North Korean Economy Watch

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
12/13/2006

Last Thursday in Seoul, the influential opposition daily newspaper Chosun Ilbo published a government document that outlined the plans for South Korean aid to be shipped to North Korea in the next financial year. In spite of the nuclear test in October and a series of missile launches last summer, the amount sent to Pyongyang this year was record-breaking – nearly US$800 million. If the document is to be believed, the target for the next year is set at an even higher level of 1 trillion won (about $910 million).

This generosity might appear strange, since technically both Koreas are still at war. However, it has long been an open secret that this is not the war the South wants to win, at least any time soon. The Seoul politicians do not want to provoke Pyongyang into dangerous confrontation, and they would be unhappy to deal with the consequences of a sudden collapse of Kim Jong-il’s dictatorship. Now South Korea wants a slow transformation of the North, and is ready to shower it with aid and unilateral concessions.

Many optimists in Seoul believe this generosity will persuade Pyongyang leaders to launch Chinese-style reforms. However, so far no significant reforms have happened. On the contrary, news emanating from the North since late 2004 seems to indicate that the government is now working hard to turn the clock back, to revive the system that existed until the early 1990s and then collapsed under the manifold pressures of famine and social disruption.

Signs of this ongoing backlash are many. There were attempts to revive the travel-permission system that forbids all North Koreans to leave their native counties without police permission. Occasional crackdowns have taken place at the markets. There were some attempts to re-establish control over the porous border with China.

Finally, in October 2005 it was stated that North Korea would revive the Public Distribution System, under which all major food items were distributed by state. Private trade in grain was prohibited, so nowadays the only legitimate way to buy grain, by far the most important source of calories in North Koreans’ diet, is by presenting food coupons in a state-run shop. It is open to question to what extent this ban is enforced. So far, reports from northern provinces seem to indicate that private dealing in grain still takes place, but on a smaller scale.

From early this month people in northern provinces are allowed to trade at the markets only as long as an aspiring vendor can produce a certificate that states that he or she is not a primary breadwinner of the household but a dependant, normally eligible to some 250 grams of daily grain ration (the breadwinners are given 534 grams daily). It is again assumed that all able-bodied males should attend a “proper” job, that is, to be employees of the government sector and show up for work regularly.

In the past few years the economic situation in North Korea was improving – largely because of large infusions of foreign aid. If so, why are the North Korean leaders so bent on re-Stalinizing their country, instead of emulating the Chinese reform policy that has been so tremendously successful? After all, the Mercedes-riding Chinese bureaucrats of our days are much better off than their predecessors used to be 30 years ago, and the affluence of common Chinese in 2006 probably has no parallels in the nation’s long history.

The Chinese success story is well known to Kim Jong-il and his close entourage, but Pyongyang leaders choose not to emulate China. This is not because they are narrow-minded or paranoid. The Chinese-style transformation might indeed be too risky for them, since the Pyongyang ruling elite has to deal with a challenge unlike anything their Chinese peers ever faced – the existence of “another Korea”, the free and prosperous South.

The Chinese commoners realize that they have not much choice but to be patient and feel thankful for a steady improvement of living standards under the Communist Party dictatorship. In North Korea the situation is different. If North Koreans learn about the actual size of the gap in living standards between them and their cousins in the South, and if they become less certain that any act of defiance will be punished swiftly and brutally, what will prevent them from emulating East Germans and rebelling against the government and demanding immediate unification?

Of course, it is possible that North Korean leaders will somehow manage to stay on top, but the risks are too high, and Pyongyang’s elite do not want to gamble. If reforms undermine stability and produce a revolution, the current North Korean leaders will lose everything. Hence their best bet is to keep the situation under control and avoid all change.

Until the early 2000s the major constraint in their policy was the exceptional weakness of their own economy. For all practical purposes, North Korea’s industry collapsed in 1990-95, and its Soviet-style collective agriculture produces merely 65-80% of the food necessary to keep the population alive. Since the state had no resources to pay for surveillance and control, officials were happy to accept bribes and overlook numerous irregularities.

However, in recent years the situation changed. Pyongyang is receiving sufficient aid from South Korea and China, two countries that are most afraid of a North Korean collapse. The nuclear program also probably makes North Korean leaders more confident about their ability to resist foreign pressure and, if necessary, to squeeze more aid from foes and friends (well, strictly speaking, they do not have friends now).

With this aid and new sense of relative security, the North Korean regime can prevent mass famine and restart some essential parts of the old system, with the food-distribution system being its cornerstone. This is a step toward an ideal of Kim Jong-il and his people, to a system where all able-bodied Koreans go to a state-managed job and spend the entire day there, being constantly watched and indoctrinated by a small army of propagandists, police informers, party officials, security officers and the like.

No unauthorized contacts with the dangerous outside world would be permitted, and no unauthorized social or commercial activity would happen under such system. Neither Kim nor his close associates are fools; they know perfectly well that such a system is not efficient, but they also know that only under such system can their privileges and security be guaranteed.

This is a sad paradox: aid that is often presented as a potential incentive for market-oriented reforms is actually the major reason North Korean leaders are now able to contemplate re-Stalinization of their country.

However, it remains to be seen whether they will succeed, since the North Korean society has changed much in the 12 years since the death of Kim Il-sung. New social forces have emerged, and the general mood has changed as well.

When in the mid-1990s the food rations stopped coming, previously forbidden or strictly controlled private trade became the only survival strategy available for a majority of North Koreans. The society experienced a sudden and explosive growth of grassroots capitalist economy, which by the late 1990s nearly replaced the “regular” Stalinist economy – at least, outside Pyongyang.

Apart from trade in a strict sense, North Korea’s “new entrepreneurs” are engaged in running small workshops, inns and canteens, as well as in providing all kinds of services. Another important part of the “second economy” is food production from individual plots, hitherto nearly absent from North Korea (from the late 1950s, farmers were allowed only tiny plots, not exceeding 100 square meters, sufficient only to grow some spices).

In many cases, the new business penetrates the official bureaucracy. While officials are not normally allowed to run their own business operations, some do, and as the line between the private and state businesses is becoming murky, the supposedly state-run companies make deals with private traders, borrow money on the black market and so on.

As one would expect, a new merchant class has emerged as a result of these changes. Nowadays an exceptionally successful North Korean entrepreneur would operate with capital reaching $100,000 (a fortune in a country where the average monthly salary is merely few dollars). Such mini-tycoons are very few and far between, but incomes measured in $100 a month are earned by many more merchants, and nearly all North Korean families earn at least a part of their income through the “second economy”.

These changes have produced a major psychological shift. The old assumptions about society are dead. After many decades of existence under the patronizing control of a Stalinist state, North Koreans discovered that one can live without going to an office to get next month’s food coupons. They also learned a lot more about the outside world. Smuggled South Korean videotapes are important, if dangerous, merchandise in the North Korean markets.

Contacts with China are necessary for a successful business, and these contacts bring not only goods for sale but also rumors about overseas life. And, of course, the vendors are the first people within living memory who became successful outside the official system. One of these former merchants recently told me: “Those who once attempted to trade, came to like it. Until now, [North Koreans] knew that only cadres could live well, while others should be content with eating grass gruel, but now merchants live better than cadres, and they feel proud of themselves.”

It seems that in recent months we have seen the very first signs of the social activity displayed by this new social group. Early last month, a large group of outraged merchants gathered in front of the local office in the city of Hoiryong, demanding to talk to the representatives of the authorities.

The Hoiryong riot was strictly non-political. A few months ago the local officials collected payments from the market vendors, promising to use the money for refurbishing the old market. However, the market was suddenly closed instead of being refurbished (perhaps as part of the ongoing crackdown on private commercial activities). The outraged vendors gathered near the market and demanded a refund.

The crowd was soon dispersed, and more active participants of the protest were arrested. Had a similar incident happened elsewhere, it would probably not have warranted more than a short newspaper report, but in North Korea this was an event of tremendous significance, the first time in decades that North Koreans openly and loudly expressed their dissatisfaction with a decision of the authorities.

In March 2005, a soccer riot in Pyongyang demonstrated that North Koreans are quite capable of breaking the law, but during that event the popular wrath was provoked by a foreigner, a Syrian referee, and could be construed as an outpouring of nationalistic sentiments (the soccer fans soon began to fight police, however). This time, in Hoiryong, a large group of North Koreans clearly challenged the state bureaucracy. Perhaps nothing like it has happened since the 1950s.

However, the growing power and social independence of the merchants is not the major problem the North Korean neo-Stalinists have to face. They deal with a society that has changed much, not least because of the penetration of modern technology, which facilitates the spread of information. The key role is played by the Chinese border, which is almost uncontrolled and has become an area of widespread smuggling.

Small radio sets are widely smuggled from China, so much so that a defector recently said: “In North Korea, nowadays every official has a radio set in his house.” This is new, since until the early 1990s all North Korean radios were fixed so that they could receive only official broadcasts. Theoretically, radio sets with free tuning are still banned, but this is not enforced. These radios sets are used to listen to foreign broadcasts, especially from South Korea.

Videocassette recorders are common as well. No statistics are available, but it seems that nearly half of all households in the borderland area and a smaller but significant number of households in Pyongyang have a VCR that is used to watch foreign movies. Defectors reported that in mid-October, just after the nuclear test, all North Koreans were required to sign a written pledge about non-participation in “non-socialist activity”. It was explained during the meetings that this activity includes listening to foreign radio and watching foreign videotapes.

Thus it seems that only a few people still believe in the official myth of South Korean destitution. Perhaps most people in the North do not realize how great the difference between their lives and those of their South Korean brethren is. Perhaps, for most of them, being affluent merely means the ability to eat rice daily. Discussions with recent defectors also create an impression that most North Koreans still believe that the major source of their problems is the suffocating “US imperialist blockade”. Still, the old propaganda about the destitute and starving South is not readily swallowed anymore.

Another obstacle on the way to a Stalinist revival is a serious breakdown of morale among officialdom. The low-level officials whose job is to enforce stricter regulations do not feel much enthusiasm about the new orders. Back in the 1940s and 1950s when Stalinism was first established in North Korea under Soviet tutelage, a large part of the population sincerely believed that it was the way to the future.

Nowadays, the situation is different. The low-level bureaucrats are skeptical. They are well aware of the capitalism-driven Chinese prosperity, and they have some vague ideas about South Korea’s economic success. And they are unconvinced by government promises that, as they know, never materialize. Unlike the elite, the mid-level officials have little reason to be afraid of the regime’s collapse. And, last but not least, they have become very corrupt in recent years, hence their law-enforcement zeal diminishes once they see an opportunity to earn extra money for looking other way.

At the same time, the new measures might find support from the large segments of population who did not succeed in the new economy and long for the stability of Kim Il-sung’s era. Recently, a former trader told me: “Elderly or unlucky people still miss the times of socialism, but younger people do business very well, believe that things are better now than they used to be and worry that the situation might turn back to the old days.”

We should not overestimate the scope of this generalization. After all, it is based on the observations of a market trader who obviously spent much time with her colleagues, the winners of the new social reality. Among less fortunate North Koreans, there will be some people who perhaps would not mind sitting through a couple of hours of indoctrination daily, if in exchange they would receive their precious 534 grams of barley-rice mixture (and an additional 250 grams per every dependant).

Early this month it was also reported that low-level officials had received new orders requiring them to tighten up residence control, normally executed through so-called “people’s groups”. Each such group consists of 30-50 families living in the same block or same apartment building and is headed by an official whose task is to watch everything in the neighborhood.

The new instructions, obtained by the Good Friends, a well-informed non-governmental organization dealing with North Korea, specify the deviations that are of particular importance: “secretly watching or copying illegal videotapes, using cars for trade, renting out houses or cooking food for sale, making liquors at home”. All these are “anti-socialist activities which must be watched carefully and exterminated”. The struggle to return to Kim Il-sung’s brand of socialism continues.

Still, North Korean authorities are fighting an uphill battle. In a sense they are lucky, since many foreign forces, including their traditional enemy, South Korea, do not really want their system to collapse and thus avoid anything that might promote a revolution. However, the regime is too anachronistic and too inefficient economically, so a great danger for its survival is created by the very existence of the prosperous world just outside its increasingly porous borders.

In the long run, all attempts to maintain a Stalinist society in the 21st century must be doomed. However, the North Korean leaders are fighting to buy time, to enjoy a few additional years of luxurious life (or plain security) for themselves. How long they will succeed remains to be seen.

Dr Andrei Lankov is a lecturer in the faculty of Asian Studies, China and Korea Center, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea, and his thesis focused on factionalism in the Yi Dynasty. He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia. He is currently on leave, teaching at Kookmin University, Seoul.

Daily NK
Kim Song A
12/12/2006

“North Korea, Restraining People’s Unit… People Suffering Fatigue”

Last month, North Korean authorities and affiliates of the people’s unit distributed lecture materials throughout the country, in attempt to strengthen the society and operations with “Our Socialism.”

The meetings of people’s units comprise of roughly thirty families who work as a political operation regulating the people. Amidst former communist countries, North Korea is the only unique system to have implemented a people’s unit.

On the 6th Good Friends, an organization aiding North Korea published on their website, North Korean News No. 49, “Introduction to lecture materials revealing the aim that to exalt supremacy while strengthening operations is ‘our socialism system.’”

Authorities and the People’s Committee notify the people’s unit which consists of 20~40 families of the same residence grouped by North Korean authorities and uses their power by controlling the lives of people living in the community as well as their thoughts and regulating visitors. However, after the “March of Tribulation (Mass starvation period in the 1990s)” people’s units remained passive as people busily tried to find food in order to live. Hence, people only felt frustrated with the system and the people’s unit movements became aberrant.

Good Friends stated “Though attempts are made (by the international community) to change the lifestyle and thinking of the people, the people’s units are making sure that they strengthen unification from within.”

More specifically, “Requests were made to be cautious of any act of anti-socialism such as secretly watching or spreading news of video tapes, anyone who uses a car to sell goods, any act of offering accommodation or receiving money for lease of accommodation and acts of brewing home-wine.”

In particular, in the cities near and around the border, meetings of people’s units frequently take place advocating the “act of giving accommodation to people crossing the border illegally prohibited.”

The people say “People with money suffer damages whereas of the people with no money, the unlucky person will suffer severe regulation and punishment” and informed the current atmosphere in the area “Excluding similar political issues, everyone either pretends or closes an eye to the situation.”

Good Friends said “The biggest issue for the people is food and firewood. It is imperative that even an additional kilo is secured and sent to the people so they may live throughout the winter” and “Wherever you go, you hear that the immediate best plan is to find a way to live. Who would listen to lectures which proclaim not to illegally cross the border?”

Recently, the citizens participating in field operations conducted by the people’s units are known to be suffering severe fatigue.

In Sungchon River-district, Ham-heung, members of the people’s units go out to the fields every day with great dissatisfaction and the head of the household must go out to the fields every morning every day of the week without fail to supervise the cable operations, informed Good Friends.

Yonhap
12/10/2006

N. Korea reaches the gold medal match after sinking China 3-1 in semifinals

North Korea showed it was far and above the favorite to win gold in women’s football by coming from behind to beat China 3-1 in the semifinal match of the Asian Games on Sunday.

The North Koreans, who are currently seventh in FIFA’s global ranking, clearly outperformed eighth-ranked China throughout the match, with missed opportunities and bad luck preventing the game from being settled in regulation time.

The defending Asiad champions got off to a rocky start when they surrendered a goal in the 10th minute of play when Wang Dandan put China up on the scoreboard 1-0.

North Korean goalie Jon Myong-hui failed to secure a cross from Weng Xinzhi that fell in front of Wang who tapped it into the net.

The goal, however, galvanized the North Koreans into action, with its players dominating the other side in both ball possession and shots and after several threatening moves, the North equalized with a deflected ball by the Chinese goalkeeper that Kil Son-hui returned to the net in the 21st minute.

The two sides went into halftime tied 1-1 and were unable to break the deadlock in the second half despite better chances for the North.

In overtime, the North’s domination of the pitch paid off with a left-footed shot by Ri Kum-suk in the 94th minute of play and another by Ri Un-gyong 5 minutes later. Ri is rated one of the top-20 players in the world.

The North Koreans could have made it 4-1 when the Chinese goalie intentionally grabbed Kil to prevent the North Korean from passing her. This resulted in the expulsion of the goalkeeper and a Chinese team struggling for the rest of the lopsided match.

Following the match, North Korean coach Kim Kwang-min said the match was a sort of payback for his side’s defeat in July at the Asian Football Confederation Women’s Asian Cup held in Australia.

“This time our players were in good mental health and spirit,” he said, expressing satisfaction with the outcome of the match.

The North Koreans will take on Japan in the finals scheduled for Wednesday, with Japan unlikely to pose a serious threat to the defending Asian champions. The Japanese side has never won the Asian gold in women’s football, having won bronze in both Bangkok and Busan in 1998 and 2002.

Daily NK
12/8/2006
Yang Jung A

While golf equipment was amongst the list of banned luxury goods the U.S. government announced recently, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on the 6th that golf is a symbol of luxurious pleasure that only the elite in North Korea can experience.

Citing from a Pyongyang report by an Agence France-Presse correspondent, RFA revealed “The main golf course in North Korea is “Pyongyang Golf Course” with about 100 members, which in reality are all officials of Chosun Workers’ Party” and “Annual membership paid by the member amounts to $10,000.”

The correspondent said “This is a figure the average North Korean citizen could not even dream as an expense” and “The golf course in North Korea is a symbol of luxurious pleasure only experienced by authority officials or the elite.”

In the vicinity of Lake Taesung in Yongkang-gun, Nampo 38km from Pyongyang is “Pyongyang Golf Course,” equipped with a complete 18 hole course and ample enough to host an international golf tournament. The course was established in ’87 in celebration of Kim Il Song’s 75th birthday, sponsored by the Jochongnyeon, the pro-North Korean residents’ league in Japan.

Although it is said that a golf course exists within the grounds of Kim Il Sung’s Mountain Myohang villa and Ryongsung resort, the only golf course open to the public is ‘Pyongyang Golf Course.’ Mountain Myohang golf course is located in a valley 1.5km from Hyangsan Hotel, whereas Ryongsung golf course is situated 20 min by car from Pyongyang.

There are also mini courses, such as Yangkakdo golf course and Pyongyang golf practice range, Nampo Wawoodo golf course (9 holes). With investments by South Korean business, more golf courses are being constructed in areas such as Mt. Geumgang.

However, these golf courses are mainly accommodated to foreigners and excluding the elitist class, common people in possession of foreign currency such as Korean born Japanese or foreigners with blood-relatives are also using the courses.

Golf is one of Kim Jong Il’s favorite pastimes. In a book written by Fujimoto Kenji, once Kim Jong Il’s personal cook, Fujimoto wrote of his times at a golf course with Kim Jong Il at his villa.

At the golf course Fujimoto visited with Kim Jong Il, Kim asked Fujimoto ‘Compared to all the other places in the world, what do you think about the golf courses in North Korea?’ That day, when Kim Jong Il visited the golf course was October 6th and categorized a public holiday as a ‘The day Kim Jong Il visited.’

One time, North Korean mass media announced that at Kim Jong Il’s first time round of golf in `94, he scored an “eagle” followed by five “hold in ones,” recording a total score of 34. This only incited laughter from the international community.

If he had made 34 hit shots in a round of 18 holes, based on a game of par 72, this would mean he is 38 under. Even if a golf angel happened to come from the heavens, this would be impossible. While deifying Kim Jong Il and having no knowledge of golfing rules, media officials only made the situation into a laughing comedy.

In response, the New York Times sarcastically commented, that if the reports by North Korean media was true, Kim Jong Il should be selected as the “World’s number one golfer” as even professional golf competitors find it difficult to claim a hole a one in a lifetime.

Yonhap
12/8/2006

A South Korean textbook publisher has donated a second-hand rotary press to North Korea to help the communist state publish school textbooks, Seoul-based UNESCO Korea said Friday.

“North Korea has requested that UNESCO assist with textbook printing presses and paper since 2000, and (South Korea’s) Daehan Printing and Publishing Co. expressed its intention to make the donation,” a UNESCO Korea official said.

The press was used in printing textbooks for South Korea’s elementary and secondary school students until 2000, the official said.

The donation is the second project UNESCO Korea has sought to help North Korean students. In 2002, UNESCO and Daehan Pulp Co. provided the North with 200 tons of paper for middle-school English textbooks there.

Daily NK
11/29/2006
Kang Jae Hyok

Bongsu Church is the first Christian place of worship built during the communist rule.

In September 1988, North Korean regime constructed the two-storey building with 450 seats in Mankyongdae district, Pyongyang, in order to show the country’s ‘religious freedom’ to foreign visitors of the 13th World Youth and Student Festival in 1989.

The construction cost, which was about half a million NK won at that time (equivalent to a quarter million US $), was contributed by ‘Christian believers around the nation and churches overseas,’ according to the Korean Christians Federation of DPRK.

Bongsu Church is consisted of a head minister, one vicar, 8 elders, 14 deaconesses, 5 deacons and about 300 gatherers.

A construction project of a larger chapel is going on, now. The three-storey new building, which is expected to seat more than 1200 attendants, is being constructed thanks mostly to South Korean Presbyterian churches’ donation of about 4 million dollars.

The cost of construction of the church, ten thousand dollars per a square meter, is much higher than that of a luxury hotel in China (about six thousand per m2).

Here is my personal experience of the Church.

I had lived in Pyongyang from 1996 to 1998. During that time, my cousin introduced me Mr. Hong, a forty two-year old official in the Foreign Ministry.

He was living in a quality apartment (in N. Korean standard) and I befriended with him for about a year. Mr. Hong, since he was born in Pyongyang and had resided abroad for a long period of time, did not know much about how people live outside the capital and asked me a lot of questions about local situation.

Hong was a graduate of North Korea’s most prestigious Mankyongdae Revolutionary Academy and studied French at KPA Security College. Since then, he had been assigned as a National Security Agency liaison officer to the Foreign Ministry.

When he married with a daughter of a senior army officer, Kim Jong Il gave him a wreath and a watch, which was a common gesture by Kim to tame party officials. Hong even served as a deputy chief of mission in DPRK Representative Office in Paris for six years.

In February 1997, Hong was appointed to the Bongsu Church. At that time, I thought the ‘Church’ was a type of state-run trade company, because Hong had been expressing his interest in working at trade department.

Hong spent much more ‘foreign currency certificate (exchanged with US dollar bills, can replace domestic currency in NK)’ compared to when he was working for the Foreign Ministry. He often bought me sushi in ‘foreign-currency-only restaurants.’ So I supposed the ‘Bongsu Church’ a huge trading company.

It was only when I defected from the North to Seoul that I figured out what kind of job Mr. Hong had held in Bongsu Church. He was dispatched to the ‘church’ because he was a trusted security agent.

In Seoul, I watched a number of South Korean Christians having service in the Bongsu Church while visiting Pyongyang. Whatever the southern Christian believers’ true intention of attending the chapel is, the fellow ‘Christians’ in Bongsu Church are, in reality, sent by the North Korean government authorities such as United Front Department of KWP and National Security Agency. It is not probable at all for the state-run Bongsu Church to have a true believer, whether of Christianity or any other kind of religion except for the Kim Il Sung/Kim Jong Il cult.

The South Korean bands “Shinhwa” and “Baby V.O.X” played a show for a North Korean audience in Pyongyang.  The quizical and stern faces from the North Koreans are probably quite different to the throngs of screaming South Koreans the bands usually get at  their concerts.

But here is the truth.  The performances are beyond cheezy.  It is something that might make a twelve-year-old girl think she is actually a princess, but should not be considered “real” art by anyone with an ounce of aesthetic appreciation.  I should know because I have very little.

So the realty is that when watching this video my facial expression was pretty much the same as the North Koreans.  Looks like we have at least one thing in common.  

Here is the video on YouTube – Shinhwa

Here is another video on YouTube – Baby V.O.X

Youtube has a video on religion in North Korea.  They are obviously of the official religious organizations.  The Changchung Catholic Church and the Pongsu Protestant Church are both featured.  I am not sure what the other two organizations are, but one is obviously buddhist.  The fourth I am not sure. 

Here is the video.

From the Daily NK:
Kim Young Jin
11/22/2006

Inside sources in North Korea revealed that North Korean authorities have recently been attempting to inform citizens through people’s units saying “Now that we are a strong nuclear power, beginning with participating nations of the 6 Party Talks, the whole world is in fear of our nuclear armaments” and that “Once the U.S. financial sanctions is removed, the 6 Party Talks will be promptly resumed.”

The meetings of people’s units comprise of thirty families, receive directives from the district people’s committee and inform it to the members of the meetings. This is a meeting for regulation and control as well as citizens education, which is the unique system for N. Korea, ever existed in the former communist bloc.

An inside source from North Hamkyung province said in an telephone conversation with a reporter on the 19th “Since last 15th 7PM, the meetings of people’s unit have been called in the districts around Hoiryeong, educating citizens on the six-party talks and to ‘abolish anti-socialist trends.’ ”

At a people’s meeting in Hoiryeong, citizens were educated on the justice of North Korea’s nuke experiment and the economic aftereffects of the nuke experiment. An organizer of the people’s meeting in Hoiryeong said “The nuclear experiment has broken all of U.S. North Korea pressure policies and we have successfully shown the whole world that our socialism is good. Now, beginning from the nations of the six-party talks, countries around the world are in fear of our nuclear armaments.”

In addition, appeals were made for citizens to be aware of the U.S. “We are prepared to join the six-party talks at any time as long as the U.S. releases the North Korea financial sanctions. If the U.S. continues to ignore our requests, ultimately we will not sit down and be attacked.”

Next, the leader of the people’s unit encouraged the people by saying “Now, our government is gathering strength to raise our economy and standard of living next year, to the point even the Americans cannot underestimate our sovereignty” and “As long as the U.S. still eagerly watches our sovereignty, we must gather our power to protect our socialism.”

Furthermore, on two occasions Sept 29th and Oct 4th, the leader of the unit announced a declaration in accordance to the “General (Kim Jong Il)’s policy” around the districts of the border to “abolish anti-socialist trends” such as aiding undercover border-crossing, smuggling, secretly listening or importing radios and circulating illegal recorded materials.

This declaration included a clause stating that any person practicing anti-socialist acts will be sentenced to severe punishment according to North Korean law. The clause outlined acts considered anti-socialist as undercover border-crossings through China, smuggling, being in possession and trade of a radio with the purpose of listening to foreign radio broadcasts and being in possession and trade of foreign movies and music CD’s.

In addition, the leader of the people’s unit and a city officer of the Party urged for people to report any acts of anti-socialism seen or heard to the security office and made all the people attending the people’s meeting sign a “written oath.”

This written oath, “Memorandum” by name, is a document signed with a persons name and date which states that the person will not partake in any anti-socialist acts and that any other person seen to be participating in anti-socialist acts will be reported immediately to the security office.

Finally, the source said that in future, the district and town authorities in Hoireyong plans to assign one official to be in charge of 10 people to work in collaboration with the people’s unit to regulate people liaising with China or in contact with foreign movies, music and broadcasting.

N. Korea invites S. Korean Buddhist leader to Pyongyang
From Yonhap
11/22/2006

North Korea has invited the head of South Korea’s top Buddhist sect, the Jogye Order, to visit Pyongyang before the end of the year, officials at the Buddhist order said Wednesday.

North Korea made the invitation to Ven. Jigwan during a ceremony commemorating a renovation of a temple at North Korea’s Mount Geumgang on Sunday, but he replied it would be difficult this year due to his tight schedule, the officials said.