North Korean Economy Watch

The Nautilus Institute has put together an amazing research paper on the DPRK’s energy sector. I cannot understate the value of the quality/quantity of facts/figures/tables in this research.

You can download the PDF here.

I have also added it to my DPRK Economic statistics Page.

Here is the introduction:

Energy demand and supply in general—and, arguably, demand for and supply of electricity in particular—have played a key role in many high-profile issues involving North Korea, and have played and will play a central role in the resolution of the ongoing confrontation between North Korea and much of the international community over the North’s nuclear weapons program. Energy sector issues will continue to be a key to the resolution of the crisis, as underscored by the formation of a Working Group under the Six-Party Talks that was (and nominally, still is) devoted to the issue of energy and economic assistance to the DPRK.

The purpose of this report is to provide policy-makers and other interested parties with an overview of the demand for and supply of the various forms of energy used in the DPRK in six years during the last two decades:

• 1990, the year before much of the DPRK’s economic and technical support from the Soviet Union was withdrawn;
• 1996, thought by some to be one of the most meager years of the difficult economic 1990s in the DPRK; and 2000, a year that has been perceived by some observers as a period of modest economic “recovery” in the DPRK, as well as a marker of the period before the start, in late 2002, of a period of renewed political conflict between the DPRK, the United States, and it neighbors in Northeast Asia over the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development program; and
• 2005, also a year in which observers have again noted an upward trend in some aspects of the DPRK economy, as well as the most recent year for which any published estimates on the DPRK’s energy sector and economy are available.
• 2008, the last year in which the DPRK received heavy fuel oil from its negotiating partners in the Six-Party talks; and
• 2009, the most recent year for which we have analyzed the DPRK’s energy sector.

According to Relief Web:

On 9 October 2012, H.E. Alexander A. Timonin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to DPRK, visited Pyongyang Biscuit Factory to formally hand over a generous donation of Russian wheat flour to WFP’s work in the country.

The donation of 6,000 metric tons of wheat flour is valued at US$5 million. Wheat flour is an essential ingredient in the production of nutritious biscuits that are distributed to well over a million children in nurseries, kindergartens and primary schools, as part of WFP’s project to address chronic undernutrition in DPRK.

Wheat flour is also used in DPR Korea to produce Supercereal – a specialised nutritious blended food – for pregnant and nursing mothers.

During the ceremony, Ambassador Timonin confirmed Russia’s engagement in assisting the most vulnerable in DPRK through its contribution to the work of WFP.

“We are very interested in the activities of WFP in DPRK and are very satisfied with its production of fortified food for children and mothers with the wheat flour donated by Russia,” he said. “The Russian Federation will continue to provide humanitarian contributions to WFP, supporting it`s activities in DPRK.”

Previous posts about aid to the DPRK in 2012 can be found here.

Previous posts about Russia can be found here.

This fall Marcus Noland has posted three blog entries which feature DPRK trade statistics with China, the European Union, and Russia. I have put the graphs from these posts here as both an archive and as a quick reference for myself. See Dr. Noland’s original posts (linked above) for his analysis.

Chinese Luxury Goods Exports to the DPRK (Published 2012-9-17):

European luxury exports to North Korea (Published 2012-10-18):

Russian luxury good exports to North Korea (Published 2012-11-14):

Post 39 (2012-10-4): The Choson Ilbo reports that the pipeline talks are delayed because DPRK is asking for transit rates above the international norm:

A South Korean government source said talks have dragged on because the North is demanding a transit fee that is two to three times more than international rates.

Based on a method of calculation used by Ukraine — about $2 per 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas for 1 km of pipeline — a reasonable fee would be about US$150 million a year given the estimated amount of gas South Korea would import from Russia and the 700-800 km of the gas pipeline running through the North. But the North reportedly demanded $300-500 million a year.

“It’s likely that the North asked for such a high price in the first place to gain the upper hand in future talks,” the source added. “There have been no full-fledged talks yet. At the moment, Pyongyang, Seoul and Moscow are just trying to read each other’s minds.”

Post 38 (2012-2-27): The Daily NK reports on details being discussed in the pipeline talks:

The Republic of Korea Ambassador to Russia, former chief nuclear negotiator Wi Sung Lac, says there has been progress on a gas pipeline connecting Russia, North Korea and South Korea.

“At the moment it is at the stage of enterprises discussing commercial conditions, and I am aware that there has been progress. North Korea and Russia are also discussing issues of transit and transit fees via working-level consultations,” he explained to reporters on a visit to Seoul today.

Wi would not be drawn on what kind of progress has been achieved, saying, “It’s about commercial details and so is hard to explain, but it appears there has been progress on supply quantities and supply conditions.”

Post 37 (2012-2-20): Gazprom reports “progress” in talks with North Korean government. According to Bloomberg:

OAO Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas exporter, said it made progress in talks to supply Korea Gas Corp. (036460) through a pipeline across North Korea, the Moscow-based company said today in an e-mailed statement.

Gazprom and Kogas, as the Korean company is called, plan to meet again in Moscow next month to continue talks, Gazprom said.

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According to Yonhap:

Bilateral trade between North Korea and its ally Russia surged nearly 50 percent from a year earlier in the first half, a report said Saturday.

According to the report from Seoul’s state-run Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), the amount of bilateral trade between the two countries in the January-June period came to US$38.8 million, up 49 percent from the same period last year.

The report, however, noted such a large on-year increase was due to a large drop posted in the first half of 2011.

“The volume of bilateral trade between North Korea and Russia is still insignificant by any standard,” it said.

The increase was also caused by a 68.3 percent rise in shipments of Russian goods to North Korea with fuel and steel products accounting for 29.9 percent and 28.7 percent of total shipments, respectively.

North Korea’s exports to Russia dropped 10.9 percent on-year to $5.4 million, according to the KOTRA report.

Here are some previous posts on this topic:
1. Lankov on DPRK-Russia trade (2012-9-18).
2. Russia reported to forgive DPRK debt (again)
3. KOTRA numbers from June
4. Lankov on DPRK-Russia ties (2011-9-25)

Read the full story here:
Trade between N. Korea, Russia surges 50 pct in H1
Yonhap
2012-9-22

Following (or perhaps concurrently with) the story on the Russia – DPRK debt forgiveness deal, Andrei Lankov writes about DPRK trade and investment in the Asia Times:

But a brief look at trade statistics makes one suspicious about claims in regard to Russia’s prominence in North Korean issues. It is not widely understood that summits and official rhetoric notwithstanding, actual trade between North Korea and Russia is miniscule, even by the meager standards of North Korea.

In 2011, trade volume between the two countries was merely US$0.12 billion. As inter-state trade goes, this practically means that Russia and North Korea have close to no trade. In the same year, Sino-Korean trade hit the $5.6 billion mark. If you compare this with other East Asian countries this is still peanuts, but it is nonetheless almost fifty times the level of Russo-North Korean trade.

One also might notice that the improvement in political relations between Russia and North Korea had absolutely no impact on Russo-North Korean bilateral trade volumes. If anything, the trade declined when the politicians were smiling and exchanging niceties.

Over the past 15 years, Russo-North Korean trade on an annual basis has fluctuated around the $100-$250 million mark (in a clear downward trend). Throughout the same period, Sino-North Korean trade has increased almost 10-fold.

It is strange that these obvious facts do not attract enough attention among those who like to talk about Russia’s supposed leverage in Pyongyang. These figures are easily obtainable and yet almost entirely overlooked. This seems to be because the figures do not easily fit into preconceived notions about Russo-North Korean relations; the inconvenient truth is that the political rhetoric shared between the two countries is often very shallow and lacking in an economic basis.

To be blunt, Russian businesses have no interest in North Korea.

North Korea is a very poor place that has few comparative advantages in the world market. Nonetheless such advantages do exist. First, North Korea has some mineral resources (iron ore,coal, copper, lead and so forth) which are largely to be found in the northern most part of the country. Second, it has a rather skilled and unbelievably cheap workforce. North Korean workers consider themselves lucky if they are paid $25 a month. But none of these two advantages are of any significance to corporate Russia.

Russian mining companies have all of Siberia at their disposal, and North Korea’s mineral deposits do not look all that impressive by comparison. Things are made even worse by the constant threat of political instability and the gross underdevelopment of transportation and infrastructure in general. Therefore, no major Russian mining firm is willing to invest in North Korea (some have been courted by Pyongyang, have always responded in the negative).

The pull of cheap labor is also not all that attractive to Russian companies. The Russian developmental model does not involve heavy reliance on light industry in general, nor in particular the manufacture of T-shirts and running shoes. There is a moderate need for cheap North Korean labor in Russia itself, and so for many decades North Korean workers have been employed in Russia. But the scale of these operations is quite limited, and likely to remain so (10-20,000 workers at most).

One can of course point at two much discussed projects of economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea – the proposed trans-Korean railway and proposed natural gas pipeline. The pipeline project was discussed during Kim Jong-il’s last trip to Russia in 2011, and as a result still attracts much attention. However, we should remember that the very similar trans-Korean railway was first officially approved in the late 1990s, but still remains on the drawing board and as elusive as ever. There is good reason to believe that a similar fate awaits the pipeline project: for years there will be talks, enthusiastic newspaper articles, even official visits, but not much in terms of actual construction.

Both railway and pipeline projects share one common feature: North Korea is treated as a space to traverse. Had this area been covered with tropical rainforest, or desert, it would have little impact on either of these projects, whose main task is to facilitate interactions between Russia and South Korea.

From a purely commercial view, a short-cut through North Korea makes perfect sense, but there are many political problems which ensure that we will have to wait for many years before any of these projects will begin in earnest.

The major problem is recurrent and perhaps incurable instability which blights the Korean peninsula. Once Russian companies start real construction, they will become hostages of the complex and often unpredictable clashes of power interests in and around the Korean peninsula.

Additional Information
1. Read more about the Rason railway project here.

2. Read more about the pipeline project here.

3. more economic statistics can be found on my DPRK Economic Statistics page

Read the full story here:
North Korea lacks rich relation in Russia
Andrei Lankov
Asia Times
2012-9-18

UPDATE 4 (2012-9-18): The Wall Street Journal offers some additional details on the deal:

Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak told Interfax that the “restructuring conditions are standard in connection with our membership in the Paris Club, with a conversion into U.S. dollars at an appropriate discounted rate with the balance of the debt to be used for a debt-for-aid program.”

The $11 billion figure was reached by using the Soviet conversion rate of 67 kopecks to the dollar, the ministry said, which at today’s exchange rate would make the debt just $238 million. Russia has reached similar agreements over the years with many former Soviet-clients in larger part because there was little chance the loans would ever be repaid.

Russian and North Korea had resumed negotiations over the decades-old debt in August 2011, following a meeting between former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the late-North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. During the meeting, the two sides agreed to pursue a pipeline project that would send Russian gas to South Korea via North Korea.

The following June, a preliminary agreement was reached and the finance ministry submitted a proposal to the Russian government for approval, Interfax reported.

Experts say the settlement of the long-stalled debt talks represented a change in political will on both sides and would help spur along the pipeline project as well as other railway and electricity deals.

“The decision on a settlement of debt is a significant step as it removes the obstacles for cooperation. Now credits can be granted,” said Alexander Vorontsov, an expert on North Korea at the Russian Academy of Sciences.

UPDATE 3 (2012-9-18): Here is coverage of the deal in KCNA:

Agreement on Debt Settlement between DPRK, Russia Signed

Pyongyang, September 18 (KCNA) — An agreement on settling the debt incurred by the loan provided by the former Soviet Union which the DPRK owes to the Russian Federation was signed between the governments of the two countries in Moscow on Monday.

The agreement was inked by Vice-Minister of Finance Ki Kwang Ho from the DPRK side and Vice-Minister of Finance Sergey Storchak from the Russian side.

The conclusion of the agreement on the debt settlement would create fresh conditions for boosting the relations of economic cooperation between the two countries in the future.

UPDATE 2 (2012-9-18): RIA Novosti reports that the DPRK and Russia have signed a debt deal.  According to the article:

Russia and North Korea have signed a deal on settlement of the DPRK’s $11 billion debts to Russia, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak told Prime news agency on Tuesday.

“It was signed yesterday,” Storchak said.

Russia and North Korea have been negotiating over the issue of Pyongyang’s debt to Russia, left over from the Soviet era, for the last four years without result. Russia did not rule out writing off part of the debt and either rescheduling the remainder or offsetting it against investment.

Storchak previously said it was understood a debt settlement would involve a conversion of the ruble debt into dollars, giving an initial discount of around 90 percent of the debt.

The remaining debt of over $1 billion would be used in a “debt for aid exchange” plan to assist with joint education, health and energy projects in North Korea.

Read more bleow…
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Back in May of 2010 I wrote this blog post about Rajin’s port. It appears to be out-of-date now.

Pictured Above (Google Earth): Rajin Port

Dr. Bernhard Seliger of the Hanns Seidel Foundation writes in with an update on the Rajin Port:

The 80 year old port has three piers, of which the No. 3 pier is used by the Russians. They have a long-term lease (50 years starting in 2008) and while they are currently doing some work there, it is not being used for exports.

China is interested in using Pier No.1 (where it rents a warehouse to store coal) and Pier No. 2 (currently in use by the Koreans). Plans have also been expressed (now cancelled) to build 2 new piers (No. 4 and 5) (See here and here). For many years the Chinese and North Korean governments have negotiated a pier rental agreement, but for now there is no concrete result–though at numerous times it has been maintained that China already rented the port. What exactly the problems are is not known. For now China uses the port to bring coal from the northernmost Heilongang Province to southern China via a sea route, an event which took place twice this year.

Theoretically, the port as a handling capacity of 3 million sq. tons, however the maximum real handling was 800.000 tons in 1979, while last year it was 200.000 tons. The depth of the harbor is 9 m.

Here is what a report in Xinhua stated (2012-8-28):

Moreover, China has played a key role in infrastructure and transportation projects, which have been increasing in the zone.

China would build No. 4 to 6 piers at Rajin Port in Rason, DPRK’s major ice-free harbor adjacent to China and Russia, and was using No. 1 and 2 piers, while Russia had leased No. 3 pier, said an official in charge of foreign affairs of the port.

See also this report by Andray Abrahamian of Choson Exchange.

According to the Asahi Shimbun:

More than 100 North Korean defectors are now in Russia, with about 30 in Moscow, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Each day, the former logger felled larch and other trees and transported them to stations from 8 a.m. to around 10 p.m. at the No. 13 office in Tygda in the Amur Oblast.

About 700 North Koreans worked as loggers at the office, with three to four dying in accidents every year.

Loggers made about $500 (40,000 yen) a month on average and $2,000 to $3,000 in a season, according to accounts of other former workers. But more than 70 percent of their pay was siphoned off by the government.

The man remembers he received a maximum of $160 a month in certificates, but supervisors said half of the payment had been sent to his family in North Korea. He was never told how much he made.

North Korean workers dispatched around the world send home several hundreds of millions of dollars a year. The workers, along with mineral resources, are a key source of hard foreign currency for the country, which suffered a trade deficit of $630 million last year.

North Korea’s Forestry Ministry operated its Russian representative office on the outskirts of Khabarovsk, with branches in Tygda and Chegdomyn in the Khabarovsk district, its two largest logging bases.

During the peak, up to 20,000 North Koreans worked as loggers in Russia, with half of them based in Tygda and Chegdomyn, according to sources.

The defector said he volunteered to go to Russia in September 1995 “to make a living.” At that time, rations were suspended in a food crisis, and people were starving to death in rural areas.

At the No. 13 office in Tygda, eight loggers formed a group. Two workers were each responsible for cutting, selecting, transporting and loading trees onto cargo trains. With equipment in short supply, the monthly quota of 3,000 cubic meters was seldom met.

North Korea focused on logging in Russia’s Far Eastern region after it concluded a contract with the former Soviet Union in 1967. Under the agreement, North Korea would take about 35 percent of the trees felled.

North Korean workers are dispatched abroad only for three years. But the man managed to extend his stay, paying bribes to representatives at the No. 13 office, including those from the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea and the State Security Department, or the secret police.

The man won the trust of senior officials and started working outside the logging base on a part-time basis in around 2000. He would earn 2,000 rubles (4,800 yen, or $60) if he worked at a road construction site for one week.

…

North Korea has closed many logging bases in Russia. Tygda and Chegdomyn have only several hundred workers between them, according to sources.

But there are still 15,000 to 20,000 North Korean workers in Russia, according to South Korean human rights groups and other sources.

A little less than 5,000 work in Vladivostok, and plans are under way to have several thousand North Koreans engage in farming or construction in the Amur Oblast.

North Korea has also sent workers to other parts of the world. About 19,000 entered China on a work visa between January and March, a 40-percent increase from the same period the previous year.

Kim Tae San, a former employee of North Korea’s Light Industry Ministry, was responsible for running a joint venture shoe sewing factory in the Czech Republic for three years from 2000.

The 60-year-old said workers could save only less than 10 percent of what they made because the remainder was confiscated by the government.

Female workers at the plant each made $150 a month, but $75 to $80 was unconditionally remitted to North Korea. In addition, the factory collected $40 for lodging expenses, $1 for subscriptions for airlifted Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of North Korea’s ruling party, and $2 for flowers. On a memorial day, a basket of flowers was presented before the Kim Il Sung statue in Pyongyang on behalf of all workers overseas.

Read previous posts on loggers in Russia here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

The full story story is well worth reading here:
FAR EAST FOCUS: Pyongyang exploits N. Korean loggers in Russia
Asahi Shimbun
Yoshihiro Makino
2012-6-25

Pictured above (Google Earth): A map of the Khasan-Rajin Port rail service.

UPDATE 9 (2012-4-2) : DPRK and Russia to start cross-border freight train service in October. According to KCNA:

Rajin-Khassan Cargo Train Service to Begin in October

Pyongyang, April 2 (KCNA) — A Rajin-Khassan cargo train service will run from October this year.

Kim Chang Sik, a department director of the DPRK Ministry of Railways, told KCNA that the laying of railroad and renovation of railway stations, tunnels and communications facilities are now under way in the section.

The railway project was highlighted in the historic DPRK-Russia Moscow Declaration, which was signed in August 2001, he said, adding:

In line with the declaration, a cooperation agreement between the DPRK Ministry of Railways and the Russia Railway Holding Corporation was concluded in April 2008 to be followed by an agreement on joint venture between Rajin Port and the Corporation.

A contract on the lease of the Rajin-Tumangang railway was made between the Ministry’s Eastern Railway Ryonun Company and the Rason International Joint Venture Container Terminal, under which the 54 km-section has been rebuilt into a mixed track from October 2008.
A trial train service took place in October 2011 between Rajin of the DPRK and Khassan of Russia.

At least 100,000 containers will be yearly carried along the line.

This section will serve as an international railway container transport line linking Northeast Asia with Europe.

KCNA also offered this video.

Yonhap also reported:

North Korea and Russia will start a cross-border cargo train service in October, Pyongyang’s state media reported Monday, in a move that could make a North Korean port a regional hub for Europe-bound shipments.

The announcement came more than three years after the two countries launched a project to rebuild two rail lines between Russia’s Far Eastern border town of Khasan and North Korea’s northeastern port city of Rajin.

The North designated Rason, which includes the Rajin port, as a special economic zone in 1991 and has since striven to develop it into a regional logistics hub close to both China and Russia.

In October, North Korea and Russia held a test run on the 54-kilometer-long railway line.

The proposed cargo service can handle 100,000 shipping containers each year, the North’s official Korean Central News Agency said in a dispatch.

The renovation project, if completed, will offer a new route of container transportation between Northeast Asia and Europe, the dispatch said, and could significantly reduce shipping time and costs.

The freight service could also help boost relations between North Korea and Russia, including their economic cooperation, the dispatch said.

The trade volume between North Korea and Russia stood at US$110 million in 2010, the latest year for which statistics are available, according to South Korea’s state-run Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency.

Russia maintains friendly ties with North Korea, though its leader Dmitry Medvedev has strongly denounced North Korea’s rocket launch set for sometime between April 12 and 16.

Medvedev made the remarks during summit talks with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in Seoul last month on the sidelines of an international nuclear summit, according to Lee’s office.

Historical posts on this topic below:

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