North Korean Economy Watch

Reuters (via Washington Post)
12/10/2007

Striking a note of musical diplomacy, the New York Philharmonic plans to visit North Korea in February — the first major U.S. cultural visit to the reclusive country, the New York Times reported on Monday.

Pyongyang’s invitation to play a concert comes as North Korea is disabling its nuclear facilities under an agreement in February, after years of six-way talks, and is beginning to see a thaw in its relations with the United States.

“It would signal that North Korea is beginning to come out of its shell, which everyone understands is a long-term process,” Christopher Hill, the Bush administration’s lead negotiator with North Korea, told the newspaper.

“It does represent a shift in how they view us, and it’s the sort of shift that can be helpful as we go forward in nuclear weapons negotiations.”

The daunting logistics of sending 250 people and bulky instruments to impoverished North Korea were being overcome with help from the U.S. State Department, South Korean companies and the Korea Society.

The concert is set for February 26 at the end of the Philharmonic’s planned tour of China, the paper said, with the orchestra expected to stay in Pyongyang for two nights to do some teaching and attend a ceremonial dinner.

Details of the trip, which the paper said has generated a measure of controversy among musicians and commentators, were expected to be formally announced on Tuesday.

After a faxed invitation in August by the North Korean culture ministry, the concert took its final steps towards reality late last week after a visit to South Korea’s capital by Zarin Mehta, the orchestra’s president, the paper said.

Hill, who plans to attend Tuesday’s news conference, said he had spoken privately to the orchestra members and believed the conditions set by the Philharmonic had been met.

The paper said those included the presence of foreign reporters, a nationwide broadcast so that not just a tiny elite would hear the concert, acoustical adjustments to the East Pyongyang Grand Theater, an assurance that eight musicians of Korean origin would not encounter problems and that the orchestra could play “The Star-Spangled Banner.”

“PRETTY NIFTY”

The orchestra will also play a concert in Seoul after its return from Pyongyang, said Evans Revere, president of the Korea Society and a former senior U.S. diplomat.

“The balance that’s being achieved here is pretty nifty,” Revere said. “It’s a nice message being sent to the peninsula that the premier American orchestra is performing in both capitals within hours of each other.”

Critics of the trip have questioned the appropriateness of visiting a country run by Kim Jong-il’s repressive regime.

“It would be a mistake to hand Kim Jong-il a propaganda coup,” Richard Allen, a former national security adviser, and Chuck Downs, both board members of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, wrote on October 28 in The New York Times.

Hill said “in a very theoretical way” any kind of opening would lend legitimacy to North Korea’s government.

“But not opening up has not had any positive effect in bringing North Korea out of its shell,” Hill said.

(Reporting by John O’Callaghan; Editing by Alex Richardson)

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
12/9/2007

By 1963, the inhabitants of the huge Soviet Embassy compound in downtown Pyongyang felt themselves under siege. All their communications with Koreans were supervised, and most North Koreans who had expressed some sympathy with Moscow had disappeared without a trace. Soviet aid nearly stopped, and most Soviet advisors left the North. On quite a few occasions, the official media of North Korea and Soviet Russia exchanged broadsides of sharply worded critical statements.

In short, in 1963-65 few people doubted that North Korea, together with Albania and, to a lesser extent, North Vietnam, chose to side with Beijing in its quarrel with Moscow. There were good reasons for this: Moscow was too liberal in its domestic policies, too disdainful of Kim Il-sung’s personality cult, too ready to compromise with the arch-villain of U.S. imperialism. And it was prone to an arrogant attitude in its dealings with the small East Asian country, too.

But then things changed, dramatically and irreversibly. The anti-Soviet pro-Maoist block, clearly in the making in the early 1960s, felt apart in 1966-67. The reason was the Cultural Revolution, the ten years of madness, which engulfed China. Some people believe that there was a system in this madness. Perhaps. But I personally find this system extremely difficult to discover.

It was not the only “cultural revolution,” of course. The Vietnam War demonstrated that China, despite its bellicose rhetoric, was unable to provide enough aid. The Russians provided Hanoi with missiles and tanks while the Chinese largely limited themselves to shipping the “little red books” full of Mao’s quotations.

But it was the “cultural revolution” that played the major role in the alienation between Korea and China. Kim Il-sung was perplexed by the new developments in his sponsor country. Everything looked like madness, and in September 1966 the Cuban Ambassador noticed that North Korean top officials began to make jokes about China and Mao the Great Helmsman himself (they suggested that a bit of Korean ginseng would help the Chinese leader who was obviously becoming senile).

Around the same time, in late 1966, the internal propaganda of North Korea began to criticize “dogmatism” and “superpower chauvinism,” clearly associated with China. For years, the major culprit in the internal propaganda was the “modern revisionism” (read: the Soviet Union). In December 1966, at a secret meeting with the Soviet leader Brezhnev, Kim Il-sung described the “cultural revolution” as a “massive idiocy.” Well, he was probably correct, even if his own policies were not exactly an embodiment of wise statesmanship.

At that stage, China still could play down the differences and probably keep North Korea on its side. But it seems that Beijing was not in control of the situation, or was not able to make reasonable decisions, so in early 1967 the Chinese press began to attack Kim Il-sung. Throughout 1967, the Red Guards newspapers frequently called Kim Il-sung a “revisionist,” the worst term of abuse in their (quite limited) vocabulary. He was accused of “blocking the revolutionary will of masses” and not starting a cultural revolution in his realm.

In early 1967, the Red Guards’ media reported an alleged attempted coup in Pyongyang. As far as we know, the story was a complete fake, but it prompted the North Korean press to react. In January 1967, Nodong Sinmun rebuffed the statements.

The propaganda war escalated. It was meaningless from the Chinese point of view: in its feud with the USSR China needed as many allies as possible. But it seems that the considerations of real politick were rejected by the zealots who required a complete adherence to the then current Chinese political line. Kim Il-sung and his entourage were not famous for their readiness to follow foreigners’ advice, so the situation went from bad to worse.

Bernd Schaefer penned a wonderful monograph based on the now de-classified East German archives, and noted some rather extreme episodes in the late 1960s. In the summer of 1968 the Chinese installed loudspeakers on the border and used them to blast North Korea with Chinese propaganda, largely with tales about the unparalleled wisdom of Mao. The Koreans retaliated in kind, by installing their own loudspeakers and bombarding their opponents with stories of Kim Il-sung’s greatness and superhuman wisdom.

The Chinese accused Kim Il-sung himself of enjoying a luxurious life, very different from the lifestyle of his subjects. This was correct, even if the same thing could be said about Mao. However, these personal accusations made Kim even less willing to accommodate the Chinese.

On one occasion, a group of Chinese soldiers crossed the border, obviously in hope of provoking a clash, but the North Koreans did not react and Chinese soon withdrew. There were also reports that bodies of ethnic Korean officials who were slaughtered in China by the Red Guards were put on a train and sent to the North. Personally, I am somewhat skeptical, but this story was indeed reported in the contemporary diplomatic messages cited by Bernd Schaefer and thus might be true.

Relations reached their nadir in late 1968. However, Kim Il-sung understood that his best policy would be a balancing act between the two Communist great powers, and he was ready to find a path to rapprochement. Fortunately for him, China was gradually coming to some semblance of normality, so from around 1970 it was once again possible to resume the balancing act policy. But that is another story.

Korea Times
Yoon Won-sup
12/9/2007

South Korea will provide 5,100 tons of steel plates to North Korea on Dec. 17 in a six-party deal that involves the provision of energy or alternatives to North Korea in exchange for the North’s disablement of its nuclear facilities by year’s-end, government officials said Sunday.

U.S. President George W. Bush sent a personal letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il last week urging him to keep his word on the disablement and declaration by Dec. 31.

The shipment is the first alternative to oil sent to the North under the agreement, although participants in the six-way talks have been taking turns to provide 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to the North every month recently.

Yonhap
12/8/2007

A ship carrying 1,400 tons of tangerines will leave Sunday for North Korea from a port on this southern island of South Korea to help promote peace and reconciliation between the two Korean states, island officials said Saturday.

They said that the tangerines grown by local farmers have been loaded onto a 3,500-ton ship, which will set sail for the North on Sunday afternoon. With crews including three South Koreans, the Panama-registered ship will arrive at Nampo, a western port town of North Korea, Tuesday, they said.

This is the first batch of 10,000 tons of tangerines that will be sent to the North this year. The officials said that the remainder will be delivered by the end of January next year at the latest.

They said that Jeju Island has sent 36,488 tons of tangerines and 17,100 tons of carrots to the North since 1998. It was humanitarian aid designed to promote peace and co-existence between the two Koreas, which remain technically at war after the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce instead of a peace treaty.

Yonhap
12/5/2007

A convoy of 10 South Korean buses drove into North Korea Wednesday across the heavily armed border to visit the city of Kaesong, launching a second tourism project between the two Koreas, said the South Korean company that developed the tour.

The one-day overland tour of Kaesong, a 90-minute drive from Seoul, offers ordinary South Koreans an unusual glimpse of North Korea, one of the world’s most isolated nations, said officials at Hyundai Asan, the company that offers the tour.

It is the second tourism project between the two Koreas by Hyundai Asan, a unit of the South Korean Hyundai conglomerate in charge of most business projects involving the North. Nine years ago it began a tour program to the North’s east coast mountain of Geumgang.

So far, the mountain resort has attracted some 1.5 million tourists, mostly South Koreans. North Korea receives US$50 for every $300 trip to the mountains.

Price of the one-day tour of Kaesong is 180,000 won ($195) per tourist with North Korea keeping $100 for each person, Hyundai Asan said.

Among the first batch of 360 tourists to Kaesong were 87-year-old Kim Yoon-kyung and four-year-old Shim Joo-eun, the South Korean company said.

They left Seoul at around 6:00 a.m. and are scheduled to return around 5:00 p.m., an official at Hyundai Asan said.

The tour of Kaesong offers visits to historical Buddhist temples, scenic waterfalls and other legacies of the city, which was the capital of the Koryo Dynasty that ruled the peninsula between A.D. 918 and 1392, the company said.

Kaesong is also the site of an inter-Korean industrial complex with some 26 South Korean companies manufacturing clothes and kitchenware there.

For years South Korea has been engaging in economic cooperation with North Korea as part of its effort to bridge the economic gap with its impoverished neighbor and prepare for reunification. South Korea’s economy is 35 times bigger than the North’s.

The effort is gaining momentum as North Korea has started disabling its nuclear weapons program and its relationship with the U.S. is improving.

Christopher Hill, the chief U.S. negotiator in international talks aimed at persuading North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program, is on a three-day visit to the North’s nuclear complex in Yongbyon, which produces weapons-grade plutonium, to check the progress of the disablement of the North’s nuclear facilities.

At the same time, the deputy prime ministers of the two Koreas are in a three-day meeting in Seoul to discuss a wide range of economic cooperation projects that South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il agreed to during their summit in October.

International Crisis Group
Asia Briefing N°71
4 December 2007

North Korea’s relations with Russia have been marked by unrealistic expectations and frequent disappointments but common interests have prevented a rupture. The neighbours’ history as dissatisfied allies goes back to the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with Soviet support and the Red Army’s installation of Kim Il-sung as leader. However, the Soviets were soon written out of the North’s official ideology. The Sino-Soviet split established a pattern of Kim playing Russian and Chinese leaders off against each other to extract concessions, including the nuclear equipment and technology at the heart of the current crisis. Since Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in 2000, diplomatic initiatives have come undone and grandiose economic projects have faltered. Russia is arguably the least effective participant in the six-party nuclear talks.

The relationship between Putin’s Russia and Kim Jong-il’s North Korea has disappointed both sides. Putin has mostly been unable to assert himself as a prominent player in North East Asia, and North Korea has received neither the unalloyed political support nor the economic backing it seeks. Russia has more influence in the region than it did in the 1990s but not enough to change the equation on the Korean peninsula. Opportunities for economic cooperation have been limited, mostly by Pyongyang’s refusal to open its economy but also by Russia’s fixation on overly ambitious schemes that at best may take decades to realise. China’s more nimble investors have moved in much faster than Russia’s state-owned behemoths.

Moscow has been conservative in its political dealings with Pyongyang, playing a minor but thus far positive role at the six-party talks consistent with its concerns about proliferation and the risks of DPRK collapse. It regards the denuclearisation of the peninsula as in its interests, has relatively few commercial opportunities in the North and considers its relations with the other nations in the exercise more important in every way than its ties to Pyongyang.

While Russia has shown interest in building energy and transport links through the North, little progress has been made. Rebuilding railways on the peninsula will cost enormous sums, and overcoming the many obstacles will require years of negotiation. Investments have been hindered by the North’s unreliability and history of default on loans. Russia may eventually have to forgive billions of dollars of debt the North cannot repay. Energy is a major mutual interest but pipelines across the North are unlikely to be built soon; Japan and China are expected to be the main markets for Russian energy, while South Korea is reluctant to become dependent on the North for its supply. 

Pyongyang wants Russia to balance China’s growing influence but appears to recognise that Moscow will never provide the level of support it once did. The North has been keen to discuss economic cooperation but has lacked the political will to reform its economy sufficiently for foreign investment, even from a country as inured to corruption and government interference as Russia. It is equally interested in technical and scientific aid. Russian technology, equipment, and “know-how” have featured prominently in the history of both Koreas, and Pyongyang still seeks to resolve its economic problems by scientific and technical solutions. But there is unlikely to be much growth in bilateral cooperation unless the nuclear crisis is resolved peacefully, and the North opens its economy. 

This briefing completes Crisis Group’s series on the relationships between North Korea and those of its neighbours – China, South Korea, Japan and Russia – involved in the six-party nuclear talks. It examines Russia’s aims and ambitions in the region, as well as the responses from North Korea and is based on both interviews in Russia, Central Asia and South Korea and analysis of Russian and North Korean statements.

Asia Times
Ting-I Tsai
12/5/2007

The likelihood that North Korea’s nuclear disarmament will be completed just a year after Pyongyang announced that it had tested a nuclear bomb has been widely welcomed around the world, with the exception, perhaps, of China.

There are increasing concerns among Chinese academics that Pyongyang’s actions are hurting Chinese interests. Last October’s nuclear test not only unmasked the contradictions of a relationship frequently described as being “as close as lips and teeth”. It may have led to a further downturn in bilateral ties.

As the host nation of the Six Party Talks and once North Korea’s closest ally, China has reacted to the prospects for disarmament in a decidedly cool manner, with its North Korea experts debating how Pyongyang will harm China’s interests.

“There is no doubt that Pyongyang will create conflicts between China and the United States once it improves its relationship with Washington,” said Zhang Liangui, professor of international strategic research at the Central Party School in Beijing. He predicted that it was only a matter of time before Pyongyang took revenge on Beijing for China’s vote to impose sanctions on North Korea at the United Nations last October.

Zhang Yushan, researcher at the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences, however, doubts that North Korea could develop a close relationship with the US in the upcoming months.

After a year of dialog, North Korea agreed in October to shut its main nuclear reactor and provide detailed descriptions of all its nuclear programs by the end of the year. Furthermore, it has pledged not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or knowledge to other countries. Pyongyang fulfilled one of those promises in July by shutting down the reactor in Yongbyon. It has yet to make any substantial moves toward providing a description of its nuclear programs.

Chinese academics who question whether North Korea’s pledges to completely abandon its nuclear program are sincere also worry about Washington’s lack of determination to shape a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula after having received Pyongyang’s assurance that it would not transfer nuclear materials, technology or knowledge to other countries.

“China has always seen North Korea’s nuclear weapon issue as the Americans’ problem and has never adopted any strategic plan for itself in the Six Party Talks, which have led to where we are now,” said Jin Linbo, a research professor at the Beijing-based China Institute of International Studies. Jin argued that Beijing might have gained nothing but a security threat from its neighbor by hosting the talks.

What has particularly frustrated Beijing has been North Korea’s selfish neglect of China’s interests. The Central Party School’s Zhang noted that the latest developments have led some Chinese academics who originally had sympathies for North Korea to change their attitudes.

“Some of them have started to argue that North Korea is outrageous,” Zhang said.

Scoot Snyder, senior associate at the Washington based Asia Foundation, noted that North Korea’s traditional strategy is to play larger parties against each other; having found their country over-reliant on China for critical inputs, North Korean leaders would certainly like to stimulate a competition between China and the United States and South Korea to see who can most effectively win influence in Pyongyang. He pointed out in particular that DPRK negotiator Kim Kye-gwan’s public criticism of the United States for relying too much on China to carry out its Korea policy, US negotiator Christopher Hill’s sudden visit to Pyongyang without passing through Beijing, and the “three- or four-party” phrase in the inter-Korean summit declaration had all caused speculation and concern in Beijing.

In a study titled, “How North Korea threatens China’s interests“, conducted by Gregory Moore, assistant professor of political science at the St. Petersburg, Florida-based Eckerd College, the start of the decline in PRC–DPRK amity coincided quite closely with the rise of Kim Jong-Il in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. It was sealed with the passing of Kim Il-Sung in 1994, and contact between Beijing and Pyongyang broke down almost completely between 1994 and 1999.

Kim Jung-il, Moore suggested in his study, revealed his willingness to affront China in 1990-91 by conducting a dialog with China’s rival Taiwan and making a deal in which Pyongyang would have been paid to accept Taiwan’s nuclear waste. He played the same “Taipei card” again in 1996 when Beijing offered one-tenth of the grain that Pyongyang had asked for. In 1997, North Korea again opened discussions with Taiwan on direct flights between the island’s capital of Taipei and Pyongyang after another quarrel with China. At the time, Chinese agricultural experts publicly encouraged Pyongyang to adopt Chinese-style reforms, which led Pyongyang to call Deng Xiaoping a traitor to socialism. That jibe prompted Beijing to mull cutting off food aid to North Korea.

Other factors have also caused the relationship to sour. North Korea’s admission to US diplomat James Kelly in October 2002 that it was indeed pursuing a uranium enrichment program, its plan to establish the free trade zone and gambling city of Sinuiju, its counterfeiting of US$100 bills and Chinese currency, and China’s cutting off of an oil pipeline and deploying troops to the border in 2003 have all caused friction. In addition, rumors have surfaced that Pyongyang’s Chinese-built Taen Friendship Glass Factory resulted from Kim Jung-il’s flirtation with the “Taipei card”.

According to a Pyongyang-based foreign diplomat, bilateral relations “are mainly close in commercial and economic matters, especially with neighboring Liaoning province” in China. Bilateral trade in the first three quarters of 2007 reached US$1.44 billion, representing 16.6 growth year-on-year. The Chinese are reportedly operating three major coal mining sites in North Korea, although related government agencies in Pyongyang have denied this.

It remains to be seen how Pyongyang will handle its relationship with China. But both governments have made efforts to demonstrate their friendship.

On November 26, Liu Xiaoming, China’s ambassador to the DPRK, delivered a speech to students at Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang, sharing the success of the Chinese Communist Party’s 17th congress, the significant accomplishments of its 29-year-long period of liberalization and reform, and China’s appreciation of its historical friendship with North Korea. The speech, which the embassy described as “a new page in the bilateral friendship”, came shortly after the visit of Liu Yunshan, member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, to Pyongyang on October 29. In July, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi made North Korea the first nation he visited after taking office.

In return, Pyongyang authorities issued a series of stamps featuring the 2008 Beijing Olympics in mid-November, and Kim Jung-il paid a visit to China’s embassy on the occasion of the Chinese lantern-festival holiday Yuan Xiao Jie.

In the eyes of South Korea, which has aggressively sought to improve its ties with the North, ties between China and North Korea remain unquestionably close.

Haksoon Paik, senior fellow at the Seoul-based Sejong Institute, argued that the US-PRC relationship is the key factor shaping East Asian international politics, and North Korea has simply “tried to just find some breathing space in between”.

Having dealt with North Koreans for more than a half-century, Chinese academics are now preparing for North Korea’s eventual tilt away from Beijing because of the landscape change in East Asian politics.

“For the upcoming decade, the relationships among the six-party-talk members will put the US, Japan and North Korea on one side, and China, South Korea and Russia on the other,” predicted a Chinese expert on North Korea, who spoke under the condition of anonymity.

Electonic Times News (South Korea)
Hat tip DPRK Studies
Gil-soo Jang
11/30/2007

South and North Korea team up to develop a version of ‘Hana Linux (tentatively named)’ and set standards.

Reunification IT Forum (South), Chosun People’s Science Technology Association (North) and Chinese Information Society co-hosted ICMIP 2007 in Yenji, China on November 27 to 28.

At the conference, IT experts from two Koreas agreed on the need for cooperation in the Linux sector and developing ‘Hana Linux.’ Besides, the two parties will pursue other projects such as Open Office, an internationally certified (CC) office suite, and developing Korean language for excellent open software.

Such a proposal was initially made by president of Hee-tak Moon of Korea Open Source Software Association (KOSSA) to the North counterpart. A detailed plan will follow at the Speical Duties Committee (SDC) which will be formed soon by two Koreas and China.

President Ho-ik Seok of Reunification IT Forum, Secretary General Kyung Chon of Chosun People’s Science Technology Association, and President Ryong-woon Hyung of Chinese Information Society agreed to five points at issue and to create expert working groups and the SDC soon.

The three parties also consented to nurture software professionals and, as part of that effort, to base Yenben and Dandung of China, and Pyongyang, Kaesong and Hoichun of Korea as training centers. Moreover, they will consider sharing information by establishing an IT exhibition hall, library and history archive.

To further the agreement and issues, IT experts decided to hold an international conference in Pyongyang in the first half of next year to bring IT professionals together.

They were in agreement that there are differences in IT terminology between South, North Koreans and Korean Chinese and agreed to make efforts to standardize the terms.

Reuters
11/26/2007

A U.S. embassy spokesman on Monday denied a report by South Korea’s biggest daily that the State Department has stationed an employee in Pyongyang to lay the groundwork for opening a permanent liaison office in North Korea.

The State Department has an employee in Pyongyang but only to manage equipment for a team that is overseeing the disablement of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The employee will be in the North through the disablement process.

“This is not for normalisation,” spokesman Max Kwak said.

There has been a rise in exchanges between the two countries after reclusive North Korea agreed this year to a multinational deal to freeze and then roll back its nuclear arms programme in return for massive aid and better international standing.

The Chosun Ilbo newspaper quoted an unnamed source in Washington as saying: “A U.S. State Department diplomat who handles administrative affairs has checked into a room in Koryo Hotel and has been using it as an office and accommodation.”

The State Department employee has been acting as an administrative liaison between the United States and North Korea, the source said.

The Koryo is one of the few hotels in Pyongyang open to foreign guests.

The United States has said if North Korea completely ends its nuclear weapons programme, Washington is willing to establish diplomatic ties with Pyongyang.
U.S. Diplomat ‘Permanently’ Stationed in Pyongyang
Choson Ilbo (h/t One Free Korea)
11/26/2007

A U.S. diplomat has been stationed permanently at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang since mid-November, a source said Sunday. The development comes as U.S.-North Korea relations are improving as Pyongyang implements its promise to disable its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon by the end of the year.

A source in Washington said that the U.S. plans to dispatch another permanent diplomat to Pyongyang soon, with the Koryo Hotel likely to serve as a de facto U.S. liaison office in North Korea. This is the first time the U.S. has ever stationed a permanent diplomat in Pyongyang, and it suggests the possible normalization of relations between the two sides.

The Washington source said, “A foreign service officer in charge of administrative affairs from the U.S. State Department has been staying at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang, using his room as both an office and living quarters. He is mainly carrying out administrative liaison efforts between the U.S. and North Korea.”

The diplomat is apparently serving as a liaison officer for U.S. delegations to Pyongyang and figuring out their staying expenses there. The temporary U.S. office at the Koryo Hotel is said to be fitted out with exclusive telephone and fax lines and a computer with an Internet connection.

The U.S. is expected to dispatch a senior diplomat to Pyongyang who will handle political affairs when North Korea completes the disablement of its nuclear facilities. This senior diplomat will also participate in talks with Pyongyang and visit the nuclear sites at Yongbyon on a non-regular basis to inspect the progress of the disablement and dismantlement of the facilities.

Washington and Pyongyang agreed on this through meetings between chief U.S. negotiator to the six-party talks Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan and through “a channel in New York,” the source said.

The U.S. is expected to operate its temporary office in Pyongyang with a staff of two diplomats for the time being, with a view to upgrading the office to a regular liaison office or a permanent mission if North Korea clearly shows its intention to fully dismantle its nuclear programs.

The agreement to operate a de facto U.S. liaison office in Pyongyang suggests that the two sides strongly intend to improve their relations. Washington and Pyongyang agreed at the 1994 Geneva Accords to open a liaison office in Pyongyang upon concluding talks on the first North Korean nuclear crisis, but that agreement was never realized.

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
11/26/2007

An insider North Korean source said in a phone conversation on the 22nd, “With long-term suspension of exports for the break in China’s investment in North Korea’s iron ore production, the lives of citizens and the Musan Mine laborers have become extremely difficult. There have been talks that this might be the 2nd March of Tribulation (Mass starvation period in the 1990s).”

The South Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry released a report, the “North Korean Underground Resource Joint Development Strategy” on the 21th saying that China has cleared with a clean stroke North Korean minerals, Musan Mines being a representative example.

The report introduced the contract which gave 50-years-mining rights to the Musan Mine in North Hamkyung, which is North Korea’s best iron ore, for 70 hundred million Yuan (approximately DSD950 million) to China, which can take 10 million tons of iron ores from Musan every year for 50 years.

However, investment in Musan Mine, which was considered the China’s representative investment in North Korean underground resources, was ruptured due to the fact that opinions surrounding on the retrieval ways of shares and investment funds could not be narrowed down. Accordingly, Musan Mine laborers going through difficulty with the operation of the mine have fallen into a severe hardship in living.

The South Korean intelligence authorities confirmed the veracity of the breakdown in investment negotiation early June of this year.

North Hamkyung Province’s Musan Mine is a strip mine containing 30 hundred million tons of coal reserves, 13 hundred million tons of coals capable of digging and several hundred tons of steel concentrate, has offered these materials to the Kim Chaek and Sungjin Steel Mills, but with the unreliable operation of these mills, mining came to a halt in early 2000.

In 2005, the North Korean government closed an investment contract with the Chinese Tonghua Steel Group Consortium and China’s investment in Musan Mine began the fall of that year. As the exports of iron ore started, the North Korean authorities resumed the provision system to mine laborers and their families.

With the influx of many goods including food, gasoline, and construction materials as a reward for exporting iron ore to China, the lives of citizens in Musan have stabilized in these last two years.

However, the volume of production was known to have rapidly decreased with the cease in iron goods export to China and the rupture in joint investment with China.

The source said, “With the cease in iron ore exports to China, provision to the miners have ceased, which has incurred significant damage. We are in the ‘March of Tribulation’ again. When we are barely able to get by, something else occurs.”

The source introduced the current situation of withdrawal for Musan Mine laborers, “With only 500 thousand won (approximately USD 152), a person can get out of mining. It takes 100,000 won at the mina labor department and another 100,000 won to receive a diagnosis at mine hospitals and about 300,000 won to receive approval from the Safety Agency and the county labor department leaders as bribes. The despair of people are so heavy that people hope to come out of mining, even with the granting of provisions.”