North Korean Economy Watch

With the likelihood that food is coming into short supply in North Korea, the authorities and individuals alike have implemented strategies to minimize the adverse effects.

I am keeping a running list of official and civil responses here as they appear in the media.

1. The DPRK supposedly ended rations for mid-level cadres (party and state employees), though food can still be purchased in markets. Unless the government is hoarding its grain supplies, this probably has the effect of improving food distribution (transferring food stocks outside Pyongyang), though not to the satisfaction of those who were used to receiving it for “free.”

2. The DPRK asked China for food aid. (Requested 150,000: tons of corn. Received: 50,000 tons on their first ask)

3. Propaganda extolling people not to waste food has been distributed to workers.

4. The DPRK has started cracking down on liquor production/sale.

5. Lets grow potatoes!

6. Distributing food stocks to military families from military warehouses.  This will hopefully take some of the pressure off the price of grains in the markets.

7. Solicit food aid from the US.

8. Officials begin to demand more bribes!

9.  The KPA halts military exercises to assist in farming.

10.  Propaganda campaign to educate the population about alternative foods (Good Friends via OneFreeKorea)

11. China increases food export quota

News of the DPRK’s food shortages began to surface several weeks ago when Good Friends reported:

North Korea’s chronic food shortage has worsened to affect even some of the country’s elite citizens in the capital, a South Korean aid group said Thursday.

The communist nation has not given rice rations to medium- and lower-level officials living in Pyongyang this month after cutting the rations by 60 percent in February, the Good Friends aid agency said in its regular newsletter.

Pyongyang citizens are considered the most well-off in the isolated, impoverished country, where the government controls most means of production and operates a centralized ration system. Only those deemed most loyal to Kim Jong Il’s regime are allowed to live in the capital.

The food situation is more serious in rural areas, with residents in many regions in the country’s South Hwanghae province living without food rations since November, the aid group said. (AP)

Why was this the case?

Floods last August ruined part of the main yearly harvest, creating a 25 percent shortfall in the food supply and putting 6 million people in need, according to the U.N. World Food Program.

Over the winter, drought damaged the wheat and barley crop, according to a recent report in the official North Korean media. That crop normally tides people over during the summer “lean season” until the fall harvest.

North Korea’s ability to buy food, meanwhile, has plunged, as the cost of rice and wheat on the global market has jumped to record highs, up 50 percent in the past six months.

China also appears to have tightened its food squeeze on North Korea for domestic reasons. In order to meet local demand and control inflation, Beijing slapped a 22 percent tariff on grain exports to the North. (Washington Post)

So North Korea’s domestic agricultural production has fallen and so have commercial food imports (international inflation, OECD government subsidies for bio-fuels, and increasing fuel prices have combined to raise the prices of commodities such as rice and pork up to 70% in the course of a year). 

Compounding this problem, however, agricultural aid from North Korea’s two most reliable benefactors (China and South Korea) has dried up.

[China] has quietly slashed food aid to North Korea, according to figures compiled by the World Food Program. Deliveries plummeted from 440,000 metric tons in 2005 to 207,000 tons in 2006. Last year there was a slight increase in aid, but it remained far below the levels of the past decade. (Washington Post)

And strained relations with the new Lee government in South Korea have not helped:

The South typically sends about 500,000 tonnes of rice and 300,000 tonnes of fertiliser a year. None has been sent this year and without the fertiliser, North Korea is almost certain to see a fall of several tens of tonnes in its harvest (Reuters)

So what will be the mitigating factors that prevent another humanitarian emergency?

“The reason for the mass starvation that occurred in late 90s is that North Korea faced natural disasters without expanding the market’s capability to substitute for the broken planned economy capability, and so the damage to North Korean citizens was inevitably large.”

“The market in North Korea has expanded in the last 10 years. The supply and demand structure of daily necessities, including food items, has been formed.”

“Because the market capacity has expanded, the possibility of a mass-scale starvation occurring is no longer high. In actuality, the change in food prices is being monitored at the market.”

-Dong Yong Seung, the Samsung Economic Research Institute’s Economic Security Team Chief, speaking at the 19th Expert Forum sponsored by the Peace Foundation (Daily NK)

Mr. Dong’s analysis addresses the improved efficiency of DRPK’s market supply chains but does not address the effects of an adverse supply shock. 

The UN seems ready to help, although it has not been asked:

Institutionally, mechanisms are in place in North Korea to ring the international alarm bell before hunger turns into mass starvation. The World Food Program monitors nutrition in 50 counties, and the Kim government has become expert in asking for help.

“The North Koreans know that they are facing a difficult situation and have made it increasingly clear in the past few weeks that they will need outside assistance to meet their growing needs,” the U.N. official said, asking not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.

North Korea, which even with a good harvest still falls about 1 million tonnes, or around 20 percent, short of what it needs to feed its people, relies heavily on aid from China, South Korea and U.N. aid agencies to fill the gap.

The UN official said it was clear from a variety of sources that the food security situation was worsening in North Korea and that it needed to be addressed.

Last month Kwon Tae-jin, an expert on the North’s agriculture sector at the South’s Korea Rural Economic Institute told Reuters that if South Korea and other nations did not send food aid, the North would be faced with a food crisis worse than the one in the 90s.

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation said in late March it sees the North having a shortfall of about 1.66 million tonnes in cereals for the year ending in October 2008.

The North will start to feel the shortage the hardest in the coming months when its meagre stocks of food, already depleted by flooding that hit the country last year, dry up and before the start of its potato harvest in June and July. (Washington Post)

The UNWFP, however, will be under pressure from its donors to monitor food aid and make sure it is not diverted to non-emergency uses.  Under these conditions, it is not likely that they will be asked to provide much aid until a catastrophy is already underway.  So with the UN out of the picture, who is best positioned to prevent the reemergence of a humanitarian crisis in North Korea today? China.  

Despite China’s own food probelms, however, it is always likely to capitulate, at least in part, to North Korea’s emergency requests.  China does not want to deal with another North Korean famine, particularly during the Olympic season, and they certainly do not want to deal with any political instability that could result. 

Yonhap reports that the DPRK has asked the Chinese for 150,000 tons of corn this year.  Chinas says they will give 50,000 tons–and that is just initially. (Yonhap)

UPDATE 4/14/2008: I still have not seen any reports in the media of Noth Korea seeking suport from Russia.

UPDATE 6/9/2008: China increases grain export quota to North Korea to 150,000 tons

(more…)

Last week we discussed the growing presence of North Korean companies in Russia.  This week, the Daily NK reports on China’s first steps at financial integration with North Korea:

China has introduced a new settlement system which allows North Korean business to open bank accounts in China and settle business transactions in Yuan, the Nikkei reported on Sunday.

With the adoption of the system, North Korean people and companies can open Yuan bank accounts within China after some formalities and use the accounts for trade settlement with their Chinese business partners. Accordingly, North Korea is now able to buy foreign currencies such as dollars and euros with its Yuan income from trade. In addition, North Korea can legally bring in foreign currencies or send them to third countries.

North Korean companies used to have difficulties of making a trade settlement with China in cash or by barter since the U.S. enacted financial sanctions on North Korea and China imposed economic sanctions regarding remittance and bank accounts after North Korea’s nuclear tests. However, China too suffered from the sanctions as the amount of Yuan smuggled into North Korea has skyrocketed proportional to the increasing volume of trade between North Korea and China.

The new settlement system will help reinvigorate the trade between two countries. However, the system can cause concerns at the Six Party Talks as it lowers the bargaining power needed to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear programs, the Nikkei said.

Meanwhile, the People’s Government of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture announced last February that Jilin Province would allow North Korean people and companies operating in China to open Yuan bank accounts for trade purpose starting with February 20, 2008.

You can read the full article here:
China Lifts Sanctions on North Korea
Daily NK
Park Eun Jae
4/9/2008

Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland published a piece focusing on North Korea’s economic integration.  Download it here: petersoninstitute.pdf

Although not the focus of the piece, here is an excerpt:

A first corollary of the injunction to avoid top-down approaches is that any collective development assistance must be extended in support of economic reform. Experience throughout the developing world demonstrates that assistance will have only marginal effects and may even have negative consequences if not coupled with policy changes. It is not simply that aid sustains the regime; since aid is fungible, even purely humanitarian aid will have that effect. The problem is that too much aid can delay or even undermine the reform process. Whatever the multilateral mechanism that ultimately emerges, it should encourage reform and economic opening in the North.

A second corollary of the injunction against top-down approaches is the importance of engaging the private sector: through trade, foreign direct investment, private capital flows (including remittances), and sheer expertise. Economic rehabilitation will require investment in social overhead capital, which will be led primarily by the public sector. But if North Korea is to evolve toward a self-sustaining market-oriented economy, private-sector involvement will be crucial. Participation of foreign firms means that projects are subject to the market test of profitability, and it encourages North Korean authorities to think of economic engagement in terms of joint gain rather than as political tribute.

(and)

North Korea is in need of depoliticized technical assistance for a whole panoply of issues running from the mundane but critical, such as developing meaningful national statistical capabilities, through basic agricultural and health technologies, to social infrastructure of a modern economy. This infrastructure includes policy mechanisms to manage macroeconomic policy, including through reform of the central bank; specify property rights and resolve commercial disputes; regulate markets, including financial markets as they emerge; establish and implement international trade and investment policies; and so on.

Read the full paper here:
A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension
Staphen Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Policy Brief
April 2008

Writing in today’s Asia Times, Dr. Leonid Petrov analyses the complexity of Russia, Rok, DPRK, and Chinese relations:

Russia and North Korea:

Territorial claims, in one form or another, involve almost all countries adjacent in this region with the exception of Russia and Korea. The Joint Russian Federation-DPRK Commission for the Demarcation of State Borders has recently completed its work by documenting and marking the 17-kilometer frontier. This strip of uninhabited and swampy land in the mouth of the Tumannaya (Tuman-gang) River plays an exceptionally important geopolitical role. It not only provides the two countries with land access to each other, but also prevents Chinese access to the East Sea (Sea of Japan).

China and North Korea: 

Here, some 50km north of the small port that forms the core of North’s Rajin-Seonbong Special Economic Zone, the interests of Russia and China are now at stake. Russia is rapidly repairing the railroad track, and China (in a similarly speedy manner) is constructing a new automobile highway, both leading from their respective borders to the port of Rajin. Russia, investing at least 1.75 billion rubles (US$72 million) into this project, seeks to strongly connect Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian Railroad. China, in turn, hopes to divert the growing cargo traffic to its own territory, offering the efficient network of railroads for delivery of South Korean and Japanese goods to Central Asian and European markets. What position will the government of North Korea take in this clash of ambitions?

Russia and South Korea (energy and trade):

In 2007, the volume of the export of “black gold” from Russia to South Korea reached 38.13 million barrels (2.7 times more than in the previous year). The relative proximity of the Russian oil and gas fields is an attractive factor for Korean companies who actively search for alternatives to Middle East oil suppliers. This year South Korea will for the first time start importing natural gas from Russia. The expected volume of delivery during 2008 is 1.5 million tons (or 5.1% of South Korea’s annual demand).

and

Trade relations between Russia and Korea are steadily growing. According to customs statistics, last year Russia recorded the sharpest increase of South Korean imports (56.2% more than in 2006). Due to the inflow of “petro-dollars” the new class of nouveaux riches in Russia began actively buying Korean automobiles, cell phones, television sets and LCD monitors. South Korea exported to Russia goods worth US$8.1 billion (including $3.296 billion of automobiles, $859 million of mobile phone equipment, motor vehicles and spare parts worth $659 million). As for trade with North Korea, in 2006 Russia occupied third place after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports.

More on Russia/South Korea energy talk here. 

The whole article deserves reading here:
Russia lays new tracks in Korean ties
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
3/5/2008

The Daily NK covers the release of KIEP’s analysis of North Korea’s external trade in 2007.  I cannot find the report in English, so I have to take the Daily NK’s word for it–insert caveat here.

Here are the highlights:

• The estimated total value of North Korea’s foreign trade decreased from US$2.996 billion 2006 to US$2.7 billion in 2007.

• China occupies 70% of the trade volume, up from 56.7 in 2006 (a startling increase).

• Trade with Japan fell to US$900,000, a decrease of 92% from 2006 (so it appears that some Chinese are getting rich from international trade restrictions).

• Trade with Thailand fell 42.4% since the nuclear test.

• Trade with the EU fell by 53.2% since the nuclear test.

To be honest I do not trust these numbers, so if someone comes across the KIEP report in English, please send it to me.

According to the Daily NK, the KIEP report is called: “Economic Prospect of North Korea in 2008” by Cho Myung Chul and Hong Ihk Pyo

The full story can be read here:
North Korea’s Economic Prospect for 2008
Daily NK
Yang Jung A
3/3/2008

Kang: North Korean Trade Potential
Council on Foreign Relations
12/17/2007

Last December, David C. Kang, a professor of government at Dartmouth College and an adjunct professor at Tuck Business School, discussed the North Korean economy for the Council on Foreign Relations. I have excerpted some of his comments below.

His view on the new North-South cargo train service:

It doesn’t have huge economic significance in the overall GDP of North Korea. But it does have major economic significance in the fact that what North Korea had to do in order to let a train go through was an awful lot of adjustment[…]in terms of linking up the railroad, all the ministries had to prepare.  The old [Korean Energy Development Organization] had this problem as well. [W]hen they wanted Americans and South Koreans working in North Korea to build this light-water reactor, [they] had to set up protocols [Post offices, phone calls, where they were going to stay, etc]. It is pretty significant in terms of how much they had to adjust.

He quoted the following figures on North – South trade:

From $200 million in 1998, to now exceeding $1.7 billion in 2007.   South Korea’s total trade volume is $250 billion.

His opinion on the direction of the North Korean economy:

At this point what we’re seeing is very initial steps on the part of North Korea as they try to open up reform and yet maintain control. At the same time, they are being forced into a number of institutional changes and mind-set changes that are the first step forward in this process.

His view of North Korea’s comparative advantage:

Most of the companies that have gone in—the South Korean companies that have gone in—are assembly and light manufactures, such as or textiles and light consumer goods. This is the sort of obvious point of departure. It’s not hugely capital intensive in terms of building factories, and can take advantage of North Korean cheap labor and South Korean technological advantages.

There are a lot of potential mineral resources in North Korea, which would require a whole infrastructure of legal reforms to happen before anyone would take care of them. But at this point the safest bets are the ones that are on the order of assembly and light manufactures in the North and then exporting them out.

His view of South Korea’s long term goals:

If there’s unification, or even better relations, and South Korean companies can use cheap North Korean labor, instead of having to send those factories to China or Vietnam—not only do they speak Korean, they’re culturally similar, and the labor would be cheaper.

[I]f you could reconnect the railroads, from Japan, through Pusan [South Korea], up through North Korea, then out to China and Russia, you would be linking up all these economies in a much more efficient way than they are now. So everybody wants that. But obviously there’s the political problem. And even on the infrastructure side, the North Korean rail system is so old and so decrepit, that basically it would have to be rebuilt from zero. But the potential upsides are massive, in the long run.

His view of China’s engagement:

China has been essentially as deeply involved in economic engagement with North Korea as has South Korea—and by some measures, actually more so. Whereas South Koreans just do this assembling, some Chinese companies are moving in and building full factories in the North. There’s a lot of interest in Chinese-North Korean economic relations on both sides.

Yonhap
2/12/2008

North Korea will begin using more than a hundred new buses with air conditioning for the convenience of a growing number of foreigners visiting Pyongyang, a U.S. government-funded radio station reported Tuesday.

Pyongyang’s municipal people’s committee recently requested a Chinese bus manufacturer to install air conditioning in 110 new buses to be used in the capital city, Radio Free Asia said.

The North already paid the cost in cash and 52 of the buses were already sent to Pyongyang, it said.

The communist state depends heavily on foreign aid to overcome its chronic energy shortage.

“North Korea is introducing buses with air conditioning to make Pyongyang look more advanced and urban in the eyes of foreign tourists whose number is on the rise,” the radio report said, quoting an unidentified source in China. “North Korean people have realized by watching TV dramas and other programs from South Korea that their living standards are not good enough.”

Writing today for the Asia Times, Sunny Lee gives an update on the North Korean-run restaurants in China and South East Asia.  Much has already been published on these restaurants: how they channel money back to North Korea and how the waitresses tend to defect.  (As mentioned in the Kaesong post yesterday, they probably also pay hefty bribes for their overseas posts and have well-connected relatives.)

Sunny Lee points out that these restaurants (see YouTube video here) are now diversifying their product lines to boost profits, and like other successful capitalists across Asia, they are doing it by leveraging their most unique asset–attractive North Korean women.  How?  By transforming into karaoke bars after dinner hours.

North Korea has some 100 restaurants overseas, mostly in China and Southeast Asia, including Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. These restaurants serve as an important revenue pipeline for earning foreign currencies for Pyongyang. Each overseas North Korean restaurant is said to be allotted a revenue quota to fill, ranging from US$100,000 to $300,000 a year to send to Pyongyang, which makes the total revenue estimation some tens of millions of dollars.

The business formula – restaurant by day and karaoke bar by night – is also seen as an effort for these restaurants to meet the assigned financial quota. Currently, there are scores of North Korean restaurants in China, including in cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, Tsingdao, Dandong and Yanji. Beijing has 11 North Korean restaurants. All of these employ North Koreans whose total employment number in China is estimated to be several hundred. (Asia Times)

Despite the higher cost, business is brisk…

The reason that North Korean restaurants are expensive yet remain popular among customers is their immaculate service from beautiful employees. In China, where service quality at restaurants is often unsatisfactory, North Korean restaurants are becoming a favorite alternative among members of the businesses community. (Asia Times)

However, if you want to enjoy an authentic North Korean dining experience but have moral qualms about supporting the regime, then you can patronize similar resturants managed by North Korean defectors in South Korea–though the experience is quite different.  Whereas the Chinese pay extra for premium restaurant service in Beijing, the South Koreans pay for the genuine socialist restaurant experience.  In other words, they pay to be treated like an annoyance to the staff.

[At the Pyongyang Moran Bar (located in South Korea), the] North Korean waitresses wore traditional dresses in the bright colors that were fashionable in the South some years back. The singer’s interpretation of “Whistle,” a North Korean standard of the 1980’s, was shaky and off-key. Service was bad and included at least one mild threat. Drinks were spilled, beer bottles left unopened and unpoured.

But the South Korean customers could not get enough of the Pyongyang Moran Bar. (New York Times)

So you have your choice of North Korean themed restaurants:  The propaganda ideal or the  socialist reality.

The full articles can be found here:
Chillin’ at a North Korean karaoke bar
Asia Times
Sunny Lee
2/8/2008

In Deep South, North Koreans Find a Hot Market
New York Times
Norimitsu Onishi
5/25/2006

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-2-5-1
2/5/2008

Kim Jong Il’s first visit of the year was reported on January 6 to have been to the Ryesonggnang hydro-electric power plant. Generally, the leader’s visits in the first months of the year, along with the New Year’s Joint Editorial, which focused on economic recovery, set the tone for the coming year’s policies. His second inspection of the year was to a military unit.

Defectors claim that prostitution is on the rise in North Korea, and on January 9, the aid group ‘Good Friends’ reported that the DPRK has begun to close massage parlors as part of a crackdown on prostitution. The agency reported that in the DPRK there was a “steady campaign to weed out decadent foreign culture,” and that in September, DPRK soldiers were ordered to avoid alcohol, sex, and money.

On January 16, it was reported that Kim Jong Il had instructed all DPRK institutions to reduce their bureaucracies, including senior staff, by thirty percent.

Figures released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency indicate that the DPRK’s population had increased to 23.6 million in 2004, the latest available figures. According to DPRK figures, the population has grown from 22.1 million in 1996.

North Korea announced the closure of its Australian embassy on January 22. While the DPRK will continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Australia, it apparently can no longer afford to maintain an embassy in Canberra.

According to a report released by the International Red Cross, North Korea has the largest number of people in the world killed by natural disasters over the past decade. The report states that 458 thousand North Koreans have died from natural disaster, 38 percent of the disaster-caused deaths in 220 countries from 1997-2006.

A U.S. Senate investigation reported that the DPRK funneled as much as 2.7 million USD through a bank account set up from UN development projects. The report stated that North Korea used the UN account due to fears that the United States would block its ability to transfer money internationally.

DPRK Nuclear Negotiations

2008 opened with the United States and Japan releasing statements expressing their disappointment at North Korea’s failure to meet its December 31 deadline to fully disclose the extent of its nuclear programs, while North Korea’s New Year’s Joint Editorial called for “stability on the Korean Peninsula and peace in the world” as well as an end to hostile U.S. policies. A U.S. White House spokesman stressed that there was still opportunity to move forward with negotiations, stating, “the important thing is that we get a declaration that…needs to be full and complete,” not whether the declaration is made by the deadline.

On January 4, North Korea claimed it had met its obligations to come clean on its nuclear programs, and that it had provided Washington with a list of its nuclear programs in November. Pyongyang also threatened to bolster its “war deterrent” because Washington had failed to provide promised aid following the declaration. Washington denied that any complete declaration had been made.

A senior Russian diplomat was quoted on January 11 as saying that while Russia regrets the slowed state of progress in talks on DPRK nuclear issues, Russia will fulfill its promise to provide the North with fuel oil. 50,000 tons of fuel oil were delivered on January 20~21.

According to a book of figures recently published by the National Statistical Office, ”Comparison of North and South Korean Socio-economic Circumstances”, the DPRK”s crude imports over the past several years bottomed out at 2,325,000 barrels in 1999, then rose to 4,244,000 barrels by 2001. Since 2001, imports have steadily fallen until only 3,841,000 barrels were imported in 2006, recording the least imports in the last five years.

North Korea opened its first online shopping mall in January. The site offers items from fourteen categories ranging from machinery and building materials to stamps and artworks. The site, www.dprk-economy.com/en/shop/index.php, is based in China.

Orascom Telecom, a Cairo-based phone operator, has been granted the first commercial license for provision of mobile phone services in North Korea. The license was granted to CHEO Technology, a subsidiary that is 25 percent-owned by the state-run Korea Post and Telecommunications Corporation.

DPRK Abduction Issue

The Cambodian Foreign Minister announced on January 16 that his country had been working behind the scenes to find a resolution to the DPRK-Japan abduction issue. The minister stated, “Cambodia is in a position where it can hold high-level meetings with North Korea, and it has the ability to persuade North Korea.”

Inter-Korean Affairs

The incoming Lee Myung-bak administration announced on January 4 a plan to develop an international cooperative fund to support North Korea’s economy. The plan is said to call for World Bank and the Asia Development Bank to help, and for South Korea to provide 40 billion USD.

On January 7, it was reported that Lee Myung-bak’s presidential transition team had asked the ROK Unification Ministry to slow the pace of inter-Korean economic projects and to link them to progress in the six-party talks. The incoming administration has promised not to link humanitarian projects such as rice and fertilizer aid to nuclear negotiations.

The Lee Myung-bak administration announced plans for downsizing the South Korean government, including disbanding of the Ministry of Unification. Opposition to the plan points out the role played by the ministry in improving inter-Korean relations, while proponents to the plan of relegating the ministry’s duties to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade applaud the move to align North Korea policy with standing foreign policy directives.

On January 14, it was reported that Lee Myung-bak had asked the United States to further engage in talks with DPRK military leaders, while presenting a balanced approach, stating that “our people don’t support the idea of giving lavish aid to the North nor do they want to irritate it too much, I believe.” He went on to add that the United States holds the key to easing DPRK fears of opening up.

The net worth of inter-Korean exchanges totaled 1,797,890,000 USD in 2007, up 33% from the 1.35 billion USD in the previous year. The almost 1.8 billion dollars in trade recorded in 2007 is the highest to date, and is equal to 65 percent of the DPRK”s non-Korean trade volume of 2.996 billion USD in 2006.

The Seoul-based International Vaccine Institute announced on January 14 that it will soon begin inoculating approximately six thousand North Korean children against bacterial meningitis and Japanese encephalitis.

The two Koreas began working-level military talks on January 25, marking the first talks of the year. During talks, the North proposed reducing the frequency of the inter-Korean rail services, citing a lack of cargo. The Southern delegation felt that the frequency was an important indication of inter-Korean cooperation. The two sides agreed to continue daily runs, but to reduce the number of empty carriages in the future.

North Korea is still not as attractive to businesses as other Asian neighbors. A survey released by the (South) Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry on January 28 indicated that China and Vietnam are more attractive to ROK businesses. According to the survey, 80 percent of businesses have difficulties starting or operating businesses in North Korea.

An ROK special envoy returned on January 23 from Moscow after proposing a joint ROK-DPRK-Russian cooperative project in eastern Siberia. President-elect Lee Myung-bak sent a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin pushing for cooperation of “North Korea’s workforce, Russia’s resources and capital, and [South] Korean technology.”

U.S.-DPRK Relations

On January 9, amidst reports concerning possible DPRK-Syria nuclear connections, it was reported that in 1991 Israel was posed to strike a ship suspected of delivering missiles from the DPRK to Syria, but was dissuaded by Washington.

A U.S. State Department official stated on January 22 that North Korea had met the legal criteria to be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. This came just after reports of conflicting opinions within the Bush administration, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sharply rebuking Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights Lefkowitz, who stated that North Korea is not serious about nuclear disarmament. Rice went so far as to say that Lefkowitz “certainly has no say on what American policy will be in the six-party talks,” dismissing his negative position on the failure of North Korea to meet its obligations. The White House later stated that North Korea must make a full declaration of its nuclear activities before being removed from the list.

Five officials from the DPRK recently visited the United States in order to learn how to treat and prevent tuberculosis, a serious concern for the North that is “practically non-existent in most developed countries.” The officials were invited by The Korea Society, which is based in New York.

DPRK-PRC Relations

According to the PRC General Administration of Customs, China’s oil exports to North Korea were the same in 2007 as they were in 2006. China sent 523,160 tons of oil to North Korea in 2007.

A senior PRC Communist Party official traveled to Pyongyang for a meeting with Kim Jong Il on January 30. Wang Jiarui, director of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese communist party, was to convey a message to Kim, inviting him to the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. While Kim reportedly told Wang that there would be no change in the DPRK stance on nuclear negotiations, he also assured the Chinese envoy that North Korea had no intention of harming DPRK-PRC relations.