North Korean Economy Watch

Daily NK
Kwon Jeong Hyun
9/28/2007

With the 2nd Inter-Korea Summit Talks coming up in five days in Pyongyang, the North Korean authorities have officially begun regulations of civilian migrations.

An inside source in North Korea said in a phone conversation on the 27th, “Control of civilians have become significantly toughened due to events of national importance, so the top (government) has completely limited travel permit approval numbers of average civilians to Pyongyang and the border regions.”

People’s Units’ chairs are in the midst of temporarily working on a reporting system which analyzes the data of civilian migrations and daily reports them to the security office.

North Korea still requires travel permits for moves to other regions from the place of residence. The inspection of permits becomes even more difficult when public transportation such as rails are used.

In particular, entry into Pyongyang, Yongbyun (nuclear power plants), Hwadaegun (Musoodan rocket launching site), and the northern border unit requires special travel permissions that are different from normal permits. For these special regions, an approval number, which signifies “special business,” is needed.

After the March of Tribulation, incidents of the Safety Agents issuing travel permits after receiving bribes were rampant, but recently, the regulation of such permits and travel restrictions on special regions have become more stringent. Restrictions on the issue of travel permits have significantly increased since the Local People’s Assembly representative elections on July 29th.

The source said, “After Chuseok (fall holiday), the order restricting the issue of all border and Pyongyang-related permits was announced at the People’s Unit meeting. With the Summit talks several days ahead, meetings of key leaders have all been cancelled and all entry and exit prohibited.”

Further, he said, “The northern border region or other controlled areas are not exceptions. Money will not do anything when trying to attain travel permits. Due to the fact that the issue of permits, with the exception of deceased reports, has been completely disallowed in surrounding cities of Pyongyang, such as Pyongsung or Nampo, the discontents of merchants who are dependent on travelling are high.”

With restrictions on civilian migrations, the price of commodities at the Jangmadang (market) has also been raised. Chinese products have to be brought back from the North Korean-Chinese border region, but because travel permits have not been issued, the transport of goods is difficult.

For industrial products, if the border region lowers the price, then prices go up in inland regions such as Kangwong, South and North Hamkyung, etc., because Chinese products coming in from border cities Shinuiju and Hyesan, Yangkang are not able to move inland. The inland is the opposite. However, the amount of rice coming in from inland regions is high, so their prices end up hiking up.”

However, the source said, “This time, the management will probably end at one-time inspection because the South Korean President is visiting. The jangmadang price levels will not skyrocket.”

Regulations regarding private visits of Chinese through Chinese travel agencies have not occurred yet.

It appears that the North Korean authorities, in order to prevent accidents and events which could happen around the Summit talk period, have strengthened preventative means.

One source who is residing in Musan, North Hamkyung, said, “In order to ensure the success of national events, lectures for leaders, with the content of hindering behind-the-scenes maneuvering of enemies and accidents and events on a timely basis, are taking place. Strict disciplinary actions for those who divulge national secrets and illegal use of cell phone are being emphasized.”

The source relayed, “Border guards are telling smugglers, ‘Wait just a few more days. After the national event (the Summit Talks), regulations will be relaxed. The situation nowadays is that smuggling is self-restrained.”

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 07-9-28-1
9/28/2007

Since early this year, North Korean authorities have been systematically implementing a double-entry accounting system to keep track of cross border trade with China, and as of late have been cracking down on private sales of goods imported under state requisitions.

It has become common practice for most traders to keep two sets of books, a private accounting record, and a set of records for government use. As these traders exported state goods to China, they would conspire with Chinese counterparts and make huge profits by recording lower prices than goods were actually being sold for. In many cases, bribes are taken to turn officially imported and exported goods (minerals, seafood, etc.) over to private sellers. These facts came to light through Chinese traders in business with North Korea.

Recently, however, investigations by the Kangsung Trade Company, operated under the supervision of the People’s Armed Forces Bureau, led to the conviction and execution of a foreign currency trader in Kangwon Province, Wonsan City and another from South Hamkyung Province, Hamheung City on charges of funneling company funds for private use. The crackdown appears to be because embezzlement and other forms of corruption are on the rise.

It was also disclosed that the foreign currency trader in Hamheung was accepting money from private business operators and using the company’s name to lend import and export quota chits. Inspectors raided the homes of the suspects and found large amounts of U.S. currency and gold, as well as no small amount of Japanese yen.

The human rights NGO ‘Good Friends’ reported in last month’s newsletter, “ After Oh Moon-hyuk, foreign currency director for the Chosun Fabric 88 Trade Company in Yunsa County, North Hamkyung Province, built a private villa on a plot with a good view, and purchased a Mercedes out of pocket, he drew the attention of General [Kim Jong Il] and was exposed. He was publicly executed in the middle of last July.” The NGO went on to report, “Every day young girls were called to the villa for his enjoyment, and security forces and police made it a point not to stop by the area near the villa often.”

Trade authorities in the area report that the crackdown on these violators has had no effect on DPRK-PRC trade. High ranking officials are aware of the abuse of authority to earn money, but had to some extent turned a blind eye to the issue. The crackdown is a result of the recent considerable growth in the problem.

Korea Herald
9/27/2007

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il would allow U.S. troops to be stationed on the Korean Peninsula even after the reunification of the two Koreas, former President Kim Dae-jung said.

During an address at the Korea Society forum in New York on Tuesday, Kim said the North Korean leader had agreed to the idea during their summit in 2000.

North Korea has repeatedly criticized the U.S. troop presence in South Korea and demanded its withdrawal. Some 29,000 U.S. troops are stationed on the peninsula as a deterrent against the North’s 1.17 million troops.

Daily NK
Namgung Min
9/27/2007

The Sankei Shimbun reported on the 26th that a smuggling vessel containing North Korean weapons have been caught on their way to illegally entering Sri Lanka.

According to the Sankei, the Sri Lanka navy arrested the vessel containing the 68 automatic rifles manufactured by the Munitions Industry Department (No. 99 Department) of the Worker’s Party that was leaving from Chonjin to Sri Lanka.

The Sankei announced that when the Sri Lanka navy tried to capture the smuggling vessel on October in 2006 and February this year, the smuggling vessel opened fire so the Sri Lankan navy shot them down. On March in 2007, the Sri Lankan navy took the North Korean vessel near the shore and confiscated the North Korean weapons and arrested the captains.

Furthermore, the newspaper revealed that there was no sign implying the nationality but it was identified as North Korean due to the confiscated weapons which were identified by the former North Korean military men who defected to South Korea.

It was announced that the North Korean machine guns and antitank guns were planned to be passed over to the Anti-government guerrilla groups named the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.

The U.S. appointed LTTE as a foreign terrorist group in 1997 and the EU also appointed the LTTE as a terrorist organization in April, 2007.

According to the newspaper, the Sri Lankan government conducted investigation and came to a conclusion that a Chinese weaponry company probably acted as an intermediary to smuggle the North Korean weapons to the anti-government guerrillas in Sri Lanka.

In regards to this incident, the Sri Lankan government raised complaints to the North Korean ambassador located in India and the Chinese government, but the both representatives are denying their relations to the illegal smuggling of the weaponry.

Summary: For the next 4 to 5 years, the North Korean mining sector is likely to continue to be dominated by the production of coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, and zinc. Because of growing demand for minerals by China and the Republic of Korea, their investment in North Korea’s mining sector is expected to increase and to extend beyond their current investments in apatite, coal, copper, and iron ore into other minerals, such as gold, magnesite, molybdenum, nickel, and zinc. North Korea’s real GDP is expected to grow at between 1% and 2% during the next 2 years.

Other highlights:

• North Korea ranked third in production of magnesiate in the world.  Its value-added product–magnesia clinker, which is used as a refractory metal–was marketed world wide. 
• According to Corporate social Responsibility Asia (CSR Asia), North Kroea ranked virtually last in environmental sustainability in the world, despite the country’s enactment of major laws for environmental protection, such as the Land Law of 1977, the Environmental Protection Law of 1986, the Forrestry Law in 1982, and the Law on Protection of Useful Animals in 1998.
• On the basis of North Korea’s industrial structure in 2004 (the last year in which data is available), the mining sector accounted for about 8.7% of North Korea’s gross domestic product.
• Recoverable coal reserves in North Korea were estimated to total about 8 billion metric tons in 2006.  Coal production reportedly dropped to about 23 Mt/yr in 2006 from 37.5 Mt/yr in 1985 mainly because of outdated mining equipment and technology.

Download the full version here: USGS.pdf

Korea Times
Jung Sung-ki
9/26/2007

(UPDATE: On Oct. 23, [2008] the State Department blacklisted two North Korean companies, Korea Mining Development Corp. and Korea Taesong Trading Co., for violating U.S. bans on the sale of equipment used in building missiles or other weapons of mass destruction to Iran and Syria. Citation: “North Korean Plane Was Grounded at U.S. Request “, Wall Street Journal, Jay Solomon, 11/1/2008 ) 

The U.S. State Department is expected to announce additional sanctions on North Korean entities connected to missile proliferation, Yonhap News reported Wednesday.

Some of the entities are believed to be linked to the Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), which was designated in June 2005 in an executive order for supporting weapons of mass destruction proliferation, it said.

The measure would come at an awkward moment as envoys from six nations _ South and North Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan _ gather in Beijing from Wednesday for a fresh round of negotiations aimed at disabling and eventually dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and programs.

The U.S. Treasury had frozen some $25 million in North Korea-related money held in a Macau bank in late 2005, a punitive measure imposed as the six countries were signing an agreement toward denuclearization. That led to more than a year’s suspension in negotiations with the North.

The new round of six-party talks is already on shaky ground with suspicions that Pyongyang may have transferred nuclear-related material to Syria, prompting the unexplained Israeli air incursion into Syria earlier this month.

Tom Casey, a State Department spokesman, said Tuesday the new sanctions are related to missile technology transfers and downplayed possible negative repercussions on this week’s talks.

“The company that was sanctioned has been sanctioned previously for the same thing. So the net effect of this is really pretty minimal,” he said. “I don’t see…any reason why this should impact on the six-party talks.”

North Korea accused the United States of defending Israel’s recent airstrike against Syria, calling the strike a grave crime that undermines regional peace and stability.

The North’s main Rodong Sinmun newspaper said, “Israeli warplanes’ intrusion into the territorial airspace of Syria and bomb-dropping are an outright violation of Syria’s sovereignty and a grave crime that destroys regional peace and security,” according to Yonhap.

The North’s comments came days after high-level talks between North Korea and Syria. The two countries, which deny the allegation of a secret nuclear connection, did not provide details of Pyongyang talks.

Andrew Semmel, acting U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for nuclear nonproliferation policy, said earlier this month that North Koreans were in Syria, and that Syria might have had contacts with “secret suppliers” to obtain nuclear equipment.

Semmel did not identify the suppliers. However, he said he could not exclude the possibility that a nuclear black-market network, run by the disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, might have been involved.

Semmel’s comments raised speculation that an alleged Sept. 6 Israeli incursion into Syrian airspace was a strike targeting a nuclear installation. U.S. officials have said Israeli warplanes struck a target. One U.S. military officer said the strike was aimed at weapons being shipped to Hezbollah militants in Lebanon.

Joong Ang Daily
Jeon Jin-bae
9/22/2007

North Korean resident identification cards have become a hot item on the black market in China for ethnic Koreans who want to live in Europe.

Mr. Kim, an ethnic Korean man from China, moved to Paris last year and obtained a resident permit from the French government a few months ago allowing him to stay in the country for 10 years. He asked not to be identified by his full name, because he obtained his permit illegally.

His resident permit states that he is a North Korean refugee and identifies him as a North Korean citizen, not a Chinese national. Kim said he purchased a North Korean resident’s ID card and pretended to be a refugee from China when he sought asylum in France.

Kim said he is not alone. “At least 100 people have sought refugee status in the last year using the same means,” he said.

According to other ethnic Koreans in China, North Korean IDs were traded in cities near the China-North Korea border, such as Yanbian and Dandong. The prices range between 1,000 yuan and 1,500 yuan ($134 to $199), they said.

“As far as I know, there are many North Koreans who want to sell their IDs,” said an ethnic Korean who lives in China.

North Koreans who manage to escape to China are anxious to sell their IDs, because they are afraid of being captured, identified as North Korean and then send back to their homeland.

According to sources, ethnic Koreans who want to live in Europe prearrange their trips through middlemen who transport them through China’s Shenzhen Province to Hong Kong.

From there they fly to Thailand and meet with South Korean middlemen who provide fake South Korean passports.

Using these documents, the ethnic Koreans will often fly to Switzerland and then move to the country of their destination, often France or Italy, via overland routes.

Reaching Europe is seen as being more than half way to success, sources said, because the process of seeking refugee status is relatively simple.

In France, immigrants only have to submit an application along with a North Korean ID card to qualify. The French government then provides a temporary three-month residence permit, which is extended until a final decision is made.

Four months after applying for refugee status an interview will take place. A French official who speaks Korean will question the applicant, but most ethnic Koreans are well prepared to pass this simple screening, the sources said.

Europe is a popular destination because it only costs 10,000 euros for a Korean-Chinese to buy refugee status and various organizations often provide them with extra protection and assistance.

Yonhap
9/24/2007

North Korea is becoming more transparent and effective in dealing with disasters, spurred by both internal and external factors, an Asia-Pacific regional specialist said in his latest paper.

Dr. Alexandre Mansourov, a securities studies professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii, noted five trends in the North Korean government’s responses over the past decade to nationwide shocks, including floods, typhoons, drought and avian influenza outbreaks.

Increasing transparency is one of the trends, with Pyongyang more quickly admitting to disasters that have struck the nation, he said in a paper (download here) released last week through the Korea Economic Institute in Washington.

It took North Korea several years to admit the impact of natural disasters in the mid-1990s that led to massive starvation and chronic food shortages. But in August 2000, when it was hit by Typhoon Prapiroon, North Korea released the news three weeks after it occurred, and in the two following years, when other typhoons struck, North Korea reported it within three to six days, Mansourov said.

Pyongyang immediately acknowledged flooding in August 2007, he said.

“Observers agree that the timeliness, details, and amount of coverage of flood damage and rehabilitation work in August 2007 is unprecedented.”

North Korea is also showing institutional knowledge and a capacity for disaster management, with new organizations growing out of a decade of learning and experience, such as various provincial centers, the professor said.

The North Korean Red Cross Society has been exceptional, he said, working with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and has made itself the leading agency in disaster preparedness and response.

Inter-agency coordination has also increased, with deputy prime minister-level working groups working closely together in each disaster since the flood of 2001, as there are preventive programs through which basic relief supplies are stored in town and villages.

For example, the 10-year strategy against avian influenza, worked out by the emergency commission in 2005, would have been unthinkable a decade ago, Mansourov wrote.

Another notable trend is the increasing cooperation between the North Korean government and international humanitarian community, gradually allowing joint needs assessments and monitoring, he noted.

Mansourov argued that external factors helped bring about the changes.

“International factors did make a difference in what happened in (North Korea), especially through the introduction of innovative ideas and dissemination of best humanitarian practices,” in addition to foreign aid, he said.

The scholar also argued that while the country’s top leader, Kim Jong-il, does control any institutional changes, there is also adaptation driven by needs.

“There has been some degree of autonomous institutional learning and adaptation; it is incremental in nature and caused by both positive and negative feedback from the environment regarding institutional performance in crisis situations,” he said.

Korea Times
Marcus Noland, Stephan Haggard
9/21/2007

Last summer North Korea conducted provocative missile and nuclear tests. Yet only four months later, Pyongyang signed on to a roadmap that included a return of international inspectors, a full declaration of contested nuclear activities, closing down existing facilities and ultimately disabling them.

American negotiator Christopher Hill predicted this last step could take place as early as the end of the year.

What are the North Koreans up to?

The cynical, some would say realistic, view in the United States _ advanced by departed Bush administration hawks such as John Bolton _ is that Kim Jong-il is raising false hopes.

The appearance of cooperation has several tactical advantages. Sanctions and ongoing uncertainty have had substantial economic costs. The February agreement was preceded by secret meetings in Berlin to resolve the Banco Delta Asia issue.

In return, the North Koreans closed their nuclear facilities, but they have not firmly committed to the difficult aspects of the agreement _ providing a full accounting of their programs, disabling their programs, and giving up actual stores of fissile material and weapons.

Cooperation also drives wedges between the U.S., South Korea and China. If North Korea appears to be making concessions, it is easier for South Korea and China to continue diplomatic and financial support.

Next month, President Roh Moo-hyun will travel to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim Jong-il. Expect him to come bearing gifts to cement his legacy as a peacemaker.

Other politicians in the presidential race have also offered extraordinarily ambitious and generous programs of support for the North as well.

Recent studies we have done on North Korea’s changing external economic relations are consistent with some of this cynical picture, but also suggest a sliver of hope for more substantial change.

To understand why, requires a brief tour of the miserable history of North Korea over the last two decades. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean economy went into a steep decline ending in full-blown famine.

By our estimates, as many as one million people _ five percent of the entire population _ perished in the mid-1990s. Out of the human ashes of this tragedy, however, the North Korean economy began to undergo a profound transformation.

As households and work units scrambled for food, they engaged in barter, trade and new economic activities.

The desperation of the famine also saw an upturn in illicit activities, from missile sales to drugs and the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. But trade and investment also started to flow across the Chinese border.

Chinese companies, small-scale traders and North Korean firms pursued business opportunities, from large-scale mining operations to the import of South Korean videos.

The regime was always hesitant about the emergence of the market. In July 2002, the government initiated economic policy changes that decriminalized some private activities. But reforms have taken a zig-zag path, always subject to reversal.

Sanctions and closer scrutiny have limited the country’s arms sales and illicit activities.
With these sources of revenue increasingly foreclosed, North Korea has two alternatives _ open the economy and increase normal commercial activities or cooperate primarily to obtain aid. In terms of internal change, these two options may actually push North Korea in opposite directions.

Consider the aid tack. Given the regime’s concerns about internal stability, aid could provide a lifeline, allowing the regime to sustain a modicum of current consumption while forgoing deeper reforms. Under this option, North Korea trades away its nuclear program for assistance precisely to maintain the political and economic status quo.

Alternatively, North Korea could use the resolution of diplomatic tensions to deepen the economic reform process.

The military has been engaged in commercial activities and could potentially benefit from such a course. But real reform will reshuffle power and influence within North Korea in ways that are unpredictable and risky.

So what can we expect from Pyongyang? The nuclear program is the regime’s one major asset and we should not expect them to bargain it away easily.

Rather we should expect prolonged and difficult negotiations as they try to extract tribute for their “Dear Leader.”

In the end, we may eliminate North Korea’s capacity for making additional nuclear weapons, but this will not necessarily be accompanied by economic or political reforms.

An important lesson learned elsewhere in the developing world is that aid is not a substitute for reform.

Ambitious schemes for infrastructure and other investment in North Korea will only generate large economic pay-offs if they are accompanied by genuine opening and a more aggressive embrace of the market.

The key issue, therefore, is how tightly South Korea will link its offer of aid to progress in the resolution of the nuclear issue. Properly conditioned, South Korean aid could be a powerful carrot in the nuclear negotiations, whether it ultimately encourages internal reforms or not.

But if the South Korean offers at the summit are large, unconditional and open-ended, they could permit the regime in Pyongyang to stall the nuclear negotiations while actually discouraging deeper reform.

Korea Times
David Kang
9/21/2007

There has been widespread speculation as to why, after repeated calls for a summit by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, Kim Jong-il decided to meet at this time.

Some have argued that Kim is only meeting because of improved U.S.-North Korean relations. Others feel that Kim hopes to gain further aid and trade from South Korea.

Although we do not know the exact reasons, one possibility is that Kim sees two major elections looming on the horizon: the South Korean and U.S. presidential elections.

A summit provides Kim the opportunity to influence these elections. Were Kim to wait until there were new presidents in both countries, his influence on the new presidents’ goals and strategies would be minimized.

As to South Korea, it is quite likely that Kim Jong-il hopes be an influence by presenting a moderate and reasonable image of himself.

Indeed, if Kim can speak the right rhetoric and portray himself as flexible, make a few token concessions to increased economic or social exchanges with South Korea, and repeats rhetoric about “uri minjok ggiri (we, Koreans, by ourselves),” there is a good chance that many South Koreans will feel reassured and sentiment favoring engagement may solidify.

This would be a good chance of binding the next South Korean administration into continuing its engagement with the North, regardless of who actually wins the presidency.

As for the United States, Kim has less ability to influence the election, simply because Americans pay far less attention to North Korea than they do to other foreign policy issues, such as the continuing troubles in the Middle East.

However, if Kim can present a moderate face, and also help forge a solid consensus in South Korea about the best way to solve the North Korean problem, Kim may be hoping to bind any new U.S. president to a path of reconciliation, as well.

Indeed, many observers think that Kim has already won, simply by agreeing to a summit meeting with Roh. Especially with Roh so clearly hoping to cement his place in history with this summit, they fear that there is little that Kim can do that would harm his image in South Korea.

However, if Kim hopes to be an influence on the presidential election in the south, this presents a genuine opportunity to further expose Kim to pressures and influences of the outside world, which is a move in the right direction.

For decades, the North Korean leadership had only concerned itself with internal regime politics, and even ignored the voices and needs of its own citizens.

If Kim realizes that his image among the South Korean public will have a direct effect on his own rule, this may affect his actions and policies.

In this way, Kim is taking more of a gamble by agreeing to a summit than is generally recognized.

If South Korean sentiment turns against Kim after the summit, this will restrict the new South Korean president’s foreign policy options, and it will also make it harder for Kim to delay, obstruct and avoid dealing with nuclear and other issues.

As such, Roh has more leverage than generally believed, if he is adroit in his negotiations.
If Roh goes into the summit determined to come away with some agreement with the North, he will have no bargaining power whatsoever, and Kim will win. But if Kim is seen by the South Koreans as the one obstructing progress, it will make North Korea’s situation more difficult in the future.

Thus, Roh absolutely must go into the summit prepared to return empty-handed. Only when Roh is prepared to walk away, will he have any leverage on Kim.

Roh must be willing to confront Kim on serious issues, such as the nuclear issue, and press Kim to make a public statement that he supports denuclearization. Ironically, Roh’s reputation may even improve if he can show that he met Kim with a flexible and reasonable set of issues and options.

Roh must also pay attention to not only the public opinion of South Koreans but also the U.S, and in particular the policymakers inside Washington.

Roh needs to realize that managing expectations and framing the summit in a positive way is critical for him to be seen in Washington as enhancing, and not obstructing, the nuclear negotiations.

There is little chance that Washington will allow Roh to set the agenda for denuclearization, as revealed in the embarrassing episode at the recent APEC meeting.

If Roh wanders too far from Washington’s stance, he will not have Washington comply, but rather he will merely be left alone.

Thus, it is critical that Roh and Cheong Wa Dae pay as much attention to how the summit is viewed in Washington as how it is viewed in South Korea.

I am in favor of this summit, only because it further exposes Kim to South Korean public sentiment, and increases the leverage the outside world has on this reclusive regime.

I hope that Roh does not squander his opportunity to further draw out the North Korean leadership and expose them to the outside world.