North Korean Economy Watch

Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland published a piece focusing on North Korea’s economic integration.  Download it here: petersoninstitute.pdf

Although not the focus of the piece, here is an excerpt:

A first corollary of the injunction to avoid top-down approaches is that any collective development assistance must be extended in support of economic reform. Experience throughout the developing world demonstrates that assistance will have only marginal effects and may even have negative consequences if not coupled with policy changes. It is not simply that aid sustains the regime; since aid is fungible, even purely humanitarian aid will have that effect. The problem is that too much aid can delay or even undermine the reform process. Whatever the multilateral mechanism that ultimately emerges, it should encourage reform and economic opening in the North.

A second corollary of the injunction against top-down approaches is the importance of engaging the private sector: through trade, foreign direct investment, private capital flows (including remittances), and sheer expertise. Economic rehabilitation will require investment in social overhead capital, which will be led primarily by the public sector. But if North Korea is to evolve toward a self-sustaining market-oriented economy, private-sector involvement will be crucial. Participation of foreign firms means that projects are subject to the market test of profitability, and it encourages North Korean authorities to think of economic engagement in terms of joint gain rather than as political tribute.

(and)

North Korea is in need of depoliticized technical assistance for a whole panoply of issues running from the mundane but critical, such as developing meaningful national statistical capabilities, through basic agricultural and health technologies, to social infrastructure of a modern economy. This infrastructure includes policy mechanisms to manage macroeconomic policy, including through reform of the central bank; specify property rights and resolve commercial disputes; regulate markets, including financial markets as they emerge; establish and implement international trade and investment policies; and so on.

Read the full paper here:
A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension
Staphen Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Policy Brief
April 2008

More politicization of the Beijing Olympics…

The United Nations has withdrawn its staff from the Olympic torch run in North Korea amid concerns that the relay will be used as a propaganda stunt.

The decision followed a heated internal debate among foreign donors, who face a constant battle with Kim Jong-il’s government in their efforts to get food and aid to impoverished people.

It is believed to be the first acknowledgment by the world body that the Olympic torch relay is a political event that can be exploited by unscrupulous governments, diplomats said.

and…

“Unicef originally decided to participate in the Pyongyang leg of the Olympic torch run in response to a request from, and as a demonstration of support for, the International Olympic Movement,” said Christopher de Bono, a spokesman for the organisation.

“However, we are no longer convinced that Unicef’s participation in the run will support the aim of raising awareness of the situation of children in the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of, or North, Korea] and elsewhere,” he said.

“Unicef has decided, in concert with other UN family entities, to withdraw from the Pyongyang relay.”

Read the full article here:
UN pulls out of North Korea Olympic torch ceremony amid fears of propaganda coup
Times of London
Michael Sheridan
4/6/2008

From the Donga Ilbo:

A black Benz with the red license plate of “087” passed by quickly. 087 is a number used exclusively for the sedans of North Korean diplomats. It was easy to tell that the North Korean embassy located on this street recently purchased the luxurious sedan.

“The North Korean embassy has been full of life since the latter half of 2006 because of the increased number of North Korean workers sent to Russia, diversified businesses and growing efforts to secure energy supplies,“ said North Korean defectors that the Dong-A Ilbo report team met in Moscow.

North Korean workers will construct the next APEC forum venue:

In order to prepare for the APEC, the Primorsky regional government (on the North Korean border) plans to issue work permits to 12,000 North Korean workers in 2008, four times higher than the number of those last year. A foreign national, who has hired North Korean workers, said, “North Korean senior officials are lobbying fiercely in order to increase the quota for laborers. They even arrange free tours of North Korea for Russian government officials.”

North Korea companies revived:

Recently, North Korean companies, such as Daedong River, Neungra, Baekdu and Goonpyo, have established their offices in many parts of Russia.

A 39-year-old North Korean defector who has stayed in Russia for 12 years said, “I believe, out of the 49 Russian provinces, North Korean firms have established their offices in about 30 provinces. Some 90 percent of them are responsible for overseeing North Korean workers.”

Joint ventures between Russia and North Korea, which went into hibernation after the United States froze North Korea’s account at Macau’s Banco Delta Asia in 2005, have recently resumed their activities. “Joint companies, which were active in the early 1990s, such as Dongbang Seafood and Far East Marine Transportation, have resumed their businesses,” said one Korean-Russian residing in Nakhodka.

Wages and Taxes:

“North Korean companies, which are spread across Russia, have been collecting about $400 to 500 from each North Korean worker every month. It is then used as high ranking officials’ business expenses,” said a 46-year-old North Korean defector.

“The discontent of workers is growing because high ranking officials dine out at fancy restaurants and their wives purchase expensive clothes with money earned by them,” added the defector.

(Uncle Sam is the only other government I know of that also taxes the income its citizens earn outside of its territory)

The story also makes a big deal out of the fact that the North Koreans pay huge bribes to do business in Russia, but who doesn’t?

Big players, who deliver a large sum of bribes to Russians, have also recently emerged. A captain of a North Korea freight ship was caught March 12 on site while shipping 100 tons of crude oil without reporting to customs at the Slavyanka shipyard, southern Vladivostok. It was found that the captain gave $45,000 to the president of the crude oil storage company as a kickback.

Read the full sotry here:
N.Korea’s Businesses Thriving in Russia
Donga Ilbo
4/4/2008

As has been chronicled before on this website, North Korean embassies generally secure their own  operating funds.  Although this might seem odd to western observers, it is an innovative model that has its benefits (i.e. the embassies earn a profit and economic considerations play a large role in determining whether an embassy is worth the cost).  There is also a downside to this model, and that is that more than one North Korean diplomat has been caught in some sort of shady smuggling or tax avoidance scheme.

The staff at the DPRK’s embassy in Germany, however, have been quite entrepreneurial in managing their real estate holdings.  They are converting their old offices into hotel space:

The Cityhostel Berlin will initially have 37 rooms at a charge of 20 Euros ($31) per head a night, Sankei reported. A reception with a grand piano is being built and a Korean restaurant is due to open in May, the newspaper said.

The embassy buildings, occupying 8,160 square meters (87,788 square feet), were built in the 1970s during the Cold War and are located in old East Berlin, Sankei said. Staff numbers at the embassy were cut after the Cold War ended and the building being converted was previously leased to corporations, Sankei said.

Update 4/5/2008:
From the Daily Telegraph:

A spokesman for the North Korean embassy dismissed the reports as Japanese propaganda, however.

“The rumours about this hostel are based on Japanese media reports, but they are not correct,” the spokesman said.

“The Japanese media are very much influenced by their government and they probably gave out this wrong information because they are our enemies.”

but…

On its website, City Hostel notes that it signed a contract in December to occupy the building, which it describes as “formerly the consulate of North Korea”.

Read the full articles here:
North Korea Converts German Embassy Into Hostel, Sankei Reports
Bloomberg
Hideko Takayama
3/25/2008

Enjoy your stay… at North Korean embassy
Daily Telegraph
Harry de Quetteville
4/5/2008

Reuters excerpt: 

North Korea has been selling multiple rocket launchers to military-ruled Myanmar since the two countries restored ties last year in violation of U.N. sanctions, Japan’s NHK public broadcaster reported.

Quoting unspecified diplomatic sources, NHK said in a report late on Wednesday that the launchers were the same type as those deployed near the demilitarized zone separating the Korean peninsula.

The report could not be independently confirmed.

A Security Council resolution passed after North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test blocks trade with the secretive communist country in dangerous weapons, heavy conventional weapons and luxury goods.

Read the whole story here:
North Korea sells rocket launchers to Myanmar: report
Reuters
4/3/2008

(Posted from Shanghai, China – I am on vacation, so this is just a quick note)

While in Beijing a few days ago, I ran into Glyn Ford giving a talk in conjunction with the release of his new book, North Korea on the Brink.

Mr. Ford was on his way to Pyongyang to pitch an idea he believes could resolve the HEU (Highly-Enriched Uranium) impasse, which is bogging down implementation of the most recent version of the Agreed Framework.

His idea is this:

Even if the North Koreans have an HEU program it would require a colossal amount of electricity delivered in a consistent fashion.  So one way the west could monitor if such a program was taking place would be to keep tabs on the North Korean power grid for suspicious activity, or to build in fluctuations to the power supply so that the machinery which does the enriching is not able to function.

If both sides can know that there is currently no HEU program underway, then maybe they can avoid the politicalty trecherous waters of determining whether such a program once existed–allowing us all to move on to the next phases of the agreement.

This new program, co-sponsored by LiNK and the International Republican Institute (IRI), seeks to invest North Korea’s future by teaching former North Korean citizens  leadership and organizational skills so they may bring benefits to the DPRK when the doors are opened.

Fifteen candidates of different ages, genders, and experiences will be selected on the basis of their potential to benefit from the program.

The three week program will be hosted in Seoul where workshops will be conducted by experts and trainers from various countries and backgrounds.  Topics to be covered include: democracy and governance, rule of law, international human rights, comparative movements, comparative politics, business protocol and etiquette, and leadership development.

All applications must be submitted with all components completed by March 31, 2008. If you feel you, or others you know, would be a good candidate for the Chollima Leadership Program, please contact jane (at) linkglobal.org for more information and an application.

Here is a summary on the IRI web page.

According to a recent story in the Choson Ilbo, the Thai government told the South Korean government in January to take the large numbers of North Korean refugees currently in Thailand off its hands, but the South Korean government found it difficult to transport more than 70 refugees at a time for reasons of security and the size of the North Korean refugee camp (Hanawon) in South Korea.

Excerpts from the story:

As of January, some 400 North Korean refugees, more than three times the optimum level of 120, were staying at the Thai immigration center. But South Korea government has been transporting only about 40 to 50 of them at a time on grounds that the North Korean refugee camp here has already reached saturation point and they have to be transported in secrecy.

A South Korean government official said, “We’ve brought North Korean refugees from Southeast Asia almost every week since December last year. As a result, the number of North Korean refugees in the Thai center has dwindled to about 300.” A total of 400 North Korean refugees have reportedly arrived in South Korea from Southeast Asia since early this year.

An estimated 800 North Korean refugees are staying at police stations or private homes in Thailand in addition to the immigration center, waiting to be taken to South Korea.

Hanawon, the South Korean government resettlement center for North Korean refugees, now accommodates some 660 North Koreans. They undergo resettlement training for three months before leaving the center. Ongoing extension work at Hanawon is expected to be completed around December.

The full story can be read here:
Thailand Urged Seoul to Accept More N.Korean Refugees
Choson Ilbo
3/19/2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Bfrief No. 08-3-13-1
3/13/2008

International fuel and food prices are skyrocketing, while the cost of Chinese goods continues to rise, so that this so-called ‘triple-threat’ is sending shockwaves through the North Korean economy. In this year’s New Year’s Joint Editorial, North Korea championed the banner of a ‘strong and prosperous nation’, and declared that this year would focus on the economy, however this ‘triple-threat’ will likely make it extremely difficult for the North to meet its policy goals.

With oil prices peaking at over 110 USD per barrel, if these high oil prices continue, North Korea, which imports crude and refined oil from China, Russia and other countries, will face a growing import burden. In accordance with the February 13th agreement reached through six-party talks, South Korea, the United States and others will provide some heavy fuel oil, and the agreement stipulated the amount of oil to be delivered, rather than the value, so this will not be affected by rising prices. However, this oil does not cover all of the North’s needs, and as for the remaining portion, either the amount imported will have to be reduced, or the North will have no choice but to invest considerably more in fuel. In addition, as a large portion of North Korea’s oil is imported from China, Pyongyang’s trade deficit with its neighbor will also grow.

According to the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), North Korea imported 523,000 tons of crude oil from China in 2005, 524,000 tons in 2006, and 523,000 tons last year, each year accounting for approximately 25 percent of total oil imports. North Korea’s trade deficit with China has shown a steadily growing trend, reaching 212,330,000 USD in 2004, 588,210,000 USD in 2005, and 764,170,000 USD in 2006. With grain prices also skyrocketing, and North Korea depending largely on China and Thailand for rice and other grain imports, the burden on the North’s economy is growing, and this is one factor in the instability of domestic prices in the DPRK.

According to the Chinese Customs Bureau, North Korea imported 81,041 tons of rice and 53,888 tons of corn last year, increases of 109.9 percent and 37.4 percent, respectively. North Korea’s corn, rice and oil imports from China are subject to market price controls, so that rising international prices directly affect the North’s cost burden. Last year, the price of Chinese goods rose 4.8 percent, recording the largest jump in ten years, and this trend extends to a wide variety of goods. 80 percent of disposable goods in North Korea are produced in China, and rising Chinese prices are directly reflected in North Korean import costs, which is passed on to DPRK citizens.

As North Korea emphasizes the building of its economy, it appears unlikely that residents will feel any direct effects of Pyongyang’s promise to prioritize the stability of its citizens’ livelihoods.

…does not sound like very easy job based on the most in-depth media coverage of their operations published in the Washington Post.

The story portrays the sad state of the DPRK’s medical facilities and shows just how much local doctors struggle to serve their patients.  According to Eugene Bell Foundation Chairman Stephen Linton:

“I’ve seen doctors who tried to capture sunlight by reflecting it from a mirror,” [during surgery] he says.

By North Korean standards, [this] patient is fortunate. She’s been given a local anesthetic, which is rare in a country where surgeons routinely etherize patients, strap them down and try to finish the operation before they come to.

and  

Like most hospitals and care centers in North Korea, the facility employs a direct-fluoroscopy machine, an X-ray device that irradiates the patient from behind while the doctor examines an image projected on a fluoroscopic plate of glass between them. “The negative is the doctor’s retina,” says Linton, who frequently admonishes physicians for submitting themselves to the machines’ potentially fatal doses of radiation. Most physicians in North Korea use them regularly, and suffer the consequences. The radiologist at Kosong, for example, has receding gums and low hemoglobin, common signs of radiation sickness. Three of his colleagues have died over the years — one from radiation overdose, another from cancer and a third from tuberculosis.

But the toll poor infrastructure takes on the provision of good health care is only exacerbated by the difficulties the DPRK bureaucracy puts in his way:

Of the 36 NGOs that began operations in North Korea as famine gutted the rural population in the mid-1990s, all but a handful have left in frustration. And Linton is particularly demanding: He insists on delivering his supplies personally, lest they be diverted to another facility or end up on the black market. When government officials balk, Linton refuses to resupply the site. So each of his two resupply visits annually is preceded by lengthy and sometimes rancorous negotiations.

“They say they want to save wear and tear on the vehicles, so they need to cut our sites by a third. Fine. I’ll cut theirs as well. Mary, I’ll need a red marker.”

Most of the cancellations involve small sanatoriums in rural areas — the very sites his donors are so keen to support. Linton suspects his hosts want to avoid those facilities because, relative to the urban care centers, their poor sanitation makes them legitimately hazardous. And the wear-and-tear issue isn’t just a red herring. Spending days crisscrossing the countryside on unpaved roads takes a huge toll on the delegation’s fleet of SUVs — vehicles that, between Linton’s visits, the ministry is allowed to use for its own purposes. In resource-starved North Korea, even government officials must barter to replace broken fan belts and transmissions. The last thing the bureaucrats want is to risk losing a precious automobile.

Linton is also apparently given a curfew when he is required to be back at this guest house in Pyongyang.

It seems Tuberculosis is running rampant at the moment:

South Korean sources suggest that tuberculosis has affected as much as 5 percent of North Korea’s population of 23 million. Linton estimates the Eugene Bell Foundation has treated up to 250,000 patients, 70 percent of whom might have otherwise died.

The whole article is well worth reading.

Donations can be made here.

The full article can be found here:
Giving Until It Hurts
Washington Post
Stephen Glain
3/9/2008, Page W16