North Korean Economy Watch

Chosun Ilbo
6/1/2007

According to Russia’s Itar Tass news agency on Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree imposing sanctions on North Korea in compliance with a UN Security Council resolution in the wake of Pyongyang’s nuclear test last October.

The presidential decree applies a full weapons embargo against North Korea in pursuance of UN Security Council Resolution 1718. All Russian government agencies and enterprises will be banned from exporting to North Korea tanks, fighter jets, warships, heavy artillery pieces, missiles, and missile launchers, as well as materials that can be used for nuclear weapons development.

In addition, North Korean officials involved in development programs for weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons are banned from entering Russia. Shipments of luxury goods to North Korea are also banned.

The measure will likely have no tangible effects, however, given that the current annual trade volume between Russia and North Korea is only about $200 million.

The decree comes as North Korea continues to delay implementing the conditions of the Feb. 13 nuclear disarmament agreement. The decree may put pressure on North Korea to follow the agreement.

After the UN approved the sanctions against North Korea in October last year, Russian government agencies had consultations amongst themselves and coordinated with the Russian parliament. Putin finally signed the sanctions decree on Sunday.

Joong Ang Daily
5/28/2007

Russia has its own dreams of a cross-border railway, linking its tracks to North Korea.

The former communist country has signed a non-binding deal with the communist country to rebuild a section of railway from the Russian border station of Khasan to the North Korean port of Najin, a Russian radio station reported yesterday.

Representatives of the Russian Railways and the North’s Ministry of Railways signed the memorandum last April at the end of the four-day talks held in Pyongyang, the Voice of Russia said.

A container terminal in Najin is the end goal of the new joint venture. After the repairs and reconstruction are completed, the two sides plan to ship freight from Northeast Asia to Russia and Europe, it said.

To solve technical and financial issues connected with this project, working groups will be set up. The first meeting is scheduled in Pyongyang next month.

After resolving practical issues, the two sides plan to organize a meeting of the leaders of the two countries’ railways to sign an agreement.

The restoration of the railway from Khasan to Najin will make it possible in the future to link the Trans Korean Railway to the Trans Siberian Railway, according to Russian media reports.

On May 17, two trains crossed the Military Demarcation Line dividing the two Koreas for the first time since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. South Korea hopes the historic test runs will lead to the connection by railway of the Korean Peninsula, China and Europe.

According to the Joong Ang Daily (2007-5-21):

It must have been the most expensive train ride in history. A ticket to cross the border between the two Koreas, a 90-minute journey over 30 kilometers, cost more than 2.7 billion won ($2.9 million) per person last week.

On Thursday, 200 South Koreans boarded two trains on the reconnected Gyeongui and Donghae lines on the west and east sides of the peninsula to chug across the Demilitarized Zone in a show of potential unity. The cost to South Korea, so far, has been 545.4 billion won to reconnect the sections of the cross-border railway severed by the Korean War.

While there are no concrete plans for further runs, the South Korean government has dreams of an inter-Korean rail network that would help the peninsula, cut freight shipment costs dramatically and link Korea by rail to the vast markets of China and the natural resources of Russia.

But to get there from here, the money spent so far on the test run is a pittance. Assuming that the enormous political obstacles to dealing with the North could be overcome, experts say it could cost as much as $10 billion to overhaul the slow, obsolete and backward rail infrastructure of North Korea.

That has not stopped some officials from insisting it can happen. On May 14, Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung announced a three-step plan for an inter-Korean railroad.

The first step would be to use a section of the Gyeongui Line, connecting Seoul and Shinuiju in the North, to serve the Kaesong Industrial Complex project. Transporting goods in and out of Kaesong and allowing North Korean workers to commute to the inter-Korean industrial complex by train is part of the plan.

The next step would be expanding use of the Gyeongui Line up to Kaesong for South Koreans, so that commuters to the complex and South Korean tourists visiting Kaesong could ride the train.

And finally, the South wants to operate trains on a regular basis between Seoul and Pyongyang.

“As of now, providing transportation for goods and commuters to Kaesong and allowing Mount Kumgang tourists to travel by train are current demands,” Lee said at the briefing. The Donghae Line, running between Yangyang and Anbyon in the North, will be used for the Mount Kumgang trip.

“More than 10 billion won worth of goods is produced in Kaesong,” Lee said. “More than 13,000 North Koreans are working there and commuting has become a serious issue.”

Lee has even more ambitious dreams ― the building of a rail line to connect Korea with Europe. “The reconnected inter-Korean railroad will be connected to Russia, one of the largest reserves of natural resources in the world, and China, to provide new economic opportunities,” Lee said. “We need a serious discussion on this with the North.”

Lee, however, admitted that there are enormous obstacles. Gaining the cooperation of the North’s hard-line military, which has been reluctant to open the border to train crossings, and modernization of the outdated North Korean rail infrastructure are among them.

Continuing his drumbeat for the project, after the test run, Lee said South Korea will gladly pay for updating the North’s railroad network ― and cost is no object. “No matter how much it will cost, it is an investment for our economy,” Lee said Friday. “The research is ongoing to estimate the cost, so it is hard to make the number public.”

Estimates vary widely about the cost of modernizing the North’s railroads. Lim Jae-gyeong, a researcher at the Korea Transport Institute, estimated that upgrading the North’s sagging rail networks, for both the Gyeongui and Donghae lines, would cost from 6.5 trillion won to 8 trillion won.

Kim Gyeong-jung, the team leader for inter-Korean railroad networks at the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, cited a Russian report that estimated it would cost up to $3.5 billion “to modernize the railroads in the North and connect them with the Trans-Siberian Railroad.”

Ahn Byung-min of the Korea Transport Institute put the figure at $10 billion for the project, also citing previous Russian reports.

Russia is enthusiastic about the prospects, though, and it conducted three surveys of the North’s railroad infrastructure between 2001 and 2003. The project may accelerate when the two Koreas and Russia begin railroad talks next month.

“We are pushing to hold talks with Kim Yong-sam, the North’s railroad minister, and Vladimir Yakunin, president of the state-run Russian Railways company, at the end of next month in Pyongyang,” said Lee Chul, head of the Korea Railroad Corporation. “The South and Russia have already agreed and the North responded positively.”

The meeting will focus on linking a trans-Korean railway with the trans-Siberia railway. By linking to the Russian lines, Vladivostok could be reached directly by rail from Busan. Researchers say the connection would enable freight to be shipped from Busan to Moscow by rail in just eight days. The transportation cost would be half of the current rate for sea shipments, which is about $600 for a 20-foot container.

The immediate challenge is the infrastructure. Rail is the backbone of North Korea’s transportation system, Ahn said. About 60 percent of passenger traffic and 90 percent of freight is carried by train. With two main rail lines running on the east and west sides of the country, Ahn said, the North Koreans have tried unsuccessfully to connect the systems since the 1970s.

“As of late 2005, the North had about 5,248 kilometers of rail, but 98 percent of them are single-track lines,” Ahn said, meaning that the traffic that can be carried is limited to one train at a time. “Most of the other infrastructure, such as bridges, tunnels, stations and communication systems, is also extremely outdated.”

The trains also run at very slow speeds, between 30 and 60 kilometers an hour. “The speed has not changed much since 1956,” Ahn said. “From Pyongyang to Shinuiju, the distance is 223.6 kilometers. By express, it would take about five hours and five minutes, so the average speed is about 40 kilometers per hour,” Ahn said. “But the regular trains take more than 11 hours.” He noted that there are also no set timetables and service is erratic and sometimes dangerous.

Ahn, who has visited North Korea several times to examine the fraying rail network, provided some extreme examples of how the North tries to cope. “Russia and China often provide food aid to the North via trains,” Ahn said. “When train cars from the two countries arrive, the North, under bilateral treaties, must send back the trains within six months. Rarely are the actual train cars returned, instead China and Russia often receive older train cars ready to retire from service.”

About 2,000 train cars sent from China and Russia have thus been marked as “made in North Korea” and put to use, Ahn said.

“North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung once said the operation of a railroad is like the circulation of blood in the human body,” Ahn said, “Based on that expression, you could say that North Korea’s rail network is a patient suffering from a serious circulatory disease.”

Read the full story here:
Inter-Korean railroad faces huge obstacles
Joong Ang Daily
Ser Myo-ja
5/21/2007

Korea Times
Kim Yon-se
5/17/2007

Senior officials of South Korea, North Korea and Russia will likely meet soon to discuss linking the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) and the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), the chief executive of the Korea Railroad Corp. (KORAIL) said Thursday.

The three countries plan to hold a second round of talks for railway cooperation in Pyongyang in late June, said KORAIL President Lee Churl.

In a meeting with reporters in Munsan, north of Seoul, Lee said, “We’ve already reached an agreement with Russia and received a positive reply from the North.”

If the North accepts the proposal, Lee will meet his North Korean and Russian counterparts to discuss the matter on the basis of the first tripartite meeting in Russia in March 2006.

The connection of TKR and TSR, dubbed the “Iron Silk Road,” is expected to bring enormous economic benefits to the two Koreas and Russia.

Experts say it is expected to cut logistic costs as well as freight delivery times substantially.

First of all, inter-Korean projects including tours to Mt. Geumgang or Gaeseong, an ancient capital city in North Korea, will likely be activated .

Freight transportation fares between Incheon and Nampo in the North are expected to fall by 25 percent on average by utilizing the railway instead of ships.

It takes about 30 days and costs $2,213 for conveying 1 TEU (20-foot equivalent units) of freight between Busan and Moscow by ship. In comparison, it would take about 15 days and $1,822 if the railways were linked.

The Busan New Port has recently been designed to make Korea a logistics hub in Northeast Asia.

The port is likely to provide another advantage when the railroad among the two Koreas and Russia is connected.

It will become both the starting and ending point of the “Iron Silk Road,” crossing the Eurasian continent via the Trans-Siberian, Trans-Manchurian and Trans-China railways.

The port authority plans to build a logistics complex on a 1.2 million-square-meter lot in the northern container pier of the new port by 2008.

Joong Ang Daily
Lee Yang-soo and Brian Lee
5/16/2007

With an eye on future transportation infrastructure, both Russia and China are courting North Korea to get in on the development of Najin port, in the far north of the country near the Russian border.

A Foreign Ministry official said yesterday that Russian Railways President Vladimir Yakunin is scheduled to visit North Korea to discuss launching a project aimed at improving and repairing a railroad from Najin to Khasan, just across the border into Russia.

Yakunin told former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, who visited Russia last month, that President Vladimir Putin had great interest in the project and Russia was hoping for the active participation of South Korean companies, the official said. The railway official visited Seoul in July last year to discuss the project with South Korean companies. The issue was also discussed in March at a bilateral meeting with Russia on economic cooperation.

A government official said that Russia wants to use Najin port as a logistics hub, but is also intending to develop the port into a base for future development of oil and natural gas in Siberia. The ultimate goal would be to connect the trans-Siberian railway with an inter-Korean railway system.

Beijing also has its eye on the North Korean port, which it envisions as part of its grand design to build a transport network that stretches from the Indian Ocean to the North Pacific.

“Najin Port is near the Jilin area and China’s own ports in the area have already reached their full capacity,” a government official said yesterday.

Beijing has recently notified Pyongyang that it is willing to spend $1 billion to develop port facilities, build railroads connecting the port to China and improve existing infrastructure such as highways, the official said.

In a report published earlier this year, Cho Myung-chul, a researcher at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, predicted that China would use investments in the North’s ports and railroads to extend its own infrastructure for export and import purposes. China has made similar investments in Burma and Bangladesh, among others.

Korea Times
Kim Yon-se
5/3/2007

President Roh Moo-hyun has expressed his willingness for economic cooperation with Russia, including linking the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) and the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), by sending a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, a Chong Wa Dae official said.

But cooperation with North Korea would be required for the railway connection between Seoul and Moscow, government officials said.

Though experts from South Korea, North Korea and Russia have held a series of meetings to discuss the railway project over the past several years, it has lingered on due to a series of politically negatives surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

According to government officials, North Korea has won Russian pledges of economic aid by agreeing on the project, which will generate huge profits for Russia.

During the Kim Dae-jung administration, many hoped the railway project would provide a momentum for the reunification of the two Koreas.  Since 2001 when North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed on the reconnection of the TKR and TSR, the project to restore the Gyeongui line which links Seoul to Pyongyang and Shinuiju in the North, was expected to recommence.

Reconnection of the Gyeongui railway was agreed upon during the inter-Korean summit talks in June 2000.

But the North withdrew its workforce and equipment from the area in 2001, while the South has completed more than 70 percent of the Southern part of the line.

When the TKR and TSR are connected, transportation costs will be cut and the time taken to ship cargo to Europe will be reduced to 20 days from 45 days, bringing a significant change to the logistics system in Northeast Asia.

In addition, the connection of the railways is expected to increase both countries’ revenues, as North Korea and Russia are likely to collect $100 million and $400 million in tolls, respectively.

“The letter to Putin did not contain anything new on the railway project, though the issue was included in suggestions for economic cooperation,” said Cheong Wa Dae spokesman Cheon Ho-seon.

He added that there has been no reply from Putin to Roh.

In the letter delivered by former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, Roh also proposed to hold a summit with Putin. Han traveled to Moscow on April 25 to attend the state funeral of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Joon Ang Daily
Brian Lee
5/1/2007

Still seeking access to the international financial system, Pyongyang has asked Macao authorities to transfer $25 million in funds to unnamed banks in Russia and Italy, signaling some progress in the deadlock over money held in a Macao bank.

Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei told Japanese lawmakers visiting Beijing that North Korea broached the idea, the Kyodo News Agency reported. Wu said that Macao authorities are trying to determine whether the move is possible.

South Korean government officials held out hope that the news could be a catalyst in finally resolving an issue that has been dragging on for weeks. “We are ready at anytime to move on; we are just waiting for the clouds to clear,” said one official. Italy was the first European country to open diplomatic ties with Pyongyang in 2000.

The dispute over the money led the North to miss the April 14 deadline for shutting down its main nuclear reactor.

In what was viewed as a major concession, Washington announced on April 10 that it supported measures by Macao to unblock the North Korean funds held in Banco Delta Asia. The U.S. had said the money was the result of illegal activities.

However, other than saying that it has taken notice of such measures, Pyongyang has delayed withdrawing the money. Instead, through state media, the North said it was looking to integrate itself into the international financial system rather than just retrieve the money.

With China and Macao entering the labor day holiday starting today, it could be a few days before any transfer takes place, the government official in Seoul conceded.

A source said that Pyongyang had also asked banks in Singapore, Vietnam and Mongolia to agree to a transfer but was rebuffed.

Washington has endorsed measures to unfreeze the funds, but it has not withdrawn its designation of Banco Delta Asia as a confirmed money launderer.

Yonhap
4/16/2007

The U.N. World Food Program (WFP) has only been able to gather one-fifth of the amount of recovery aid it is seeking for North Korea, with less than a year left in the aid program, according to the agency’s tally on Sunday.

A resourcing update for North Korea dated Thursday showed the WFP received donations totaling just short of US$21 million, accounting for 20.53 percent of the aimed $102 million. The donations include $3.2 million carried over from previous operations.

Russia remained the biggest donor with $5 million, which is almost 5 percent of the total. Switzerland provided $2.57 million.

Germany donated $1.66 million. Other contributors include Cuba, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Italy and Poland.

Private donations totaled $8,474 as of Thursday.

The United Nations has contributed $2.3 million, or 2.25 percent of the total.

Called “protracted relief and recovery operation,” the project runs from April 1, 2006, to March 31, 2008.

Yonhap
4/14/2007

A festive mood was pervading North Korea Saturday as the birthday of the communist state’s late founder drew near, with a series of exhibitions and gatherings being held, the North’s state media reported.

Pyongyang has staged art, sports and dance events annually for the birthday of Kim Il-sung, which falls on April 15, and is also known as the Day of Sun. Kim died of heart failure on July 8 1994 at the age of 82, and his son Kim Jong-il took power afterward.

Art troupes from China, Russia, Japan, Kazakhstan, India and Indonesia staged performances in Pyongyang on Saturday, the third day of the country’s April Spring Friendship Art Festival, according to the North’s state media.

A flower exhibition for “Kimilsungia,” an orchid named after Kim, was opened Friday with the North’s and foreign officials in attendance. The exhibition will be run until Thursday.

The festive mood is expected to culminate when the North stages the pro-unification Arirang festival Sunday through May 20. It is one of the North’s major gymnastics events and is popular among both Western and South Korean visitors.

Foreign delegations also have arrived Pyongyang to celebrate Kim’s birthday, the state media reported.

An Indonesian delegation made a visit to the North’s Mansudae Assembly Hall on Friday and conveyed a present to the incumbent North Korean leader via Kim Young-dae, the North’s No. 3 leader. It also toured Mankyongdae, the birthplace of the late founder in a rural village near the North Korean capital.

A Russian delegation also paid homage to a Kim Il-sung statue at the Mansudae Assembly Hall, while a Mongolian delegation paid visits to art exhibition halls and other sites to commemorate the birthday.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
4/8/2007

It is a sort of commonplace statement that the U.S. forces which landed in Korea in early September 1945 had almost no local knowledge and no plans of what they were going to do. But it is sometimes stated, that the Soviet forces which had arrived two weeks earlier had some plans. Such statements are especially common on the political right. This is understandable: Human beings tend to see themselves as disorganized and unprepared while believing that their opponents possess diabolic foresight and an uncanny ability to exercise the utmost control over events. Fortunately or not, such a perception, the basis of all conspiracy theories, is usually wrong.

So did the Soviets have a plan when their forces fought their way to Korea in mid-August 1945? Obviously, not. At least this is what I can say from my frequent talks with the participants of those events, and also from the papers which I have seen.

Actually, Korea did not feature prominently in Soviet international strategy before 1945. For decades, Moscow’s policy toward Korea was subordinated to what appeared to be much more important _ its relations with China and Japan. The Soviet Union secretly subsidized and supported the Communist movement in colonial Korea, but this was a relatively small-scale operation seen, first and foremost, as a part of the larger efforts to undermine the Japanese empire.

The situation was exacerbated by Stalin’s Great Purge of the late 1930s. Before that, the Soviet citizens of Korean extraction played a prominent role in formulating the Soviet policy toward the peninsula. However, in the great slaughter of the bureaucrats and military officers that took place in the late 1930s, ethnic Koreans enjoyed especially bad survival chances. Their ethnicity made them suspicious, and few of them survived the bloodbath of 1937-38. As a result, the Soviet Foreign ministry, intelligence agencies, and armed forces lost what little Korea-related expertise they had possessed in earlier days. Those people who were responsible for the Korean policy in the 1920s and early 1930s were mostly shot or had died in various prisons by 1940.

There was also another reason for the Soviet reluctance to draw up plans for the political future of Korea. Nobody expected that the victory over Japan would be that swift. The Soviet military remembered their protracted and bloody battles with the Japanese during the undeclared border wars of the late 1930s, and so they were prepared for a campaign that would drag for many months.

However, the Japanese military machine collapsed in a week. Western readers believe that the reason was the nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki _ a claim that was never particularly popular in Russia. Irrespective of their contribution to the outcome of the war, the nuclear bombs hardly changed much in Manchuria and North Korea. The Russian forces had experienced engagement with the Nazis in Europe, while the Japanese troops in the area were weakened by frequent withdrawals of their best forces to the Pacific theater.

Thus, in late August 1945 the Soviet generals suddenly found themselves responsible for a large territory of which they knew almost nothing. The army had few Korean speaking interpreters, and virtually no local political intelligence. Not only was it the local army headquarters that was lacking in this regard, even Moscow itself had only vague ideas about the political forces active in Korea _ and even this inadequate knowledge was largely about Seoul, not the areas of the North.

In the greater context of the post-war world, the future of Korea remained undetermined. The Kremlin expected that its relations with the U.S. would deteriorate ? on the generally correct assumption that any major victory brings about a greater rivalry between the winners.

However, the shape and intensity of this confrontation remained to be seen. In those days, the Soviets also felt a profound insecurity about Japan: the rebirth of Japan as a great power was seen as a potential threat, so Stalin wanted to make sure that Japan would never be able to threaten the Russian Far East if it somehow regained its military and/or economic power in a distant future. Thus, uprooting the Japanese influence in Korea was a major task for the Soviet leaders.

Thus, in late August, the Soviet forces had quite nebulous tasks in front of them. They wanted to ensure law and order (incidentally, threatened first and foremost by their own soldiers), get rid of the Japanese influence, and lay the groundwork for a future friendly Korean government.

The first instructions arrived only in late September, when Stalin sent his famous secret cable to Korea. His cable envisioned a “bourgeois democratic government” for the Soviet zone of occupation, and explicitly warned against attempts to export Communism to Korea. The cable obviously talked about a government in the North, and this can be seen as the first sign of future division. Nonetheless, this was only the first step: Coherent ideas about Korea’s future developed in the Kremlin only in early 1946.

The “September cable” also implied that the Soviets would have to cooperate with the local Right _ and indeed they soon recruited Cho Man-sik, a prominent Christian nationalist _ to act as a leader of the local administration.