North Korean Economy Watch

Joong Ang Daily
12/19/2006

Despite United Nations sanctions aimed at preventing the North Korean government from buying luxury goods for its ruling class, government sources here said a North Korean trading company is still busy providing Kim Jong-il loyalists with their perquisites.

Tian Ming Trading Company, in the center of this former Portuguese enclave now with the same China-affiliated status as Hong Kong, says its main business line is carpets, and little more. Three office workers said there were no North Koreans at the company and that it has never traded with North Korea. The company’s president was out of town on business, they said.

But a source with close ties to the trading economy here said that Park Su-dok, a 53-year-old North Korean, is in Macao and obtained a visa as an employee of the company.

Another source said, “Tian Ming is a joint venture by North Korean and Hong Kong investors, and its main business is buying luxury goods from Hong Kong for shipment to North Korea.” He added that Tian Ming’s president, a Hong Kong resident, is buying luxury watches, gold products and expensive liquor at North Korea’s request, using a Hong Kong branch office for the purpose.

Other Macao government officials said 18 North Korean firms were registered in Macao as of late November, and 115 North Koreans carry Macao visas as employees. Twenty have become Macao citizens, they added.

Since Washington threatened to impose sanctions on Banco Delta Asia here, allegedly for helping North Korea launder cash from its alleged dubious business lines, some of those companies have shut down. Ten are still in limited operation, however, these government sources said.

Separately, a South Korean banker in Hong Kong told the Joong-Ang Ilbo that a North Korean businessman had visited him in an attempt to sell gold bars through one of the South Korean bank branches in Hong Kong.

The banker reportedly spurned the overture, although the transaction would not have violated any South Korean laws or regulations on North-South dealings. He said he simply did not want to get involved in such a deal given the international attention being paid to commercial dealings with North Korea. The banker suggested that the offer may have been a sign of the foreign currency problems North Korea is facing because of the UN sanctions and U.S. pressure on financial dealings with North Korea.

Banco Delta Asia has said that between 2003 and 2005, it had sold 9.2 tons of gold bars that it had purchased from the North, where gold production is estimated to be about 25 tons per year, mostly for export.

Wall Street Journal
12/18/2006
Gordon Fairlcough, p.A1

Close-Out Sale: North Korea’s Elite Shop While They Can

A North Korean businesswoman with heavy makeup and a bouffant hairdo studied herself in a mirror as she modeled fur-lined leather coats at a small store in [Dandong, China] this frigid northeast border city.

During a three-day excursion late last month, the woman also tried on shoes and looked at large-screen television sets before buying furniture and fresh fruit and heading home to Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital city.

The United Nations has called for a crackdown on luxury-goods shipments to North Korea as a way of pressuring the country to drop its atomic-weapons programs, which came under new fire after an October nuclear test.

If anything, the uncertainty about the flow of fancy goods appears to have whetted the appetites of some privileged North Koreans — whose impoverished country cultivates a Spartan socialist image.

In Dandong, North Koreans, many wearing lapel pins with a picture of North Korea’s founding dictator, Kim Il Sung, stroll through hotels and department stores. Signs are often written in Korean, with storekeepers advertising computers, karaoke machines and the erectile-dysfunction drugs Viagra and Cialis.

A few North Koreans have bought new cars at a Toyota dealership near the Dandong customs checkpoint, according to a salesman. One man paid about $50,000 in cash for a luxury sedan.

Gold is also gaining a following. Wang Xiaoju, a saleswoman at the jewelry counter at Xin Yi Bai Department Store, says North Korean women come in nearly every day, mostly to buy gold chains and other gold jewelry.

Women from the North also are frequent visitors to a riverfront spa, favoring milk baths and massages, according to staff there. A saleswoman at the Xin Yi Bai L’Oreal counter says North Koreans are regular customers. Among the big sellers: body sculpting cream for women who want to look thinner.

In the first 10 months of this year, Chinese exports of fur coats and fake furs to North Korea soared more than sevenfold from the year-earlier period, according to Chinese Customs figures. Exports of televisions and other consumer electronics were up 77%, while perfumes and cosmetics were up 10%.

Some North Koreans are even buying real estate in Dandong. One high-rise building, where three bedroom apartments go for nearly $100,000 each, has sweeping views of a decrepit North Korean village with crumbling cinder-block houses across the border. A North Korean buyer recently purchased one of the units with cash, according to the building’s sales agent.

“Life is quite comfortable” for senior party members, military officers and traders, who have prospered despite widespread shortages of food, fuel and medicine in North Korea, says Pak Yong Ho, a former high-ranking North Korean official who defected to South Korea two years ago.

North Korea’s Communist Party has long had overseas agents in Macau, Switzerland and elsewhere dedicated to maintaining supplies of luxuries for top military and government personnel, according to former North Korean officials. Their jobs, in the wake of the U.N. sanctions, could get much harder.

The U.N. so far has let individual countries decide which high-end products to block. Washington has barred U.S. companies from selling everything from iPods to Harley-Davidson motorcycles. But that move was largely symbolic, as there is very little direct trade between the U.S. and North Korea.

Japan, which has for decades been a source of luxuries for the North Korean ruling class, has banned exports of 24 fancy products from caviar and gems to watches and art.

But the key to whether the sanctions will work is in the hands of China, North Korea’s largest trading partner.

A steel-girder bridge here spans the Yalu River, connecting Dandong to the city of Sinuiju in North Korea. That has helped Dandong, whose name means “Red East,” become a popular shopping destination for North Koreans with money. It is unclear how much that will change because of the sanctions.

So far, China hasn’t disclosed what specific kinds of high-end exports — TVs or luxury automobiles, for instance — it will block. A Chinese foreign-ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, has said the list “should not be allowed to impact normal trade transactions” between the socialist neighbors.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, whose own taste for expensive French cognac and other imported luxuries is well known, uses money and goods liberally in an effort to buy the loyalty of the elite, according to U.S. and South Korean officials. Some of these officials say that depriving the ruling class of its creature comforts could alienate them from Mr. Kim, long known as “Dear Leader.”

But many North Korea watchers and North Korean defectors doubt that the elite would revolt against Mr. Kim’s government, because their fates are so closely tied to his now. “Under this regime, the privileged have had a very good life,” says Kim Dok Hong, the second-highest North Korean official to defect. “If the regime collapses, the people they’ve mistreated will be looking for revenge.”

At the peak of the famine that killed more than a million North Koreans in the mid-1990s, Mr. Pak, the former government official, says his parents weren’t short of food. Their home had three refrigerators regularly replenished with imported provisions by the Communist Party. Mr. Pak uses a pseudonym to protect family members still in the North from government retribution.

“The elites have had more freedom to do their own business” since economic overhauls in 2002, says Yang Chang Seok, a senior official at South Korea’s Unification Ministry, which oversees relations with the North. “People have earned a lot of money from trading.”

These days in Pyongyang, members of the ruling class are ferried around in imported cars and live in well-appointed — and well-guarded — apartment complexes. Their children race around city parks on in-line skates and play American computer games.

Says Mr. Pak: “If you can afford to pay, there’s nothing you can’t get.”

Wall Street Journal Opinion Journal
Melanie Kirkpatrick
12/18/2006

This being The Wall Street Journal, we went straight to the bottom line. How much, we asked our visitor at a recent editorial board meeting, does it cost to free one North Korean refugee hiding in China?

The Rev. Phillip Buck pauses a moment before replying, apparently making the yuan-to-dollar conversions on the abacus in his mind. “If I do it myself,” he says, “the cost is $800 per person. If I hire a broker to do it, it’s $1,500.”

Pastor Buck is a rescuer. It’s a job title that applies to a courageous few–mostly Americans and South Koreans and predominantly Christians–who operate the underground railroad that ferries North Korean refugees out of China to South Korea, and now, thanks to 2004 legislation, to the U.S. Mr. Buck, an American from Seattle, says he has rescued more than 100 refugees and helped support another 1,000 who are still on the run. For this “crime”–China’s policy is to hunt down and repatriate North Koreans–he spent 15 months in a Chinese prison. He was released in August.

The plight of the tens of thousands of North Korean refugees in China is a humanitarian crisis that has received scant world attention. It won’t be on the agenda of the six-party talks, which are scheduled to restart today in Beijing. But the experience of Pastor Buck and other rescuers is worth noting as negotiators sit down with Kim Jong Il’s emissaries. North Korea won’t change, they believe, so long as Kim remains in power. Follow that logic, and regime change is the proper goal.

The refugees, Pastor Buck argues, are the key to regime change in North Korea and, by inference, the key to halting the North’s nuclear and missile programs. Help one man or woman escape, he says, and that person will get word to his family back home about the freedom that awaits them on the outside. Others will follow, and the regime will implode. This is what happened in 1989, when Hungary refused to turn back East Germans fleeing to the West, thereby hastening the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Pastor Buck was born in North Korea in 1941 and fled with his brothers to the South during the Korean War. He emigrated to the U.S. in the ’80s, becoming a citizen in 1992. When famine hit North Korea in the late ’90s, and millions died, he raised relief funds in Korean churches in the U.S. “I helped send 150 tons of flour and rice to the North,” he says, “and 70 tons of fertilizer . . . This was a time when government rations had stopped and people were living off grass.”

But on visits to the North, he soon realized that the government was stealing the food intended for starving citizens. “I changed my mind” about the efficacy of aid, he says, and in 1998 he joined the effort to help people escape. “If you see someone who is drowning in the river, wouldn’t you reach out and help that person?” he asks. “That’s what was in my heart.”

Pastor Buck is nothing if not determined. In 2002, while in a Southeast Asian country with a group of refugees he had guided there, his apartment in Yanji city, in northeast China, was raided. Nineteen refugees were captured and a copy of his passport was confiscated. With his identity now compromised, Mr. Buck returned to the U.S. and underwent legal proceedings to change his name. John Yoon, the name he was born with, was dead; Phillip Buck was born.

The new Pastor Buck returned to China, where, on May 25, 2005, he was arrested and eventually convicted of the crime of helping illegal immigrants. Thanks to the intervention of the U.S. government, he was deported before he could be sentenced.

Another American, Steve Kim, was not so lucky. Mr. Kim, a furniture importer from Huntington, N.Y., has been in prison in China since September 2003, sentenced to five years for smuggling aliens. Mr. Kim, who, like Mr. Buck, is of Korean ancestry and is a Christian, became aware of the plight of the refugees during business trips to China. He funded two safe houses and paid for refugees’ passage on the underground railroad. Beijing refuses to grant him parole, saying foreigners are not eligible. His wife and three children will pass their fourth Christmas without him.

Mr. Buck, meanwhile, will celebrate Christmas at home in Seattle, along with four refugees, now settled in South Korea, whom he has invited to spend the holiday with him and his family. These refugees–two men and two women–have harrowing personal tales of starvation, death and repression in the North and desperate lives on the run in China.

One young man, who asks that his name not be used for fear of retribution on family members still at home, spent time in the North Korean gulag, after being captured in China and repatriated. He was tortured, he says–rolling up his trousers at a recent press conference in Washington, D.C. to display the scars on his legs.

One morning at roll call, he recounts, one of his cellmates, a man who had been badly beaten during the night, was too sick to get out of bed. The guards ordered the prisoners to carry the injured man into the woods and bury him. “I keep thinking, maybe he would still be alive if we hadn’t buried him,” the escapee says. The name of the dead man was Kim Young Jin. The name of the prison is Chong Jin. Says the man who escaped: “I am very glad to be here, and tell the people in America how life in North Korea really is.”

Pastor Buck spent last Christmas in jail. “My cellmates were criminals,” he says, “12 in all, murderers and rapists.” His diary entry for Dec. 24, 2005, notes that he distributed the chocolates his children had sent him as Christmas gifts to his cellmates. And this year? “I am so excited that I can celebrate this Christmas with lots of joy,” his diary entry for last Thursday reads.

His final words are for the refugees. “I pray, let the Christmas spirit be with those North Korean refugees still in China. Let them be safe too.”

Official Web Page:

Northeast Asia can be considered the last major economic frontier on the Asian continent.  The region has enormous economic potential, but this potential can only be realised through dynamic cooperation and sharing of resources.

Recognising Northeast Asia’s considerable potential and geopolitical significance, UNDP in 1991 agreed to support the initiative of the countries in the region to establish an institutional mechanism for regional dialogue and further cooperation.   For the past twelve years, the Tumen River Area Development Programme has facilitated economic cooperation among the five member countries: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Mongolia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Russian Federation.  The member countries are equally represented in the Consultative Commission for the Development of the Tumen River Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia, which meets annually at Vice Ministerial level.

The main objectives of the Tumen Programme are to:

• attain greater growth and sustainable development for the peoples and countries in Northeast Asia, and the Tumen Region in particular;
• identify common interests and opportunities for cooperation and sustainable development;
• increase mutual benefit and mutual understanding;
• strengthen economic, environmental and technical cooperation; and
  work to ensure that the Tumen Region is attractive for international investment, trade and business.

The first phase of the Tumen Programme involved extensive planning and background studies.  An interim phase focused on investment promotion and development initiatives designed to build momentum for the region as a growth triangle.  The second phase built on the institutional framework for regional cooperation created by the multilateral agreements concluded in 1995.  The third – and current – phase continues to address factors fundamental to regional economic cooperation and is designed to ensure the sustainability of this regional cooperation framework.

Why the Focus on the Tumen Region?
The Tumen Region has great potential as a major entrepot for international trade because of the strategic location of the Tumen transport corridor, the strong complementarities of the Tumen River Area, vast natural and human resources, and the area’s accessibility to the resources and markets of Northeast Asia.

Northeast China and Mongolia are landlocked and therefore have a strong interest in access to ports in DPRK and the Russian Far East.  Overseas shippers also have a stake in the Tumen transport corridor, for it offers a much shorter route to affluent and new markets, and facilitates transit trade to a number of destinations.

The local governments in the Tumen Region have been steadfast supporters of the Tumen Programme since its inception.  It appears that central governments in Northeast Asia are now re-emphasising the value of the Tumen Region, particularly its strategic transport corridor.  Northeast Asian governments are rapidly improving the Tumen Region’s infrastructure network and transport services.  They are also working to create legal and institutional mechanisms conducive to cross-border trade and transport.  The Tumen Programme is actively facilitating the creation of an enabling environment through “soft” infrastructure and human capacity building.

Why is Regional Cooperation so Important?
Regional cooperation is a vital part of the development process and a building block for effective participation in world trade and capital markets.  For the Tumen Region, which partly consists of small and remote areas of large countries, economic cooperation is an effective way to avoid marginalisation.  Cross-border cooperation also helps resolve environmental issues and facilitates the adoption of international environmental standards.  Most importantly, enhanced economic cooperation in Northeast Asia helps improve political relations and stability, in turn vital elements for investment and economic growth.

It is worth recalling how remote and closed the Tumen Region was just a dozen years ago, to appreciate the full significance of its role as a frontier for economic cooperation in Northeast Asia.  Much has been achieved during the Tumen Programme’s existence, particularly in terms of opening borders and increasing interaction in a region that was, until recently, tense and largely closed.  A new trade and transport corridor has been created, which will – in time – evolve into an economic corridor with a significant impact on poverty reduction and improved living standards in the region.

The Future of the Tumen Programme
The prevailing political and economic climate in the region has altered dramatically since the start of the Tumen Programme in 1991.  The Soviet Union has dissolved, China and ROK have established diplomatic relations and a major trading partnership, and there has been a degree of rapprochement between DPRK and ROK.  The transition to stronger economic systems in the countries that relied on the Soviet Comecon trading system has reinforced the logic of economic cooperation in the Tumen Region.  The increased participation of DPRK, Mongolia and the Russian Far East, combined with the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy, will help the Northeast Asian economy grow.

Dynamic cooperation has found increasing expression in Northeast Asia, and relations in the region continue to improve, helped by stronger economic links.  Despite major improvements in the geopolitical circumstances of the region, however, much remains to be done.  The Tumen Programme is the only initiative that brings the member countries together on a sub-regional basis, and its existing institutional structure and multilateral agreements should be utilised to maximum effect to help Northeast Asia achieve peace and prosperity.

Donga
12/7/2006

As the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution against North Korea, some of the projects pursued in partnership with Pyongyang needed to be postponed. So I explained the background to a North Korean director-level official in charge of relevant work, but he knew nothing about the UNSC sanctions.”

He suggested that the U.S.` financial sanctions against the North were already having an impact on the upper class. “I recently met a businessman selling medical devices to North Korea, who told me that the sales of blood pressure testers widely used by the North Korean upper class recently dropped dramatically. I believe this is because foreign currency inflows into North Korea are on the decline due to the financial sanctions against it,” he explained.

He also mentioned subtle changes taking place in relations between North Korea and China that have become growingly complex these days.

“The North is recently beefing up security measures against Chinese merchants operating in Pyongyang. The development project of the Musan iron mine in North Hamgyong Province of North Korea, which China has pushed for enthusiastically as part of its endeavor to secure natural resources, is put off for now. It is reported that after the North Korean nuclear test, the Chinese authorities ordered a postponement of the project for the time being.” As China needs raw material in the long term, however, he projected, “Though there currently are some conflict factors between China and North Korea, China will have to support the North as it does not want the country to collapse.”

With regard to what North Korean society as a whole is like after the nuclear test, he stated, “There are absolutely no signs of political changes. The North Korean regime`s control over the society is rock-solid, not being swayed at all.” He also indicated, however, “More recently, the North Korean authorities are strengthening their control over foreigners there.”

As to why the North Korean regime forces humanitarian international groups leave the country and tries not to receive food aid from outside, he cited two reasons: First, as international groups have operated in the North for a long period of time, North Korean residents started to show “real goodwill” to them. This leads to social uncertainties there. Second, as a country emphasizing “self-reliance,” North Korea finds it hurting its ego to receive foreign aid every year.

He worried that a food shortage is expected when the season of spring poverty unfolds in earnest in April. He stressed, “Given this year`s harvest was not good, if foreign aid decreases, North Korea is highly likely to face the worst-ever food shortage, arbeit not a famine, since the mid-1990s (dubbed the “Painful March under Trials”). Help from the international community is desperately needed.”

Regarding his life as a diplomat in Pyongyang, he said that even though he needed to get permission from the North Korean authorities to go to provincial areas, he could move freely within downtown Pyongyang. As the structure of everyone monitoring each other has been internalized in North Korea, he added, when one tries to shoot an “inappropriate” scene from the perspective of North Korea, someone appears out of nowhere to stop him.

He plans to return to Pyongyang sooner or later.

Donga
12/6/2006

“The relationship between North Korea and China can be compared to a river that seems calm on the surface but has a great number of uncertainties surging underwater.”

Kurt Campbell, the senior vice president at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a think- tank in the U.S., had an interview with this newspaper on December 04. Senior vice president Campbell, renowned as an authority in international securities especially regarding China, said, “The official stance of China is to protect North Korea, but the nation is upset internally at the attitude of North Korea that belittles China and the global society. Without a noticeable change in the attitude of North Korea, China might take steps to reappraise its policies toward North Korea it has maintained over the years.”

―You analyzed in a seminar last month that North Korea will come into possession of nuclear capability targeting China.

“North Korea is feeling threats from many sides. What I meant was that while the major military is aimed at the U.S. across the truce line and Japan, North Korea should be aspiring underneath the surface to have suppressive force against China out of concerns regarding their relationship with China.”

At this point, senior vice president Campbell diagnosed that “North Korea seems determined to become a nuclear nation and will not give up on it” and went on to give his view that “even in case North Korea returns to the six-party round table, it will not show fundamental improvements.”

―How do you view the South Korea-U.S relationship in the present and in the future?

“The relationship between South Korea and the U.S is quite stable at the lower level. The greatest risk to the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. presently is not in the relationship itself but in the domestic politics of South Korea. Uncertainties are being aggravated by questions over where President Roh will take the problems (of the Korean Peninsula).”

―You said the South Korea-U.S relationship is stable at a low level.

“The nuclear testing by North Korea helped compose the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. The replacement of U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will also help. He was not a factor conducive to the South Korea-U.S. relationship. I think he looked at South Korea not as a profitable strategic partner but as a pain in the ass. In this aspect it was incidental and ironic that the aim of Secretary Rumsfeld and President Roh, regarding matters such as the transfer of right to control strategies in war, converged at the same point. Of course their motivations diverged greatly. On the other hand the future U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates seems to be a person who shares the opinion that having a closer relationship with South Korea is important.”

―How would you grade the response by related nations toward North Korean nuclear testing?

“I hope to see South Korea, the U.S., and China sending North Korea a concurring message. But what I’m concerned about is whether the government of South Korea did not send a message that “even though the nuclear testing was depressing, it was not unforgivable, and a certain level of business can go on.”

Asia Times
(abridged)
11/30/2006

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 has had no impact on the economic activity in the remote northeastern corner of North Korea where Russians and Chinese are building transportation infrastructure for future industrial-development projects. As was planned before the nuclear test, the Russians began repairing a dilapidated railway line, while the Chinese continued with their highway-construction project.

There were no delays in the normal operations of the Kumgang (also transliterated Geumgang) project, a joint tourist venture on the border between two Koreas. Every day many hundreds of South Korean tourists travel about 20 kilometers into the North to visit the picturesque mountains and spend a few days there, leaving their currency in the accounts of the North Korean government. The project has always been a major money-earner for the cash-hungry North. The Americans tried to stop Kumgang operations, but the South Koreans refused, and business continued as usual.

It was reported this month that a number of the North Korean workers employed by South Korean companies in Gaesong industrial park exceeded the 10,000 mark. Gaesong industrial park is the largest cooperative venture between two Koreas. It is the place where South Korean capital and technology use cheap North Korean labor to produce internationally competitive stuff – or at least this is what is supposed to be going on there.

In spite of optimistic talk, so far the project has been a money-losing enterprise for the Southerners, and most companies stay in Gaesong only because their government is willing to back them financially.  Still, Seoul, even when it talked tough, did not do anything to slow down the project. On the contrary, the Gaesong project is growing fast, and so, one might suspect, are revenues it provides to the Pyongyang regime.

By now it has become patently clear. No international sanction regime against North Korea worthy of its name is in place, and there is no chance that such regime will emerge in future. China, Russia and, above all, South Korea do not want to punish North Korea for going nuclear.

China is not happy about a nuclear North Korea, but probably sees it a lesser evil than a unified Korea that is likely to be under US influence and will perhaps even have US military bases. Beijing does not want this. It also does not want a collapse of another state under communist rule – this might be a bad news for domestic propagandists.

And last but not least, in recent years Chinese companies have moved into North Korea, taking over mining and infrastructure, so such gains need be protected as well. At the same time, the North Korean nukes are not seen by Chinese strategists as an immediate problem: the Chinese assume (correctly, perhaps) that these weapons will never target China and will not be transferred to China’s enemies. So for China, keeping North Korea afloat is a strategic imperative.

Russia is not a major player in the Korean game nowadays, but it has some leverage as a potential “blockade breaker”. Without sincere cooperation from Russia, no efficient sanctions regime will be possible, and such cooperation seems unlikely. Moscow does not want the North Korean regime to collapse. The country’s leader Kim Jong-il is potentially useful for numerous diplomatic combinations, and also as a deterrent against the Americans, who are increasingly seen by President Vladimir Putin’s Moscow as dangerous global bullies.

However, it is South Korea whose policy is decisive in these issues. Indeed, in recent years North Korea was kept afloat by generous Southern aid, with some 500,000 tons of grain and a large amount of other supplies being sent north every year. This aid saved countless lives in the North, but it also contributed to keeping the regime in control.

It has been clear for a decade that South Korea, in spite of all the rhetoric, does not want unification to happen too fast or too soon. The German experience demonstrated how vastly expensive unification might become, and Koreans have good reasons to believe that their situation is much worse than that of Germany. After all, the per capita gross national product in East Germany was roughly half of the West German level, while in the case of North Korea, per capita GNP is less than one-tenth of the South Korean level.

Judging by the experience of the 1990s when the North Korean regime was more isolated than now, economic pressures alone will not necessarily lead to its collapse. During the great famine of the late 1990s, between a half-million and a million people starved to death without causing any inconvenience to the regime. There are no reasons to believe that sanctions would achieve much either, apart from producing another famine and many more deaths.

In contrast, the ongoing exchanges bring to North Korea information about the outside world, and this information is subversive by definition, making more and more people wonder whether something should be done about their country’s political and economic system, so clearly inefficient and anachronistic. Thus the current situation surrounding the so-called “sanctions” might be a rare case when the hypocrisy and duplicity of so-called “collective diplomacy” is doing more good than harm.

Early this month a market riot happened in the remote North Korean city of Hoeryong. Perhaps for the first time since 1945, a large group of North Koreans openly and vocally protested an unpopular decision of the local administration. This was a minor incident, but in the long run it might be more significant than all the meaningless invectives delivered by the well-dressed people in the UN Assembly Hall.

Joong Ang Daily
11/17/2006

China has not cut off oil supplies to North Korea, nor will it stop oil and food assistance to its ally as a means of exerting political pressure, Chinese officials were quoted as telling a group of U.S. scholars.

The Americans in the group also said Wednesday that Chinese officials seemed to have a different understanding from the North Koreans about how U.S. financial sanctions would be dealt with at the next round of six-nation talks.

The Chinese reportedly said they were “surprised” that Pyongyang had told the group it expected those sanctions to be lifted.

Siegfried Hecker, a visiting professor at Stanford University, said he asked Chinese foreign ministry officials if Beijing had cut off heavy fuel oil to North Korea as reported.

“The answer was that China did not cut off heavy fuel oil to North Korea. That’s the direct answer that we received,” he said at a news conference.

Mr. Hecker was part of a four-member delegation that was in Pyongyang Oct. 31-Nov. 4. He is a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, a U.S. nuclear weapons center, and has visited North Korea three times.

The other members of the team were Jack Pritchard, former U.S. point man on North Korea policy and now head of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C.; Robert Carlin, a former North Korea analyst now at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization; and John Lewis, a Stanford University professor.

There was speculation that Beijing had ended the fuel aid to the North in September, when Pyongyang showed signs of preparing for its first nuclear test. The aid suspension was believed to be China’s way of pressing its ally to forgo the test.

Mr. Hecker said Chinese officials were clear that Beijing did not and would not stop fuel and food donations, arguing that North Korea would only “grow stronger” if pressured.

The team arrived in North Korea on the day the communist regime, after a year’s boycott, agreed to return to the six-nation nuclear talks that also involve South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan.

Pyongyang left the table to protest punitive measures taken by the U.S. Treasury against Macao’s Banco Delta Asia for allegedly laundering money for the North.

North Korean officials told the American visitors that they expected discussions and a conclusion of the sanctions issue at the next six-party talks, according to Mr. Pritchard.

But Chinese officials, when told of Pyongyang’s position, “expressed some surprise,” Mr. Hecker said.

“They indicated, obviously, differences of opinion as to what was agreed on,” he said.

Asian Survey
November/December 2006, Vol. 46, No. 6, Pages 898-916
Jae Cheol Kim
Professor of International Studies at the Catholic University of Korea, Seoul.

PDF here: chinainDPRK.pdf

Conclusion:
China’s investment efforts suggest that it has begun to engage North Korea economically. By investing, the Chinese leadership has attempted to push the North to embrace economic reforms, which in turn could improve the North Korean economy and reduce the country’s potential for political instability. In order to lead the North to embark on reform policies, Beijing has tried to provide it with seed money and technology by encouraging Chinese companies to invest. This suggests that despite expectations and allegations from the West that China might abandon its long-time ally, China is committed to supporting North Korea.

The Chinese investment, however, has increasingly been influenced by commercial considerations. Officials in Beijing have stressed that economic exchanges with the North must be mutually beneficial. Chinese companies, which have become responsible for the majority of the investment, have paid increasing attention to market share and natural resources. That China has increasingly tried to gain economic advantage in the North suggests that Sino-North Korean relations are being transformed from being ideology-motivated to interestmotivated.

Despite a stiff increase over the past couple of years, it is hard to say that Chinese investment is either full-fledged or irreversible. Because the instability of North Korea prevents Chinese entrepreneurs from fully embracing the country, Chinese investment must be seen as a pilot project, with Chinese companies and entrepreneurs testing the water. Looking to the future, Chinese investment in North Korea is likely to increase. Despite problems, the Chinese leadership will probably continue to encourage further investment in an effort to exploit developmental opportunities while simultaneously curtailing the flow of direct aid to the North. In addition, China’s dynamic economic growth will propel its overseas investment. As China’s capital account is gradually liberalized, cash-rich Chinese companies will look for markets and resources abroad to fuel their development. The potential appreciation of the yuan will further force firms to relocate factories producing low-end products to countries where the labor cost is lower. Seen from this perspective, North Korea is a good candidate for future Chinese investment—if there is no major turbulence in bilateral relations.

Highlights:
North Korea has been reluctant to follow China’s path of reform and opening because it worried that the policy may create political problems. In an apparent response to China’s recommendation in the late 1990s for reform, for instance, Kim asked Beijing to respect “Korean-style socialism.” But China’s support for reform is not unconditional. Although Chinese leaders have repeatedly urged the DPRK to embrace market-driven reforms (even taking Kim Jong Il is on tours to see the results of China’s economic reforms), when North Korea decided to set up a special economic zone in Sinuiju, apparently without prior consultation with Beijing, China aborted the project by arresting Yang Bin, whom North Korea had designated head of the zone, in October 2002.

China, however, does not want to see turbulence on the Korean Peninsula, which could not only lead to the economic and political collapse of a socialist regime on China’s border but could also threaten regional stability. China thus has tried to sustain the Pyongyang regime by providing economic assistance–believing that reform and opening would not only revive the North Korean economy but also reduce the need for regular aid to prop up the regime, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that the Chinese government would encourage more of its companies to invest and establish their businesses in North Korea.

For Chinese firms, the prime minister’s statement amounted to a government directive, with some entrepreneurs understanding that Wen’s statement was a signal for Chinese companies to invest.  Organizations were formed to smooth such investment, including the Shenyang Municipal Association of Entrepreneurs (Shenyangshi Qiyejia Xiehui), Dandong Municipal Economic Consultation Center for the Korean Peninsula (Dandongshi Chaoxianbandao Jingji Zixun Zhongxin), and Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company (Beijing Chaohua Youlian). They organized explanatory meetings on investment, drawing numerous applicants.

Beijing attempted to boost investors’ confidence by signing an “Investment Encouragement and Protection Agreement” with Pyongyang in March 2005 when Premier Park Bongju visited Beijing. The framework for economic and technological cooperation was made clearer through the signing of an “Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation” that October. Chinese officials have given financial incentives and guarantees to firms that invest in North Korea. China’s state-run banks have not only provided companies with investment capital but also have underwritten Chinese investment for joint ventures. Beijing granted preferential treatment to products processed in the North, allowing them better access to the Chinese market. Products that were processed in the Rajin area with Chinese materials and then imported to China, for instance, were labeled domestic trade and were thus exempted from customs inspection.

The deputy CEO of Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company, a Beijing company that helps Chinese companies invest in the North, has been quoted as saying that whether a company is able to invest in North Korea depended not on the company’s will but on whether the North would accept it or not. Foreign investors, he added, needed to meet the criterion of “political reliability.” In practice, concerns about political contamination limit North Korea’s economic cooperation with South Korea, whose government has eagerly pushed economic integration with the North. North Korea’s opening therefore means an opening toward China, and this in turn gives Chinese companies very rare advantages.

Labor costs in the DPRK are low [compared to China], running only 70–80 yuan (about US$10) per month.  Building a factory is very cheap, up to one million yuan (about $120,000).  Chinese entrepreneurs see that what North Korea needs is largely light industrial products. Because brand consciousness there is weak, these investors believe that many Chinese companies, even small- and medium-sized ones, can compete in the North Korean market.  The scope for making profits is bigger in North Korea than in China because manufacturers can charge more for similar products in the North. For example, the price of a cigarette lighter is three to five yuan ($0.36 to $0.60) in Pyongyang but only 0.5 yuan ($0.06) in Wenzhou, China.

Although big state-owned companies account for the majority of Chinese outward investments, they rarely invest in North Korea, leaving this to small- to medium-sized companies. In the past, most Chinese investors were Korean-Chinese merchants from two areas in China: Liaoning Province and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. They do not expect that they can make profits in the North Korean market right away; rather, they plan to be ready for when the North opens to the world, by moving into the market early.

Chinese investment projects in North Korea are not only small in number but also weak in scale. There are no detailed data available on their average size, but they likely are no exception to the fact that China’s outward investment is generally characterized by its small scale and low level of technology.

Although North Korea wants capital in such sectors as home appliances, construction materials, electronic communications products, and machine building, Chinese investment is heavily concentrated in the sectors where China’s needs lie, such as resource extraction, or where its companies can make a profit, such as service sectors. The official Chinese guideline for outbound investment, noted above, recommended investment only in such manufacturing sectors as textiles, clothing, and food products, leaving aside other sectors for which North Korea wants investment.

The North lacks basic frameworks needed for drawing in foreign investment. Policies, laws, and regulations about tax, for instance, are not in place. There is no well established market mechanism for running the economy. The government is still heavily involved in economic management; therefore, potential investors need to have personal networks to open doors, a point that worries potential Chinese investors.  North Korea lacks a sound political environment for enticing foreign investment. The country’s economic policies, especially those related to reform, shift continuously, raising questions about the official commitment to reform.

Pyongyang Department Store No. 1
Zeng Changbiao, chief executive officer (CEO) of the Zhongxu Group, in a much publicized deal in 2004, signed a contract to run Pyongyang’s Department Store No.1 for 10 years. He said his main motive for investing was to take over the North Korean market. He wants to be dominant in the North Korean retail business by securing and expanding market share. But it is not clear whether the contract was put into practice.  An article in a journal published by the National Development and Reform Commission, a ministry-level organization of the Chinese government, suggested that little had changed at the department store by the middle of 2005. South Korean officials also say that the store is still run by North Korea. Zhongxu Group’s Zeng received the lowest tax rate—5% income and 5% import—in the North Korean tax system.

This is one of three big department stores that were being run either by the Chinese alone or jointly.  Shenyang Municipal Association for Trade Promotion opened Daesong Market in Pyongyang, the first wholly foreign-owned company in a non-science sector.

Musan
China has shown an interest in joint resources development projects. The best known case is the project to develop the Musan iron mines. It is not easy to draw an exact picture of Chinese investment in the mines because many press reports suggest different stories. According to a Korean report, a Chinese company from Jilin Province planned to invest about $500 million in the mines. Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper, reported that three companies from Jilin—Tonghua Iron & Steel Group (Tonggang), Yanbian Tianchi Company, and Sinosteel Corporation (Zhonggang)—contracted rights to exploit the Musan iron mines for 50 years. According to the report, the Chinese companies were going to invest 7 billion yuan (about $865 million) and planned to produce 10 million tons of iron ore each year.  In the case of the Musan mines, 2 billion yuan (about $240 million) out of the 7 billion China committed to invest was allocated to building roads and railways from Musan to Tonghua in China. Sizable investment levels might help Jilin secure access to seaports in North Korea.

Similarly, the Chinese press has reported that the Musan iron mines development project was canceled by officials in North Korea, embarrassed by publicity over the deal because it highlighted the degree of foreign investment, a subject that Pyongyang would prefer to handle quietly.

Raijin
Rason International Logistics Joint Company-Rason International secured the exclusive rights to run the No. 3 and No. 4 piers of Rajin port for 50 years. In order to secure the rights, China committed to investing 30 million euros ($36 million) to build an industrial park, tourism facilities, and a road from the trade district of Rason city to Rajin Port. North Korea in turn committed to providing China with 5 to 10 square kilometers of land to build the industrial park.

Daily NK
10/26/2006
Yang Jung A

Since the passing of the U.N. North Korea Resolution 1718, there has been an urgent focus on China’s measures on North Korea. Although China did not elucidate that it would adopt the sanctions, in reality, acquaintances of North Korea-China trade are saying that the sanctions are having effects on certain locations.

Even until now, the Chinese government has not revealed any measures to implement North Korea sanctions

Liu Jianchao spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “Although we may act compliantly to the Security Council’s resolution, China’s aim is not for sanctions. Countries related must not take this issue upon their own discretion and escalate this situation to make it worse.”

Tradesman ‘A’ met on the 25th in Liaoning, Dandong China said that little had changed in trade operations around the North Korean border. However, inspection at customs has tightened drastically, and whether or not new investments into North Korea has rapidly decreased or that banks are experiencing turmoil, warning signals are on the rise. The biggest threat amongst tradesmen is the increased feeling of insecurity.

‘A’ said, “The (Chinese) government has advised that investments in North Korea should not exceed $300,000,” and that “Conditions in North Korea are risky, so investments should be made with this in mind. Isn’t this basically saying, don’t make investments?”

He said, “There are rumors spreading in North Korea that the Chinese government will dismantle the customs house in 40 days. Although there are not many people who believe this rumor, we only hear these rumors because people are feeling insecure.”

Tradesman ‘B’ said, “Though remittances to North Korea can be made much the same as before, it has become very strict and difficult to create new accounts. Rather than being a directive from the government, it seems that banks are independently taking measures for their own protection.”

In the past, when a Chinese bank made transactions with North Korea, they would have to work in collaboration with the North Korean Gwang Sung Bank. A Chinese businessman would deposit funds into the Chinese bank and the North Korean businessman would collect the money through North Korea Gwang Sung Bank. This system has not been completely stopped. In ‘B’s’ opinion, transaction details and procedures have merely become more strict.

As deposit transactions between North Korea and China become inconvenient, more and more tradesmen are turning to cash transactions. Various media have reported that 4 banks in Dandong have begun to make restrictions on foreign transactions with people or corporations of North Korean origin.

Though China’s North Korea sanction is rough on independent private-sectors, this is an indication that the Chinese government is taking action in response. to the Security Council’s resolution.

From the New York Times:
Jim Yardley
10/25/2006

[edited]Sanhe, China–Truckers carrying goods into North Korea across the sludge-colored Tumen River say inspections are unchanged on the Chinese side. Customs agents rarely open boxes here or at two other border crossings in this mountainous region, truckers and private transport companies say.

Nor are any fences visible, like the barrier under construction near China’s busiest border crossing at the city of Dandong. There were early reports that inspectors in Dandong were at least opening trucks for a look, but so far statistics and anecdotal reports in the Chinese news media indicate that, essentially, everything remains the same.

What is visible here, though, is the growing and, in some ways, surprisingly complicated trade relationship between China and North Korea. China remains North Korea’s most important aid donor and oil supplier, but, conversely, China is now importing growing amounts of coal and electricity from North Korea. Chinese entrepreneurs, meanwhile, are starting to buy shares in North Korean mining operations and, in one case, trying to gain access to the Sea of Japan by leasing a North Korean port as a potential shipping hub.

The upswing in Chinese economic activity — which is already raising questions about whether the intent is more strategic than commercial — is one of the reasons that China has sent mixed signals about how aggressive it will be in inspecting border trade to meet the United Nations sanctions. For now, at least, some truckers in this region say the only change in border inspections has come on the North Korean side, where customs agents are checking loads more carefully for items deemed contraband by Kim Jong-il’s government.

“We used to sit with North Koreans that we know and have a chat,” said Jiang Zhuchun, a trucker waiting to cross into North Korea on Tuesday afternoon. “But after the nuclear test, we are only allowed to sit alone in our trucks.”

The United States has praised China for approving the sanctions against North Korea, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used her visit to Beijing last week to emphasize the common desire to restart diplomatic talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. China’s leaders are said to be deeply angered over the nuclear test and have signaled they may take a harder line against their longtime ally. Last week, some banks in Dandong froze certain accounts and financial transactions with North Korea.

But the question of inspections along the 866-mile border between China and North Korea is a different matter. The sanctions authorized countries to inspect cargo entering and leaving North Korea and barred the sale or transfer of material that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Yet the sanctions are still less than two weeks old, and some details have still not been worked out. For example, the sanctions ban luxury goods without defining them.

The United States wants tightened border inspections by China as a tool for squeezing the North Korean economy and ensuring that North Korea cannot buy or sell nuclear materials. China is worried that destabilizing North Korea could begin an exodus of refugees and has resisted changing inspections. This week, with rumors swirling about a possible border crackdown, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, said China intended to comply fully with the sanctions, but also said inspections along the border would remain “normal.”

The Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region, the name of the sprawling district that includes the Sanhe border checkpoint, is not the primary trade route between China and North Korea; Dandong, with its more direct route to Pyongyang, the North’s capital, is by far the busiest. But the Yanbian area is wedged into a geopolitical hotspot where China, North Korea and Russia all come together.

In interviews and visits to three crossings from Yanbian into North Korea, truckers, transportation company agents, investors and others confirmed without exception that trade is continuing across the border much as it always has. Customs agents examine bills of lading but usually open shipments only when they are tipped in advance to someone trying to smuggle goods like beer or liquor without paying customs duties, several people said.

“No matter who you talk to, they will tell you there is not much difference,” said Jin Lanzhu, whose trading company is one of the largest in the region.

On Wednesday morning inside the Chinese customs yard in the border city of Tumen, small groups of North Koreans, each wearing their mandatory pins with images of either North Korean leader Kim Jong-il or his father, Kim Il-sung, waited to cross the bridge. They had nylon sacks stuffed with shoes and clothes, television sets, a refrigerator. Some carried bags of rice.

“How many bags do you have?” asked a female Chinese customs agent in a blue uniform. She looked them over and walked away without opening any. She did forbid the North Koreans to take several boxes of fruit because of a problem with worms. Then, the men began loading the sacks onto a flatbed truck operated by the customs office to carry smaller loads to the North Korean side. Two North Korean women complained to a local taxi driver that they had to pay 400 yuan, or about $50, for the service.

“They don’t really check over here,” one North Korean woman said of Chinese customs. “They do on the North Korean side.”

A similar scene unfolded later in the day at a smaller crossing in the dingy town of Kaishan, where the customs port is so small that trucks take a dirt road to a crumbling checkpoint. On Wednesday, a young soldier watched laborers load about 150 used televisions and boxes of medicine into a North Korean truck that had crossed the river to collect the shipment.

“I’m here for security,” the soldier said.

Trade between China and North Korea has grown rapidly in recent years — as has North Korea’s trade deficit with China, in part, because China no longer appears to be selling oil at a subsidized rate. China now accounts for almost 40 percent of North Korea’s total foreign trade; bilateral trade has more than doubled to $1.1 billion in 2005 from $490 million in 1995. In Yanbian alone, trade with North Korea jumped 82 percent in 2004 and another 20 percent in 2005, according to a local newspaper account.

Divining what the increased traffic says about the state of North Korea’s economy is a subject of debate. New research and interviews in the Yanbian region suggest that North Korea, a country that regularly suffers blackouts, is now exporting growing amounts of coal, minerals and even electricity to China, which is hungry for energy and raw materials. In exchange, North Korea is no longer importing as much raw material and machinery as it had in the past.

Instead, North Korea is importing food, clothes, daily sundries, outdated televisions and appliances and, of course, oil. The trend could suggest that North Korea’s recent experiments with private markets may be expanding, some analysts said.

A recent study by the Nautilus Institute, a San Francisco-based research group, used customs statistics to describe the trend, but also concluded that it might indicate that North Korea’s nonmilitary manufacturing industries were in sharp decline. One Chinese investor in a North Korean coal mine agreed. “They seemed to have stopped the factories,” said the investor, who asked not to be identified. He said doing business with North Korea was very risky and cautioned that numerous Chinese businessmen had lost money. “There are zero guarantees and protections.”

Even so, Chinese entrepreneurs and companies, both private and state-owned, are starting to buy interests in North Korean mines to export raw materials. The amount of investment is not clearly defined, but different Chinese proposals call for building truck routes between inland trade centers in northeast China to the North Korean coast, according to Chinese media accounts.

A Chinese property developer, Fan Yingsheng, told the Chinese news media that despite the nuclear test, he was still pursuing plans to develop the North Korean port of Rajin into a shipping center for goods from China. He said he would soon fly to Pyongyang to sign a final agreement.

The flurry of Chinese activity has not gone unnoticed by South Korea and others in the region, analysts say. Like China, South Korea has resisted harsh economic sanctions and refused to shut down its own trade deals with North Korea in part because of concerns about a swift collapse of the North Korean government. But South Korea is also positioning itself, to some degree against China, to be the dominant player in the future of North Korea.

China, meanwhile, has said the activity is not strategic positioning but natural economic outgrowth for a booming, entrepreneurial economy in need of resources. Li Dunqiu, a North Korea specialist with a research institute under China’s State Council, or cabinet, recently wrote that “laws of the market economy” were the driving force in Chinese investment in North Korea.

Along the border, it is easy to see how the daily traffic from China is a lifeline for North Korea. One woman from Yanbian said her family had recently come across to buy rice and other essentials. But Mr. Jin, the owner of the trading company, said charity was not at the essence of China’s trade with North Korea.

“The business interest is the most important thing,” he said. “Helping them comes after that.” Then, pausing to reflect on the potential and perils of trading with North Korea, he added: “North Korea is just like China in the past. It is a blank sheet of paper. You can draw wherever you want to. The question is whether the paper is going to be there at all times for you to draw on.”