North Korean Economy Watch

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2/22/2007

North Korean spy agencies love kidnappings. Of course, their colleagues worldwide also would not mind abducting a person or two, but in most cases there are some urgent reasons for taking such drastic measures _ the victims are prominent opposition leaders, or wanted criminals who cannot be extradited through normal channels, or people who are unlucky to know something way too important. North Korean abductions are different: They are often surprisingly random and target people of no significance. The very randomness of most of their abductions once was often cited by sceptics who tried to refute these accusations as “Seoul-inspired falsities.’’ Indeed, why should the secret services of a Stalinist state spend so much time and money only to kidnap a Japanese noodle chef, or a tennis-loving teenager? Nonetheless, in 2002 Kim Jong-il himself confirmed that these seemingly meaningless abductions of ordinary Japanese citizens did take place.

Of course, North Koreans spies did not limit themselves to Japanese only. Quite a number of South Korean citizens have disappeared into the Northern maw as well: it is known that at least 486 South Koreans have been forcibly taken to the North and have never returned.

A vast majority of them are fishermen who were imprudent to come too close to the North Korean coast, but this figure also includes a number of known victims of covert operations. Currently they number 17, but there are few doubts that the actual number is much higher. If the abduction is planned and conducted well, its victim simply disappears and is eventually presumed dead.

A good example is the case of the five South Korean high school students who disappeared from the island beaches in 1977 and 1978. They all were believed dead for two decades, but in the late 1990s it was discovered that the youngsters were working in North Korea as instructors, teaching the basics of South Korean lifestyle to would-be undercover Northern operatives.

Eventually, one of those former students was even allowed to briefly meet his family at the Kumgang resort. Kim Yong-nam disappeared from a beach in North Cholla Province in 1978. Later he was identified as the husband of an abducted Japanese woman, so North Korean authorities grudgingly admitted that Kim Yong-nam was indeed in the North, and staged a meeting with his family. Unsurprisingly, during this meeting and press conference, he insisted that he was not kidnapped but saved from the sea by North Korean sailors. Far more surprisingly, he sort of admitted that his job was related to spying.

It is remarkable that the kidnappings of the South Korean teenagers roughly coincided with similar abductions in Japan. In both cases the abductors obviously targeted randomly selected teenagers who were unlucky enough to be on a lonely beach. Another commonality was that the abductees were later used to train espionage agents. Perhaps, teenagers were seen as ideal would-be instructors for the spies _ still susceptible to indoctrination but with enough knowledge of local realities to be useful.

In April, 1979, a young South Korean walked into the North Korean Embassy in Oslo, Norway. His name was Ko Sang-mun, and he was a schoolteacher back home. Why and how he came to arrive at that embassy is not clear. As was usually the case, the North Korean side insisted that Ko Sang-mu defected, while the South Koreans alleged that the young teacher was the a victim of a taxi driver’s mistake: He took the taxi to a “Korean embassy’’ and the driver delivered him to the embassy of the wrong Korea.

It is impossible to say now whether this highly publicised case was abduction, defection, or something in-between. However, in 1994 it became known that Ko Sang-mun was in a labour camp. A small propaganda war ensued. Ko was made to appear in a North Korean broadcast assuring everybody that he was free, happily married, and full of righteous hatred for the US imperialists and their Seoul puppets (most of his speech consisted of customary anti-American rhetoric). We do not know where he went after delivering this speech _ to an apartment in Pyongyang or to a dugout in a prison camp. Meanwhile, Ko’s widow in the South committed suicide, unable to cope with the stress of the situation.

There were also more “normal’’ instances of abductions. The North Koreans kidnapped people who possessed important intelligence. In 1971 Yu Sang-mun, a South Korean diplomat stationed in West Germany was kidnapped in West Berlin, together with his family _ wife and two children. Perhaps, the few other South Korean officials who went missing in Europe in the 1970s were also abducted by North Korean agents, but presently only Yu’s case is certain.

In the 1990s most abductions of this sort took place in China, and their victims were political activists, missionaries, and real or suspected South Korean spies. All these abductions occurred in the Chinese North-East, near the borders of North Korea.

The abduction of North Korean dissenters, or suspected would-be defectors, from Soviet territory has been quite routine for decades. Sometimes these abductions sparked a crisis in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, but in most cases the Soviets simply turned a blind eye to such acts.

Korea Times
Park Song-wu
2/11/2007

South Korea is thinking of chairing a working group for energy aid to North Korea as the United States is trying to differentiate this round of the six-party talks from a 1994 process, a Seoul official said on Sunday.

But Seoul has a firm position that all parties should jointly pay the “tax” for peace, he said.

“Denuclearization will benefit all parties, so the burdens should be shared jointly,” he said. “But we are thinking of taking the lead in the working group for energy aid, considering the circumstances of the other parties.”

He did not elaborate. But Tokyo is not expected to raise its hand to chair the working group, considering the Japanese anger over the North’s abduction of its nationals in the past.

Russia prefers forgiving the North’s debts instead of providing it with energy.

China, host of the multilateral dialogue, is already playing the most important role of chairing the six-party meeting.

What the United States apparently has in mind, and consented to by all parties, is the necessity to differentiate the result of these on-going negotiations from the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Since it was signed by Robert Gallucci and Kang Sok-ju in Geneva on October 21, 1994, Washington provided 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to Pyongyang over the following seven years.

But the North’s promise to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors in return for two light-water reactors was not obeyed, causing the Bush administration to criticize the deal as a diplomatic failure of his predecessor, Bill Clinton. After that, U.S. diplomats even avoided meeting their North Korean counterparts bilaterally.

The U.S. policy, however, has recently reached a turning point.

“The Bush administration may have been driven to greater negotiating flexibility by a need to achieve a foreign policy victory to compensate for declining public support for the Iraq war and the loss of the Republican leadership of Congress,” Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow for the Heritage Foundation said in a recent article.

But one thing that has not changed is the U.S. hope of not repeating the “mistake” it made with the Geneva agreement.

From 1994 to 2002, Pyongyang received 3.56 million tons of heavy oil, equivalent to $500 million, from the now-defunct Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the United States shouldered the largest share of $347 million.

To shake off that bad memory, Washington wants to use the term “shut down” instead of “freezing” and even wants to avoid providing fuel oil to the North, reportedly citing the possibility that it can be used for military purposes.

So the talks have dragged on. And, to make things worse, the North Koreans are demanding a lot.

Japan’s Kyodo news agency reported that North Korea had demanded 2 million tons of heavy oil or 2 million kilowatts of electricity in exchange for taking the initial steps towards denuclearization.

Christopher Hill, the top U.S. envoy, expressed hope on Sunday that such technical issues could be discussed at working group meetings. On the same day, the Seoul official hinted that South Korea will chair the working group.

Korea Times
2/9/2007

North Korea purchased about 15,000 metric tons of rice from China late last year, reflecting a severe food shortage in the communist state, according to South Korea’s state-run trade agency Friday.

The impoverished communist country imported 7,423 tons of rice in October, 3,910 tons in November and 3,928 tons in December, the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) said.

The amount of rice imported over the three-month period is about 2.6 times more than that of the same period in 2005, and it accounted for almost half of its annual rice imports totaling 38,479 tons, KOTRA said.

“North Korea’s massive rice imports following the harvest season means that its food situation is so severe. Due to the imported rice, North Korea’s market rice prices are stable so far,’’ said Kwon Tae-jin, a senior researcher at the state-run Korea Rural Economic Institute.

Another North Korea expert said the communist country might have had to take such measures because of United Nations sanctions on the North following its nuclear weapon test in October as well as South Korea’s suspension of its food and fertilizer aid to North Korea since July.

BBC
2/7/2007

As six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme resume in Beijing, the BBC’s Penny Spiller considers whether food shortages in the secretive communist state may have an impact on progress. 

Negotiators for the US, North Korea, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia are meeting in Beijing amid signs of a willingness to compromise.

While the last round of talks in December ended in deadlock, bilateral meetings since then have brought unusually positive responses from both North Korea and the US.

Such upbeat noises were unexpected, coming four months after North Korea shocked the world by testing a nuclear bomb.

The test brought international condemnation and UN sanctions, as well as a significant drop in crucial food aid.

South Korea suspended a shipment of 500,000 tonnes of food supplies, while China’s food exports last year were sharply down.

The World Food Programme has struggled to raise even 20% of the funds it requires to feed 1.9 million people it has identified as in immediate need of help.

Aid agencies warned at the time of a humanitarian disaster within months, as the North cannot produce enough food itself to supply its population. It also lost an estimated 100,000 tonnes-worth of crops because of floods in July.

‘Queues for rations’

Kathi Zellweger, of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Pyongyang, said the present food situation in the country was unclear.

No figures are yet available for last year’s harvest, and it was difficult to assess what impact the lack of food aid was having on supplies, she said.

However, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation estimated the country was short of one million tonnes of food – a fifth of the annual requirement to feed its 23 million people.

South Korea-based Father Jerry Hammond said there were signs of shortages – not only in food but also in fuel – when he visited the North with the Catholic charity Caritas in December.

He described seeing long queues for rations, and ordinary people selling goods in the street for money to buy the basics.

“You do expect to see more shortages during the winter time,” the US-born priest, who has visited North Korea dozens of times in the past decade, said.

“But I did see a noticeable difference this time.”

High malnutrition rates

Paul Risley, of the World Food Programme, said people in North Korea may still be cushioned by the November harvest and the pinch will be felt in the coming months.

“We have great concerns,” he said, pointing out that North Korea was now in its second year of food shortages.

He says “stabilising food security” in the country will be very relevant to the talks in Beijing.

“It is certainly the hope of all who are observing the situation in [North Korea] that imports of food can be resumed and returned to prior levels,” he said.

“Malnutrition rates are still the highest in Asia, and we certainly don’t want to see those rates rise any further.”

Father Hammond thinks Pyongyang may be persuaded to consider compromises in Beijing, but is unlikely to do so as a result of any pressure from the people of North Korea.

“People are very cut off from the outside world, and there is constant propaganda about national survival. Even if they go hungry, it will be considered patriotic,” he said.

There have been signs of possible compromise from both sides in the run up to the talks.

Washington has reportedly hinted at flexibility over its offer of aid and security guarantees, as well as showing a willingness to sit down and discuss North Korea’s demands to lift financial sanctions.

Meanwhile, North Korea reportedly recently told visiting US officials it would take the first steps to disband its nuclear programme in return for 500,000 tonnes of fuel oil and other benefits.

And South Korea is keen to resume its shipments of rice and fertiliser aid – if Pyongyang agrees to freeze its nuclear programme, the Choson Ilbo newspaper has reported.

As the nuclear talks resume, all sides will be looking to translate such pressures into progress.

Daily NK
2/3/2007

Though the number of North Korean drug smuggling cases is on the decline, a U.S. report claims that the number of Chinese crime gangs reexporting North Korean drugs to 3rd world countries is on the rise.

Radio Free Asia (RFA) conducted an interview with Researcher Raphael Pearl of the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) on the 30th regarding his claims in a report “Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy.

In the report Pearl spoke of an incident where Australian authorities captured a North Korean vessel “Pongsu” in April 2003 which was amidst transporting $160mn worth of heroin and said that this case had “enhanced international attention” on the issue of North Korean drug smuggling and since then the number of drug smuggling incidents had generally declined.

Since 1976, there have been a total of 50 cases where 20 different countries were caught in foreign relations with North Korea for drug trafficking. However, within the last 2 years, the majority of cases of drug smuggling were found in China’s Shenyang, Dalian and Dandong. Further, links to North Korean authorities have yet to be verified regarding these cases.

Pearl said that despite the fact North Korean drug trafficking has declined on the whole there have been cases where North Korean drugs were mistaken for drugs made in China. Also, he said that through the intervention of Chinese crime gangs, North Korean drugs were being reexported to 3rd world countries.

Some argue that the reason drug incidents have declined is due to the fact North Korean authorities have reduced their direct participation in the manufacture of goods. However, more and more Chinese crime gangs are intervening in the manufacture of North Korean drugs and smuggling, he said. In other words, there is a high possibility that North Korean drugs are being reexported through the intercession of China.

Pearl said that North Korean authorities are attempting to compensate the losses from a decline in drug smuggling with the manufacture and smuggling of fake cigarettes, medicines and small weapons. He also emphasized and confirmed the pivotal role of illegal acts such as exporting fake cigarettes and drugs in contributing to North Korea’s economy and income.

In the report, Pearl expressed his concerns on North Korea, giving the example that parts of farming areas had been used to cultivate drugs even amidst a poverty stricken country and indicated that the money from illegal acts such as drug smuggling and counterfeit currency could further add to the development of missiles and nuclear weapons.

He also expressed concern over the issue of segregating North Korean authorities especially with foreign groups being associated with North Korean drug smugglers.

Choson Ilbo
2/2/2007
 
Russia is trying to strengthen ties with North Korea, citing a “China threat” in Korea and the Far East. The Gudok, the daily newspaper of Russian Railways, said in an article Tuesday, “If China takes control of Najin port in North Korea, Russia may suffer huge losses in the project to link the TKR (Trans-Korea Railway) and the TSR (Trans-Siberian Railway).”

Gudok is published by Vladimir Yakunin, the president and CEO of Russian Railways and one of the closest allies of Russian president Vladimir Putin. Sources say the report can be viewed as Russia’s official position as it tries to expand its influence with Pyongyang.

“China has completed feasibility studies for Najin port and is now doing repairs and upgrades to wharfs and container unloading facilities,” the article said. It said that because the port lies at the start of the Najin-Hasan Railway and does not freeze throughout a year, Russia must take hold of it.

“China has already requested that the UNDP, or UN Development Program, give the Chinese the right of free passage in the UNDP-initiated Tumen river development project. What China aims to achieve is to establish its own port in North Korea as a foothold to advance into the Pacific Ocean,” the article said. The newspaper urged the Russian government to respond aggressively.

Sources with the Korean government said Thursday, “The Russian government suggested late last year that it would pursue a railway modernization plan on a 54km stretch of the Najin-Hasan line with its own money, without support from South Korea, if we expand container transportation on the route between Busan and Najin.”

Currently only North Korean trains are in service on that stretch of railway. Russia has been working on the line since July, converting its narrow gauge to the standard that supports container transportation.

North Korea, which has sent around 10,000 construction workers and loggers to the Far East region, is welcoming closer cooperation with Russia. When president Putin announced last Saturday that Russian would spend 100 billion rubles (W3.7 trillion) to hold the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vladivostok in Russia, North Korean consulate-general Shim Kuk-ryeong in Nachodka said, “North Korea is ready to join major construction projects as soon as Vladivostok’s infrastructure development project starts.”

Russia’s efforts to expand its influence with North Korea can be seen as falling within the context of Putin’s recent emphasis on the Far East. Late last year, Putin said, “Russia’s security is now being threatened with the illegal migration of Chinese into the Far East.”

Seoul Cautious Over Rift With China
Korea Times
Lee Jin-woo
2/2/2007

South Korea tried Friday to downplay its short track skaters’ action over Korea’s historical claim to a mountain on the border between North Korea and China during the ongoing Winter Asian Games.

On Wednesday, five South Korean female short track skaters held up seven placards with the message “Mount Paektu is our territory” during the awards ceremony following their silver medal win in the 5,000-meter relay.

A high-ranking South Korean official said the young skaters’ behavior was impromptu and should not be interpreted to have political significance.

“We have stressed that both Seoul and Beijing should deal with this issue calmly,” a government official said on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. “We delivered the message yesterday and today to our Chinese counterpart.”

The organizing committee of the Changchun Asian Games expressed regret Thursday and asked that similar incidents to be prevented in a letter to Kim Jung-kil, head of the Korea Olympic Committee. The games will end tomorrow.

The Chinese officials defined South Korean players’ act as a political activity, which is banned under the charter of the International Olympic Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia.

China’s foreign ministry also called on a senior South Korean diplomat in Beijing on Thursday afternoon and expressed regret over the issue.

South Korean skaters’ surprising move at the award ceremony came after the Chinese government made efforts to promote Mt. Paektu as “Changbai Mountain” during the games.

China has reportedly renamed schools after the mountain and has also ordered a dozen hotels run by ethnic Koreans near the mountain to halt business.

On Sept. 6, the organizing committee lit a torch at the top of the mountain, angering many South Koreans. The mayor of Changchun, the host city, said the mountain was chosen as the torch site on Sept. 6 because three rivers _ Tuman, Amrok and Songhua _ originate there. Tuman and Amrok rivers are known as Tumen and Yalu in China.

Many South Koreans believe the efforts are part of the Northeast Project, a Chinese academic project to reexamine the ancient history of the region.

They view the project as an attempt to distort ancient Korean history in the northeastern territory of what is now China, including the Koguryo Kingdom (37 B.C.-A.D. 668) and the Palhae Kingdom (698-926).

Beijing has disclosed plans to list the mountain as a UNESCO Natural World Heritage site, and plans to host the 2018 Winter Olympics there.

Unlike the angry South Korean public and news media, the South Korean government has remained calm over China’s actions to avoid stirring up a diplomatic dispute.

Under an agreement struck in 1962, China and North Korea, two sovereign states and U.N. members, agreed to share the mountain. The North has claim to 54.5 percent of the mountain, while China claims the remaining 45.5 percent.

Yonhap
2/2/2007

China has made little investment in North Korea since the North conducted its first nuclear device test in October last year, but their two-way trade volume rose 21.6 percent year-on-year over the past few months, informed sources said Friday.

“Over the three months since the October test, China made no investment in the North except in some low-budget mining development. But North Korea’s dependence on China in terms of trade increased sharply,” a senior government official said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the information.

Another source said from October to November in 2006, the trade volume between North Korea and Japan declined 75 percent year-on-year to US$7.9 million, illustrating the full range of the impact from United Nations sanctions over the North’s surprise nuclear test, they said.

Japan has shown the strongest response to the North’s nuclear test and long-range missile launches last year, banning North Korean goods and citizens from entering the country as well as barring its ships from Japanese ports.

In all of 2006, the trade volume between North Korea and China rose 7.5 percent year-on-year to $1.69 billion, while two-way trade between North Korea and Japan decreased 34 percent to $119 million in the first 11 months of last year, the source said.

“North Korea can make financial dealings only via Russia and a few other countries because it has a lot of trouble in doing financial transactions and wooing investments since the United States imposed financial sanctions on the North in September 2005,” he said.

The U.S. cut off Macau-based Banco Delta Asia’s access to the U.S. financial system, alleging that North Korea used the bank to counterfeit U.S. dollars and engage in other financial wrongdoing.

North Korea boycotted the six-party talks on its nuclear disarmament until December, saying that the U.S. should discuss ways to lift the sanctions on the sidelines of the six-nation talks involving the two Koreas, the U.S. China, Japan and Russia.

Chinese schools renamed after border mountain
Joong Ang Daily
2/2/2007

China has renamed 18 primary and secondary schools after [Pektu] a scenic mountain that straddles the border with North Korea, a Chinese committee said.

The Committee for the Protection, Development and Management of the Changbaishan Protection Zone under the control of the Jilin Province, northeast China, said Wednesday it changed the names in July of last year to boost the protection of the mountain. The provincial government administers the Chinese part of the mountain.

The schools now have 11,000 students and 1,720 teachers, according to the committee.

The 2,750-meter (9,000-foot) peak, the highest on the Korean Peninsula, is a major tourist attraction for both Koreans and Chinese. North Korea signed an agreement in the 1960s to secede the territorial rights to about half of Mount Paekdu to China.

China has irritated Koreans by claiming the ancient Goguryeo Kingdom (B.C. 37-A.D. 668), which ruled most of northeastern China as well as the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, was a Chinese provincial government.

Some South Koreans insist the 1904 agreement between China and Japan on the transfer of China’s Yanbian region, which encompasses Mount Paekdu, should be nullified because Korea’s diplomatic sovereignty was deprived at that time, several years before Japan formally colonized the Korean Peninsula in 1910.

In September last year, China issued a directive to about a dozen hotels operating there, including four run by South Koreans and one by an ethnic Korean resident of Japan, to cease operations and leave by year’s end. The move was seen as part of its initiative to make the Mount Paekdu area a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Heritage site.

In a related move, Jilin Province has announced its plans to develop the mountain as the country’s highest-level tourism zone.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
1/30/2007

The North Korean press insists that the “great and immortal” juche idea was designed by the “Great Leader,” Kim Il-sung, in the mid-1920s and has remained the guiding principle of the Korean revolution ever since. But do not expect to find references to juche in Korean publications of the 1950s or even early 1960s.

Even if Kim Il-sung first used the term in his speech in December 1955, it took at least five years before the term became widely known in the country _ and five more years for it to become the name of North Korea’s official ideology.

Only in April 1965, while delivering a lengthy lecture in Indonesia, did Kim Il-sung make it clear that from that point on juche would be considered the basic principle of North Korean ideological policy.

The North Korean leadership badly needed a new ideology in 1965. Why? This was the year when the dispute between the Soviet Union and China reached new heights. The two communist powers had been quarrelling for some time, but from 1965 to 1970 the two countries, which had recently vowed “eternal friendship,” were on the brink of war.

North Korea wisely decided to maintain neutrality, allowing it to milk both sponsors. But in the heavily ideological world of oldstyle communism one needed a theoretical justification for one’s position, even if this position was taken exclusively on account of pragmatic considerations (sounds like academia, doesn’t it?).

Nothing could be as handy as a new ideology, especially since the North had been drifting away from Soviet-style Leninism for some time. A locally designed juche was a good solution to the ideological conundrum.

It was easy to say that North Korea had discovered a new truth that was, needless to say, superior to the truth of Sovietstyle Leninism or Chinese-style Leninism-plus-Maoism. Hence, being bearers of the supreme truth, Koreans could not be ordered around.

But what exactly were the relations between juche and Marxism? For our readers this might appear a rather scholastic question, but the world of communism was based on ideology, and ideological disputes mattered. Of course, communist leaders had long learned how to bend their ideology and how to adjust its postulates to any given current political purpose.

In this regard, they were no different from leaders of supposedly religious states, whose actual policy was not too constrained by their loudly professed faith.

Nonetheless, some explanations had to be invented.

Until the late 1960s, juche was presented as a specific form of Marxism-Leninism, which suited the Korean realities and demands of the Korean communist revolution. It was not separated from Marxism. This explanation found its way into the North Korean constitution of 1972. Article 4 described juche as “a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country.”

The next step in juche’s development took place around 1974 and was perhaps related to the gradual rise of Kim Jong-il. It has been often stated that Kim Jongil introduced new interpretations of juche because he wanted to flatter his father, the founder of juche, and thus demonstrate his loyalty to Kim Il-sung’s cause.

Whatever the reasons, in 1974 some documents signed by Kim Jong-il but actually written by the administration’s chief theoretician, Hwang Jang-yop (currently in Seoul), began to use the term “kimilsungism” as a synonym for juche. In February 1974, Kim Jong-il explained that the works of Marx and Lenin had become outdated.

They described the world as it was 100 or 50 years ago, while juche was suited for the modern world, they argued. Thus, in 1980 the Korean Workers’ Party proclaimed juche the party’s guiding ideology, without mentioning its relationship to Marxism.

That statement doubtless resonated well with the nationalism of Korean cadres because it essentially placed North Korea at the ideological center of the world. Since then, the nationalist element of juche has been increasingly emphasized.

That position was also an open challenge to orthodoxy as understood in Moscow and Beijing. It was as if a local Catholic bishop proclaimed that he had a better grasp of the Holy Scriptures than the pope (or, to take the analogy a bit further, two quarrelling popes) and was able to devise something like a Newest Testament.

These statements made juche-worshipping North Koreans into open heretics within the communist camp, but other “fraternal countries” had to swallow this: Whatever they said, strategic considerations took precedence over ideology. Nobody wanted to alienate Pyongyang, which had been long seen as a strangebehaving sibling of the communist “family.”

However, this family unity did not last. In 1992, the newly amended North Korean constitution completely omitted references to Marxism-Leninism and replaced it with juche as the sole official ideology. Nobody was outraged.

By that time Leninism was patently dead, and even the few countries that still maintained a commitment to that ideology hardly took their own declarations seriously.

However, after the death of Kim Il-sung there were some signs that the significance of the juche idea began to wane.