North Korean Economy Watch

According to Reuters:

North Korean trade officials visited Myanmar this week to discuss a possible deal to import Burmese rice to ease major food shortages at home, a government official said on Wednesday.

A meeting was held on Tuesday in the country’s biggest city, Yangon, but the terms of the agreement and how North Korea planned to pay for the rice were not known, the official told Reuters, requesting anonymity.

A North Korea-flagged cargo ship named Tumangang has been docked in the port city since Monday. Witnesses and a Reuters photographer said the vessel appeared empty and no cargo was seen being loaded or unloaded.

Myanmar was once the world’s biggest rice exporter and has shipped 450,000 tonnes of the grain so far this year, up from 440,000 tonnes for the whole of 2010. It exported 1.1 million tonnes in 2009, mostly to markets in Africa and the Middle East.

…

The Burmese official said the North Koreans who visited Yangon on Tuesday dealt directly with the military-owned Myanma Economic Holding Ltd (MEHL), one of the country’s biggest firms. MEHL enjoys a monopoly of many of the country’s most lucrative import and export produce.

A senior member of from the Myanmar Chambers of Federation of Commerce and Industry said it was likely North Korea would try to import more than just rice, noting that it previously bought Burmese rubber.

Ties between the two reclusive countries were restored in 2007 after a 24-year freeze that followed the failed assassination attempt by North Korea agents on then South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during a visit to Myanmar.

The revived ties have worried the United States, which believes Myanmar’s military has sought to develop its own nuclear weapons technology using North Korean expertise.

The DPRK recently engaged Cambodia for a barter food deal.

Here is a compendium of stories related to the DPRK’s alleged food shortage this year.

Read the full story here:
North Korea seeking rice deal with Myanmar
Reuters
Aung Hla Tun
2011-8-10

Bertil Linter, who is probably the most prolific author when it comes to illicit DPRK/Myanmar relations, has published an interesting piece in the Asia Times on cargo shipping between the two countries. The whole piece is well worth reading.

The only comment I have on the article is in regards to his economic reasoning for why trade between the two countries makes sense:

All this seems to confirm what diplomatic observers have long suspected: that Myanmar and North Korea, two countries with limited access to bank and other international financial trade facilities, are engaged in barter trade. Myanmar’s ruling generals want more weapons but often don’t have the foreign funds handy to pay for them – or at least they don’t want such transactions to show up in their bank records. North Korea, meanwhile, is starved for food and likewise lacks the finances to pay for imports.

The DPRK does appear to be suffering a shortage of food, but the government does have the funds to pay for food imports–it just prefers to spend those funds in other ways.  Below is a chart of the DPRK’s estimated trade balance from 2000-2008 published by the Congressional Research Service:

As you can see from the bottom line of the table, the DPRK has been running a substantial trade deficit (as a % of its total trade) for nearly the last decade.  This trade deficit must be paid for with hard currency inflows of one kind or another (“aid”, investment, illicit exports). Where these funds are coming from and to whom specifically within the DPRK they are going is a mystery to me, but we do know they are importing (as a group) much more than they are exporting.

Below is the article in the Asia Times:

With the Middle East and North Africa in turmoil, North Korea risks losing some of its oldest and most trusted customers for military hardware. Pyongyang has over the years sold missiles and missile technology to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Syria and Iran, representing an important source of export earnings for the reclusive regime. The growing uncertainty among those trade partners could explain why North Korea is now cementing ties with a client much closer to home: military-run Myanmar.

In April 2007, North Korea and Myanmar resumed diplomatic relations. Those ties were after North Korean agents planted a bomb in the then capital of Yangon in October 1983, killing 18 high-ranking South Korean officials who were on a visit to the country. Only days after the restoration of diplomatic ties, a North Korean freighter, the MV Kang Nam I, docked at Thilawa port, 30 kilometers south of Yangon.

Officials claimed at the time that the ship docked to seek shelter from a storm. However, two local reporters working for a Japanese news agency were turned back and briefly detained when they went to the port to investigate, indicating that there could have been other, more secret reasons for the Kang Nam I’s arrival.

The same ship was put on global radar in June 2009 when it was pursued by the USS John S McCain and then reversed course. It was believed that it was on its way back to Myanmar with more unspecified cargo. Military observers tied the Kang Nam 1 incidents to the arrival of another North Korean ship, MV Bong Hoafan, at a Myanmar port in November 2006 before the resumption of diplomatic relations. Curiously, it was also reported to have been “forced” to seek shelter at a Myanmar port because of “adverse weather conditions”.

An Asia Times Online investigation has found that those were not isolated incidents. Shipping records from Myanmar show that North Korean ships have been docking regularly at Thilawa and Yangon ports for almost a decade. Even the ill-fated Kang Nam 1 had docked in Myanmar long before the 2007 and 2009 incidents. The ship made its first voyage to Myanmar in February 2002, carrying what was declared as “general cargo,” according to the shipping records.

North Korean shipments are almost invariably specified as “general goods” and sometimes “concrete”, but both in and outgoing cargo is usually handled by Myanmar’s Ministry of Heavy Industry 2, which supervises the country’s defense industries, the armed forces’ Directorate of Procurement, and the military’s own holding company, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH).

When the MV Bochon, another North Korean ship, arrived at Thilawa in October 2002, the Myanmar military’s high command sent a document marked “top secret” to the port authorities, requesting them to clear the entire docking area for “security reasons”. They were also advised, according to the shipping records, that some “important cargo” would be offloaded within 36 hours.

When the MV Chong Gen approached Thilawa on April 12, 2010, it asked for permission to fly a Myanmar flag instead of its North Korean one, according to the shipping records. The captain also requested a Myanmar SMC card (smart media card) for a mobile phone, along with coastal charts. These were odd requests for a ship that was officially carrying 2,900 tons of cement and 2,105 tons of “general goods” from the North Korean port of Nampo.

Bizzare barter
Indeed, the requests made by North Korean ships traveling to Myanmar have often been outright bizarre. MV Du Man Gang appears to be one of the most regular North Korean visitors at Thilawa. On one of its many trips to Myanmar, in July 2009 it asked for 150 crates of Myanmar brandy. In March 2010, when another North Korean ship, the MV Kan Baek San, arrived in Myanmar, the North Korean ambassador asked for an unspecified quantity of Myanmar vodka to be sent to the ship, according to the shipping records.

The involvement of North Korean diplomats in these shipments is otherwise more convoluted. In September 2009, the MV Sam Il Po docked at a smaller terminal in Yangon and both the North Korean ambassador Kim Sok Chol and defense attach้ Kim Kwang Chol were present to inspect the cargo along with Lt Col Thein Toe from the Myanmar military. The unspecified cargo was received by UMEH, which in return supplied 1,500 tons of rice which was taken back to North Korea.

That was not the only incident when North Korean freighters returned with Myanmar rice. The MV So Hung arrived in November 2008 with 295 tons of material for the Ministry of Defense and left with 500 tons of rice. When the MV Du Man Gang docked in July 2009 it left with not only brandy but also 8,000 tons of rice. In June 2010, the MV An San arrived with 7,022 tons of what was alleged to be “concrete” and left in July with 7,000 tons of rice.

All this seems to confirm what diplomatic observers have long suspected: that Myanmar and North Korea, two countries with limited access to bank and other international financial trade facilities, are engaged in barter trade. Myanmar’s ruling generals want more weapons but often don’t have the foreign funds handy to pay for them – or at least they don’t want such transactions to show up in their bank records. North Korea, meanwhile, is starved for food and likewise lacks the finances to pay for imports.

When money is involved in North Korea-Myanmar trade, transactions are always done in cash and thus untraceable. Like all other ships, North Korean ones have to pay port fees in Myanmar. The MV Du Man Gang, for instance, asked to pay US$30,994 in cash rather than make a bank transfer. Other ships have made similar requests which has led to speculation about the kind of currency the North Koreans, notorious for counterfeiting US dollars, may be using.

Large quantities of counterfeit US notes have recently shown up in areas around Myanmar. In July and August 2009, a customer tried to change U$10,000 in fake notes at the State Bank of India’s main office in Imphal, Manipur. The fake bills were all of the US$100 denomination and of excellent quality, according to sources. It was the first such incident in Manipur. Although it is not clear whether the bogus notes were printed in North Korea, Imphal is located just over 100 kilometers from Moreh, an Indian town opposite Myanmar’s Tamu where a virtually unregulated border trade is booming.

Trade between North Korea and Myanmar is also apparently being done through front companies. In June 2010, the North Korean freighter MV Ryu Gong arrived with 12,838 tons of what was also described as “cement”. While the shipment was handled by the Ministry of Heavy Industry 2, the stated recipient was a little-known company known as Shwe Me, or “black gold” in Myanmar.

Port documents show that the company has nearly a million US dollars in assets but what it actually intended to do with all that cement is unclear. Just as puzzling is the involvement of Singapore-based shipping companies, which handle most of the cargo’s logistics and operate under innocuous sounding names including words like “maritime” and “services”. One of the companies has a distinct Korean name but is actually based in Singapore.

Port records point to a brisk trade between North Korea and Myanmar, all of which is handled by Myanmar’s military rather than civilian-owned private companies. In August last year, then prime minister and now president Thein Sein visited Pyongyang. According to the official Korea Central News Agency, he said that “the government of Myanmar will continue to strive for strengthening and development of the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries.”

With those intentions publicly well-stated, Myanmar may well be on its way in overtaking Egypt, Libya and other traditional military trading partners in the Middle East and North Africa as North Korea’s main market for its military hardware.

Read the full story here:
Fog lifts on Myanmar-North Korea barter
Asia Times
Bertil Linter
3/4/2011

Below I am indexing media coverage of Wikileaks stories involving the DPRK:

2011-10-7: Jordanian bank tied to illicit weapons trade.

2011-9-13: As ties between the DPRK and Myanmar continue to grow, it is becoming more difficult for defectors to transit to South Korea.

2011-9-11: The Guangdong Development Bank, a mainland lender partly owned by the U.S. bank Citigroup, had banking ties with a North Korean arms dealer in 2009, according to a cable sent by the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong in July 2009, The South China Morning Post reported Saturday, quoting information provided by the Wikileaks.

2011-9-8: Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun said Kim Jong-il believes the 2004 train station explosion in Ryongchon assassination attempt.

2011-9-6: U.S. prepared to intercept N. Korean missile: cable

2011-9-5: North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il expressed distrust of his country’s major economic prop China during a 2009 meeting with a visiting South Korean businesswoman, according to a US diplomatic cable.

2011-9-5: Myanmar, North Korea traded rice for arms: US cable

2011-9-3: Sudan negotiating purchase of missiles from North Korea

2011-9-3: US State Department urged China not to sell steel to the DPRK.

2011-8-3: Cambodian government worked with US and South Korea to quietly process North Korean defectors

2011-6-1: US tried to get Canada to finance oil donations to DPRK.

2011-4-11: China and US held DPRK intelligence talks.

2011-1-18: Did Iran pay the DPRK through a South Kroean branch?  The bank says no.

2011-1-6: U.S. Ambassador Feels Heat from WikiLeaks

2011-1-5: Chinese criticize DPRK currency reform.

2011-1-4: Kim Jong-il told a visiting South Korean businesswoman in 2009 that he had ordered the removal of a missile launch scene fromthe Ariarang Mass games because “Americans did not like it.”

2011-1-4: Former Chinese ambassador to Seoul, said today’s North Korea was similar to China during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 70s and dealing with officials there required that he “mentally reset his personal clock by thirty years.”

2010-12-19: WikiLeaks cable: Winston Peters condemns N Korea missile tests

2010-12-9: DPRK-Myanmar nuclear cooperation: here, here, and here.

2010-12-11: DPRK-US family reunions are extortion (Guardian)

2010-12-5: Nothing new in NK leaks (Andrei Lankov)

2010-12-3: Top-Level Defectors from N.Korea Identified (Choson Ilbo)

2010-12-3: N.Korea ‘Fattens Up’ People for Family Reunions (Choson Ilbo)

2010-12-2: North Korean diplomat: Six-party talks are dead (Foreign Policy)

2010-12-2: North Korean’s Earning $1 Per Month!

2010-12-1: WikiLeaks: Mongolia passed North Korea message to U.S. (CNN)  Brookings also published information on the Mongolia-DPRK relationship.

2010-12-1: Singapore disapproves (Straits Times)

2010-12-1: China Blocks Wikileaks (Sky News)

2010-11-30: Cheong Wa Dae denies reports of considering N. Korean regime change (Yonhap)

2010-11-30: What WikiLeaks Cables Reveal About North Korea (The Atlantic)

2010-11-29: North Korea Keeps the World Guessing (New York Times)

2010-11-28: Is there an Iran-NK missile link?  Russia says no. Experts question the idea.

Seriously.

Acording to Foreign Policy Magazine:

It’s not strictly accurate to say there was no international observation of Sunday’s Burmese election:

The newsreader said Myanmarese had voted “freely and happily,” noting the election had been witnessed by foreign diplomats, including some from North Korea, Vietnam and China, as well as the “Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Rangoon.”

Compared to those three countries, all of which have elections in which only the ruling Communist party participates, Burma, which at least has multiple military-backed parties disagreeing on small points of policy, may actually be the most democratic. Perhaps they were ensuring that international standards for rigging and suppression were met.

Additional information
1. I have actually visited all the countries mentioned in this article: the DPRK, China, Myanmar and Vietnam.  All fantastic trips, and I recommend you visit each of these countries.  Each country is unique and well worth the trip.  You will meet some fantastic people and gain memories that last a lifetime.

2. Several years ago a Myanmar military delegation visited the DPRK.  I mapped out the locations they visited on Google Earth.  You can see them here and here.

3. Thank you FP.

There is an interesting article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:

Article Highlights
1. The idea that North Korea and Myanmar are collaborating on a nuclear weapons programs represents only one possible scenario among several that deserve closer examination.

2. Myanmar’s goal might be to improve its missile program or trade in illicit technology rather than build nuclear weapons.

3. Myanmar’s receipt of illegally-exported or questionable dual-use items should cause the international community to reexamine export controls and policies specific to trade with the Southeast Asian country.

Article Text:

Is Myanmar developing nuclear weapons, perhaps with the help of North Korea? That worrisome possibility, prompted by Myanmar’s receipt of dual-use technology via an illegal North Korean procurement network, has garnered considerable speculation. Compelling evidence amassed in reports published this year by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), Jane’s Intelligence Review, and Al Jazeera indicates that, as the ISIS report put it, “There remain sound reasons to suspect that the military regime in Burma [Myanmar] might be pursuing a long-term strategy to make nuclear weapons.”1

The possible existence of such a program cannot and should not be discounted, but it is far from the only explanation that can account for Myanmar’s unusual imports. The dual-use technology sent to Myanmar — including a cylindrical grinder and magnetometer — are considerably beyond the country’s current technical capabilities, according to the DVB report. Such sophisticated devices, which could be used to produce nuclear- or missile-related parts, may point to a well-planned, long-term nuclear weapons program, perhaps assisted by North Korea.

However, alternate explanations also warrant consideration to better understand the nature of DPRK-Myanmar trade in such technologies. Plausible alternative scenarios include the use of Myanmar as a transshipment hub for items ultimately destined for North Korea, an evolving conventional missile program, procurement errors or other planning missteps, or some combination of these possibilities.

Myanmar as a transshipment hub. In late 2009, the Yokohama District Court in Japan found the president of Toko Boeki (a small Tokyo-based trading company) guilty of coordinating illegal WMD-related exports to Myanmar.2 Investigators determined that Toko Boeki had acquired cylindrical grinders and a magnetometer at the behest of New East International Company, a North Korean front company based in Hong Kong.3 Although New East International directed Toko Boeki to deliver the equipment to Myanmar, it is possible that the devices were not intended to remain there; Myanmar may have been a transfer point before the goods were shipped to another location — perhaps even North Korea.

Indeed, Myanmar has distinct advantages to North Korean procurement networks that want to circumvent sanctions and illegally divert dual-use equipment to Pyongyang. (See Editor’s Note.) Although it is also subject to sanctions, Myanmar is not as isolated as North Korea, and legitimate shipments originating from Japan, for example, can provide suitable cover for WMD-related deliveries.

In addition, Myanmar’s flourishing illegal trade networks — including drug and human trafficking — represent a familiarity with the kind of knowledge required to covertly transship deliveries to countries with more advanced WMD programs (such as North Korea). The rampant corruption associated with the military regime further enables illicit trade.

The revival of diplomatic and military relationships between Myanmar’s ruling junta and Pyongyang is another reason to consider whether North Korea, and not Myanmar, may have been the final destination for the dual-use equipment.4 Chartered or diplomatic air transport, necessary to ferry officials between capitals, is less susceptible to interdiction, offering an ideal conduit for the transfer of some types of dual-use equipment from Myanmar to North Korea. A UN panel of experts on Resolution 1874 (which strengthened sanctions on North Korea after its second nuclear test) highlighted such a scenario in a May 2010 report PDF, suggesting that Pyongyang may turn to illicit air cargo shipments as a preferred mode of transport for its illegal trade.

A conventional missile program. Myanmar may be an ideal transshipment hub, but reports from ISIS and DVB indicate that dual-use machine tools from Japan and Europe are not simply being stored in Myanmar, but also used there. This could indicate that the devices may actually be intended for use in Myanmar’s indigenous missile program.

Although Myanmar’s overall technological development appears limited in comparison with North Korea, the majority of the questionable dual-use items received by Myanmar may truly be for its own missile development effort. Acquisition of conventionally armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles would provide the junta with a significant strategic advantage over regional and domestic rivals, and short-range missiles could be useful to fight insurgent groups that challenge the junta’s authority.5

Further, Myanmar’s defense industry already produces artillery and mobile rocket launchers, and the country reportedly has spent more than a decade improving its missile production capabilities.6 This practical experience could facilitate Myanmar’s eventual creation of larger missiles, such as Scarabs or early Scud derivatives. Myanmar cannot yet produce these missiles, but the equipment identified in the Toko Boeki case and in the DVB report could be used to help it develop more advanced missile designs.

Alternative scenarios. It is also possible that, after some of the questionable dual-use equipment had already been received, a North Korea-Myanmar proliferation relationship fell into disarray due to the enormous complexity that plagues all WMD programs. Payment disputes (similar to those PDF that held up Myanmar’s negotiations with Russia for a 10 megawatt research reactor) could be one cause.7 Myanmar’s acquisition of equipment beyond its technical capabilities could also be explained by a procurement error or an overestimation of indigenous know-how, as the DVB report acknowledges. In 2002, Myanmar expressed interest in buying a mini-submarine from Pyongyang, according to Jane’s, but abandoned the idea due in part to its lack of expertise.8

The transfer of such advanced equipment could also be an example of aggressive sales of unsuitable technology to a naïve junta, similar to Geoffrey Forden’s suggestion that North Korea has been selling subpar missile technology to states in the Middle East. It is also plausible that a core group of scientists has the ear of the junta — as well as its funding — and may have over-promised deliverables. These scientists might include U Thaung, the pro-nuclear energy minister of science and technology, and Ko Ko Oo, who is director general of the Department of Atomic Energy and former director of the Department of Technical and Vocational Education (DTVE). The two departments shared the same address, phone number, and fax number until Myanmar’s capital was moved to Naypidyaw, and the DTVE is an end-user of some of the questionable dual-use equipment that Myanmar has acquired, according to ISIS.9

Another possible scenario is that Myanmar could be “warehousing” devices for North Korea under a barter agreement that allows Myanmar to train personnel on the dual-use equipment (and thereby gain valuable hands-on experience with the devices) before it is ultimately moved to North Korea. It is possible that Myanmar may even be viewed as an offshore production hub for transfer of items to North Korea or other interested parties. Sanctions make it nearly impossible for Pyongyang to acquire controlled, technically advanced equipment that requires installation and maintenance by foreign technicians; North Korea and Myanmar may have therefore collaborated to purchase the equipment, install it in Myanmar, and use the machines to produce advanced missile or nuclear parts that could then be more easily routed via air cargo to North Korea (or elsewhere).

Conclusion. The possibility that Myanmar is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is just one of many potential explanations for its importation of technologically advanced dual-use items. The alarming prospect of a nuclear-armed Myanmar cannot be ignored, but neither should it prevent the assessment of other feasible scenarios. More research is needed to determine precisely why Myanmar received questionable dual-use items and to discover their final destination, if Myanmar is a transshipment point. Export control regimes should take note of the potential for diversion of dual-use items through Myanmar, and to protect regional stability, governments in Asia should reexamine their trade policies toward the Southeast Asian country.

Read the full article here:
North Korea and Myanmar: A match for nuclear proliferation?
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Catherine Boyle, Melissa Hanham, Robert Shaw
9/27/2010

A few weeks ago I posted images of a secret Myanmar delegation visit to the DPRK. I was unsure the location of the “Model Command Post” (Command Control System and National Air Defense Command System – PLUTO – 4S), however an anonymous reader located a facility that is consistent with the picture taken by the Myanmar delegation:

The facility is located at 39° 3’0.86″N, 125°45’51.57″E between the Pyongyang television tower and the May Day Stadium.  Satellite imagery reveals the facility is relatively new.  As of October 2005, construction on the building had not begun.

Another reader also located the position of KPA unit 681.   According to KCNA:

(Feb 11, 2009) General Secretary Kim Jong Il inspected Unit No. 681 under the KPA Artillery Command and watched its firing exercise.

He was greeted on the spot by Col. General Ri Jong Bu, KPA Artillery commander, and other general officers and commanding officers of the unit.

He acquainted himself with the unit’s performance of duty. Then he mounted an observation platform where he was briefed on the plan for the exercise by the artillery commander and watched it.

The one-match-for-a-hundred artillerymen’s exercise clearly showed the resolute determination of the servicemen to crush the aggressors at a single blow when they dare intrude into the DPRK even 0.001mm and their merciless striking capability.

After watching the exercise conducted by the brave servicemen firmly armed with the ever-victorious Juche-based war methods, he expressed great satisfaction over the fact that all the servicemen are fully prepared politically and ideologically and in military technique to beat back any enemy’s surprise invasion in time and defend the socialist homeland like an impregnable fortress.

He highly estimated their successful exercise and set forth important tasks which would serve as guidelines for further developing the KPA into invincible revolutionary armed forces.

The KPA, a successor to the brilliant traditions of the anti-Japanese war, has grown not only to be an army strong in ideology as it regards the spirit of devotedly defending the leader, the spirit of becoming human bullets and bombs as unshakable faith but to be powerful revolutionary armed forces equipped with modern offensive and defensive means enough to wipe out the enemies at a single blow no matter from which part of the earth they come to invade the DPRK, he said, adding: The socialist homeland is impregnable and its cause of building a great prosperous powerful nation is firmly guaranteed as its defence line is guarded by this invincible army, which has grown strong in the protracted and arduous struggle.

He met the servicemen who took part in the exercise and warmly encouraged them, before having a photo session with them.

He was accompanied by KPA Vice Marshal Kim Yong Chun, minister of the People’s Armed Forces of the NDC of the DPRK, KPA General Ri Yong Ho, chief of the KPA General Staff, KPA General Kim Jong Gak, first vice-director of the KPA General Political Bureau, and KPA Generals Hyon Chol Hae, Kim Myong Guk and Ri Myong Su and other commanding officers of the army and Kim Ki Nam, secretary of the WPK Central Committee, and Jang Song Thaek, Pak Nam Gi and Kim Yang Gon, department directors of the C.C., the WPK, and other senior officials of the society.

By comparing satellite imagery with images captured from the ground, it appears that the unit is based near the Wonsan AFB runway:

Or maybe they just want us to think it is there!

Anyway, a big thanks to those readers for their time.

I can’t say enough about the benefits of crowd sourcing.  This is how we located the DPRK’s Reconnaissance Bureau some time ago.

According to Reuters Canada:

North Korean diplomats in Myanmar have confiscated hundreds of copies of a locally published biography on the Stalinist state’s reclusive leader, Kim Jong-il, the book’s author said Friday.

Prominent Burmese writer Hein Latt, 62, said two senior embassy officials visited his home and took away the remaining 300 copies of the book, which they said was “false and inaccurate” and could endanger ties between the two countries.

“I handed over these books just because I don’t want to take the trouble to sort out whatever consequences will appear,” Hein Latt told Reuters, adding he had not received any complaints from the authorities in military-ruled Myanmar.

There was no immediate explanation as to why diplomats were acting to confiscate books in a foreign country.

North Korea and Myanmar have developed a close diplomatic relationship, causing concern among Asian and Western countries fearful the two are cooperating on issues related to nuclear weapons technology.

North Korea’s Foreign Minister, Pak Ui-chun, is currently in Myanmar on a four-day visit.

Hein Latt, who has authored about 25 biographies, including books on U.S. President Barack Obama, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, said about 700 copies of his book had been sold since it was launched two months ago.

He said the biography, entitled “Kim Jong-Il: The Dear Leader of North Korea,” had been approved by the Press Scrutiny Department of the Myanmar’s Ministry of Information. It was written in the Burmese language.

The embassy officials said it contained false information because it made references to other texts published in North America about Kim, son of North Korea’s late founder, Kim Il-sung, the country’s “eternal” president.

An interview with the author is here.

Read the full story here:
North Korean diplomats seize books on Kim in Myanmar
Reuters Canada
7/30/2010

I stumbled on a set of photos taken by a Myanmar military delegation which visited the DPRK to shop for military accessories.  The visit was from Nov 21-28, 2008, but there are no KCNA stories which report on the visit.  I am not sure how the pictures made it out of Myanmar, but I am sure somebody got into trouble (UPDATE: See Tad in the comments).  They have been in the public domain for some time I gather, but I had never seen them until recently.

I received the photo set in PDF format with Burmese captions.  The image resolution was not great.  You can see the original PDF here. I had the photo captions translated and matched up with a publication of the group’s membership and itinerary and I even took the time to locate some (though not all) of the group’s destinations on Google Earth. You can see the photos and translated captions here (PDF). It is a large file, so give it a minute to download.  Apologies for any grammatical mistakes in this document.  There are some small typos which I could not be bothered to fix.  I relied on friends (and friends of friends) for all the translation work, but I believe it is all reasonably accurate.

Surprisingly, many of the stops on the delegation’s visit were typical tourist locations: Myohyangsan, West Sea Barrage, Tower of the Juche Idea, Arch of Triumph, Puhung and Yangwang Metro Stops.  But below I identify some of the more unique shopping destinations.

1. The Myanmar military delegation stayed in a “special hotel” for dignitaries behind Kamsusan Palace.  Previous guests have included the former King of Cambodia.  Below are frontal and satellite images:

2. The delegation visited a facility called the “Model of Command Post”  (Command Control System and National Air Defense Command System – PLUTO – 4S).  Judging by the satellite imagery, this is a new facility.

3. Judging from the pictures, the delegation seems to have visited the Pipagot Naval Base near Nampo. The South Koreans allege this base was involved in the sinking of the Cheonan.  We are not given this location in the pictures but we do know that the group was near Nampo at the time and that the pictures and satellite imagery of Pipagot are consistent.

4. I believe that the pictures also confirm the Myanmar delegation visited the Onchon Air Force Base.  Again this is because we know the group was near Nampo, the photos and the satellite imagery of the area are consistent, and in the fourth photo below, the Burmese language caption acknowledges the existence of Onchon’s underground aircraft hangar.

5. And finally, the photos claim that the delegation visited a number of facilities in a place called “Tackwon”:  A Women’s military unit, AA ammunition factory, anti-tank-laser-beam-guided-missile factory, radar factory, and Igla factory.  This location is is actually Taegwan (Daegwan, 대관) in North Pyongan Province (40°13’10.48″N, 125°13’27.32″E).  Of all the facilities mentioned in the itinerary, the only one from which we have ground-level photographs is the “Women’s Artillery Unit” and the  ”Radar Factory”.

As of 12/8/2010 the imagery for this location is in high resolution on Google Earth and we can now pinpoint these locations.  The “Women’s Artillery Unit” is located at 40.218949°, 125.231670° and the “Radar Factory” is located at 40.228778°, 125.237964°.  They are pictured on the left- and right-hand sides of the following image:

According to Bloomberg:

Allegations by a Myanmar defector that the military-run country is pursuing a nuclear program are corroborated by newly available commercial satellite images, Jane’s Intelligence Review said in an article released yesterday.

The photos of buildings and security fences near the country’s capital, Naypyidaw, confirm reports by Major Sai Thein Win of machine tool factories and other facilities alleged to be part of a nascent program to build nuclear weapons, the magazine reported from London.

“They will not make a bomb with the technology they currently possess or the intellectual capability,” Jane’s analyst Allison Puccioni said in an interview. “The two factors do make it possible to have a route to one.”

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed concern about reports that North Korea and Myanmar are expanding military ties and sharing nuclear technology at a meeting of Southeast Asian foreign ministers in Thailand last year.

Clinton said the U.S. would remain “vigilant” against any military cooperation between the two countries. Yesterday, Clinton announced further sanctions against North Korea in an effort to halt the country’s nuclear-weapons program.

Sai said he worked at two factories involved in the nuclear program. His report to a Burmese opposition news website, Democratic Voice of Burma, based in Norway, included documents and color photographs of the interior of the installations.

The satellite imagery reviewed by Jane’s showed only the exterior of the buildings, Puccioni said.

‘Overly Ambitious’

Jane’s said Myanmar’s nuclear program is “overly ambitious with limited expertise,” in a statement yesterday. While Myanmar is a signatory to international agreements to control nuclear weapons use, it hasn’t agreed to more recent changes in the treaties and therefore isn’t subject to international inspections, the magazine said.

“With Myanmar’s current freedom from sanctions and relative economic prosperity, the junta may be able to outsource the technical know-how and tools to reach its goals far sooner than expected,” Christian Le Mière, editor of Jane’s Intelligence Review, said in a statement.

“Someone had to be assisting them, that’s the frightening thing,” said David Kay, a former United Nations weapons inspector and now a fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, Virginia, in an interview. “Myanmar is uniquely incapable of carrying this through.”

North Korea could be the country providing aid, said Michael J. Green, an adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former senior director for Asia on the National Security Council under President George W. Bush.

North Korea

During the Bush administration, North Korea discussed delivering short-range missiles and nuclear capability to Myanmar, Green said.

“We worry about the transfer of nuclear technology” and indications of clandestine military cooperation between two of Asia’s most secretive regimes, Clinton said last year. “I’m not saying it is happening, but we want to be prepared to stand against it.”

State Department spokesman Philip J. Crowley said on July 12 that the U.S. continues “to have concerns about Burma’s relationship with North Korea. It’s something that we watch very, very carefully and consistently.”

Last year, the U.S. Navy followed the Kang Nam I, a North Korean freighter headed in the direction of Myanmar with unknown cargo. The ship turned around and returned home.

The evidence points to a method of uranium enrichment, laser enrichment, that the North Koreans have never used, Kay said. “If it is laser enrichment the finger points more toward Chinese assistance or some place in the former Soviet Union,” he said.

Read the full story here:
Myanmar Nuclear Weapon Program Claims Supported by Photos, Jane’s Reports
Bloomberg
Peter S. Green
7/21/2010

According to the Irrawaddy:

A recent New York Times op-ed article by Aung Lynn Htut, formerly a high-ranking Burmese military intelligence officer who defected in 2005 while he served as an attaché at the Burmese embassy in Washington, shed new light on the history of the still murky relationship between Burma and North Korea, two of the world’s most isolated, secretive and oppressive regimes.

Burma broke diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1983, when North Korean agents attempted to assassinate the South Korean president on Burmese soil. But according to Aung Lynn Htut, shortly after current junta-chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe assumed power in 1992, he surreptitiously moved to renew ties with Pyongyang.

“Than Shwe secretly made contact with Pyongyang. Posing as South Korean businessmen, North Korean weapon experts began arriving in Burma. I remember these visitors. They were given special treatment at the Rangoon airport,” Aung Lynn Htut said in his June 18 article.

The junta kept its renewed ties with North Korea secret for more than a decade because it was working to establish relationships with Japanese and South Korean businesses, Aung Lynn Htut said. By 2006, however, “the junta’s generals felt either desperate or confident enough to publicly resume diplomatic relations with North Korea.” 

In November 2008, the junta’s No 3, Gen Shwe Mann, visited North Korea and signed a memorandum of understanding, officially formalizing military cooperation between Burma and North Korea. Photographs showed him touring secret tunnel complexes built into the sides of mountains thought to store and protect jet aircraft, missiles, tanks and nuclear and chemical weapons.

According to Aung Lynn Htut, Lt-Gen Tin Aye, the No.5 in the Burma armed forces and the chief of Military Ordnance, is now the main liaison in the relationship with Pyongyang. Tin Aye has often traveled to North Korea as well as attended ceremonies at the North Korean embassy in Rangoon.

In September 2009, The New Light of Myanmar reported that Tin Aye went to the anniversary celebration of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), held in a hotel in Rangoon. In February, Tin Aye, along with other senior officials, attended the birthday event of the Dear Leader of North Korea at the embassy.

Flights and ships from North Korea to Burma have been carrying more than just Burmese generals. Analysts, including Burma military expert Andrew Selth, say that for years Burma and North Korea have used a barter system whereby Burma exchanges primary products for North Korean military technologies.

In June 2009, a North Korean ship, the Kang Nam I, was diverted from going to Burma after being trailed by the US navy. Then in April, another North Korean ship, the Chong Gen, docked in Burma carrying suspicious cargo, allegedly in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which restricts North Korea from arms deals and from trading in technology that could be used for nuclear weapons.

In May, the seven-member UN panel monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea said in a report that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Burma with the aid of front companies around the world.

According to the UN report, a North Korean company, Namchongang Trading, which is known to be associated with illicit procurement for Burma’s nuclear and military program and is on the US sanctions list, was involved in suspicious activities in Burma.

The report also noted three individuals were arrested in Japan in 2009 for attempting to illegally export a magnetometer—a dual-use instrument that can be employed in making missile control system magnets and gas centrifuge magnets—to Burma via Malaysia allegedly under the direction of another company known to be associated with illicit procurement for North Korea’s nuclear and military programs.

The UN experts also said that the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation has handled several transactions involving millions of dollars directly related to deals between Burma and the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation.
 
With this string of events and the suspicions surrounding them as a dramatic lead in, on June 4, Al Jazeera aired a news documentary prepared by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) which was written by Robert Kelley, a nuclear scientist and former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The DVB report claimed that the ruling military junta in Burma is “mining uranium, converting it to uranium compounds for reactors and bombs, and is trying to build a reactor and/or an enrichment plant that could only be useful for a bomb.”

The IAEA wrote to Burma’s agency representative, Tin Win, on June 14 and asked whether the information provided in the DVB report was true. Burma, which is a member of the IAEA, a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a signatory to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, responded with a letter stating that the DVB report allegations are “groundless and unfounded.”

“No activity related to uranium conversion, enrichment, reactor construction or operation has been carried out in the past, is ongoing or is planned for the future in Myanmar [Burma],” the letter said.

The letter also noted that Burma is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the agency’s so-called safeguards agreement. “As stated in the safeguards agreement, Myanmar will notify the agency if it plans to carry out any nuclear activities,” the letter said.

The regime, however, has not signed the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, meaning that the agency has no power to set up an inspection of Burma’s nuclear facilities under the existing mechanism known as the Small Quantities Protocol.

Previously, on June 11, Burma’s state radio and television news had reported the Foreign Ministry’s denial of the allegations in the DVB report. The denial claimed that anti-government groups in collusion with the media had launched the allegations with the goal of “hindering Burma’s democratic process and to tarnish the political image of the government.”

The Foreign Ministry denial also addressed Nyapyidaw’s relationship with Pyongyang. “Following the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, Myanmar [Burma] and the DPRK, as independent sovereign states, have been engaging in promoting trade and cooperation between the two countries in the same way Myanmar is dealing with others,” the ministry said in its statement.

The regime did acknowledge that the Chong Gen docked at Thilawa Port near Rangoon in April. But the statement said the North Korean vessel was involved in importing cement from North Korea and exporting rice from Burma.

But in an article for Asia Times online, Burma analyst Bertil Linter noted that, “if carrying only innocuous civilian goods, as the statement maintains, there would seemingly have been no reason for authorities to cut electricity around the area when the Chong Gen, a North Korean ship flying the Mongolian flag of convenience, docked on the outskirts of Yangon.”

“According to intelligence sources, security was tight as military personnel offloaded heavy material, including Korean-made air defense radars. The ship left the port with a return cargo of rice and sugar, which could mean that it was, at least in part, a barter deal. On January 31 this year, another North Korean ship, the Yang M V Han A, reportedly delivered missile components also at Yangon’s Thilawa port,” Linter said.

Strategypage.com, a military affairs website covering armed forces worldwide, said, “Indications are that the North Korean ship that delivered a mysterious cargo four months ago, was carrying air defense radars (which are now being placed on hills up north) and ballistic missile manufacturing equipment. Dozens of North Korean technicians have entered the country in the last few months, and have been seen working at a military facility outside Mandalay. It’s unclear what this is for. Burma has no external enemies, and ballistic missiles are of no use against internal opposition.”

In his Asia Times online story, Lintner noted that on June 24, the DVB reported that a new radar and missile base had been completed near Mohnyin in Myanmar’s northern Kachin State, and he reported that work on similar radar and missile bases has been reported from Kengtung in eastern Shan State,160 kilometers north of the Thai border town of Mae Sai.

“Since Myanmar is not known to have imported radars and missile components from any country other than North Korea, the installations would appear to be one of the first visible outcomes of a decade of military cooperation,” Lintner said.

Lintner also reported that Western intelligence sources know that 30 to 40 North Korean missile technicians are currently working at a facility near Minhla on the Irrawaddy River in Magwe Division, and that some of the technicians may have arrived overland by bus from China to give the appearance of being Chinese tourists. 

North Korea has also issued adamant denials with respect to allegations regarding its relationship with Burma.

According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), on June 21 Pyongyang said, “The US is now making much fuss, floating the sheer fiction that the DPRK is helping Myanmar [Burma] in its nuclear development.”

The KCNA often highlights the close relationship between North Korea and Burma.

On June 20, the Pyongyang news agency reported that ex-Col Than Tun, deputy chairman of the Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Ltd., sent a statement cheering Kim Jong Il’s 46th anniversary at the Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea.

On April 18, Korean state-run- media reported that Than Tun also issued a statement cheering the 17th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s chairing of North Korea’s National Defense Commission.

“Kim Jong Il’s field inspection of KPA [Korean People’s Army] units served as a main source that helped bolster [North Korea's] self-reliant defense capability in every way,” the statement noted.

Military sources said the Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Ltd, managed by the junta, is responsible for purchasing imported weapons for Burma’s armed forces, including transferring money to overseas banks such as Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation.

Meanwhile, in addition to its escalating relationship with North Korea, the Burmese military regime has recently boosted ties with Iran, which according to the UN report is also allegedly receiving nuclear and missile technologies from North Korea.

In recent years, Burmese and Iranian officials visited their counterparts homeland for the purported purpose of improving economic ties. Observers, however, said Than Shwe has made a tactical decision to develop relationships with other “pariah states,” particularly enemies of the US, to relieve Western pressure on his regime.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali Fathollahi met Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win and Minister of Energy Lun Thi during his trip to Burma on June 15-17.

“The two sides reiterated their desire to further expand the ties of friendship and economic cooperation and to increase cooperation in the regional international forums such as [the] United Nations and Non-Aligned Movement,” The New Light of Myanmar reported on June 18.

Fathollahi’s visit came three months after Maung Myint’s visit to Iran on March 8-11, when he met Iranian Foreign Minister Manochehr Mottaki and Deputy Minister of Petroleum H. Noghrehkar Shirazi.

Read the full story below:
Burma-North Korea Ties: Escalating Over Two Decades
Irrawaddy
Wai Moe
7/7/2010