Archive for April, 2017

Recent changes at Prison Camp 15 (Yodok) [UPDATED]

Thursday, April 27th, 2017

UPDATE 3 (2017-11-16): Google Earth Satellite imagery dated 2017-9-19 indicates that the vast majority of housing in Yodok Prison Camp (Kwanliso No. 15) shows signs of being demolished, deteriorated or uninhabited. There is also significant deterioration of economic units in the camp. However, only minor changes to the security and administrative infrastructure, so it is too soon to say the camp is closed.

Below is an overview of the areas inside Camp 15 where I have observed razed or deteriorating facilities in the September 2017 imagery. Yellow pegs indicate razed/deteriorated housing. Blue pegs indicate deteriorated economic infrastructure. The single white peg is the demolished security facility.

I provided some images to Radio Free Asia for the Korean media and I add one here:

UPDATE 2 (2017-4-27): More prisoner housing in Yodok is being razed.

In September 2015, Joseph Bermudez and the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea reported that the “Revolutionizing Zone” of Yodok Prison Camp (Camp 15) had been torn down as of October 2014.

The “Revolutioninzing Zone” was for prisoners judged to be worthy of re-education through labor, and thus eligible for release. It is because there were prisoners who were released, and who later defected, that we know so much about the camp.

Based on new Google Earth imagery, it appears that additional housing inside the camp security perimeter has also been torn down sometime between June 2, 2016 and February 19, 2017.

Here is an overview of the areas where housing has been razed:

First let’s look at the housing in the “Total Control Zone” (39.699346°, 126.849473°):

Google Earth: Image date 2016-6-2

Google Earth: Image date 2017-2-19

In the above images, we can see that 38 housing units have been razed, and only seven buildings remain standing. I presume that the remaining buildings still serve an economic or administrative function.

Here is a second site where housing was razed between 2016-6-2 and 2017-2-19 ( 39.686860°, 126.844236°):

Here is a third site where housing was razed between 2016-6-2 and 2017-2-19 ( 39.704151°, 126.872365°):

What does this mean? Using this Google Earth imagery alone, it is still hard to say exactly what is happening in the camp. The new imagery only covers the eastern-half of the camp, so there may be changes on the western-half of the camp (such as the construction of new housing) that may offset the housing losses we have observed here.

Is this good news for the prisoners? I cannot say. If the housing was torn down, and new housing was not built to replace it, it is possible prisoners were executed or transferred into pre-existing housing, leading to cramped, less-sanitary conditions. Some prisoners may have been released, but they could just as easily have been transferred to the new prison camp that was opened up on the site of the closed Camp 18.

Is the camp being closed? This rumor has been floating around for several years. The theory that North Korea desires to close the camp at some date in the future is consistent with the observations we have seen–in that a process of gradual reduction in prisoners and prisoner housing is taking place over time. However, we still do not know if new housing has been built on areas that are not covered by recent satellite imagery, and we do not know if the camp’s closure will lead to an outcome that the prisoners would find welfare-enhancing (Are they being executed, transferred, or released?). As far as I can tell, the administrative portion of the camp, near the southern entrance (and the security perimeter) have seen no substantive changes over this same period.

As always, we need more imagery and more testimony.

This has been reported in Radio Free Asia.

UPDATE 1 (2015-2-17): HRNK has published a report on Camp 15 that confirms some of the information on this web page and adds more.

ORIGINAL POST (2014-12-9): I do not really focus in human rights issues. The only real exception to this is that I keep up with new satellite imagery of incarceration facilities when pictures are released on services like Google Earth.

In the past couple of years, we have seen interesting developments in the camps. No.’s 18 and 22 were closed, and are being converted into ordinary villages and coal mines. I was also the first to write about the expansion of Camp 14 and Camp 25. There have also been minor changes to Camp 16, and I was able to point out exports from the camp that are possibly used for generating hard currency.

So now we turn our heads to Camp 15, AKA Yodok. This was the most “well known” of the prison camps before Shin Dong-hyok’s book on Camp 14 was published. Yodok was the subject of Kang Chol-hwan’s The Aquariums of Pyongyang, and it even inspired a musical.

Camp 15 is an enormous facility in Yodok County, South Hamgyong Province. It borders Maengsan County, Nyongwon County and Taehung County in South Phyongan Province. The camp is over 22km from north to south and over 20km from east to west. There are two entrances to the camp. The main entrance is on the south side, just north of kuup-ri (구읍리) and approximately six kilometers from the town of Yodok (요덕). There is a secondary entrance on the north end of the camp on Paek-san that borders with Nyongwon County. According to North Korean sources, there are four villages (리) officially listed within the camp perimeter: Ryongphyong-ri (룡평리),  Phyongjon-ri (평전리), Ripsok-ri (립석리) and Taesuk-ri (대숙리).

HRNK’s Hidden Gulag describes the camp security perimeter this way:

The whole encampment is surrounded by a barbed-wire fence measuring 3 to 4 meters (10 to 13 feet) in height. In some areas there are walls 2 to 3 meters (7 to 10 feet) tall, topped with electrical wire. Along the fence there are watchtowers measuring 7 to 8 meters (23 to 26 feet) in height, set at 1-kilometer (0.62-mile) intervals, and patrolled by 1,000 guards armed with automatic rifles and hand grenades. Additionally, there are teams with guard dogs. Inside the camp, each village has two guards on duty at all times.

 

Yodok-Overview-2014-12-9

Pictured above: The borders of Camp 15, AKA, Yodok.

On November 8, the Daily NK published  a story claiming that the camp had been closed and torn down:

“That political prison camp that used to be in Yodeok County in South Hamkyung has already been broken up. There’s not a trace of it left,” the source, who is with the military in the northerly province, claimed in conversation with Daily NK on the 7th. However, the disbanding of Camp 15 does not seem to have brought liberty for many of its inmates. According to the same source, “The political prisoners who were there have been divided up and moved to camps 14 and 16.”

I have viewed satellite imagery from as recent as October 20, 2014, and based on that evidence, I am unsure of the present status of the camp. Mines have been closed along with Sorimchon District, but guard housing has increased, as have security units. I also saw no change in the security perimeter.

Below is a list of changes with before and after images that can be seen on Google Earth. Although the latest Google Earth imagery is dated 2014-5-5, I did not see anything on imagery from October 20, 2014 that added to this analysis.

1. “Sorimchon District (aka Kumchon-ri)” has mostly been torn down:

Yodok-Sorimchon-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-Sorimchon-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

This area was first described (in English) in the second version of HRNK’s Hidden Gulag (See pages: 56, 64, 66, and 68. On Page 69 is a map, and on page 199 is a labeled satellite image).

Sometime between 2008-12-12 and 2014-5-5 most of these buildings were destroyed. The only remaining building is thought to be the Ministry for State Security (MSS, SSD, NSA) office.

2. A building identified by HRNK in 2003 as a “holding cell” in Knup-ri area was torn down and replaced by additional guard housing (this probably happened sometime around 2008-12-12). Hidden Gulag refers to “Knup-ri” but I believe this actually refers to “Kuup-ri”, which is the name of the village that lies just outside the camp’s perimeter:

Yodok-holding-cell-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-holding-cell-2014-5-5

Image date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

But between 2002 and 2008, this area saw a significant increase in guard housing:

HRNK-Knup-guard-housing-2002

Yodok-Knup-guard-housing-2008-12-12

All of this housing remained as of October 20, 2014.

3. In the Knup-ri guard housing area, a new park or cemetery appears to be under construction:

Yodok-cemetery-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-cemetery-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

4. Mining area near Taesuk-ri torn down (TBD if it will be renovated):

Yodok-taesuk1-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-Taesuk1-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

Yodok-taesuk2-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-taesuk2-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

5. A mine in Ripsok-ri was also torn down (TBD if it will be renovated):

Yodok-ripsok-mine-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-ripsok-mine-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

5. Mining activity in Phyongjon-ri has also apparently come to a halt:

Yodok-Phyongjon-mine-2003-10-1

Image Date (Google Earth): 2003-10-1

Yodok-Phyongjon-mine-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

6. The camp initiated a logging site:

Yodok-logging-2003-10-1

Image Date (Google Earth): 2003-10-1

Yodok-logging-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

7. Two new security units have been built:

Yodok-new-security-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-new-security-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

Yodok-sec2-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-sec2-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

8. A new checkpoint building has been built on the northern perimeter crossing: 

Yodok-border-post-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-border-post-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

9. A new facility has been constructed in Knup-ri area that appears to be a new factory:

Yodok-new-building-2008-12-12

Image Date (Google Earth): 2008-12-12

Yodok-new-building-2014-5-5

Image Date (Google Earth): 2014-5-5

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Chinese imports of North Korean goods down by 35 pct in March 2017

Wednesday, April 26th, 2017

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Yonhap reports a 35 percent drop in Chinese imports from North Korea in March this year, compared to February, citing decreased coal imports after the February ban as a reason:

Imports from North Korea declined to US$114.56 million last month from $176.7 million tallied the previous month, according to Chinese customs data.

In late February, China suspended North Korean coal imports through the end of the year in accordance with the U.N. Security Council resolution adopted in December to punish Pyongyang for its fifth nuclear test in September.

The resolution centers on putting a significant cap on North Korea’s exports of coal — the country’s single biggest export item and source of hard currency. The cap was set at whichever is lower between 7.5 million tons or $400 million.

North Korea heavily relies on coal exports to China for its foreign currency income. China imported $1.19 billion worth of coals from North Korea last year.

Full article:
China’s imports of N. Korean goods fall 35 pct in March
Yonhap News
2017-04-25

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UK freezes KNIC assets

Monday, April 24th, 2017

According to The Guardian:

The UK has frozen the assets of a North Korean company based in south-east London after claims it funnelled cash to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme.

The Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) is registered at a property in Blackheath. The EU has already imposed sanctions against the company, which it describes as “generating substantial foreign exchange revenue which is used to support the regime in North Korea”. The move by Brussels followed an UN resolution.

The EU warned: “Those resources could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.”

The company is registered to a detached property on Kidbrooke Park Road among suburban houses in an affluent part of London. Its entry on Companies House now describes KNIC as “closed” since 6 October 2016. Accounts show that in 2014 it had total assets of 130bn North Korean won, the equivalent of £113m.

According to EU sanctions imposed in July 2015, the KNIC’s headquarters in Pyonyang is linked to Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ party. In 2010 the US Treasury described Office 39 as “a secretive branch of the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that provides critical support to North Korean leadership in part through engaging in illicit economic activities and managing slush funds and generating revenues for the leadership”.

A spokesman for HM Treasury said: “We cannot comment on individual cases. However, the UK has fully complied and implemented the UN sanctions regime in relation to North Korea and North Korean companies.”

Through the EU regulations, the UK imposes restrictions on a range of goods from entering or leaving North Korea and imposes a travel ban and an asset freeze against people designated as engaging in or providing support for its programmes for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Under the same sanctions, the funds and economic resources have been frozen of four Hamburg-based North Koreans who ran the KNIC branch in Germany and two other regime officials who have since moved back to Pyongyang.

The Sunday Times, which first reported the freeze on the assets of the UK branch, reported that a North Korean man at the Blackheath property told it that the insurer’s main UK director, Ko Su-gil, had left Britain in September.

Read the full story here:
UK freezes assets of North Korean company based in south London
The Guardian
2017-4-23

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North Korea-China trade grew by almost 40 percent in the first quarter of 2017

Thursday, April 13th, 2017

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Reports?New York Times😕

China released the first-quarter trade data just days after President Trump urged its leader,?Xi Jinping, to clamp down on trade with North Korea. The two leaders met at?Mr. Trump?s Mar-a-Lago resort?in Florida last week.

With signs indicating that North Korea could be planning a nuclear or missile test as early as Saturday, a United States Navy strike group led by the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson is steaming toward the Korean Peninsula in a show of force. But the Trump administration has indicated that economic pressure ? particularly imposed by China, with which North Korea conducts almost 90 percent of its trade ? is its preferred form of deterrence.

[…]

The data released on Thursday showed that China?s trade with North Korea grew 37.4 percent in the first quarter of this year from the period in 2016. Chinese exports surged 54.5 percent, and imports increased 18.4 percent, the General Administration of Customs said at a news conference in Beijing.

China buys iron ore, zinc and other minerals from North Korea, as well as growing amounts of seafood and garments manufactured in the North?s well-equipped textile factories. China reported that its imports of North Korean iron were up 270 percent in January and February compared with the period in 2016.

But imports of coal dropped 51.6 percent in the first three months of 2017 compared with the first quarter of last year, said Huang Songping, a spokesman for the customs agency. Coal has been the biggest hard-currency earner among North Korea?s fairly limited menu of exports.

[…]

After the United Nations sanctions were announced, some economists said it was still possible for Chinese businesses to import coal on an off-the-books basis, using transactions that would not be recorded by customs officials.

But since mid-February, Chinese coal traders have said that their business has virtually vanished. ?It?s over,? said a coal trader who operates from Dandong, a city on China?s northeastern border that functions as the main center of business with North Korea. The trader spoke on the condition of anonymity because he feared reprisals from the city authorities.

Full article:

China Says Its Trade With North Korea Has Increased
Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang
2017-04-13

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Overview of Rason SEZ legislation

Wednesday, April 5th, 2017

Yeobin Yoon and Philipp Kopp at the Hanns Seidel Foundation have put together a brief analysis of different laws that govern the Rason Economic and Trade Zone.

It shows an interesting evolution in the SEZ’s regulations as North Korean policymakers try to make the zone more hospitable to foreign investment.

You can download the PDF of the short report here.

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N. Korea emphasizes corporate profits in economic policies

Tuesday, April 4th, 2017

According to Yonhap:

North Korea appears to stress the importance of increasing corporate profits, an indication of a shift in its economic policies from centralized planning, according to a North Korean university’s newspaper obtained Tuesday by Yonhap News Agency.

The newspaper, published by Kim Il-sung University, North Korea’s top university, on March 5, 2017, carried an article saying, “Net profits gained by individual corporations are fundamental to the establishment of a powerful economy.”

The article, titled “Establishing Way of Economic Management in Our Own Style Leads to Basis of Economic Powerhouse,” apparently lays emphasis on individual corporations’ profits becoming the financial basis for economic development, encouraging the corporate sector to make more profits.

“All corporations should set up scientific strategies and management strategies of their own and ensure they have the maximum effect in their production and management activities so that they could fulfill their duties to provide the state with more profits,” the article said.

This is interpreted as the North Korean economic authorities’ request that corporations focus their management activities on seeking effect and profits rather than relying on centralized planning and guided management.

Since the North’s current leader Kim Jong-un came to power in 2012, the North has taken measures to achieve economic reforms aimed at expanding elements of the market economy, including the country’s new economic management system announced in June 2012.

The university’s newspaper also indicated that the North has introduced a set of measures to strengthen corporations’ autonomy to its economy. Under the implementation of the measures, called “the socialist corporate responsible management system,” companies are given more autonomy than ever in their management and take care of economic problems arising from their production and management processes on their own, according to the article.

But the article made sure that the ruling party will not depart from its control on the economy, saying, “In our country’s socialist system, corporations’ independent management activities are to be carried out under the guidance of the party right down the line.

“I understand North Korean corporations currently pay 30 to 40 percent of their profits to the authorities,” said Cho Bong-hyun, a senior analyst at IBK Economic Research Institute. “The more profits corporations earn, the more national finance increases.”

Cho said the North appears to support its finance by spurring corporations into increasing profits amid the implementation of U.N. sanctions aimed at halting Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea emphasizes corporate profits in economic policies
Yonhap
2017-4-4

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