund this year.

“Many government agencies are cutting their budgets, and so is the State Department,” said a diplomatic source in Washington. “It has drastically cut funds for other countries such as the Philippines as well.”

But Radio Free Asia quoted a State Department official as saying it is possible that Washington will keep supporting the North through an emergency relief fund.

Read the full story here:
US Scraps Budget for Promoting Democracy in N.Korea
Choson Ilbo
2/16/2011

According to Voice of America:

US news broadcaster Voice of America has reported that the American government allowed 3.1 million US dollars worth of goods to be exported to North Korea last year.

Out of the 18 export cases 15 of them were humanitarian goods such as food and medical items, while the other three were portable generators.

Currently there are various export restrictions placed on North Korea by the US due to the North’s nuclear programs and its human rights abuses.

But the American government allows certain exports for humanitarian purposes such as blankets, shoes and medicine on a case-by-case basis.

Read the full story here:
US Allowed $3.1 Million Worth of Exports to N. Korea : VOA
Arirang News
2/12/2011

Each year the “intelligence community” in the person of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reports to the US Congress on the status of potential threats from across the globe.

Below I have posted the texts of these reports as they relate to the DPRK.  I have also provided links to the reports themselves should you be interested in continuing your research.

FEBRUARY 10, 2011: Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

North Korea (p 6-7)
Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the security environment in East Asia, a region characterized by several great power rivalries and some of the world’s largest economies. North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities. Despite the October 2007 Six-Party agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, we remain alert to the possibility North Korea could again export nuclear technology.

We judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices. The North’s October 2006 nuclear test is consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device, although we judge the test itself to have been a partial failure. The North’s probable nuclear test in May 2009 is consistent with our assessment that the North continued to develop nuclear weapons, and with a yield of roughly two kilotons TNT equivalent, was apparently more successful than the 2006 test. Although we judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices, we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, but we assess it has the capability to do so.

In November 2010, North Korean officials told US visitors that North Korea is building its own light water reactor (LWR) for electricity production. The claimed prototype LWR has a planned power of 100 megawatt-thermal and a target completion date of 2012. North Korean officials also told the US visitors in November that it had constructed and started operating a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon that they claimed was designed to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) and support fabrication of reactor fuel for the LWR. The US visitors were shown a facility at the existing fuel fabrication complex in Yongbyon, which North Korea described as a uranium enrichment plant. North Korea further claimed the facility contained 2,000 centrifuges and was operating and producing LEU that would be used to fuel the small LWR. The North’s disclosure supports the United States’ longstanding assessment that the DPRK has pursued a uranium-enrichment capability.

We judge it is not possible the DPRK could have constructed the Yongbyon enrichment facility and begun its operation, as North Korean officials claim, in such a short period of time—less than 20 months—without having previously conducted extensive research, development, testing, fabrication, and assembly or without receiving outside assistance.

Based on the scale of the facility and the progress the DPRK has made in construction, it is likely that North Korea has been pursuing enrichment for an extended period of time. If so, there is clear prospect that DPRK has built other uranium enrichment related facilities in its territory, including likely R&D and centrifuge fabrication facilities, and other enrichment facilities. Analysts differ on the likelihood that other production-scale facilities may exist elsewhere in North Korea.

Following the Taepo Dong 1 launch in 1998, North Korea conducted launches of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) in 2006 and more recently in April 2009. Despite the most recent launch’s failure in its stated mission of orbiting a small communications satellite, it successfully tested many technologies associated with an ICBM. Although both TD-2 launches ended in failure, the 2009 flight demonstrated a more complete performance than the July 2006 launch. North Korea’s progress in developing the TD-2 shows its determination to achieve long-range ballistic missile and space launch capabilities. If configured as an ICBM, the TD-2 could reach at least portions of the United States; the TD-2 or associated technologies also could be exported.

Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, the North’s leaders are focused on deterrence and defense. The Intelligence Community assesses Pyongyang views its nuclear capabilities as intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We judge that North Korea would consider using nuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances. We also assess, albeit with low confidence, Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use nuclear weapons against US forces or territory unless it perceived its regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control.

North Korea (p11-12)
We assess that North Korea‟s artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November was meant in part to continue burnishing successor-designate Kim Jong Un‟s leadership and military credibility among regime elites, although other strategic goals were also factors in the attack. Kim Jong Il may feel the need to conduct further provocations to achieve strategic goals and portray Jong Un as a strong, bold leader, especially if he judges elite loyalty and support are in question.

Kim Jong Il has advanced preparations for his third son to succeed him, by anointing him with senior party and military positions, promoting probable key supporting characters, and having the younger Kim make his first public appearances. These steps strengthened the prospects for the 27-year old Jong Un to develop as a credible successor, but the succession process is still subject to potential vulnerabilities, especially if Kim Jong Il dies before Jong Un consolidates his authority.

The North has signaled it wants to return to a nuclear dialogue. The North probably wants to resume nuclear discussions to mitigate international sanctions, regain international economic aid, bolster its ties with China, restart bilateral negotiations with South Korea and the United States, and try to gain tacit international acceptance for its status as a nuclear weapons power.

Since 2009, Pyongyang has made a series of announcements about producing enriched uranium fuel for an indigenous light water reactor that it is building at its Yongbyon nuclear complex. In midNovember, 2010, the North showed an unofficial US delegation what it claims is an operating uranium enrichment facility located in the Yongbyon rod core production building.

North Korea‟s conventional military capabilities have eroded significantly over the past 10-15 years due to persistent food shortages, poor economic conditions, inability to replace aging weapons inventories, reduced training, and increased diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Therefore, Pyongyang increasingly relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss.

Nevertheless, the Korean People‟s Army remains a large and formidable force capable of defending the North. Also, as demonstrated by North Korean attacks on the South Korean ship Cheonan in March 2010 and Yeongpyong Island in November. North Korea is capable of conducting military operations that could potentially threaten regional stability. These operations provide Pyongyang with what the regime may see as a means to attain political goals through coercion.

The full 2010 report can be downloaded in PDF here.

FEBRUARY 2, 2010: Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

North Korean WMD and Missile Programs (p14-15)
Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the security environment in East Asia. North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries including Iran and Pakistan, and its assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor, exposed in 2007, illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities. Despite the Six-Party October 3, 2007 Second Phase Actions agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how we remain alert to the possibility North Korea could again export nuclear technology.

The North’s October 2006 nuclear test was consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device, although we judge the test itself to have been a partial failure based on its less-than-one-kiloton TNT equivalent yield. The North’s probable nuclear test in May 2009 supports its claim that it has been seeking to develop weapons, and with a yield of roughly a few kilotons TNT equivalent, was apparently more successful than the 2006 test. We judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices, and while we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, we assess it has the capability to do so. It remains our policy that we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, and we assess that other countries in the region remain committed to the denuclearization of North Korea as has been reflected in the Six Party Talks.

After denying a highly enriched uranium program since 2003, North Korea announced in April 2009 that it was developing uranium enrichment capability to produce fuel for a planned light water reactor (such reactors use low enriched uranium); in September it claimed its enrichment research had “entered into the completion phase”. The exact intent of these announcements is unclear, and they do not speak definitively to the technical status of the uranium enrichment program. The Intelligence Community continues to assess with high confidence North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past, which we assess was for weapons.

Pyongyang’s Conventional Capabilities. Before I turn the North Korean nuclear issue, I want to say a few words regarding the conventional capabilities of the Korea People’s Army (KPA). The KPA’s capabilities are limited by an aging weapons inventory, low production of military combat systems, deteriorating physical condition of soldiers, reduced training, and increasing diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Inflexible leadership, corruption, low morale, obsolescent weapons, a weak logistical system, and problems with command and control also constrain the KPA capabilities and readiness.

Because the conventional military capabilities gap between North and South Korea has become so overwhelmingly great and prospects for reversal of this gap so remote, Pyongyang relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss. Six Party Talks and Denuclearization. In addition to the TD-2 missile launch of April 2009 and the probable nuclear test of May 2009, Pyongyang’s reprocessing of fuel rods removed from its reactor as part of the disablement process appears designed to enhance its nuclear deterrent and reset the terms of any return to the negotiating table. Moreover, Pyongyang knows that its pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability has returned that issue to the agenda for any nuclear negotiations. The North has long been aware of US suspicions of a highly enriched uranium program.

We judge Kim Jong-Il seeks recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons power by the US and the international community. Pyongyang’s intent in pursuing dialogue at this time is to take advantage of what it perceives as an enhanced negotiating position, having demonstrated its nuclear and missile capabilities.

The full 2010 report can be downloaded in PDF here.

FEBRUARY 25, 2009: Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions (p24-26)
In addition to a possible India-Pakistan conflict, Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions and proliferation behavior threaten to destabilize East Asia. The North’s October 2006 nuclear test is consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device. Prior to the test, we assessed that North Korea produced enough plutonium for at least a half dozen nuclear weapons. The IC continues to assess North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past. Some in the Intelligence Community have increasing concerns that North Korea has an ongoing covert uranium enrichment program.

Pyongyang probably views its nuclear weapons as being more for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy than for warfighting and would consider using nuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances. We also assess Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use nuclear weapons against US forces or territory unless it perceived the regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control. Progress was made, albeit painstakingly, last year in Six Party Talks; the DPRK has shut down three core facilities at Yongbyon and has completed eight of the eleven disablement steps. However, much work remains. At the latest round of talks held in December in Beijing, the DPRK refused to agree to a Six Party verification protocol needed to verify the completeness and correctness of its nuclear declaration. Since then, Pyongyang has issued hardline statements suggesting further challenges to denuclearization.

On the proliferation side, North Korea has sold ballistic missiles and associated materials to several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, and, in our assessment, assisted Syria with the construction of a nuclear reactor. We remain concerned North Korea could again export nuclear technology. In the October 3 Second Phase Actions agreement, the DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how. We assess Pyongyang is less likely to risk selling nuclear weapons or weapons-quantities of fissile material than nuclear technology or less sensitive equipment to other countries or non-state actors, in part because it needs its limited fissile material for its own deterrent. Pyongyang probably also perceives that it would risk a regime-ending military confrontation with the United States if the nuclear material was used by another country or group in a nuclear strike or terrorist attacks and the United States could trace the material back to North Korea. It is possible, however, that the North might find a nuclear weapons or fissile material transfer more appealing if its own stockpile grows larger and/or it faces an extreme economic crisis where the potentially huge revenue from such a sale could help the country survive.

We assess that poor economic conditions are fueling systemic vulnerability within North Korea. Public statements by the regime emphasize the need for adequate food supplies. A relatively good fall harvest in 2008, combined with the delivery of substantial US food aid—500,000 tons of grain have been promised and about one-third of this has been delivered—probably will prevent deterioration in the food security situation during the next few months. However, we assess North Korea is still failing to come to grips with the economic downturn that began in the early 1990s and that prospects for economic recovery remain slight. In addition to food, shortages in fertilizer and energy continue to plague the economy. Investment spending appears is negligible, trade remains weak, and we see little progress toward economic reforms. Pyongyang has long been in default on a relatively large foreign debt and we assess that badly needed foreign investment will not take place unless the North comes to terms with its international creditors and conforms to internationally accepted trade and financial norms, badly needed foreign investment will not take place.

Pyongyang’s strategic posture is not helping its economy. Trade with Japan has fallen precipitously since the nuclear and missile tests of 2006, and, while commercial trade with South Korea rose in 2008, South Korean aid and tourism to the North declined due to increased North-South tensions.

Despite this poor economic performance and the many privations of the North Korean public, we see no organized opposition to Kim Jong Il’s rule and only occasional incidents of social disorder. Kim probably suffered a stroke in August that incapacitated him for several weeks, hindering his ability to operate as actively as he did before the stroke. However, his recent public activities suggest his health has improved significantly, and we assess he is making key decisions. The state’s control apparatus by all accounts remains strong, sustaining the dismal condition of human rights in North Korea.

The full 2009 report can be downloaded in PDF here.

UPDATE 3: The JoongAng Daily (2/12/2011) reports on comments made by Robert King:

King explained that in the past, the U.S. had agreed to give North Korea 500,000 tons in food aid, but was only able to give 170,000 tons as North Korea refused the rest and ordered foreigners who had entered North Korea to deliver the aid to leave.

The envoy also said that it has not yet been decided whether the U.S. will grant food aid to the North and that three prerequisites must be fulfilled if it does.

The three conditions, he explained, are whether a real demand for food truly exists in North Korea, whether the North’s need for food is on the same level as other countries in need of aid, and whether monitoring of the aid will be securely guaranteed. Only when these three prerequisites are met can the U.S. grant aid, King said.

UPDATE 2: According to the JoongAng Daily (2/9/2011) the North Koreans have made an official request for food aid to the US government:

North Korean deputy ambassador to the UN, Han Sang-ryol, requested U.S. food aid last month through Robert King, the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, a diplomatic source told the JoongAng Ilbo yesterday.

Local analysts suspect that King, who is currently in Seoul, informed the South Korean government of the request and is discussing a joint response to it.

“Ambassador Han met King in New York on Jan. 14 and requested large-scale U.S. food aid for the North,” said the diplomatic source in Washington.

It is the first time in years that a behind-the-scenes diplomatic discussion between Pyongyang and Washington on aid has come to the surface. U.S. food aid to the North has been suspended since March 2009 after the Kim Jong-il regime rejected a U.S. proposal to increase the number of Korean-speaking food-distribution monitors to make sure aid was getting to the public.

Han told King that the North was willing to enhance international monitoring of food aid “as much as the U.S. wants,” the source said.

King, who came to Seoul on Sunday, started meetings with Seoul officials yesterday, including Wi Sung-lac, the top envoy on North Korean nuclear issues. At a brief media conference after the meeting with Wi, King did not elaborate on the purpose of his visit or his discussion with the South Korean envoy, saying only it was “very good, very serious and a very thoughtful discussion.”

When asked whether food assistance to the North was on the agenda, King said they “talked about a lot of issues.”

“[It is] extremely important for the U.S., as we pursue our policies toward North Korea, to coordinate with the government of South Korea,” King said. “We have a close working relationship, we are able to work together well on issues, we share our analysis, we share our ideas in terms of making progress.”

The official United States stance, as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said earlier this month, is that it does not have a plan to resume food aid to the North for now.

“The U.S. does not think the North has met conditions to get U.S. food aid,” the source said.

And even if Washington decides to resume aid, it will take time because of congressional procedures, the source said. But some analysts see the possibility of change, citing some opinions in the U.S. State Department in favor of engaging the North with aid to sway its attitude on other issues, including denuclearization.

UPDATE 1: According to the Donga Ilbo (2/6/2011):

The U.S.-based Radio Free Asia says the U.S. government and nongovernmental organizations are discussing the resumption of food aid to North Korea.

Quoting diplomatic sources in the U.S., the broadcaster said Washington has not decided to resume food aid to Pyongyang but is having many talks and discussions on the issue.

Voice of America said Friday that the World Food Program and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, both of which are under U.S. influence, also plan an additional survey of the North`s food situation for about a month from Feb. 10.

In an interview, Dr. Kisan Gunjal of the food organization said he will survey the North’s food security and crop situations from Feb. 10 to March 12 at Pyongyang’s official invitation.

In a phone interview with The Dong-A Ilbo, an official at a South Korean aid group said, “The U.S. has asked South Korean non-governmental organizations about North Korea’s crop and food supply situations in 2011 since the North’s artillery provocation on Yeonpyeong Island in November.”

Washington, however, remains officially cautious. U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley told a news briefing Monday that the U.S. government has no immediate plans to provide humanitarian aid to the North.

ORIGINAL POST: According to the Donga Ilbo (1/31/2011) the US and DPRK are talking food aid once more:

The U.S. and North Korea have begun their third round of food diplomacy, with Washington considering resuming food aid to Pyongyang.

The U.S. has halted food aid to the North twice since its first provision in 1996 after blaming Pyongyang for diverting the aid.

The North has always asked for food aid first since North Korean leader Kim Jong Il confronted a series of crises in the early 1990s, when the former Soviet Union and China stopped economic assistance to the Stalinist country.

His father and the North`s founder Kim Il Sung died in 1994. When the North was devastated by floods and other natural disasters nationwide, Kim Jong Il ordered state cadres to beg the U.S. for help.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry then formed a committee for flood damage and went hat in hand to Washington. The Clinton administration provided 19,500 tons of food through the World Food Program in 1996, expecting the North to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework and be docile in talks for the repatriation of remains of American soldiers killed in action in the Korean War.

Washington increased its food aid from 177,000 tons in 1997 to 695,000 tons in 1999. In 2000, a joint communiqué between the North and the U.S. was signed.

North Korea, however, diverted the food aid in ignoring U.S. and international principles for humanitarian aid.

As public opinion in the U.S. worsened over the assistance, the George W. Bush administration slashed the aid volume from 350,000 tons in 2001 to 40,000 tons in 2003. The U.S. Congress demanded greater transparency in the distribution of the food aid in 2004, when it passed the North Korean Human Rights Act.

Rejecting the demand, Pyongyang expelled World Food Program staff in 2005. Washington opted not to provide food aid to Pyongyang in 2006.

Flexing its muscles in November 2006 by conducting its first nuclear test, North Korea again requested U.S. aid in 2008. The Bush administration, which was nearing the end of its term, chose to sit at the negotiating table with the North and offered 500,000 tons of food aid through the World Food Program.

The North received 169,000 tons of food by expanding the areas where food distribution is monitored and agreeing to allow more Korean-speaking monitoring personnel.

In early 2009, Pyongyang decided to test the newly inaugurated Obama administration by launching a long-range rocket and preparing for a second nuclear test. In March that year, the North expelled humanitarian aid groups, saying it would not be able to keep its promise of distribution transparency.

In fall last year, North Korea unveiled its uranium enrichment program and showed its centrifuges to the U.S. in a virtual threat to conduct its third nuclear test with uranium bombs if Washington failed to provide food.

What the U.S. will eventually do is attracting interest since South Korea is opposed to aid to the North.

Read the full stories below:
Pyongyang asks U.S. to restore food aid: source
JoongAng Daily
Kim Jung-wook, Moon Gwang-lip
2/9/2011

US, N. Korea begin 3rd round of food diplomacy
Donga Ilbo
1/31/2011

Radio Free Asia: US, NGOs discussing food aid to NK
Donga Ilbo
2/6/2011

According to Radio Netherlands Worldwide:

Free North Korea Radio, a South Korea-based shortwave station targeting North Koreans, saw its annual financial support of 400,000 to 500,000 US dollars from the US government more than halved last year, a first since the station`s foundation in 2004, due to accounting errors. Mainly led by North Korean defectors, the station lets North Koreans know what is happening in both South Korea and the world by renting foreign shortwave frequencies with US funds. The broadcaster also breaks news about the isolated communist country to South Koreans. If financial support decreases, such activities cannot continue.

Read the full story here:
US government reduces support for Free North Korea Radio
Radio Netherlands Worldwide
Andy Sennitt
1/24/2011

According to the Korea Times:

The late North Korean leader Kim Il-sung proposed secret negotiations with Washington ahead of the assassination of then South Korean first lady Yuk Young-soo in 1974, according to a classified document dated June 6, 1974 from the U.S. Embassy in Senegal.

The revelation came after An Chi-yong, a former journalist based in the United States, posted the confidential dossier, classified as “secret,” on his website “Secrets of Korea,” Tuesday.

It reveals that the North’s founder, father of current leader Kim Jong-il, asked the late Senegalese President Leopold Senghor to deliver a secret message to the U.S. in 1974.

“President Senghor informed me on June 5 that during his recent visit to Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung charged him with a message for the United States government,” according to the dossier.

“Kim Il-sung said the DPRK (North Korea) would welcome secret negotiations with the USG (U.S. government) on the future of Korea.”

The suggestion was made two months before the assassination of the first lady on Aug. 15, 1974.

Yuk was shot by a Japan-born Korean believed to be a communist sympathizer and having acted upon orders from a pro-Pyongyang organization there.

The dossier also offers a glimpse of Kim Il-sung’s attitude toward Washington and Tokyo and his thoughts on the unification of the two Koreas.

“The North Korean leader told Senghor he felt the DPRK’s enemy in the Pacific is Japan, not us,” the document stated.

“What North Korea seeks is a confederation, not suppression of South Korea, and within that confederation, there would be a place for U.S. influence in the South.”

Another U.S. government document that cites a New York Times article by Richard Halloran reveals that Kim Il-sung may have sought a similar favor from the late Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki before the 1974 assassination.

“Halloran (NYT 8/10) says Kim Il-sung informed President Ford through Prime Minister Miki he wants to open direct talks with us to settle outstanding issues of Korea,” according to the dossier dated Aug. 11, 1975. “Wants us to send envoy to prepare agenda for talks with HAK (Henry A. Kissinger) on U.S. troop withdrawal, peace treaty to replace 1953 truce.”

The two Koreas remain technically at war as the 1950-53 Korean War ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty

It remains uncertain whether the communist North succeeded in holding bilateral talks with Washington.

A declassified U.S. document shows that Pyongyang continued its efforts to have dialogue with the U.S. even after the tragic assassination took place.

It says on Aug. 27 1974 an aide to then Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu met with then U.S. President Ford at the White House to deliver a message from Kim Il-sung.

“The North Korean leadership wants to have confidential contact with the United States for discussions,” according to the declassified memorandum from President Gerald Ford’s files.

Yet, Ford’s response to the repeated proposal for talks was lukewarm.

“Certain things must precede such contacts. We don’t want to go in without a firm understanding,” the U.S. President was quoted as saying in the declassified documents.

Here is a link to the actual document.

Here is a link to “Secret[s] of Korea“.

Read the full story here:
NK proposed talks with US before 1974 assassination’
The Korea Times
Lee Tae-hoon
2011-1-11