Archive for the ‘Civil society’ Category

A striking glimpse of North Korea

Friday, September 2nd, 2005

Globe Staff
Ty Burr
9/2/2005

The West has so successfully demonized North Korea in recent years that the notion of normal teenage girls living normal teenage lives in the capital city of Pyongyang comes as a shock. Only when the shock wears off do you begin to see at what cost that normality is maintained.

“A State of Mind” is the British documentarian Daniel Gordon’s second film about the country he calls the “least visited, least known, least understood” on the planet, and it’s a quietly wrenching eye-opener. The rare Western filmmaker allowed north of the 38th Parallel, Gordon focused on athletic achievement in 2002’s “The Game of Their Lives,” about the 1966 North Korean World Cup team. Here he uses athletic achievement to make striking and subtle points about daily life in a paranoid dictatorship. Take your teenagers.

Each year the city hosts the Mass Games, a sort of epic three-day pageant of gymnastics, music, and placard flipping that suggests what Busby Berkeley might have come up with if he’d been hired to choreograph the Nuremberg Rally. “A State of Mind” zooms in on two young girls practicing for the 2003 Games, but it quickly ducks under that thematic wire to offer fuller portraits of their lives and families.

At 13, Pak Hyon Sun has a bit of the rebel to her she drolly confesses to playing hooky from the required two-hour Games drills until she was busted, and she carps about having to learn a particularly tough routine. Kim Song Yun groans about having to wake up for school like any other 11-year-old. This is about as defiant as they get, because everyone in “A State of Mind” kids, parents, grandparents, teachers lives in ideological thrall to the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Il, and to the memory of his late father, Kim Il Sung.

There is no resistance; there is, instead, a complete and almost touchingly childlike faith in the divinity of “the General” and, by extension, the evil of his enemies, America chief among them. (The film points out that this has been so ever since the devastating US bombing of the North during the Korean War.) If you want to know what a successful state cult of personality looks like, here it is.

The director never pounds the point home, though, and he doesn’t have to. He mostly observes this society at work, occasionally dropping patient narrative points about the Games’ usefulness in subordinating individual will to the needs of the group. The film makes clear that those living in the capital are better off than the peasants in the country, and it shows that “better off” is a relative term. The Paks and the Kims are from different classes the former are blue-collar, the latter academic intellectuals but their living quarters are similarly cramped high-rise apartments, with grandparents and siblings sleeping on floors. Each person is allotted one chicken and five eggs per month.

And these are the good times. “A State of Mind” lets the older generation talk candidly of the “Arduous March,” the period after Kim Il Sung’s 1994 death during which the country fell into a famine whose scope has never been fully calculated. Outside commentators have blamed North Korea’s outmoded agricultural policies; the Paks and the Kims blame America, as they do for everything, including the nightly electrical blackouts. But you might, too, if you had a state-installed radio in your kitchen that could be turned down but never off.

A co-production of the BBC, French public TV, and New York’s WNET, “A State of Mind” slightly overstays its welcome, and its use of Beth Orton-style techno-folk under the Mass Games routines is an odd if catchy creative choice (what’s wrong with hearing the music the girls actually performed to?). That said, the film’s most remarkable aspect is its depiction of casually loving family relations and giggling girlishness proof of the resilience of smaller human freedoms in the face of almost constant mind control.

The girls, of course, consider Kim Jong Il their spiritual father. Song Yun goes so far as to say, “Other kids get to play in the bright sunlight, but we train to perform in front of our dear General.” When the Games finally arrive and they are an epic display of state kitsch the two wait in vain for Kim himself to attend one of the shows. He never does, but the notion of a Kafkaesque void at the top is lost on the subjects. “A State of Mind” implicitly insists we can only truly understand what we can see for ourselves, and that goes for the West’s view of North Korea as well as the girls’ view of their dictator.

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The Dear Director

Tuesday, August 2nd, 2005

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
8/2/2005

One of the few things known about Kim Jong-il in the West, from at least the 1980s, is that the North Korean dauphin is a movie fan, and that for a while he personally led the entire North Korean movie industry.

Indeed, movies titillated Kim Jong-il’s imagination when he was a student at the Kim Il-sung university in the early 1960s; he loved movies. Of course, his choice was not the boring North Korean films about exemplary steel workers and selfless military nurses who recited dreary monologues about their love for the party (not so for the Leader at that stage).

The young dauphin preferred Western movies, mostly imported from Europe or the U.S. via Moscow. Following the then Soviet approach, such ideologically suspicious movies were bought in very small quantities. They were not for public screening, but the private viewing of the top elite. It is well known that Stalin was a great movie fan.

Nothing like it has ever been heard about Kim Il-sung, but it seems that his eldest son spent long hours in a small viewing room of the Film Distribution Center, itself located on the second floor of an unremarkable apartment building in downtown Pyongyang.

This youthful passion for movies influenced his private life. The two major love affairs that Kim Jong-il had were with women from this theatrical-cinematographic milieu. But it also influenced his political career since the first job for the ‘rising son’ was to head the cinema production group in the Party Central Committee.

In a Communist party, the Central Committee is believed to be the center of everything, and the “ideological guidance” of the fine arts is one of its major tasks. In North Korea, following the Soviet prototype, this task was entrusted to the Agitation and Propaganda Department, which had a special arts section. Arts were seen as a part of propaganda, first and foremost. The cinema production group, headed by Kim Jong-il, belonged to this section.

Kim Jong-il assumed his leadership role in September 1967, when the cinema world was in turmoil. In September 1967, the North Korean Politburo, the party- state’s supreme council, held an urgent meeting on the premises of North Korea’s largest cinema studio. Movie industry leaders were subjected to sharp attacks because they allegedly condoned “anti-party activity” by producing a movie about Pak Kum-chol, a prominent statesman who had recently fallen from grace. Needless to say, this is the normal risk of being a movie producer or writer in a Stalinist society. You are required to worship heroes, but you never know if today’s hero will become tomorrow’s villain. The situation looked grim, praising the enemies of the people could not be taken lightly.

According to an apocryphal but perhaps true story, it was during the “studio” meeting of the Politburo that the then 25 year-old Kim Jong-il volunteered to take control of the cinema industry. Whatever his intentions, this decision saved many people in the industry from humiliation and death. Kim Jong-il staged large-scale self-criticism sessions, but more serious punishments were rare.

In fact, Kim Jong-il protected his beloved cinema world during the turbulent years of the “Kapsan purge,” which was probably the last large-scale purge of top leaders and their associates in North Korean history. After 1970, purges were largely isolated albeit frequent events, not large-scale campaigns as before.

Under Kim Jong-il’s guidance, the movie studios were refurbished. He arranged the best equipment to be imported from overseas. This sounds fine until one remembers that this meant the re-allocation of scarce hard currency reserves, which could be used for buying anything else, from medical supplies to new battle tanks. However, the crown prince loved cinema, and nobody dared question his demands. After all, new movie cameras are much cheaper than missile launchers.

Kim Jong-il’s years at the helm were marked by a serious improvement in the technical quality of North Korean cinema. The story lines remained as tedious as before, and perhaps even got worse: in general, the late 1960s was a period of increasing ideological repression in the North. But the same old boring stories of self-sacrificing workers, exemplary farm girls and, of course, selfless guerrillas were delivered with much better technical precision.

Guerrillas were particularly important since many major movies produced under Kim Jong-il’s guidance dealt with the anti-Japanese struggle of the 1930s. Sea of Blood, a guerrilla epic with a story line patterned after Gorky’s Mother, and Flower Girl were major examples of this trend. For Kim Jong-il this was important, since he reminded his father Kim Il-sung about the heroic days of anti-Japanese warfare, and by doing so he positioned himself as his father’s most trustworthy successor.

By the late 1960s, it became clear that a dynastic succession was in the offing, but there were few contenders who wanted to become heirs to the aging Great Leader. Kim Jong-il had the best chance from the very beginning, although he was not without rivals as well. But that is another story…

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Construction Delayed for the First Foreign Church in North Korea

Sunday, July 31st, 2005

Daily NK
Yang Jung-A
7/31/2005

Demand for Renovation of Chilgol Church in Pyongyang

The construction of the first church for exclusively foreigners and with state permission, “Harvest Church” has been pending.

Park Min Hee, director of “Nation Loving Christian Missions Alliance” said in his interview with the Radio Free Asia on July 2 that “recently the government of North Korea requested renovation of Chilgol Church located in Pyongyang instead of building a new church, so there has been a delay on the construction.”

Pyongyang International Harvest Church is under construction with the support of missionary groups such as the Campus Crusade for Christ and the Love Network for Korea in Los Angeles. They obtained permission of building a church exclusively for foreigners last fall and the construction was underway.

Harvest Church is to be the third official church in North Korea following the Bongsu Church built in 1988 and Chilgol Church built in 1999, and the first church for exclusively foreigners.

Director Park said, “The construction that had been carried out smoothly until now is being delayed by the new request of the North Korean government to renovate (expand) Chilgol Church and to use it instead of building a new church.”

“It is important for us to build another church in North Korea, so we will be demanding for the building of third church following Chilgol Church,” said Mr. Park. He added “For a better financial assistance we would like to seek help of the churches in South Korea, but North Korean would not like that.”

According to the plan, with the help of NOVA, an American information technology company, a four-story building that could hold 1000 people with lodging facilities is to be constructed. The church will also run a school for foreign students.

Director Park said, “We were going to build a separate school for the citizens of Pyongyang, but the government of North Korea furiously opposed it, but they granted permission to build a school for foreigners.”

The school will hold English and computer courses and other various classes.

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Koreas set up reunion video link

Monday, July 18th, 2005

BBC
7/18/2005

North and South Korea have joined fibre-optic cables across their border to allow families separated for decades to take part in video reunions.

A handful of face-to-face meetings have already taken place between relatives split by the 1950s Korean War, but the cables should help others reunite.

The move is part of a range of measures agreed during cabinet-level talks between the two sides in June.

The first video link-ups will be held on 15 August between 20 families.

The cables run from Munsan in the south to Kaesong in the north.

KT Corp, a South Korean telecoms company taking part in the project, said the link would allow simultaneous connections of up to 9,600 telephone lines.

“We have laid the foundation for accelerating inter-Korean exchanges,” said Kim In-chol, a North Korean postal and communications official.

Reunions between North and South Koreans, which only last a few days, are always surrounded by intense emotion, not least because many of those desperate to be reunited with their relatives are becoming increasingly frail.

Thousands die every year before getting the chance to be reunited with loved ones.

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Controlling Internet Café in North Korea

Wednesday, July 13th, 2005

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
7/13/2005

Pictures of the “Information Technology Store,” also known as “internet café” in other parts of the world and the “study guide” used by the Party members and workers to control circulation of South Korean soap opera DVDs were revealed to the public for the first time.

Rescue! The North Korean People Urgent Action Network (RENK), a Japanese North Korean human rights NGO and Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (NKnet) together held a press conference and revealed three pictures of “Information Technology Store,” and a study guide with the title, “About Completely Destroying Enemies’ Maneuvers to Spread Conspicuous Life Style.”

The pictures and documents revealed at the conference were obtained by Kim Man Chul (pseudo name), the same staff of RENK who took pictures of Japanese food aid sold in the open markets in North Korea in May. It was known that pictures Kim provided RENK were taken by not himself but others inside North Korea.

Existence of Internet Café in North Korea Not Connected to the Outside World

The revealed pictures contain scenes of outside of the store that says, “Information Technology Store,” inside of the store and the boys playing computer games. This internet café is located in Chungjin, North Korea.

Han Kihong, director of NKnet stated, “The “Information Technology Store” is similar to an internet café, and computer classes are also provided at the price of 20,000won per month (average monthly wage of a worker is 2,500~3,000won). It is known that internet connection is good for computer games and email but only connects within North Korea, and the connection does not reach to outside information.”

Mr. Han said, “The “Information Technology Store” has state permission and operate as individual business or small enterprise. Since the price is so expensive, common people would not be able to enter.”

“The computers in the “Information Technology Store” are used computers brought in from China but due to the severe energy situation, in case electricity is cut off, it has its own electricity generator,” added Mr. Han.

The “study guide” presented to the reporters contained critical writings that characterizes circulation of South Korean soap opera DVDs, music CDs, or radio broadcastings as unsound and demoralizing and ways to fight against such conspicuous life style.

Appeasement Outside, Stricter Control of the People Inside

Mr. Han explained, “Recently there have been presuppositions that North Korea pursues appeasement outside and reformation inside thanks as the result of the frequent inter-Korean talks. However, this document (study guide) is the evidence that North Korean government is strengthening the level of control of the people from the outside world.”

This “study guide” also include criticism on Radio Free Asia (RFA) broadcastings, which states, “It (RFA) is a kind of cultural interference of the US to invade and dominate Asia” and showed how much it is alert about RFA’s influence.

About this kind of phenomenon, Mr. Han said, “Until 2000, social and educational broadcasting of KBS were popular among the North Korean people, now they trust FRA much more as reliable news source.”

The study guide also emphasizes importance of fighting against outside influence in every parts of living including hair style, manner of greetings, and eating habits. The government of North Korea is ultimately trying to strengthen internal control.

Lee Young Hwa, director of RENK, criticized the North Korea government at the conference saying, “Kim Jong Il’s conspicuity of controlling hair style and eating habits of the people who are starving to death is a maneuver that must be completely destroyed.”

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The Transformation of Class Structure and Class Conflict in North Korea

Friday, July 8th, 2005

International Journal of Korean Unification Studies
Vol. 14, No.2, 2005, pp 52-84.

PDF Here: transformation of class structure.pdf

Abstract
This study examines how North Korea’s class structure transformations influenced the social transformations, and seeks to understand the structural characteristics of North Korea by examining in detail the existing shape of each social class. This study found that North Korea’s socialist transformation was the process of dismantling every social class, such as the landowners, farmers, commerce and industry, and intelligentsia classes, etc. The 1946 land reform dismantled the landowner class, the 1958 agricultural collectivization dismantled the farmers class, and the 1958 nationalization of commerce and industry did the same to the petty bourgeoisie. The only class remaining in North Korea is the managers of the governing class. There was no class differentiation, only dismantlement. Thus, with social classes dissolved, the governing class remains as the monolithic class monopolizing social, economic, and political power in North Korea, with no other social power to act as a balancer. This type of class structure may constitute the social conditions of political dictatorship in North Korea.

Highlights:
In North Korea, the fundamental ownership relations of the traditional class structure were dismantled in the name of socialist construction. The victims of this construction were the traditional classes of landowner, petty bourgeoisie, farmer, and intellectual.

When the 1946 Land Reform Law was passed, it was enacted in a month.  The law provided for government confiscation of land properties over 5 chongbo (1 chongbo=2.45 acres).  When completed, 1,000,325 chongbo of 1,982,431 under cultivation at the time.  At the time, land owned by the Japanese state, Japanese people, and religious organizations was barely 4%.  the remaining 96% was in the hands of Korean landowners and tenants.  It affected 405,603 of the 1,121,295 registered farming households.  4 in 10 households had land confiscated in part or whole.  Ten years after land reform, many were again prospering, and theor political influence became noticeable.  Kim il Sung sought to reassert control over them.  In 1958, land reform was reversed and farms were colectivised.

Nationalization of industry, traffic, transportation, communications and bank finances, including over 1034 important factories and businesses.  In 1947 80.2% of industry was held in state control.  Private commerce made up the rest.  After the Korean War, private enterprise production consisted of small-scale mills, metal workshops, rubber factories.  by May 1957, the number of private industrial enterprises was 633.  By August 1958, this activity was completely eliminated.

To purge the intellectuals (who were educated in the old ways) Kim il Sung proposed, “we have to speed up the construction of socialism, and fo rthat purpose, we have to fight against the conservatism of the intellectuals.” This started with technicians and economic managers.  Then dissident writers.

All social powers were ousted: Landowners, farmers, businessmen, and intellectual classes.  All menas of production were nationalized and socialiazed, so all became employees of the state, and the state became the sole employer.  North Korea’s new system consists of the rulers and everyone else (two groups).

To prevent remanats of the past from gaining influence, North Korea classified each individual according to their family background, and discriminated on this classification (starting in 1957).

Yunan and Soviet factions were purged in the August Faction Incident in 1956.  Cabinet Decision 149 mandates that ousted individuals be put in area 20km from the sea coast and demarcation line, 50km away from Pyongyang and Kaesong, 20km away fro mother cities and limited residential areas.  These individuals received a special stamp on their ID cards and were registered with the social security agency.

The North Korean managerial (ruling) class is an exclusive group which has institutionalized a system so that it may keep its privileges.  Only the sons and daughters of the core class can become promoted within the managerial class.  Children of Cadres only marry children of cadres.

Core class is 3,915,000 people in 870,000 households.  Wavering is 3,150,000 in 700,000 households.  Hostile is 7,930,000 in 173,000 households.

In the workplace, all indivduals are obliged to be part of one of three organizations: the party, the Youth League, or the Workers Union.

Supplies are divided into special numbers.  1,2,3,4, etc.  Those in higher positions are afforded higher rank in distribution.  “How could Party Secretaries, who don’t do anything,obtian objects of a 4 level?”

Private relationships are only possible through the party.

Self-criticism sessions are carried out every week.  Since these are routine, people know each other and act accordingly.  Becuase everyone has to criticize each other they tend to do so in a modest way.

Peasants most angry.  Laborers and office workers have time to do business on the side, but peasants do not.  Some bright peasants do tend private plots.

People complain openly now.

While the core class focused on inner-systemic solidarity when faced with a crisis, the wavering and hostile classes were the first to enter the black market.  After business expanded in the country side like wildfire the government brought the businesses into the open in July 2002.  The marginalized societies led the change in values.  Reportedly the collude with the regulatory authorities and security guards, borrow and rent vehicles for biusiness.

Only those sub-classified as Manyongdae line (Kim Il Sung’s lineage), Baektusan line (Kim Jong Il’s lineage), and Ryongnamsan line (People who graduated with Kim Jong Il from Kim Il Sung University) are able to receive official government posts.

Of the total population, 10% makes up the power-holding ruling class.  Another 40% make up a lower social rung doing business and making deals.

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Trading Ideals for Sustenance

Monday, July 4th, 2005

Los Angeles Times
Barbara Demick
7/4/2005

For most of her life, Kim Hui Suk had spouted the sayings of North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung and never for a moment harbored a doubt: Capitalists were the enemy. Individualism was evil.

But then disaster rained down on her hometown, Chongjin, on North Korea’s remote east coast. Factories ran out of fuel. Food rations stopped. Watching her family slowly succumb to the famine — her mother-in-law, husband and son eventually would die of starvation — Kim realized she had to change.

Once a stickler for following the rules, she bribed a bureaucrat so she could sell her apartment. Then, with no business skills other than the ability to calculate on an abacus, she used the proceeds of the sale to set herself up in a black market business, hawking biscuits and moonshine she brewed from corn.

Kim could have been sent away for life for such crimes. But obeying the rules would have meant a death sentence.

“The simple and kind-hearted people who did what they were told — they were the first to die of starvation,” said Kim, a soft-spoken grandmother who now lives in South Korea and has adopted a new name to protect family members still in the North.

The famine that killed 2 million North Koreans in the mid-1990s and the death of the nation’s founder, Kim Il Sung, in 1994 sparked vast changes across the secretive communist country.

Markets are springing up in the shadows of abandoned factories, foreign influences are breaching the borders, inflation is soaring and corruption is rampant. A small nouveau riche class has emerged, even as a far larger group has been forced to trade away everything for food.

This is the picture of life in North Korea as painted by more than 30 people from Chongjin, the nation’s thirdlargest city. Some are defectors living in South Korea. Others were interviewed in China, which they had entered illegally to work or beg. Accounts of aid workers and videos taken illegally in Chongjin by disgruntled residents were also used to prepare this report.

Although the North Korean regime has a reputation as the ultimate Big Brother, people from Chongjin say the public pays less and less heed to what the government says. There is little that might be called political dissent, but residents describe a pervasive sense of disillusionment that remains largely unspoken.

“People are not stupid. Everybody thinks our own government is to blame for our terrible situation,” said a 39-year-old coal miner from Chongjin who was interviewed late last year during a visit to China. “We all know we think that, and we all know everybody else thinks that. We don’t need to talk about it.”

Kim Sun Bok, a 32-year-old former factory worker who came to South Korea last summer, said the country was “changing incredibly.”

“It is not the same old North Korea anymore except in name.”

Just a decade ago, when people in Chongjin needed new trousers, they had to go to government-owned stores that sold items mostly in drab browns or a dull shade of indigo. Food and other necessities were rationed. Sometimes the government permitted the sale of home-grown vegetables, but even a hairbrush was supposed to be purchased from a state-run shop.

Today, people can shop at markets all over Chongjin, the result of a burst of entrepreneurship grudgingly allowed by the authorities. Almost anything can be purchased — ice cream bars from China, pirated DVDs, cars, Bibles, computers, real estate and sex — for those who can afford the high prices.

The retail mecca is Sunam market, a wood-frame structure with a corrugated tin roof that is squeezed between two derelict factories.

The aisles brim with fresh cucumbers, tomatoes, peaches, scallions, watermelons and cabbage, as shown by rare video footage taken last year by the Osaka, Japan-based human rights group Rescue the North Korean People. Everything else comes from China: belts, shoes, umbrellas, notebooks, plates, aluminum pots, knives, shovels, toy cars, detergents, shampoos, lotions, hand creams and makeup.

Each of Chongjin’s seven administrative districts has a state-sanctioned market. Sunam, the city’s largest, is expanding, and some say it has a wider variety of goods than the main market in Pyongyang. Many vendors wear their licenses pinned to their right breasts while the obligatory Kim Il Sung buttons remain over the heart.

Although markets have been expanding for more than a decade, it was only in 2002 and ’03 that the government enacted economic reforms that lifted some of the prohibitions against them. Most of the vendors are older women such as Kim Hui Suk, a tiny 60-year-old with short, permed hair and immaculate clothing.

She was working in the day-care center of a textile factory in the early 1990s when production ground to a halt. Men were ordered to stay in their jobs, but Workers’ Party cadres at the factory started whispering that the married women, or ajumas, ought to moonlight to provide for their families.

“It was clear that the ajumas had to go out and earn money or the family would starve,” Kim said.

She first tried to raise pigs, locking them in a shed outside her downtown apartment building and feeding them slop left over from making tofu. But the electricity and water were too unreliable to keep the business going.

In 1995, Kim sold her apartment in the choice Shinam district and bought a cheaper one, hoping to use the proceeds to import rice from the countryside. But that too failed when she injured her back and couldn’t work.

The family’s situation became dire. Her husband’s employer, a provincial radio station, stopped paying salaries, and food distribution ended. In 1996, her mother-in-law died of starvation, and her husband the following year.

“First he got really, really thin and then bloated. His last words to me were, ‘Let’s get a bottle of wine, go to a restaurant and enjoy ourselves,’ ” Kim recalled. “I felt bad that I couldn’t fulfill his last wish.”

In 1998, Kim’s 26-year-old son, who had been a wrestler and gymnast, grew weak from hunger and contracted pneumonia. A shot of penicillin from the market would have cost 40 won, the same price as enough corn powder to feed herself and her three daughters for a week. She opted for the corn and watched her son succumb to the infection.

But Kim did not give up. She swapped apartments again and used the money to start another business, this time baking biscuits and neungju, a potent corn moonshine. If buyers didn’t have cash, she would accept chile powder or anything else she could use.

“We made just enough to put food on the table,” said Kim.

Much of Chongjin’s commerce is still not officially sanctioned, so it has an impromptu quality. Money changes hands over wooden carts that can be rolled away in a hurry. Those who can’t afford carts sell on tarpaulins laid out in the dirt.

Fashion boutiques are slapped together with poles and clotheslines, enlivening the monochromatic landscape with garish pinks and paisleys. Some clothes have the labels ripped out and vendors whisper that these items came from araet dongne or the “village below,” a euphemism for South Korea, whose products are illegal in the North.

Shoppers can buy 88-pound sacks of rice emblazoned with U.S. flags, and biscuits and corn noodles produced by three factories in Chongjin run by the U.N. World Food Program — all intended to be humanitarian handouts.

Some people cut hair or repair bicycles, though furtively because these jobs are supposed to be controlled by the government’s Convenience Bureau.

“They will bring a chair and mirror to the market to cut hair,” Kim said. “The police can come at any moment, arrest them and confiscate their scissors.”

Another new business is a computer salon. It looks like an Internet cafe, but because there’s no access to the Web in North Korea, it is used mostly by teenagers to play video games.

More products are available, but inflation puts them out of reach for most people. The price of rice has increased nearly eightfold since the economic reforms of 2002 to 525 won per pound; an average worker earns 2,500 won a month — about $1 at the unofficial exchange rate.

World Food Program officials in North Korea say the vast majority of the population is less well off since the economic changes, especially factory workers, civil servants, retirees and anybody else on a fixed income. But there are those who have gotten rich. Poor Chongjin residents disparage them as donbulrae, or money insects.

“There are people who started trading early and figured out the ropes,” said a 64-year-old retired math teacher who sells rabbits at the market. “But those of us who were loyal and believed in the state, we are the ones who are suffering.”

If Chongjin’s economic center is Sunam market, its political heart is Pohang Square, a vast plaza dominated by a 25-foot bronze statue of Kim Il Sung.

The grass here is neatly mowed, the shrubbery pruned and the pavement in good repair. Even when the rest of the city is without electricity, the statue is bathed in light. Across the street, a tidy pink building houses a permanent exhibit of the national flower, a hybrid begonia called Kimjongilia, named for current leader Kim Jong Il.

Since the practice of religion is barred, Pohang Square stands in as a spiritual center. Newlyweds in their best clothes pose for pictures, bowing to the statue so that their union is symbolically blessed.

When Kim Il Sung died on July 8, 1994, half a million people came to Pohang Square to pay their respects in the pouring rain and stifling heat. But among the adoring multitudes, there were malcontents.

One was Ok Hui, the eldest daughter of entrepreneur Kim Hui Suk. Though she dutifully took her place in the throng, any sadness she felt came from a foreboding that Kim Jong Il would be worse than his father.

“I went day and night along with everybody else. You had to…. But there were no tears coming from my eyes,” recalled Ok Hui, now 39, who did not want her family name published.

Ok Hui worked for a construction company’s propaganda unit, a job that entailed riding around in a truck with a megaphone, exhorting workers to do their best for the fatherland. But she didn’t believe what she preached.

Her father had taught her to doubt the regime. As a reporter and member of the Workers’ Party, he knew more about the outside world than many people and realized how far North Korea lagged behind South Korea and China.

“He and his friends would stay up at night when my mother was out, talking about what a thief Kim Jong Il was,” Ok Hui said.

Her mother, though, remained a firm believer. “I lived only for the marshal. I never had a thought otherwise,” said Kim Hui Suk. “Even when my husband and son died, I thought it was my fault.”

Ok Hui and her mother frequently clashed. “Why did you give birth to me in this horrible country?” Ok Hui remembers taunting her mother.

“Shut up! You’re a traitor to your country!” Kim retorted.

“Whom do you love more? Kim Jong Il or me?” her daughter shot back.

The regime was probably less beloved in Chongjin than elsewhere in North Korea. Food had run out in its province, North Hamgyong, earlier than in other areas, and starvation rates were among the highest in the nation.

Chongjin’s people are reputed to be the most independent-minded in North Korea. One famous report of unrest centers on the city. In 1995, senior officers from the 6th army corps in Chongjin were executed for disloyalty and the entire unit, estimated at 40,000 men, was disbanded. It is still unclear whether the incident was an attempted uprising or a corruption case.

Chongjin is known for its vicious gang wars, and it was sometimes difficult to distinguish political unrest from ordinary crime. There were increasing incidents of theft and insubordination. At factories, desperate workers dismantled machinery or stripped away copper wiring to sell for food.

Public executions by firing squad were held outside Sunam market and on the lawn of the youth park, once a popular lover’s lane.

In a village called Ihyon-ri on the outskirts of Chongjin, a gang suspected of anti-government activities killed a national security agent who had tried to infiltrate the group, former kindergarten teacher Seo Kyong Hui said.

“This guy was from my village. He had been sent to inform on a group that was engaged in suspicious activities,” she said. “They caught him and stoned him to death.”

Work crews went out early in the morning to wash away any anti-regime graffiti painted overnight, according to human rights groups, but most people were too scared to express their discontent. Badmouthing the leadership is still considered blasphemy.

To discourage anti-regime activity, North Korea punishes “political crimes” by banishing entire families to remote areas or labor camps.

“If you have one life to live, you would gladly give it to overthrow this government,” said Seo, the teacher. “But you are not the only one getting punished. Your family will go through hell.”

Even as Kim Jong Il’s regime weakens, many of its stalwarts are growing richer. Many of Chongjin’s well-to-do are members of the Workers’ Party or are connected to the military or security services. In the new economy, they use their ties to power to trade with China, obtain market licenses, extract bribes and sell bureaucratic favors.

“Those who have power in North Korea always figure out ways to make money,” said Joo Sung Ha, 31, who grew up in Chongjin and now works as a journalist in Seoul.

Joo was the pampered only son of a prominent official, and his family lived in Shinam, in the city’s northern hills overlooking the ocean. By the standards of South Korea or China, the single-family homes with lines of fish and squid drying from the roofs are nothing special. But for North Koreans, these are mansions.

The Joo family had a 2,000-square-foot cement-block house and a walled garden about twice that large. The garden proved crucial in protecting the family against the famine, though they had to contend with hungry soldiers who would scale the walls and steal potatoes and cabbages.

North Korean families like to measure their status by the number of wardrobes they own, and Joo’s family had five — plus a television, a refrigerator, a tape recorder, a sewing machine, an electric fan and a camera. They didn’t have a phone or a car — at that time those were unthinkable even for a well-off family — but they did have a bicycle.

“The appliances were of no use after the electricity ran out,” Joo said. “The bicycle was the most important thing, because the buses and trams stopped running.”

Joo attended the best elementary school in Chongjin, the city’s foreign language institute, and eventually the country’s top school, Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang. He never met a native English speaker in the North, or any foreigner for that matter, but he trained his ear with videotapes of the BBC and banned Hollywood films.

“I sometimes watched ‘Gone With the Wind’ twice a day. Anybody else would have been arrested for watching Hollywood movies,” he recalled.

Joo’s glimpses of Western culture eroded his loyalty to the system. “I saw myself 20 years down the road in the prime of my career and North Korea would be collapsing,” he said.

While many of his classmates went to work for the regime’s propaganda news service after graduating, Joo arranged to return to Chongjin, where he taught high school until he escaped in 2001.

“The people from our neighborhood couldn’t understand,” said Joo, who stays in contact with his family. “They thought I had everything.”

Kim Hye Young, an actress, was also a child of privilege. Her father, Kim Du Seon, was an official of a trading company that sold mushrooms and fish in China. He learned how to navigate the bureaucracy, using his connections with the army and security services.

“If one of [the officials] had a wedding in the family, they would come to me for a couple of cases of wine,” the older Kim said.

As trade with China became more important, the family prospered. They took drives in a company car and ate at Chongjin’s nicest restaurant.

Growing up, Kim showed a flair for theater, and through her acting became a member of the elite in her own right. Her best-known role was in a play called “The Strong and the Righteous,” in which she portrayed a spy who sacrifices her life for North Korea.

When the production won first place in a Pyongyang drama festival in 1996, she got to meet Kim Jong Il. Still breathless with the memory, she said the leader shook her hand and gave her a fountain pen.

“I knew that I, as an actress, had an important role to promote the ideology of my country,” Kim said.

Kim and her sisters were largely oblivious to the famine, and their mother said she took pains to shelter them.

“My daughters don’t know to this day how many children in our neighborhood starved to death,” said her mother, Choe Geum Lan. She also didn’t tell them that their father, as a result of his business trips to China, had become increasingly pessimistic about North Korea’s future.

In 1998, when Kim was home from Pyongyang on vacation, her parents told her the family was going to visit an aunt in Musan, a city near the Chinese border. It was not until they had crossed to the other side that Kim and her teenage sisters, were told they had defected.

Kim, now 29 and advertising toothpaste on South Korean television, is one of the few defectors who says she didn’t want to leave.

“I was content with my life,” she said.

Today, North Korea’s elites are even better off, buying telephones for their homes and even cars.

“For $4,000 or $5,000, anybody can buy a car now. It used to be that you weren’t allowed to register your own car. We couldn’t dream of it,” said Kim Yong Il, a defector from Chongjin who lives in Seoul.

Recently, he arranged to have a computer smuggled from China to his relatives in Chongjin. North Korea’s state-run companies don’t have computers, so they’re eager to hire people who do. “If you have a computer, you can get a job,” he said.

Visitors have been shocked to glimpse the new conspicuous consumption in Chongjin.

Jeung Young Tai, a South Korean academic who was in Chongjin delivering South Korean government aid, noticed a paunchy man standing in front of the Chonmasan Hotel next to a new Lexus.

And at a hot spring in Kyongsong, on the city’s outskirts, he saw a woman carrying a lap dog — a striking sight in a country where there is so little food that the only pets usually are goldfish.

“You get the sense that there is a tremendous gap between rich and poor and that the gap is growing,” Jeung said.

The flip side, of course, is that the poor are getting poorer.

In Chongjin, those at the very bottom of the heap can be found at the train station.

The cavernous building boasts a large portrait of Kim Il Sung above the entrance and a granite-faced clock that rarely tells the right time. In front is a vast plaza crammed with people waiting for trains — sometimes for days, because the trains have no fixed schedules — and people waiting for nothing at all.

These are the homeless, many of them children. They’re called kotchebi, or swallows, because they wander the streets and sometimes between towns in search of food. Many gravitate to Chongjin station, because it is a major hub and the travelers have more to give.

A video shot last year by a military official and sold to Japan’s NTV television captured barefoot children near the station in torn, filthy clothing fighting over a nearly empty jar of kimchi. One boy scooted along the pavement on his buttocks; the narrator said his toes had been eaten away by frostbite.

Kim Hyok knows how easy it is for a child to end up at the station; he spent the better part of two years living there.

“If you can’t find somebody or they left their home, chances are you can find them at the station,” said Kim, now 23 and resettled in South Korea.

Kim’s mother died when he was a toddler, and he was raised by his father, a party member and an employee of a military unit that sold fish in China. During his early childhood, Kim, his father and elder brother lived in relative comfort in a high-rise apartment in the Sunam district.

When the government stopped handing out rations in 1993, Kim’s father used his connections to place his sons in an orphanage 60 miles away.

Kim, who was about 12 at the time, wasn’t sorry to be sent away. It was considered a privilege because the orphanages had food.

In 1997, just before his 16th birthday, Kim “graduated” from the orphanage. He caught a train back to Chongjin, but when he got to his neighborhood, things looked unfamiliar. The electricity was off. Many apartment buildings had no glass in the windows and appeared vacant.

Climbing the eight flights in pitch dark to his family’s unit, he heard a baby crying and wondered whose it might be. Confused and scared, he knocked on the door.

A young couple opened the door and told him his father had moved long ago but left a message: Look for him at the train station.

The phenomenon of vagrancy is testament to how much North Korea has changed. Before the famine, the government controlled people’s movements so strictly that they could not dream of visiting a relative in a nearby town without a travel permit, let alone selling their homes. Not showing up for work could bring a visit from police.

But as people embarked on increasingly desperate hunts for food, families broke apart. With few telephones and a barely functional postal service, parents and children became separated.

“People just started wandering around because they were hungry,” Kim said. “They would sell their apartments for a few bags of rice.”

Kim never found his father. He also never found his brother, who had left the orphanage a year earlier.

With no place to go, Kim ended up at the train station. By night, he slept squeezed into a narrow space designed for a sliding iron gate. By day, he loitered near the food vendors on the plaza. He often worked with a gang of other kids — a few would topple a vendor’s cart and the others would scoop up whatever spilled.

“If you’re not fast, you can’t eat,” said Kim, who even today in South Korea bears the signs of chronic malnutrition, with a head that looks oversized on a shockingly short frame.

Kim began hopping the slow-moving trains that pass through Chongjin on their way to the Chinese border. Once on board, Kim would scramble up to the top of a car, flatten himself to avoid the electric lines above and, using his pack as a pillow, ride for hours.

At the border, he would wade across the river to hawk the items in his pack: household goods on consignment from Chongjin residents, who were selling off their possessions.

In 1998, Kim was arrested by Chinese authorities, who do not recognize North Koreans as refugees. He was sent back to North Korea and spent two years in a prison camp before escaping again in 2000 to China, where he was eventually taken in by missionaries and brought to South Korea.

For every homeless person who survived, many more likely died. Kim Hui Suk recalled a particularly ghoulish scene at the train station.

“Once I saw them loading three bodies into a cart,” Kim said. “One guy, a man in his 40s, was still conscious. His eyes were sort of blinking, but they still were taking him away.”

Although the ranks of the homeless have thinned since the height of the famine, North Korean residents say their numbers are still considerable.

“If somebody disappears, you don’t know whether he dropped dead on the road or went to China,” the coal miner said.

About 100,000 North Koreans have escaped to China in the last 10 years. Many have ended up returning to North Korea, either because they were deported or because they missed their families. They often bring back money, goods to trade and strange new ideas.

Smugglers carry chests that can hold up to 1,000 pirated DVDs. South Korean soap operas, movies about the Korean War and Hollywood action films are among the most popular. Even pornography is making its way in.

This is a radical change for a country so prudish that until recently women were not permitted to ride bicycles because it was thought too provocative. Seo Kyong Hui, the kindergarten teacher, said that when she left North Korea in 1998, “I was 26 years old, and I still didn’t know how a baby was conceived.”

Even today, women are prohibited from wearing short skirts or sleeveless shirts, and both sexes are forbidden to wear blue jeans. Infractions bring rebukes from the public standards police.

But it is a losing battle to maintain what used to be a hermetic seal around the country. Just a few years ago, ordinary North Koreans could make telephone calls only from post offices. Dialing abroad was virtually impossible. Now some people carry Chinese cellphones and pay for rides to the border to pick up a signal and call overseas.

Smugglers also bring in cheap Chinese radios. Unlike North Korean radios, which are preset to government channels, the Chinese models can be tuned to anything, even South Korean programs or the Korean-language broadcasts of Radio Free Asia.

In the past, being caught with such contraband would land a person in political prison. Nowadays, security personnel will more likely confiscate the illicit item for personal use.

When a policeman caught Ok Hui, the entrepreneur’s daughter, with a Chinese radio in 2001, the first question he asked was, “So how do you work this thing?”

She wrote down the frequencies for South Korean radio stations.

“Don’t you have earphones so you can listen without anybody hearing you?” the officer then demanded.

North Korea instructs its citizens that the country is a socialist paradise, but the government knows outside influences can puncture its carefully crafted illusions.

“Bourgeois anti-communist ideology is paralyzing the people’s sound mind-set,” warns a Workers’ Party document dated April 2005. “If we allow ourselves to be affected by these novel ideas, our absolute idolization for the marshal [Kim Il Sung] will disappear.”

Among those who make it to China, many describe a moment of epiphany when they find out just how bad off North Koreans are.

Kim Ji Eun, a doctor from Chongjin, remembers wading across the partially frozen Tumen River in March 1999, staggering to a Chinese farmhouse and seeing a dish of white rice and meat set out in a courtyard.

“I couldn’t figure it out at first. I thought maybe it was for refrigeration,” recalled Kim, who now lives in South Korea. “Then I realized that dogs in China live better than even party members in North Korea.”

Many Chongjin residents who are caught trying to flee the country end up back in the city, behind the barbed wire of Nongpo Detention Center.

It sits near the railroad tracks in a swampy waterfront area. Prisoners are assigned back-breaking jobs in the nearby rice paddies or brick factory, where the workday begins at 5 a.m.

Ok Hui was one of those who served time in Nongpo. A rebel by nature, she had become fed up with North Korea and a difficult marriage.

In September 2001, during one of several failed attempts to escape, she was arrested in Musan and brought back to Chongjin by train. Guards tied the female prisoners to one another by tightly winding shoelaces around their thumbs.

In Nongpo, the inmates bunked in rows of 10, squeezed so tightly together that they had to sleep on their sides. Newcomers sometimes had to bed down in the corridor near overflowing toilets. Meals consisted of a thin, salty soup, sometimes supplemented by a few kernels of raw corn or a chunk of uncooked potato.

“The walls were very high and surrounded by wire,” Ok Hui said. “One woman tried to climb the wall. They beat her almost to death. You can’t imagine. They made us stand and watch.”

One day, when she was assigned to work in the fields, she spotted an old woman. She took off her underwear and offered it to the woman in exchange for sending a message to her mother. Underwear is scarce in North Korea, so the woman accepted and agreed to send a telegram to Ok Hui’s mother.

With her market earnings, Kim Hui Suk bought 10 packs of cigarettes for a security official to arrange her daughter’s release.

Some days later, the prison administrator came to talk to Ok Hui and other female prisoners who were picking corn. They were all due to be freed shortly, and the administrator urged them to resist the temptations of capitalism and imperialism, and to devote themselves to North Korea.

Then, he asked for a show of hands: Who would promise not to run away again to China?

Not a single woman raised her arm.

“We were all just thinking that our whole lives we had been told lies,” Ok Hui recalled. “Our whole lives, in fact, were lies. We just felt this immense rage toward the system.”

The prison administrator looked at the women squatting sullenly in silence in the cornfield.

“Well,” he said, “if you go again to China, next time don’t get caught.”

Forty days after her release, Ok Hui escaped again to China and made her way to South Korea. She used $8,000 in resettlement money from South Korea’s government to pay a broker to smuggle her mother out of North Korea. Today Ok Hui works in a funeral home and her mother as a housekeeper.

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Tourism with a North Korean twist

Tuesday, June 28th, 2005

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
6/28/2005

This month, Hyundai Asan Corp stated that the number of tourists to have visited the Kumgang Mountain Tourist Project in North Korea since it began operations in 1998 had finally reached one million. This is seen as a reason for some major celebration – as any sufficiently round figure would.

However, in January 1999 Hyundai Asan leaders assured that by the end of 2004, there would have been an accumulative 4.9 million visits to the North. The actual figure was about 900,000. At the same time, Hyundai Asan managers predicted that in 2004 alone some 1.2 million tourists would visit the project. Yet the actual number of visits that year was 274,000.

Does this mean the Kumgang project is a failure? Not quite, since it remains in operation – unlike many other much-trumpeted intra-Korean projects. But it is kept afloat only due to persistent political and financial support from the South Korean government (or, in other words, due to the deepness of the pockets of South Korean taxpayers). Within its short history, the project has been on the verge of bankruptcy, and has even seen its chief executive officer driven to suicide.

The project was conceived in 1989, when Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai Group, spent a week in North Korea negotiating with the Pyongyang leaders, including president Kim Il-sung himself. The chairman of Korea’s largest industrial conglomerate was born in what is now North Korea, and in last years of his long and eventful life he demonstrated a sentimental attachment to his native land, being the most enthusiastic proponent of South Korean investment in the North.

One of the schemes briefly discussed during his 1989 visit was the idea of setting up a large tourist park in North Korea, to be used by South Korean tourists. The park was to be located in the Kumgang (“Diamond”) mountains, which for centuries have been seen in Korean culture as an embodiment of scenic beauty. The mountains conveniently lay near the Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, the border between the two Korean states.

However, it took a decade and some major political changes to start the project moving. By the mid-1990s, Seoul realized that the collapse of North Korea was both unlikely and undesirable, since a German-style unification would be prohibitively costly. Hence, investment to the North and all kinds of direct and indirect aid came to be seen as a necessity by the new left-leaning administration of president Kim Dae-jung, who was elected in 1997.

That meant Chung Ju-yung’s plans received government support. He moved ahead with his characteristic energy, and in November 1998, the Kumgang project began to operate.

The idea was simple. The North Koreans agreed to create a sort of ghetto for South Korean visitors. A part of the Kumgang mountains was fenced off, with all the local population moved away. The South Korean tourists took a cruise ship to the area. The ship moored in a local harbor while the visitors ventured out for mountain walks and sight-seeing. Typically, a tour lasted for four days and three nights, and tourists lived onboard the cruise ship, which doubled as a floating hotel.

This clever scheme solved the problem of information flow, which was seen by Pyongyang as the major obstacle in its interactions with the South. North Korean commoners are supposed to believe that their South Korean brethren suffer under the cruel yoke of US imperialists. Understandably, their government does not want them to know that the per capita gross national project (GNP) in South Korea is 20 to 30 times higher than in the North. The sight of well-dressed South Korean crowds would be damaging for public morale and even political stability, but in the tourist scheme the rich southerners could be kept out of sight of average North Koreans, being accompanied only by a handful of carefully selected minders.

The South Korean visitors also had to behave themselves. They were warned that they could not criticize the North Korean system and its leaders, and that, in general, talking politics with North Korean personnel was not advisable. Transgressions could be punished.

In June 1999, Min Yong-mi, a 35-year-old housewife from Seoul, was engaged in talks with a North Korean minder. She told him a few words about South Korean prosperity and said something to the effect that North Korean defectors in the South were doing well. The reaction was swift: the talkative lady was arrested and spent one week in detention, accused of espionage. Of course she was not put into a real prison, but the ordeal was tough enough to undermine her health. There are good reasons to suspect that the entire affair was a deliberate provocation: the North Korean authorities were waited for something like this to happen to demonstrate that no quasi-political activities would be tolerated. They wanted to make an example of Min, and they generally succeeded: since then, tourists have become far more cautious.

Moneywise, the North Koreans were doing very well, too. The Hyundai Group built all the necessary infrastructure (presumably including the fences to keep the South Korean visitors under control), and also paid US$12 million every month as a fee for the use of the area. Some additional income was earned by North Korea through the sale of grossly overpriced local products and souvenirs.

Initially these conditions were accepted, not only because Chung Ju-yung was sentimental (and over-optimistic) about investment to North Korea, but also because a large tourist flow was expected. According to the above-cited sanguine estimates of 1999, by 2003 the numbers were supposed to reach the level of one million visitors per year – and then exceed them.

However, the plan did not work out as intended. Contrary to initial expectations, South Koreans were not too eager to spend their short vacations behind barbed wire. The early enthusiasm soon wore out, and from 2,000 the numbers of tourists began to decline. The trips were not cheap: the cost in 1998-99 was about 650,000 to 750,000 won (some $500-600 at the current rate). South Koreans soon discovered that for a similar amount of money they could visit China or even some parts of Southeast Asia, where apart from the scenery they would have some exposure to foreign cultures and would not feel under constant control and supervision.

The reformist drive of the Seoul government also contributed to the project’s mounting problems. Until early 2001, other subsidiaries of the mighty Hyundai Group were helping Hyundai Merchandise Marine, which initially operated the Kumgang Project. But as a result of government-initiated reforms of chaebol (conglomerates), the Hyundai Group was disbanded, after which independent companies of the former chaebol were not too eager to keep afloat a struggling project. In April 2001, Hyundai halved the number of trips to Kumgang and stated that the project would be discontinued due to the great loss of money.

Trouble in paradise
The government, however, could not allow this to happen; by that time the project had acquired huge symbolic importance. By 2001, the Kumgang project had become by far the largest intra-Korean economic operation, and the Kim Dae-jung administration, bent on keeping its “sunshine” engagement policy going, could not afford to lose the major symbol of such policy.

A rescue package saved the project from demise. The government-owned Korea National Tourist Organization was ordered to take part in the project and pay some of the overdue bills. The government also occasionally paid for generous discounts for many groups of people. For nine months in 2002, for example, the government paid 70% of the traveling expenses for elementary, middle and high school students, and 60% as well as all costs for students and teachers living in rural areas.

The North Koreans also demonstrated uncharacteristic flexibility when in 2001 they reluctantly agreed to accept payments depending on the number of tourists and the length of their stay, instead of the earlier fixed fee. Currently, these payments amount to $50 per tourist with a standard package of two nights, and $25 for a tourist who stays only one night.

Thus, the project survived the first crisis – only to be struck by a new one. This time, the reasons were political: the opposition uncovered evidence which showed that in order to secure Pyongyang’s agreement to participate in the North-South summit of June 2000, Seoul had secretly transferred $500 million to North Korea.

It was only logical that this clandestine money transfer was conducted with the involvement of Hyundai Asan. First, the survival of the corporation would be impossible without government involvement, and this meant its leaders could hardly say “no” when asked by the authorities to “help” in some delicate affair. Second, being the largest South Korean operation in North Korea, Hyundai Asan had both vested interests in intra-Korean detente and experience in dealing with money transfers of such kinds (there are some good reasons to suspect that the ill-fated “summit fees” were not the only clandestine money transfer to Pyongyang).

The discovery of the “summit bribe” led to a political scandal. An investigation ensued, and the then-head of Hyundai Asan, Chiung Mong-hun, the 55-year-old son of the conglomerate’s founder, found himself in the center of the scandal. He could not handle the stress. Amid mounting political pressures, he committed suicide by throwing himself out of his headquarters’ window on August 4, 2003.

Yet once again the Kumgang project survived the blow. In May of this year, Hyundai Asan stated it would probably make a profit in 2005. If that happens it will be the first time a profit has been recorded in the company’s history – of course, we are talking about ongoing costs and revenues, without considering the estimated $470 million that has been invested in the project so far. Nonetheless, it is clear that the situation has improved over the past few years, even if the actual performance would not be considered satisfactory in a less politically motivated project.

The improvement was brought about by the opening of a land route in 2003 that replaced the earlier cruises. Now, South Korean tourists board buses near the checkpoint and then travel to hotels operated by Hyundai Asan in the same Kumgang area. Currently, two hotels are operational, but the number will probably increase. The new tours can be shorter, with two nights being the norm. The new scheme also cuts down prices considerably, making the trip somewhat more attractive at 300,000 to 400,000 won (roughly, $350-$400) per person.

The basics of the tour remain unchanged, however: South Koreans are placed in a sort of ghetto, behind high fences carefully guarded by sentries. The tourists can shop for North Korean souvenirs, which are sold at exorbitant prices. It seems ant liquor and snake wine (with a real dead snake floating inside the bottle) are especially popular among males – both are believed to be good for virility. An acrobatics show and a hot spring are additional pleasures available for visitors – if they are willing to pay. A visit to the hot spring, for example, costs some $30, or about half of the average annual salary in North Korea.

Outside their hotels, tourists are constantly supervised by their North Korean guides, mostly young girls who are obviously selected for their good looks and, presumably, political reliability. There are some males as well, who dress in plain clothes. All guides are equipped with their Kim Il-sung badges, and are ever ready to deliver a well-rehearsed eulogy to the Great Leader and his son and successor, Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, in suitably exalted tones.

Combined with large iconic pictures of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il on major crossroads and eulogies to their greatness carved in mountain rock, this creates a very bizarre picture of time travel: for one who wants to experience the feelings of visitors to Mao Zedong’s China in the early 1970s or Stalin’s Russia in the late 1930s, the place is worth a visit. Admittedly, not many foreigners rush to see the Stalinesque environment, long extinct elsewhere: even though formalities are kept at a bare minimum, only 0.5% of all visitors are foreign citizens.

Looking at the North Koreans present on the scene, one cannot help but wonder what is actually happening inside the heads of these highly privileged people, more often than not agents of the secret police or scions of well-connected families. The crowds of well-dressed, well-fed South Koreans contradict the official picture of the South as an impoverished domain of US imperialists and Japanese neo-colonialists. The selected few probably don’t ask questions, but they arrive at some conclusions no doubt.

However, this impact should not be overestimated. After all, the project was conceived in a way that allowed the impact of the South Korean visitors to be kept as low as possible. The number of North Koreans allowed to see these visitors is intentionally kept very low. Until recently, Pyongyang did not allow the Kumgang project to employ local personnel, and only recently have North Korean waitresses and cooks appeared at some restaurants and in one of the hotels. Their attitude vividly reminds this writer of the privileged Intourist hotel in Leningrad, which had the same air of unintended rudeness in dealing with its foreign guests, and great superiority in interacting with Soviet citizens. Nonetheless, at the Kumgang project, the presence of some 400 North Korean employees (excluding the guides and plain-clothed minders) is significant. However, most of the semi-skilled personnel are ethnic Koreans recruited from China – they agree to work for very low wages.

How will historians see the Kumgang project and the much-trumpeted “intra-Korean cooperation” in general? As a selfish attempt by affluent South Koreans to prolong the existence of a brutal dictatorship in order to save themselves from the troublesome necessity of paying for North Korea’s transformation? Or as an important contribution toward this transformation, a way to slightly open the closed doors of North Korean society and teach its inhabitants a thing or two about the modern economy and modern world? Perhaps they will see it as a way to support the expensive habits of the North Korean elite, or a way to ameliorate suffering of the commoners. We know not, but one thing is clear: business with North Korea is, first and foremost, a political affair, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

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Against the odds, North Korea begins race for sports sponsorship

Wednesday, April 13th, 2005

AFP
4/13/2005

In the last global outpost of hardline Communism, North Korea’s athletes have begun competing in an event they seem destined to lose under their current manager — the race for international sponsorship.

After being shut out for decades from the lucrative spin-offs of capitalist economics, officials in North Korea say dictator Kim Jong-Il is now urging sports chiefs to find major global brands to bankroll their national teams.

“We want to do what all the countries around the world are doing. We want to find sponsors,” the chief executive officer of North Korea’s Sports Marketing Group, Jon Chol-Ho, told an AFP journalist in Pyongyang.

The government set up the Sports Marketing Group in 2000 to find sponsors ahead of the Sydney Olympics but Jon said, after some initial success, global brands had shown very little interest.

“I have sent messages to many people around the world but there is no answer, no reply,” Jon said.

North Korea’s initial ventures began well when they secured Italian sports apparel company FILA to sponsor their national teams.

But when FILA was sold to a US company in 2003, Jon said the days of the partnership were numbered and the sports firm did not renew the contract when it expired last year.

Other brands, such as Adidas, Mizuno and Asics, have taken a minor interest and helped teams for the Athens Olympics and other major events, but Jon said the deals were generally only for uniforms and equipment, not big cash.

“For Athens, we did that very much the hard way… this is not so good,” he said. “I want to make one big contract with one big company. The problem is just to find one company.”

Jon said Kim, who has opened up tiny sections of North Korea’s stagnant economy over recent years despite his virulent anti-Western ideologies, was behind the push for international sports sponsors.

“It is very important for people to know this. Our great General Kim Jong-Il is very interested in developing our sports,” he said to emphasise that foreign companies would be welcomed onto North Korea’s sporting fields.

“He is very interested to give us everything we need. That’s why I’m confident if a company asks if anything is possible, I can answer yes, as long as it is not against any law.”

However two sports marketing executives with extensive experience in North Asia said that simply having Kim’s blessing was not nearly enough to entice major brands into investing in such a poor nation with a closed economy.

“There are virtually no commercial activities in North Korea so it means there’s almost no chance for a company to generate income there through sponsorship,” a senior executive with a global sports marketing firm in South Korea told AFP by phone from Seoul.

“If there’s no profit for them in that domestic market, companies will continue to stay away.”

Richard Avory, who was one of the pioneers of sports marketing in China and a former senior executive with global industry giant IMG, agreed that one of the biggest obstacles for North Korea was that almost no-one there could buy the goods of potential sponsors.

“The basic problem lies with the fact they don’t have much of a market… there is no consumer demand,” Avory, who is now president of China Sports and Entertainment Group, said by telephone from Beijing.

However Avory said there was some hope for North Korea simply because they have some world class sports teams and athletes.

The men’s football team is one of eight left in Asia still in the race for next year’s World Cup, although they have lost their first three matches in the final qualifying round and their odds of getting through are slim.

Their female counterparts are also one of the best teams in Asia and four North Koreans won silver medals at the Athens Olympics, including Hyang Mi-Kim in the women’s table tennis and featherweight boxer Kim Song-Guk.

“Being good at sports is very important… obviously any firm that sponsors a team wants that team to be good,” Avory said, adding companies would be willing to back North Korean athletes if they had a stronger international presence.

“If they (the men’s football team) could qualify for the World Cup, that would be a huge boost to them from the viewpoint of companies wanting to be involved.”

The Seoul-based marketing chief, who did not want to be named, said another potential sponsorship avenue was through South Korean firms looking to boost their domestic image by helping out their “brothers” in the north.

“Some companies already supply some products from a humanitarian standpoint… that may create good PR in South Korea and help their sales domestically,” he said.

The Seoul executive said North Korea’s reputation in the West as an “axis of evil” and an “outpost of tyranny”, as US leaders have described the nation, has played only a minor role in keeping international sponsors away.

“It’s more an economic issue. It could create some bad PR (for Western firms) but politics and the business of sponsorship are generally different issues.”

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Social Strata

Tuesday, April 12th, 2005

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
4/12/2005

Who is the best choice for a spouse in North Korea? Someone with equal or better “songbun,’’ of course! And who can get a good job? Someone with an appropriate songbun! And who will never be allowed to reside in Pyongyang? Someone with bad sogbun!

But what does songbun mean? Essentially, this is a hereditary group to which every North Korean belongs. The first attempts to classify the entire population according to the people’s origin and, thus, perceived political reliability took place in the late 1950s, but the current system was developed between 1964 and 1969, when specially appointed groups undertook painstaking research of every adult North Korean’s family background and origin. With some minor changes, this system has been functioning to the present day.

The whole population of the DPRK is divided into 51 groups, which, in turn, forms three strata or classes: the “main’’ (kibon kyechung), the “wavering’’ (tongyou kyechung), and the “hostile’’ (choktae kyechung).

In order to make the readers feel better about North Korean bureaucracy, I’d rather name some of the groups that are included in these strata.

Let’s start from the top. The main stratum includes 12 groups: 1) workers who come from working families; 2) former farmhands; 3) former poor peasants; 4) the personnel of state organizations; 5) KWP (Party) members; 6) the family members of deceased revolutionaries; 7) the family members of national liberation fighters; 8) revolutionary intelligentsia (that is, those who received their education after liberation); 9) the families of civilians who were killed during the Korean war; 10) the families of soldiers who were killed during the Korean war; 11) the families of servicemen and 12) heroes of the war.

The “uncertain’’ stratum includes nine groups _ whose descriptions I probably omit. But as one might expect, the enemies make the longest list. The bad ones are: 1) workers of complicated origin, that is, people who had formerly been entrepreneurs and officials; 2) former rich peasants; 3) former small or medium merchants; 4) former landlords, that is, people who before the reform of 1946 had more than 5 hectares of land; 5) people who participated in pro-Japanese or pro-American activities; 6) former officials in the Japanese colonial administration; 7) families of people of good social origin who fled to the South during the war; 8) families of people of bad origin who fled to the South during the war; 9) Chinese Koreans who returned from China in the 1950s; 10) Japanese Koreans who returned from Japan in the 1960s.

I’ll stop here _ the complete list of the “recommended suspects’’ is way too long. Among others, it includes practicing Protestants, Catholics and Buddhists, descendants of shamans or courtesans, families of prisoners, and the like.

There is considerable variation in rights and privileges not only between strata, but also between different groups within each stratum. Of course, it is not as bad to be a grandson of a rich peasant than the son of a political criminal. The position of Korean Japanese is even more controversial: the authorities keep them away from some sensitive jobs and watch them closely while courting them in order to extract money and expertise from the friends and relatives they once left behind in Japan.

A person’s fate is determined by his group, by his songbun. It influences his chances of getting a good job and higher education, of being allowed to live in Pyongyang and other major cities, and, hence, his standard of living, punishment in case of a criminal persecution, and many other things. Thus, members of the “hostile stratum’’ normally have no chance to study in prestigious Pyongyang colleges.

It is sometimes possible to improve own station: say, an exemplary military service will vindicate a lad who was unlucky enough to be the grandson of a Protestant minister. These things happen, but the songbun often lasts for generations.

It is impossible to determine the number of people in each group _ even approximately. The existing (and oft-cited) estimations are often patent nonsense. Perhaps we will never learn the truth until the collapse of the DPRK. Nonetheless, it is clear that the economic turbulence of the last decade greatly damaged the system. But that is another story…

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