North Korean Economy Watch

Yonhap
11/1/2007

South Korean business leaders are set to inaugurate a forum next week to facilitate economic cooperation between the two Koreas’ private sectors, a South Korean business body said Thursday.

The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), which has spearheaded the the forum’s establishment, said about 70 business and financial figures, including KCCI chief Sohn Kyung-shik, and Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung, will get together on Monday to launch the private forum for inter-Korean economic cooperation.

Sohn will take the helm of the 60-member forum that will include representatives of the South’s leading conglomerates that have taken part in inter-Korean economic projects — Samsung Electronics Co., Hyundai Motor Co. and Hyundai Asan Corp.

The forum’s inauguration comes on the heels of the Oct. 2-4 inter-Korean summit. At the close of the summit, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il issued a joint declaration calling for massive investment from the South in the North’s key industrial sectors, including shipbuilding and tourism.

The forum plans to serve as a mediator for exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas’ private firms. After receiving information and feedback from South Korean firms on their investments in the North, the forum also plans to make recommendations to the two governments on inter-Korean economic projects.

In addition, the forum envisions the dispatch of a delegation to the North, which will examine the investment climate in the communist country and establish a dialogue channel for inter-Korean economic cooperation in the private sector.

Yonhap
10/30/2007

Police said Tuesday they have abolished rewards for those who turn in North Korean propaganda leaflets discovered in South Korean territory, as almost none have been found over the past few years amid thawing inter-Korean relations.

“In recent years, the number of North Korean leaflets that have been reported to us is close to zero,” said a spokesman for the National Police Agency, adding that the reward policy is already useless.

Leaflet dissemination was a key element of propaganda warfare between the archrival countries during the Cold War. The two Koreas, which are technically in a state of war, attempted to secretly distribute the leaflets in each other’s territory ever since the 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice.

However, the number plummeted in recent years amid a thaw in two-way ties, especially after the first summit between the leaders of the two Koreas in Pyongyang in 2000. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held the second inter-Korean summit in the North Korean capital early this month.

The North attempted to disseminate millions of propaganda leaflets in the South every year until the 2000 summit.

The North Korean leaflets, often found in the countryside or on university campuses, were allegedly distributed by South Korean sympathizers or sent by balloon from the communist state.

The leaflets contained messages or pictures aimed at enticing South Koreans to defect to the North or criticizing the Seoul government.

Police had previously urged citizens to be aware of the leaflets in April and August, as strong northwestern winds enabled more balloons carrying the propaganda to reach the South.

Police used to grant medals to adults who collected a large number of the leaflets, while children were rewarded with new pencils and notebooks.

Joong Ang Daily
10/23/2007

Regulatory filing requirements to invest in North Korea will be eased, and the Export-Import Bank of Korea will manage information on investment activities in the North, according to a Ministry of Finance and Economy release yesterday.

For an amount below $300,000, an investor will no longer need to hand in an annual financial report to the bank handling the company’s foreign exchange deals for investments in the North.

For an amount below $1 million, an investor will only need to report briefly.

The bank dealing with foreign exchange transactions will need to report the investor’s financial information to the Export-Import Bank of Korea instead of the Ministry of Unification and the Finance Ministry.

Yonhap
10/20/2007

The number of South and North Koreans who made cross-border visits during the first nine months of this year surged over 30 percent as economic, social, cultural and humanitarian exchanges between the Koreas expanded, a government report showed Saturday.

According to the report released by the Unification Ministry, a total of 102,809 people from the two countries made cross-border visits during the January-to-September period, up 33.6 percent from the same period of the previous year.

Of the total that excluded South Koreans who visited the North’s Mount Geumgang, 102,079 were South Koreans going to the North, and only 730 North Koreans visited the South, it added.

Exchanges in the economic sector were most brisk with a total of 69,729 people crossing the border, followed by 9,924 for social and cultural exchanges, and 7,260 for humanitarian purposes, the report showed.

Meanwhile, inter-Korean trade during the nine months amounted to US$1.22 billion, up 12.7 percent from a year earlier, the report noted.

The countries remain technically at war as the 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.

AP
10/5/2007

A group of North Korean diplomats got a secret tour of Washington last month, seeing the White House and driving past the Pentagon, the Chicago Tribune reported on its website Friday.

But the 16 North Korean diplomats and their families posted to the United Nations and normally not allowed to travel outside New York were not all that impressed on their September 8 visit, which the Tribune called “unprecedented.”

“They were like, ‘Is that all?’ when they stopped at the White House, Fred Carriere, executive director of the Korea Society and one of the group’s tour escorts, told the newspaper.

The visit came as Washington begun acknowledging Pyongyang’s progress on meeting its commitments to move toward nuclear disarmament.

The Tribune said the North Koreans came to Washington with the approval of Christopher Hill, the senior US diplomat in charge of negotiating the North Korean nuclear disarmament deal under the six-party framework.

Because the two countries do not have diplomatic relations and have remained technically at war since the 1950-53 Korean War, Pyongyang’s diplomats are normally confined to a 40 kilometer (25 mile) radius from Manhattan, where the United Nations is located.

Carriere told the Tribune that the North Koreans also visited the Lincoln Memorial landmark in central Washington, where they demonstrated their knowledge of US history.

One pointed to the Lincoln quote inscribed on the memorial wall asserting that all men are created equal and said: “But we understand he had slaves,” Carriere said.

The Tribune reported that in another sign of warming relations, representatives of the New York Philharmonic were to travel to Pyongyang this week to arrange a visit there by the United States’ most prominent orchestra.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 07-10-2-1

DPRK-U.S. RELATIONS
North Korean and U.S. officials kicked off the month of September with meetings held in Geneva on the 1st~2nd. The bilateral talks focused on how to implement the February 13 agreement. After two days of talks, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill stated he is “convinced” the North will disable nuclear programs by year’s end, a timeline offered by the DPRK negotiators. North Korean press reported that the DPRK would be removed from the U.S. terrorism roster and sanctions imposed under the Trading with the Enemy Act would be lifted in return.

On September 7, Hill announced that North Korea had invited nuclear experts from the United States, Russia, and China to the DPRK in order to survey nuclear facilities and recommend dismantlement plans. The experts examined North Korean nuclear sites from September 11 to September 16.

On the same day, U.S. President Bush stated Washington would consider a peace treaty with North Korea in return for the North’s abandonment of nuclear arms.

On September 17 it was reported that North Korea had admitted that it had earlier procured materials needed to build uranium enrichment centrifuges. The admission regarded the import of 150 tons of hard aluminum pipes, enough for 2,600 centrifugal separators.

On September 20, the DPRK was removed from Washington’s list of countries producing illegal drugs. The North was added to the list in 2003.

On September 28, U.S. President Bush authorized 25 million USD worth of energy aid for North Korea. These funds could be used to provide the DPRK 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil, equal to the amounts provided by China and South Korea as part of the February 13 agreement.

DPRK-JAPAN RELATIONS
Two days of talks between North Korean and Japanese diplomats began on September 5 in Mongolia, with both sides expressing confidence that there would be progress. Wartime compensation issues were discussed, although Japan continued to link normalization of relations with kidnapping issues.

Following the talks, North Korea stated that kidnapping issues were resolved with Japan, while Japan stated that both sides reiterated existing positions. On the same day, Japan rejected a DPRK request to allow North Korean ships to dock in Japan in order to pick up aid for flood victims.

On September 30, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura said Japanese economic sanctions on North Korea would be extended for another six months due to “basically no progress” on abduction issues.

DPRK-SYRIA ARMS COOPERATION
Reports began coming out of Israel in early September that reconnaissance flights over Syria had taken pictures of North Korean nuclear supplies and materials. Following Israeli air strikes, it was reported that Special Forces had entered Syria and confiscated material that appeared to be of DPRK origin. Conflicting reports stated that the facilities struck were missile storage facilities, rather than of a nuclear nature. North Korea has denied any nuclear cooperation with Syria.

DPRK-UAE RELATIONS
North Korea established ambassador-level diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates on September 18. A joint statement said the two countries aim to “enhance understanding and boost the links of friendship and cooperation between their two peoples.” Ties with such an oil-rich nation on friendly terms with Washington could be significant as the North moves to dismantle nuclear facilities.

ROK-DPRK ECONOMIC COOPERATION
It was reported on September 4 that stock prices of South Korean companies engaging in inter-Korean economic cooperation have shot up on news that the DPRK will dismantle nuclear programs. This includes not only those companies operating in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but also firms involved in providing electricity and other projects planned in exchange for the North’s denuclearization.

On September 20 it was announced that the ROK government plans to request a 50 percent increase for inter-Korean cooperative projects in next year’s budget. The Ministry of Planning and Budget will request 822 million USD for cross-border projects, as well as 580 million USD for humanitarian assistance.

On September 27, it was reported that the ROK government was reviewing a proposal to jointly develop Nampo, Haeju, Najin, Sunbong, Wonsan, and Shinuiju. The North has requested development of heavy industries, while South Korea seeks cooperation on light industrial projects.

SIX-PARTY TALKS
The latest round of six-party talks opened in Beijing on September 27, with both the U.S. and DPRK negotiators promising progress. On September 30, talks were ended to allow delegates to return to their home countries to work on a ‘nuts and bolts’ joint statement. U.S. delegate Hill stated the delegates were close to agreeing on a definition of facilities, and that the proposed joint statement was very detailed. Before returning to Pyongyang, Kim Kye-gwan was quoted as saying that the North can report nuclear programs, but will not declare nuclear weapons by the end of the year. An ROK official stated that the North’s position was acceptable to Seoul. Negotiators are also thought to have agreed to begin removal of ten core devices from three nuclear facilities beginning in November. The joint statement is scheduled for release on October 2.

DPRK FLOODING
Acting UN Coordinator to the DPRK Jean-Pierre de Margerie stated on September 3, “The level of damage to infrastructure, to communications, to crops, to farmland and to households, is considerable,” but also pointed out, “The [DPRK] government has improved its level of cooperation by giving us unprecedented access to the field to conduct our assessments of the damage.”

ESPIONAGE IN THE DPRK
Li Su-Gil, spokesman for the DPRK National Security Service, reported on September 5 that several foreigners had been arrested along with a number of DPRK citizens accused of spying for a foreign country; Specifically, for having “collected official documents and information on the DPRK’s important military facilities, and spread the idea of so-called democracy and freedom to the people.” The identities and nationalities of those arrested were not revealed.

Summary: For the next 4 to 5 years, the North Korean mining sector is likely to continue to be dominated by the production of coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, and zinc. Because of growing demand for minerals by China and the Republic of Korea, their investment in North Korea’s mining sector is expected to increase and to extend beyond their current investments in apatite, coal, copper, and iron ore into other minerals, such as gold, magnesite, molybdenum, nickel, and zinc. North Korea’s real GDP is expected to grow at between 1% and 2% during the next 2 years.

Other highlights:

• North Korea ranked third in production of magnesiate in the world.  Its value-added product–magnesia clinker, which is used as a refractory metal–was marketed world wide. 
• According to Corporate social Responsibility Asia (CSR Asia), North Kroea ranked virtually last in environmental sustainability in the world, despite the country’s enactment of major laws for environmental protection, such as the Land Law of 1977, the Environmental Protection Law of 1986, the Forrestry Law in 1982, and the Law on Protection of Useful Animals in 1998.
• On the basis of North Korea’s industrial structure in 2004 (the last year in which data is available), the mining sector accounted for about 8.7% of North Korea’s gross domestic product.
• Recoverable coal reserves in North Korea were estimated to total about 8 billion metric tons in 2006.  Coal production reportedly dropped to about 23 Mt/yr in 2006 from 37.5 Mt/yr in 1985 mainly because of outdated mining equipment and technology.

Download the full version here: USGS.pdf

Korea Times
Marcus Noland, Stephan Haggard
9/21/2007

Last summer North Korea conducted provocative missile and nuclear tests. Yet only four months later, Pyongyang signed on to a roadmap that included a return of international inspectors, a full declaration of contested nuclear activities, closing down existing facilities and ultimately disabling them.

American negotiator Christopher Hill predicted this last step could take place as early as the end of the year.

What are the North Koreans up to?

The cynical, some would say realistic, view in the United States _ advanced by departed Bush administration hawks such as John Bolton _ is that Kim Jong-il is raising false hopes.

The appearance of cooperation has several tactical advantages. Sanctions and ongoing uncertainty have had substantial economic costs. The February agreement was preceded by secret meetings in Berlin to resolve the Banco Delta Asia issue.

In return, the North Koreans closed their nuclear facilities, but they have not firmly committed to the difficult aspects of the agreement _ providing a full accounting of their programs, disabling their programs, and giving up actual stores of fissile material and weapons.

Cooperation also drives wedges between the U.S., South Korea and China. If North Korea appears to be making concessions, it is easier for South Korea and China to continue diplomatic and financial support.

Next month, President Roh Moo-hyun will travel to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim Jong-il. Expect him to come bearing gifts to cement his legacy as a peacemaker.

Other politicians in the presidential race have also offered extraordinarily ambitious and generous programs of support for the North as well.

Recent studies we have done on North Korea’s changing external economic relations are consistent with some of this cynical picture, but also suggest a sliver of hope for more substantial change.

To understand why, requires a brief tour of the miserable history of North Korea over the last two decades. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean economy went into a steep decline ending in full-blown famine.

By our estimates, as many as one million people _ five percent of the entire population _ perished in the mid-1990s. Out of the human ashes of this tragedy, however, the North Korean economy began to undergo a profound transformation.

As households and work units scrambled for food, they engaged in barter, trade and new economic activities.

The desperation of the famine also saw an upturn in illicit activities, from missile sales to drugs and the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. But trade and investment also started to flow across the Chinese border.

Chinese companies, small-scale traders and North Korean firms pursued business opportunities, from large-scale mining operations to the import of South Korean videos.

The regime was always hesitant about the emergence of the market. In July 2002, the government initiated economic policy changes that decriminalized some private activities. But reforms have taken a zig-zag path, always subject to reversal.

Sanctions and closer scrutiny have limited the country’s arms sales and illicit activities.
With these sources of revenue increasingly foreclosed, North Korea has two alternatives _ open the economy and increase normal commercial activities or cooperate primarily to obtain aid. In terms of internal change, these two options may actually push North Korea in opposite directions.

Consider the aid tack. Given the regime’s concerns about internal stability, aid could provide a lifeline, allowing the regime to sustain a modicum of current consumption while forgoing deeper reforms. Under this option, North Korea trades away its nuclear program for assistance precisely to maintain the political and economic status quo.

Alternatively, North Korea could use the resolution of diplomatic tensions to deepen the economic reform process.

The military has been engaged in commercial activities and could potentially benefit from such a course. But real reform will reshuffle power and influence within North Korea in ways that are unpredictable and risky.

So what can we expect from Pyongyang? The nuclear program is the regime’s one major asset and we should not expect them to bargain it away easily.

Rather we should expect prolonged and difficult negotiations as they try to extract tribute for their “Dear Leader.”

In the end, we may eliminate North Korea’s capacity for making additional nuclear weapons, but this will not necessarily be accompanied by economic or political reforms.

An important lesson learned elsewhere in the developing world is that aid is not a substitute for reform.

Ambitious schemes for infrastructure and other investment in North Korea will only generate large economic pay-offs if they are accompanied by genuine opening and a more aggressive embrace of the market.

The key issue, therefore, is how tightly South Korea will link its offer of aid to progress in the resolution of the nuclear issue. Properly conditioned, South Korean aid could be a powerful carrot in the nuclear negotiations, whether it ultimately encourages internal reforms or not.

But if the South Korean offers at the summit are large, unconditional and open-ended, they could permit the regime in Pyongyang to stall the nuclear negotiations while actually discouraging deeper reform.

Korea Times
David Kang
9/21/2007

There has been widespread speculation as to why, after repeated calls for a summit by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, Kim Jong-il decided to meet at this time.

Some have argued that Kim is only meeting because of improved U.S.-North Korean relations. Others feel that Kim hopes to gain further aid and trade from South Korea.

Although we do not know the exact reasons, one possibility is that Kim sees two major elections looming on the horizon: the South Korean and U.S. presidential elections.

A summit provides Kim the opportunity to influence these elections. Were Kim to wait until there were new presidents in both countries, his influence on the new presidents’ goals and strategies would be minimized.

As to South Korea, it is quite likely that Kim Jong-il hopes be an influence by presenting a moderate and reasonable image of himself.

Indeed, if Kim can speak the right rhetoric and portray himself as flexible, make a few token concessions to increased economic or social exchanges with South Korea, and repeats rhetoric about “uri minjok ggiri (we, Koreans, by ourselves),” there is a good chance that many South Koreans will feel reassured and sentiment favoring engagement may solidify.

This would be a good chance of binding the next South Korean administration into continuing its engagement with the North, regardless of who actually wins the presidency.

As for the United States, Kim has less ability to influence the election, simply because Americans pay far less attention to North Korea than they do to other foreign policy issues, such as the continuing troubles in the Middle East.

However, if Kim can present a moderate face, and also help forge a solid consensus in South Korea about the best way to solve the North Korean problem, Kim may be hoping to bind any new U.S. president to a path of reconciliation, as well.

Indeed, many observers think that Kim has already won, simply by agreeing to a summit meeting with Roh. Especially with Roh so clearly hoping to cement his place in history with this summit, they fear that there is little that Kim can do that would harm his image in South Korea.

However, if Kim hopes to be an influence on the presidential election in the south, this presents a genuine opportunity to further expose Kim to pressures and influences of the outside world, which is a move in the right direction.

For decades, the North Korean leadership had only concerned itself with internal regime politics, and even ignored the voices and needs of its own citizens.

If Kim realizes that his image among the South Korean public will have a direct effect on his own rule, this may affect his actions and policies.

In this way, Kim is taking more of a gamble by agreeing to a summit than is generally recognized.

If South Korean sentiment turns against Kim after the summit, this will restrict the new South Korean president’s foreign policy options, and it will also make it harder for Kim to delay, obstruct and avoid dealing with nuclear and other issues.

As such, Roh has more leverage than generally believed, if he is adroit in his negotiations.
If Roh goes into the summit determined to come away with some agreement with the North, he will have no bargaining power whatsoever, and Kim will win. But if Kim is seen by the South Koreans as the one obstructing progress, it will make North Korea’s situation more difficult in the future.

Thus, Roh absolutely must go into the summit prepared to return empty-handed. Only when Roh is prepared to walk away, will he have any leverage on Kim.

Roh must be willing to confront Kim on serious issues, such as the nuclear issue, and press Kim to make a public statement that he supports denuclearization. Ironically, Roh’s reputation may even improve if he can show that he met Kim with a flexible and reasonable set of issues and options.

Roh must also pay attention to not only the public opinion of South Koreans but also the U.S, and in particular the policymakers inside Washington.

Roh needs to realize that managing expectations and framing the summit in a positive way is critical for him to be seen in Washington as enhancing, and not obstructing, the nuclear negotiations.

There is little chance that Washington will allow Roh to set the agenda for denuclearization, as revealed in the embarrassing episode at the recent APEC meeting.

If Roh wanders too far from Washington’s stance, he will not have Washington comply, but rather he will merely be left alone.

Thus, it is critical that Roh and Cheong Wa Dae pay as much attention to how the summit is viewed in Washington as how it is viewed in South Korea.

I am in favor of this summit, only because it further exposes Kim to South Korean public sentiment, and increases the leverage the outside world has on this reclusive regime.

I hope that Roh does not squander his opportunity to further draw out the North Korean leadership and expose them to the outside world.

Yonhap
9/20/2007

[excerpt] 

The South Korean government plans to ask the National Assembly to significantly increase its budget for inter-Korean cooperation projects and aid programs for North Korea, the Ministry of Planning and Budget said Thursday.

Seoul hopes to increase the fund for its cross-border projects to 750 billion won (US$812 million) next year from 500 billion won this year, according to the ministry.

The amount of money allocated for its humanitarian projects will also increase 14 percent to some 530 billion won, the government said.

“The increased budget for humanitarian programs will go to providing half a million tons of rice and 400,000 tons of fertilizer,” each up 100,000 tons from what Seoul provided this year, a government official said while asking not to be identified.

The requests for budget increase are still subject to approval by the parliament, but observers believe the amount of Seoul’s economic aid or assistance will be significantly increased next year following the upcoming summit of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang from Oct. 2 through Oct. 4.

The government was widely expected to promise large assistance and economic cooperation at the summit, only the second of its kind since the two Koreas were divided at the end of 1950-53 Korean War.

Meanwhile, the government also said it would request a total of 895 billion won for its official development assistance next year, up 23.3 percent from some 725 billion won in 2007, as part of efforts to boost its grants and soft loans for developing and under-developed nations to 0.12 percent of its gross national income from 0.08 percent.