North Korean Economy Watch

Yonhap
2/26/2007

South Korea has earmarked 20 billion won (US$21.3 million) to provide 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea as part of a recent nuclear agreement in which the North agreed to take the initial steps toward nuclear disarmament, the Unification Ministry said Monday.

“The government embarked on internal preparations to provide 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil for North Korea in accordance with the six-nation agreement,” said Yang Chang-seok, spokesperson for the ministry.

He said the oil shipment will cost an estimated 20 billion won, including delivery expenses, adding that the details will be worked out during the upcoming meeting of a working group on energy aid.

Earlier in the day, the ministry made the announcement to a panel of the National Assembly on unification and foreign affairs, after the decision was approved by the state-run committee of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.

“The government will commission the Public Procurement Service to choose a local oil refinery for the project. It will cost about $350 per metric ton, and incidental charges of delivery will constitute about 20 percent,” Yang told reporters.

On Feb. 13, North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities and eventually dismantle them in exchange for energy aid and other benefits. The United States also agreed to discuss normalizing relations with the communist nation.

Under the deal, North Korea will receive initial aid equal to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil for shutting down and sealing its main nuclear reactor and related facilities at Yongbyon, 80 kilometers north of Pyongyang, within 60 days. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors will determine whether the North carries out the steps properly.

The communist nation can eventually receive another 950,000 tons in heavy fuel oil or equivalent aid if it disables the reactor irreversibly and declares that it has ended all nuclear programs. The cost of aid will be equitably distributed among the five other countries in the six-party talks, which are South Korea, the U.S., Japan, China and Russia.

The agreement also calls for the establishment of five working groups, one of which is to address the normalization of Washington-Pyongyang diplomatic relations. The groups are to convene within 30 days of the Feb. 13 accord.

Korea Herald
Yoav Cerralbo
2/26/2007

Last week, the Australian government announced that it would be sending a diplomatic team to North Korea to help strengthen bilateral ties.

In Seoul, Australian Ambassador Peter Rowe spoke about this news with The Korea Herald, explaining that the Australian team will be looking at ways they can help in energy, aid and safeguards expertise.

“These are things that Australia can contribute,” he said.

Rowe said that Australia, a strong proponent of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, would be “happy” to provide expertise and training in nuclear safeguards as part of North Korea’s dismantling process.

This bilateral exchange is not new to both countries. After the 1994 framework agreement, Australia helped to train and install safeguards in North Korea.

“That was when we started to develop the bilateral relationship,” he said. “It was only as the North Koreans were doing things like missile and nuclear tests that we had to run backwards.”

He added that Australia wants to see North Korea as a constructive, positive member of the international community.

“If North Korea wants to join the international community in this process, that is return enough for us because it contributes to regional security and stability,” the ambassador said.

The diplomatic mission would be coordinated with the other members of the six-party talks and as the secretive and unpredictable regime fulfills the benchmarks that were set up in the deal, Australia would be there in support and would reciprocally increase the relationship.

The idea of this mission, Rowe said, is to urge North Korea to fulfill the obligations they’ve undertaken in this most recent agreement. “That will be its main task.”

At the six-party talks recently, fueled-starved North Korea agreed to start the process of shutting down their Yongbyon nuclear reactor within 60 days in return for initial aid equal to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil after international inspectors have confirmed the shutdown.

“I’m reasonably confident that North Korea will go with the commitments they made for the first 60 days,” he said.

Reuters (Hat tip DPRK studies)
2/26/2007

Senior officials from South and North Korea resume talks on Tuesday, seven months after dialogue broke down in acrimony over Pyongyang’s missile tests.

Following are key points in the ties between the two:

STILL AT WAR

– An armistice ending the 1950-53 Korean War dominates the relationship between the two Koreas. Nearly 1.2 million North Korean soldiers and South Korea’s 680,000 troops remain in a tense military standoff despite political and commercial ties that have warmed since 2000.

– The two have enough missiles and artillery pointed at each other to largely destroy major cities on both sides of the Korean peninsula.

POINTS OF EXCHANGE

– An industrial park in Kaesong just a few minutes’ drive from the heavily-fortified border is home to 21 companies employing about 12,000 North Korean workers.

– About 1.4 million South Koreans have visited the Mount Kumgang resort in the North just above the border on the east since the tours began in 1998. Roughly a quarter of a million made the visit in 2006 even as tension spiked following the North’s missile and nuclear tests.

– About 102,000 people crossed the border last year, not including Kumgang tourists and most of them South Koreans visiting the North for business. The total exchange of people was 269,336 as of the end of 2006.

TRADE

– Cross-border trade was $1.35 billion in 2006 up from $1.05 billion a year ago, largely from the strength of the Kaesong industrial park.

HUMANITARIAN AID

– South Korea has supplied between 200,000-350,000 tonnes of fertiliser a year to the North since 2000.

– It has also shipped up to 500,000 tonnes of rice a year to the North in the form of low-interest, long-term loans. Food aid has been suspended since the North’s missile tests in last July.

REFUGEES, PRISONERS OF WAR AND ABDUCTEES

– South Korea believes more than 1,000 of its people are still alive in the North either as civilian abductees or as prisoners captured during the Korean War.

– North Korea has said 10 South Korean POWs and 11 civilians were alive there.

– More than 1,000 North Koreans each year have fled hunger and persecution in the North and sought refuge in the South. In the first six months of last year, 854 arrived in the South for a total of 8,541. (Source: South Korean Unification Ministry, Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, Reuters)

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2/22/2007

North Korean spy agencies love kidnappings. Of course, their colleagues worldwide also would not mind abducting a person or two, but in most cases there are some urgent reasons for taking such drastic measures _ the victims are prominent opposition leaders, or wanted criminals who cannot be extradited through normal channels, or people who are unlucky to know something way too important. North Korean abductions are different: They are often surprisingly random and target people of no significance. The very randomness of most of their abductions once was often cited by sceptics who tried to refute these accusations as “Seoul-inspired falsities.’’ Indeed, why should the secret services of a Stalinist state spend so much time and money only to kidnap a Japanese noodle chef, or a tennis-loving teenager? Nonetheless, in 2002 Kim Jong-il himself confirmed that these seemingly meaningless abductions of ordinary Japanese citizens did take place.

Of course, North Koreans spies did not limit themselves to Japanese only. Quite a number of South Korean citizens have disappeared into the Northern maw as well: it is known that at least 486 South Koreans have been forcibly taken to the North and have never returned.

A vast majority of them are fishermen who were imprudent to come too close to the North Korean coast, but this figure also includes a number of known victims of covert operations. Currently they number 17, but there are few doubts that the actual number is much higher. If the abduction is planned and conducted well, its victim simply disappears and is eventually presumed dead.

A good example is the case of the five South Korean high school students who disappeared from the island beaches in 1977 and 1978. They all were believed dead for two decades, but in the late 1990s it was discovered that the youngsters were working in North Korea as instructors, teaching the basics of South Korean lifestyle to would-be undercover Northern operatives.

Eventually, one of those former students was even allowed to briefly meet his family at the Kumgang resort. Kim Yong-nam disappeared from a beach in North Cholla Province in 1978. Later he was identified as the husband of an abducted Japanese woman, so North Korean authorities grudgingly admitted that Kim Yong-nam was indeed in the North, and staged a meeting with his family. Unsurprisingly, during this meeting and press conference, he insisted that he was not kidnapped but saved from the sea by North Korean sailors. Far more surprisingly, he sort of admitted that his job was related to spying.

It is remarkable that the kidnappings of the South Korean teenagers roughly coincided with similar abductions in Japan. In both cases the abductors obviously targeted randomly selected teenagers who were unlucky enough to be on a lonely beach. Another commonality was that the abductees were later used to train espionage agents. Perhaps, teenagers were seen as ideal would-be instructors for the spies _ still susceptible to indoctrination but with enough knowledge of local realities to be useful.

In April, 1979, a young South Korean walked into the North Korean Embassy in Oslo, Norway. His name was Ko Sang-mun, and he was a schoolteacher back home. Why and how he came to arrive at that embassy is not clear. As was usually the case, the North Korean side insisted that Ko Sang-mu defected, while the South Koreans alleged that the young teacher was the a victim of a taxi driver’s mistake: He took the taxi to a “Korean embassy’’ and the driver delivered him to the embassy of the wrong Korea.

It is impossible to say now whether this highly publicised case was abduction, defection, or something in-between. However, in 1994 it became known that Ko Sang-mun was in a labour camp. A small propaganda war ensued. Ko was made to appear in a North Korean broadcast assuring everybody that he was free, happily married, and full of righteous hatred for the US imperialists and their Seoul puppets (most of his speech consisted of customary anti-American rhetoric). We do not know where he went after delivering this speech _ to an apartment in Pyongyang or to a dugout in a prison camp. Meanwhile, Ko’s widow in the South committed suicide, unable to cope with the stress of the situation.

There were also more “normal’’ instances of abductions. The North Koreans kidnapped people who possessed important intelligence. In 1971 Yu Sang-mun, a South Korean diplomat stationed in West Germany was kidnapped in West Berlin, together with his family _ wife and two children. Perhaps, the few other South Korean officials who went missing in Europe in the 1970s were also abducted by North Korean agents, but presently only Yu’s case is certain.

In the 1990s most abductions of this sort took place in China, and their victims were political activists, missionaries, and real or suspected South Korean spies. All these abductions occurred in the Chinese North-East, near the borders of North Korea.

The abduction of North Korean dissenters, or suspected would-be defectors, from Soviet territory has been quite routine for decades. Sometimes these abductions sparked a crisis in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, but in most cases the Soviets simply turned a blind eye to such acts.

Oh My News
Robert Neff
2/21/2007

(Check out the original post for photos)
Many people’s impression of North Korea is that of a poor country unable to feed its own people and desperate for cash. Other than selling weapons, printing counterfeit money, and engaging in the production of illegal drugs, it is thought that it has very little means of obtaining hard currency. Yet, recently, it has received a great deal of the media’s attention for its sale of gold to Thailand. Many people forget that North Korea has always had an abundance of mineral wealth — including gold.

Korea’s wealth had long been known not only in the Far East, but also in the Middle East. Ibn Khordadzbeh (844-848), an Arab, wrote that “there is a mountainous country named Silla and divided into numerous principalities. Gold abounds there.” Another Arab, Ibn Rosteh, repeated this claim in the 10th century when he pronounced Silla was very rich with gold. Arab merchants traveled from their own countries, along with the Chinese, and traded with Korean merchants along the Yesong River during the Koryo period. Most of Korea’s trade with these merchants was mainly gold and silver utensils, copper, ginseng, paper, fans and swords.

Eventually, as Korean foreign policy changed and it began to avoid most intercourse with foreign nations, this trade died, but the legends of Korea’s wealth didn’t. In 1867, Ernest Oppert, a Prussian trader from Shanghai, China, may have used Korea’s reputation for being abundant with gold, and the common belief amongst the Westerners that Korean kings were buried in coffins of solid gold, to hire a band of mercenaries to assist him in his infamous failed attempt to exhume the Korean regent’s father’s tomb and hold his remains as ransom.

Although gold is found throughout the Korean peninsula, it was, for the most, primarily mined and panned for in the mountainous regions of the northern provinces of Korea and along the eastern coast using primitive methods. This mining has gone on for literally centuries, but it wasn’t until the 1880s when several attempts, Korean and Western, were made to mine gold using “modern” methods. These efforts failed primarily because of the lack of finances, skilled labor, infrastructure and the resolve of the Korean government.

It wasn’t until 1896 when the first large mining concession was granted to a couple of American businessmen that “modern” gold mining in Korea began. This was the origin of the Oriental Consolidated Mining Company [OCMC], the first, longest running, and the richest of the Western mining concessions in Korea, and one of the richest in the world. It was soon followed by British, German, French, Italian, and of course, Japanese concessions, but none of them could compare to the wealth and size of the OCMC.

Although these mining concessions have been condemned by many modern Korean scholars as tools of exploitation by the Japanese and the West; it is also important to remember that they brought employment, education, and even higher living standards to thousands of Korean miners and their families.

The pictures accompanying this article are of the Seoul Mining Company located at Su’an (in present day North Korea) in 1915. The Seoul Mining Company was established in 1907 when two American businessmen, H. Collbran and H.R. Bostwick, leased Su’an mine from a British mining syndicate. The British had grown disenchanted with the mine and were convinced that it was not very profitable — they were wrong. Within the first six years of its operation it had produced nearly $3,000,000 worth of gold. Although the Seoul Mining Co., at first appeared to be one of, if not, the richest gold mining operations in Korea, by the early 1920s it was apparent that the gold was nearly depleted and in 1924 the mine was closed.

One of the chief problems for the early mining companies was transportation. Most of these gold mining sites had few, if any, crude roads or paths to them. It was often easier to transport supplies and equipment by flat-bottomed boats up the river to the landing nearest the mines. Then, depending on what was being transported, Korean ponies or bulls were used to manhandle the equipment and supplies to the mines.

The Korean bull was a slow moving powerful animal that was extremely docile and easily handled by its mapoo (handler), the ponies on the other hand were described as “swell-made spirited little beasts [but] generally vicious.” One early Westerner described his first encounter with his pony:

“As soon as the creature saw me approaching to mount, it reared and kicked furiously, and opened its mouth and flew at me like a tiger.”

So violent were these little ponies that a missionary remarked: “I love to see the pony shod, see him pinioned teeth and nail, in one hard knot, lying on his back under the spreading chestnut tree, with the village smithy putting tacks into him that brings tears to his eyes.”

In addition to transportation problems there was the lack of timber. Timber was essential to mining operations. In the beginning it was used as fuel to run the stamps (grinding equipment), to construct the buildings and to support the mine shafts, but timber was not always readily available in large quantities. Without timber the mines were doomed. By about 1910, most of the mines participated in reforestation programs, but for most of them they would not be around long enough to profit from these actions.

Most of the mines were in remote places, far from civilization. Obtaining enough miners to work the mines was usually not a problem, as they were generally paid better than the average Korean. However, these remote sites were home to large populations of big predatory animals — chiefly, tigers, leopards, and wolves.

Occasionally, tigers, especially ones that were too old to hunt the fleet-footed deer, would attack a lone Korean miner returning to his home at night. Often very little of the victim was found in the morning save a few pieces of ripped clothing and scuffle and blood marks on the ground. Surprisingly the animal that caused the most fatalities and was arguably the most feared was the wolf.

Sometimes wolves would creep into the small mining settlements at night and snatch children on their way to and from the outhouses. There are even accounts of wolves forcing their way into the flimsier hovels and dragging away children from the safety of their beds.

By 1939 all of the large Western gold mining concessions had been sold to the Japanese, and only a few very small mines were still operated and owned by Westerners, and even these were eventually taken over by the Japanese when Japan entered World War II. During World War II many of the mines fell into disrepair due to the negligence of their Japanese managers, and their failure to pay their Korean miners. During the Korean War, American soldiers reported that the OCMC mines were flooded and unworkable.

It has been more than 50 years since the Korean War has ended. During this time, North Korea has made great effort and progress in reopening some of these mines from the past and developing new ones. Today Western financing and expertise are still being used to aid the extraction of gold from the mountains of the north.

Unification Ministry says assistance should continue ‘if possible,’ regardless of the actions the country takes
Joong Ang Daily
Ser Myo-ja
2/21/2007

Humanitarian aid will keep flowing to North Korea “if possible,” no matter what the country does politically, the Ministry of Unification announced yesterday.

Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung said yesterday that the 2007 operational plan had been submitted to President Roh Moo-hyun on Feb. 6, before the recent agreement in the six-party talks designed to eventually eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

The Unification Ministry released the abstracts of the plan yesterday, and critics quickly denounced it.

“I cannot understand why the administration is voluntarily giving up its leverage,” Nam Sung-wook, a professor of North Korean studies at Korea University, said yesterday. “If the government wanted to separate humanitarian aid from politics, it should have linked the aid provision to other developments in humanitarian programs, such as separated family issues or the repatriation of POWs.”

The administration has shown a tendency to try to change its policy toward North Korea whenever inter-Korean relations have frozen, rather than trying to push North Korea to change, Mr. Nam said.

After the North test-fired missiles in July of last year, South Korea withheld its promised 500,000 tons of rice and 300,000 tons of fertilizer aid. Inter-Korean ministerial talks are scheduled to take place from Feb. 28 to March 2 and resuming the humanitarian aid is expected to be discussed.

In its plan for this year, the Unification Ministry set forth six goals for inter-Korean relations, saying “humanitarian assistance will be provided separately from political situations if possible.”

Among the goals were releasing tension and building trust between the two Koreas, expanding inter-Korean economic projects, the construction of infrastructure such as roads and train tracks in North Korea and adding more businesses to the Kaesong Industrial Complex program.

The ministry also said it will seek progress in humanitarian projects, such as reuniting separated families and repatriating South Korean prisoners of war and kidnap victims alive in the North.

Mr. Lee also stressed the importance of the inter-Korean summit to resolving the nuclear crisis and to bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula, but added, “Right now, the government is not engaged in any specific efforts for an inter-Korean summit.”

He said new applications will be accepted by South Korean firms for locations in Kaesong by late as mid-April.

The South will also resume flood relief aid to the North, withheld after the North’s nuclear test in October, Mr. Lee said.

Daily NK
Kang Jae Hyok
2/20/2006

Every year when spring arrives, North Korea faces yet another food crisis. 10 years after the “march of suffering,” North Korea has still made little change.

The greatest change that has occurred is by the North Korean people. The most of North Koreans have surpassed the ‘march of suffering’ and have survived by relying on themselves

In comparison to last year, the Korea Rural Development Administration (RDA) estimated that North Korea had experienced a loss of 1.8% (60 thousands tons) in agricultural production at 4.48 million tons of cereal. The World Food Program (WFP) also predicted similar figures at 4.3 million tons.

On the other hand, a national North Korea aid organization Good Friends reported that only 2.8 million tons of agricultural production had been made and that if any less than 1.5 million tons of food aid was supported, North Korea would be faced with another severe food crisis.

In the 90’s foreign aid could block mass starvation

During the “march of suffering” that began in the mid-90’s, food distributions were suddenly terminated. Nonetheless, people went on working, starving, believing that food distributions would begin once again.

However, one month passed then two, and still the distributions did not resume. In the end, the number of deaths from starvation began to arise. Yet, North Korean authorities did not respond with any countermeasures. As a result, in 3~4 years, 3mn North Korean citizens died of starvation.

Nonetheless, the tragic mass starvation that occurred at the time could have been stooped if it weren’t for the irresponsible acts of North Korean authorities. We can view this by analyzing the figures denoting the amount of aid supplied from 1995~1999.

Year   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999
Production of food
         3490   2500   2680   2830   4280
Aid from FAO
           980   1070   1440   1490   1190
Aid from S.Korea
           960   1050   1630   1030   1070
Food distributions in North Korea
         4450   3550   4120   3860   4450
       ~4470 ~3570 ~4310 ~4320 ~5476
Death rate 
               615    1704     549 
         (Unit: 1,000 tons, million persons)
 
Table of North Korea’s food production and foreign aid in the 90’s in comparison to the death rate. (Good Friends 06.12.22)

According to the table above, South Korea and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) aided North Korea with 2mn tons of food annually from 1995~1999.

If we consider that only 10,000 tons of food is needed to provide the whole of North Korea a day, then there would be no reason for a shortage in food distributions with a total of 3.7mn tons of food aid being supplied. According to the table above, annual aid provided to North Korea was 3.55mn tons at the minimum and 4.45mn tons maximum. This equates on average at 4.09mn tons of supplies.

However, during this period 3mn people died of starvation and 30mn people defected from North Korea. Contrary, there has never been a time where so much foreign aid was supplied to North Korea. Why then at a time where greatest aid was given to North Korea, was there the greatest number of deaths?

One of the essential reasons behind this occurrence was the fact that foreign aid never reached the provinces of North Hamkyung, Yangkang and Jakang where food was most needed. If food aid had been distributed to the areas most dire of starvation, then at the least, this incident would not have occurred.

At the time, most of the aid was distributed preferentially to soldiers, authorities and powerful ministers in Pyongyang. On the whole, aid to North Korea had been sent via ship through Nampo, Haeju and Wonsan harbor, then supplied to Pyongyang and South Pyongan province.

During the 90’s, transportation of cargo was practically immobilized due to the shortage of electricity and lack of fuel which ultimately led to the suspension of locomotives. On the whole, goods are transported via railroad, however, in the 90’s, both passenger and freight trains had come to a halt.

Basically, it takes about a fortnight to travel return, from Wonsan, Gangwon province to Najin, North Hamkyung on train 21. The Pyongyang-Tumen River train which departs from Pyongyang to Sunbong, North Hamkyung on train 1, also takes more than 10 days travel return.

Back then, it took twice as long to for a freight train to reach its destination in comparison to a passenger train. 10,000 tons of foreign aid that arrived at Wonsan harbor took 2~3 months to transport from North Hamkyung to Chongjin. In other words, it would take more than 2 years to distribute 100,000 tons of food to Wonsan in Gangwon province to Chongjin in North Hamkyung province. Hence, it is pointless to rely on railroad to distribute goods.

Losses incurred while transporting aid

Further, 30~40% of goods go missing while being transported. Every time a cargo train stops, guards responsible for the goods sell rice to traders at wholesale prices so they can use the profits to live. Also, street kids and thieves often steal the goods so that the intial 1,000 ton of rice is often depleted to 600~700 tons upon arriving at its destination.

The problem is that North Korean authorities well aware of this fact that are unwilling to modify the routes or assert change. Ultimately, foreign aid is distributed throughout the regions of Pyongan province where the situation of food is relatively good in comparison to the rest of North Korea.

As rice only lands in the hands of people living in Pyongyang and Pyonan where influential ministers and Kim Jong Il’s elite reside, it can only be analyzed that this situation is occurring under specific motives. In the end, the majority of deaths occurred in Hamkyung, Yangkang and Jakang, and the situation has remained the same until today.

Following the missile launch and nuclear experiment, last year South Korea and the international community suspended food aid to North Korea, and in Feb 13th, the third phase of 5th round 6 Party talks ended with the South Korean government confirming that food aid would resume.

Undoubtedly international food aid is important but unless rice is distributed to the areas in most need, a similar situation to the 90’s will occur once again.

More importantly and urgently, aid must be delivered directly to the provinces of Yangkang, Hamkyung and Jangang. Thinking that North Korean authorities will wisely distribute food aid throughout the country is merely a South Korean fallacy.

Yonhap
2/18/2007

A British travel firm is organizing an escorted tour of North Korea in April when the secretive nation celebrates the birthday of its late president, who is still venerated by the North as the “great leader.”

Steppes Travel has been recruiting customers from November for the April 11-26 trip to North Korea, advertised in the firm’s Web site as “the last bastion of communism in the world” and an experience that “will surely leave a lasting impression in your mind.”

The price is 2,795 British pounds (US$5,462) per person, and minimum 10 clients must sign up.

The package starts at Mansudae where the statue of North Korea’s late leader Kim Il-sung is flanked by monuments to the anti-Japanese struggle and the Korean War, and Mangyongdae, Kim’s birthplace. The tourists will then visit Kim’s residence Kumsusan on April 15, his birthday, where they are likely to see one of the country’s largest festivities.

NY Times
David E. Sanger

It is hard to imagine that either George W. Bush or Kim Jong-il would have agreed even a year ago to the kind of deal they have now approved. The pact, announced Tuesday, would stop, seal and ultimately disable North Korea’s nuclear facilities, as part of a grand bargain that the administration has previously shunned as overly generous to a repressive country — especially one that has not yet said when or if it will give up its nuclear arsenal.

But in the past few months, the world has changed for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Kim, two men who have made clear how deeply they detest each other. Both are beset by huge problems, and both needed some kind of breakthrough.

For Mr. Bush, bogged down in Iraq, his authority undercut by the November elections, any chance to show progress in peacefully disarming a country that detonated a nuclear test just four months ago could no longer be passed up. As one senior administration official said over the weekend, the prospect that Mr. Bush might leave Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and North Korea more dangerous places than he found them “can’t be very appealing.”

Still, the accord came under fast criticism from right and left that it was both too little and too late.

For years, Mr. Bush’s administration has been paralyzed by an ideological war, between those who wanted to bring down North Korea and those who thought it was worth one more try to lure the country out of isolation. In embracing this deal, Mr. Bush sided with those who have counseled engagement, notably his secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, and her chief negotiator, Christopher R. Hill. Mr. Bush took the leap in the hope that in a few months, he will be able to declare that North Korea can no longer produce fuel for new nuclear weapons, even if it has not yet turned over its old ones.

For Mr. Kim, the nuclear explosion — more of a fizzle — that he set off in the mountains not far from the Chinese border in October turned out to be a strategic mistake. The Chinese, who spent six decades protecting the Kim family dynasty, responded by cutting off his military aid, and helping Washington crack down on the banks that financed the Cognac-and-Mercedes lifestyle of the North Korean leadership.

“As a political statement, their test was a red flare for everyone,” said Robert Gallucci, who under President Clinton was the chief negotiator of the 1994 agreement with North Korea, which collapsed four years ago. “It gave President Bush and the Chinese some leverage.”

Mr. Gallucci and other nuclear experts agree that the hardest bargaining with world’s most reclusive, often paranoid, government remains ahead.

Over the next year, under the pact, the North must not only disable its nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities, it must lead inspectors to its weapons and a suspected second nuclear weapons program. And to get to the next phase of the agreement, the one that gives “disarmament” meaning, North Korea will have to be persuaded to give away the country’s crown jewels: the weapons that make the world pay attention to it.

But before the administration faces off against Mr. Kim in Pyongyang, it will have to confront the many critics of the deal here at home. As the White House took credit on Tuesday for what it called a “first step,” it found itself pilloried by conservatives who attacked the administration for folding in negotiations with a charter member of what Mr. Bush called the “axis of evil,” and for replicating key elements of Mr. Clinton’s agreement with North Korea.

At the same time, Mr. Bush’s advisers were being confronted by barbs from veterans of the Clinton administration, who argued that the same deal struck Tuesday had been within reach several years and a half-dozen weapons ago, had only Mr. Bush chosen to negotiate with the North rather than fixate on upending its government.

In fact, elements of the new decision closely resemble the Clinton deal, called the Agreed Framework. As it did in that accord, the North agrees to “freeze” its operations at Yongbyon, its main nuclear facility, and to allow inspections there. And like that agreement, the new one envisions the North’s ultimately giving up all of its nuclear material.

In two respects, however, the new accord is different: North Korea does not receive the incentives the West has offered — in this case, about a year’s supply of heavy fuel oil and other aid — until it “disables” its equipment at Yongbyon and declares where it has hidden its bombs, nuclear fuel and other nuclear facilities. And the deal is not only with Washington, but with Beijing, Moscow, Seoul and Tokyo.

“We’re building a set of relationships,” Ms. Rice argued Tuesday, saying that the deal would not have been possible if she and President Bush had not been able to swing the Chinese over to their side. Mr. Bush has told colleagues that he believes the turning point came in his own blunt conversations with President Hu Jintao of China, in which, the American president has said, he explained in stark terms that a nuclear North Korea was more China’s problem than America’s.

But the administration was clearly taken aback on Tuesday by the harshness of the critique from the right, led by its recently departed United Nations ambassador, John R. Bolton, who charged that the deal “undercuts the sanctions resolution” against the North that he pushed through the Security Council four months ago.

Democrats, in contrast, were caught between enjoying watching Mr. Bush change course and declaring that the agreement amounted to disarmament-lite. “It gives the illusion of moving more rapidly to disarmament, but it doesn’t really require anything to happen in the second phase,” said Joel Wit, who was the coordinator of the 1994 agreement.

The Bush administration is counting on the lure of future benefits to the North — fuel oil, the peace treaty ending the Korean War it has long craved, an end to other sanctions — to force Mr. Kim to disclose where his nuclear weapons and fuel are stored.

Mr. Bush’s big worry now is that Mr. Kim is playing the administration for time. Many experts think he is betting that by the time the first big deliveries of oil and aid are depleted, America will be distracted by a presidential election.

But Mr. Bush could also end up with a diplomatic triumph, one he needs desperately. To get there, he appears to have changed course. Asked in 2004 about North Korea, he said, “I don’t think you give timelines to dictators and tyrants.”

Now he appears to have concluded that sometimes the United States has to negotiate with dictators and odious rulers, because the other options — military force, sanctions or watching an unpredictable nation gain a nuclear arsenal — seem even worse.

Yonhap
2/14/2007

Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said Tuesday that United Nations nuclear inspectors will return to North Korea following the international deal committing the communist regime to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

“The IAEA will go back to North Korea to ensure that all nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes,” he told reporters during a visit to Luxembourg.

He did not say when the inspectors would go but said it would be discussed at a meeting of the agency’s board of governors on March 6.

ElBaradei welcomed the agreement, although he had yet to see all thedetails. “It’s a step in the right direction,” he said. “This is the first part of the process.”

He suggested it could serve as an example for ending the international standoff over Iran’s nuclear program.

“We should find a way to get Iran to sit around the table” and talk to world powers, ElBaradei said.

The agency has been shut out of North Korea for four years and ElBaradei has frequently urged Pyongyang to end its nuclear pariah status by returning to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty it quit in 2003 and allowing back agency inspectors.

In a related move, U.N. chief Ban Ki-moon welcomed the groundbreaking deal struck with North Korea to end its nuclear program, calling it the “first practical stage” toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

Ban was “encouraged that this constructive effort by the international community can eventually result in strengthening the global nonproliferation regime as well as in contributing to durable peace, security and prosperity in the region,” a statement issued through U.N. spokeswoman Michele Montas said.

“This agreement represents the first practical stage toward a non-nuclear peninsula,” said Ban, South Korea’s former foreign minister.

He also urged participants at the six-party talks in Beijing — the two Koreas, China, the United States, Russia and Japan — “to make every effort to sustain the current positive momentum and ensure that this accord is implemented as agreed.”