Stephan Haggard posted a link to (and translation of) some clandestine video footage shot in Pyongyang’s Moran Market (모란시장) and broadcast on KBS. I don’t have much to add except a satellite image of the area where the video was shot. It matches the video!
Pictured Above (Google Earth: 39.043922°, 125.747335°) is the Moran Market. See it in Google Maps here.
Pictured Above (Google Earth ): The initial phase of the Taedonggang Fruit Farm (대동강과일종합가공공장) in Samsok-guyok, Pyongyang. See in Google Maps here.
KCNA recently published the following article on the fruit farm (2011-8-12):
The Taedonggang Combined Fruit Farm in Pyongyang attracts admiration from foreign visitors.
After visiting the farm, Martin Lotscher, chairman of the Switzerland-Korea Committee, said the farm is associated with benevolent politics pursued by leader Kim Jong Il and that such an amazing farm can never be found in other countries.
Anders Karlsson, chairman of the Communist Party of Sweden, said the farm offers a glimpse of Kim Jong Il’s strenuous effort for providing the people with a happy life, as well as advantages of the socialist economy.
It is incredible that this large and wonderful fruit farm was built in only three years.
Mamoru Kitahara, chairman of the Fukuoka Prefectural Association for Japan－DPRK Friendship, said he deemed it a great honor to visit the fruit farm at a time when the Korean people were striving hard to build a thriving nation.
He congratulated the Korean people on the tremendous achievements they made under the leadership of Kim Jong Il.
The North Korean media has reported on this farm dozens of times, but it has never mentioned that the apple trees in the Taedonggang Fruit Farm were supplied by a European company. This same firm may have also supplied apple trees to similar new fruit farms in the DPRK (Kosan and Toksong fruit farms), though I am unsure of their direct involvement beyond the Taedonggang fruit farm.
Some other interesting gossip about the area:
1. The farm is probably the best-defended in the world. It is surrounded on all sides by dozens of KPA units, HARTs, and anti-aircraft positions. Looking at the level-1 roads in Pyongyang, it is also likely that Kim Jong-il drives through the farm every time he commutes from downtown Pyongyang to his Kangdong residence.
2. The farm is located just north of Wonhung-ri (원흥리). There are some villas hidden back in the woods (to the south of the farm) and I believe that Shin Sang-ok and Choi Eun-hee spent some time here. If a reader in South Korea could get Ms. Choi to confirm, I would appreciate it!
Pictured Above (Google Earth): WPK Building No. 3 compound (Third Building) mentioned below. See in Google Maps here.
Andrei Lankov has a great article in the Korea Times on the WPK’s naming conventions. I have attached the article below and supplemented it with related material taken from Helen-Louise Hunter’s Kim Il-Song’s North Korea and the Yonhap North Korea Handbook.
Lankov writes in the Korea Times:
Anybody who has ever dealt with North Korean officials or documents is aware that the nation’s bureaucracy loves number-based names and titles.
To a very large extent this is related to the deeply militaristic nature of the country’s culture. The military usually numbers units and often gives top secret armaments or projects numerical names. In North Korea, the same practice is applied to the society at large. The resulting names sound mysterious and this is probably part of its objective.
More or less every North Korean knows what the term ‘number-one event’ means. This is the name of all events in which the “Dear Leader,” Marshall Kim Jong-il, is expected to participate. When inhabitants of a town see their streets swamped with plain-clothes police, and when they are ordered to paint all fences anew, they understand: A number-one event is expected.
Everything related to the Kim family is “number one.” For example, painters who have a license to depict the members of the Kim family are known as number-one painters (and such a license is not easy to obtain). Predictably, an actor who is playing a member of the ruling family is known as a number-one actor.
Numbers are everywhere. If you need permission to go outside your native city or country, you should apply for a travel permit at Department 2 of the local municipal office. Of late, affluent North Koreans have become annoyed by the activities of Department 27. This department is responsible for the control of privately-owned electronic equipment. Now, as electric equipment is becoming increasingly common in North Korean homes, the officials of Department 27 are expected to conduct random checks of privately-owned computers. They are to ensure that no improper content is kept on hard-drives, and nowadays such visits must be time-consuming and stressful.
At the same time, North Koreans are (or at least used to be) quite happy to be number 65 distribution targets. North Korea, until the early 1990s, was a country of total rationing, where the government decided how much food and basic daily provisions were to be distributed to each citizen, depending on their perceived worth (admittedly food and goods were heavily subsidized and were essentially provided free). This is clearly an egalitarian approach, but, as Orwell once wrote, some are more equal than others. Members of the elite were given better rations and issued goods and services beyond the reach of the common people. They were referred to as number 65 distribution targets.
The place where they were issued special rations of pork and beer (luxuries by North Korean standards) were known as number 65 distribution centers.
Rations are long gone, so access to special distribution quotas is far less important than it was in the 1960s or 1970s. Money talks nowadays, so one should not be surprised that it is extremely prestigious to work for Bureau 38 or Bureau 39, the money-earning branches of the ruling ― and for all practical purposes, only ― party. The task of these bureaus is to earn hard currency which is then used to keep the Kim family and the upper crust of the regime sufficiently comfortable. There are some differences in their functions, but it’s not known exactly how these two agencies differ.
Another part of the central committee bureaucracy is the “Third Building.” This is a common name used to refer to all agencies that deal with South Korea. Actually the name is historic since, once upon a time, all South Korea related agencies and departments were once housed together in a building with the above designation.
Within the Third Building bureaucracy, a special role is played by Bureau 35. The bureau is essentially the intelligence-gathering branch of the ruling Korean Workers Party. Most countries worldwide have two intelligence services, one serving the military and the other gathering political intelligence. On top of that, North Korea also had a party intelligence service.
The initial role of Bureau 35 was to bring about revolution in the South. But with no revolution in sight, it gradually became just another intelligence bureaucracy. Recently North Korea conducted a major reshuffle of its spy agencies, and according to reports, Bureau 35 has had its functions either acquired by another agency or was at least downsized.
It was glamorous to work at Bureau 35 and/or be a number 65 distribution target. It is far less glamorous to be a “target 49.” This is what mentally handicapped people are called in the North. The “49 centers” are the agencies that take care of the needs of people with mental and psychiatric problems.
The list of North Korea’s mysterious numbers has many more interesting entries. Sometimes it seems that numbers are more frequently used there than real names. But what can we expect from a state which unabashedly models itself after the military?
On a related note, Helen-Louise Hunter wrote in Kim Il-song’s North Korea (p. 14–Order at Amazon, Google Books):
The numerical identification of a factory or collective farm is derived from the date of Kim’s first visit . For Example, the 18 September Nursery School in Pyongyang is named for the day when Kim [Il-sung] visited it. Although this name for the most prestigious nursery school in North Korea, which caters to the crème de la crème in Pyongyang, seems unimaginative and unimpressive, it establishes Kim’s personal connection with the school. In North Korea that is all-important.
Additionally, North Korean organizations are named after important political dates. According to the Yonhap North Korean Handbook (p.675–Order at Amazon, Google Book):
North Korea had declared the People’s Army Founding on February 8, 1948, and February 8 was commemorated as the People’s Army Fonding Day before 1978. In February 1978, North Korea changed it to April 25 while arguing that “the People’s Army is the direct heir of Choson People’s Revolutionary Army” and the former president Kim Il-sung had organized Choson People’s Revolutionary Army (anti-Japan guerilla corps) on April 25, 1932.
Perhaps you have heard of the February 8 Vinalon Complex (2.8 Vinalon Complex) or the April 25th House of Culture?
Below (NASA): August 13, 2011 – Tropical Storm Muifa (11W) over China and Korea
Click image above for larger version
According to NASA:
This image was captured at 15:10 UTC (12:10 a.m. in Seoul), and shows the center of circulation touching the North Korean coast. On July 30, Muifa, which had begun as a low pressure center on July 23, had strengthened to a Category 5 Super Typhoon, with maximum sustained winds of 160 miles per hour (260 kilometer/h). On August 7, the maximum sustained winds had dropped to 60 mph (100 km/h) as the storm rapidly weakened before striking land. After Muifa made landfall the next day, the winds dropped to 46 mph (75 km/h) with higher gusts. Despite the weakening trend and lower wind speeds, the storm caused significant damage in North Korea, killing at least 10 people, damaging over 2,000 acres of farmland, and harming more than 100 homes, according to the state-run news agency KCNA. In China, news agencies reported the storm caused about 3 billion yuan ($466 million) in damage, and affected 1.74 million local residents in Shanghai and neighboring provinces.
Read the full report here (PDF).
According to the Daily NK:
North Korea’s rapidly burgeoning cell phone user numbers have surpassed 660,000, according to Egyptian operator Orascom Telecom’s half-year earnings report for January-June, 2011.
As of March, the last time Orascom released a similar report, the number of subscribers stood at 530,000, meaning that the company has officially added 130,000 additional users in just three months, an extraordinary performance given prevailing economic conditions, the price of phones and official controls.
The figures look even better over a 12 month period; at the same point last year, there were just 184,531 subscribers. Although things are likely to slow as time passes, this still puts the era of a million subscribers, which would represent around 4% of the population, within sight.
The causes of the rapid increase in user take-up include a rapidly expanding network, that the authorities encourage Party cadres to make use of the phones, and that they are of increasing importance to those doing business in the market. In addition, the company has been working to target young people with a number of additional services including MMS and Video Call.
According to the earnings figures, as a result of these efforts Orascom made $61 million from its North Korea venture in the first half of the year, an increase of 160% on last year.
Commenting on the success, company CEO Ahmed Abou Doma noted, “Our operation in North Korea continues to display tremendous growth with a subscriber base that has more than tripled compared to the first half of 2010, the growth of which impacted revenues which increased 164% year-on-year.”
However, there is another story behind the official earnings that could serve to give investors pause. First, the earnings are based on the official USD exchange rate, 135 North Korean won, instead of the market exchange rate, which stood at far removed at 2540 North Korean won in Pyongyang on August 2nd.
Second, the report notes the introduction of what it calls the ‘Euro Pack’, a bundle which offers new subscribers “voice minutes and VAS in return of fees that could only be paid in Euros”, a concept which Orascom says is proving popular, but which certainly reflects the uncertainty inherent in dealing with the North Korean currency.
Martyn Williams has more here.
Read the full story here:
Orascom User Numbers Keep Rising
Daily NK
Chris Green
2011-8-11
UPDATE 1 (2011-8-17): The recently sanctioned bank denies it has ties to Iran and the DPRK. According to Lebanon’s Daily Star:
The Lebanese subsidiary of a Syrian bank sanctioned by the United States denied on Wednesday “unfounded political allegations” that it dealt with North Korea and Iran.
“Since the establishment of our institution, we have never had any operation with either a North Korean or an Iranian entity even before the existing sanctions,” the Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank said.
“As a result, we deny all accusation of being involved in any illegal activity with any suspected country,” a statement added.
The United States Treasury has charged that the state-owned Commercial Bank of Syria allegedly supported Syria and North Korea’s efforts to spread weapons of mass destruction.
Washington last week imposed sanctions on the bank, the Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank and telecoms company Syriatel over President Bashar al-Assad’s increasingly brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests.
The move freezes the US assets of the businesses targeted and prohibits US entities from engaging in any business dealings with the two banks.
ORIGINAL POST (2011-8-14): The US has sanctioned a Syrian Bank for its involvement in DPRK proliferation activities. According to Yonhap:
The Treasury Department said the Commercial Bank of Syria has provided financial services to North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank and Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, both of which were blacklisted for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The Syrian bank’s Lebanon-based subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank, and Syriatel, the largest mobile phone operator in Syria, were also sanctioned under Wednesday’s measure.
“By exposing Syria’s largest commercial bank as an agent for designated Syrian and North Korean proliferators, and by targeting Syria’s largest mobile phone operator for being controlled by one of the regime’s most corrupt insiders, we are taking aim at the financial infrastructure that is helping provide support to (President Bashar) Asad and his regime’s illicit activities,” Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen said in a press release.
The Commercial Bank of Syria also holds an account for Tanchon Commercial Bank, the primary financial agent for the Korea Mining Development Corp., North Korea’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons, according to the department.
The U.S. is stepping up efforts to isolate the Assad regime amid its brutal crackdown on anti-government protesters.
NTI has additional information here.
Other DPRK-Syria stories below:
1. Syria and the DPRK collaborated on the construction of Syria’s nuclear facility which was destroyed in 2007 by an Israeli air strike.
2. According to Joshua Pollock, over the last decade the DPRK and Syria have cooperated on missile development.
3. The UNSC was investigating a shipment of North Korean chemical safety suits to Syria.
4. Syria’s Tishreen War Museum was designed and built by North Koreans!
According to Yonhap:
North Korea imported more corn and less rice from China in the first half of this year than in the same period a year ago apparently due to a lack of foreign cash, a study showed Sunday.
North Korea’s grain imports from the neighboring country in the six-month period consisted of 38.2 percent corn, 37.5 percent flour, 16.9 percent rice and 7.2 percent beans, according to an analysis of the two countries’ trade by Kwon Tae-jin, vice president of the Korea Rural Economic Institute.
Last year, the figures stood at 34.2 percent flour, 28.8 percent corn, 19.3 percent rice and 16.4 percent beans, indicating an overall increase in imports of cheaper grains such as corn and flour this year, according to the study based on data from the Korea International Trade Association. Imports of rice and beans, meanwhile, fell from the same period last year.
This year, imports of beans cost $661 per ton on average, while a ton of rice, flour and corn sold for $538, $395 and $304, respectively.
The total amount of grain imports rose 5.5 percent to 149,173 tons, up from 141,395 tons in the first half of last year, apparently reflecting food shortages in the impoverished nation, the study said. Grain imports cost US$404 per ton on average, up 8.6 percent from $372 last year, bringing the total cost to $60.3 million, or 14.4 percent more than last year.
“The amount of grain imports last year was larger than in most years, but the fact that (North Korea) imported even more this year seems to indicate a shortage of food,” Kwon said in his study. “The larger imports of corn than beans or rice appears to be the result of a lack of foreign currency.”
Meanwhile, North Korea also boosted its imports of fertilizers by 91 percent in the first half of this year, buying a total of 190,396 tons compared with 99,588 tons in the same period last year. The country bought more than 164,000 tons of ammonium sulfate, which is sold at $188 per ton, while only importing some 25,000 tons of urea for $346 per ton.
“It seems like either fertilizer production in North Korea has dropped significantly, or they are aiming to boost their food production by a large amount,” Kwon said.
The Daily NK also published a story on these findings.
Read the full story here:
Lack of foreign cash forces N. Korea to buy more corn, less rice
Yonhap
2011-8-14
Pictured Above: The Taesung Machine Factory featured in the most recent issue of KPA Journal.
I have been pretty busy this week, but I wanted to put up a quick link to the latest issue of KPA Journal. This issue focuses on the Tae-sung Machine Factory. The issues also contains addendums, corrections and other publications of interest.
Have a good weekend!
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-8-10
Kim Jong Il is stressing the importance of the production of commodities for the North Korean people through upgrading the country’s light industry.
On August 1, an editorial in the Rodong Sinmun, “Let’s Go Full Speed Ahead with the Light Industry to Maximize the Production of Commodities,” mentioned the second product exhibition at the Pyongyang Department Store No. 1 as an exposition of “the growing development of light industry.”
The article emphasized Kim Jong Il’s second visit to the exhibition of commodities at the department store, “With the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung, our fatherly leader, revolutionary transition to improve the production of daily commodities must be put into full effect.” Kim’s recent field guidance at the exhibition hint at the state’s increasing efforts to improve the living standards of the population.
The newspaper also reiterated the significance of the exhibition stating, “The second exhibition of commodities at the Pyongyang Department Store corroborated the policies and the legitimacies of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), aimed at improving the living standards of the people through continuous revolution and progress in the light industry of the country.”
In addition, the news mentioned, “Under the leadership of the WPK, the light industry products at this exhibition displayed the spirit of Juche and modernization at the forefront in building an economically powerful nation.” It also explained a variety of about 1,400 “high quality” light industry products were manufactured by 350 central and regional light industry factories, companies, affiliated units, department stores in Pyongyang, and comprehensive industrial product shops.
The newspaper also praised the exhibition to provide an, “Important opportunity to improve the lives of the people while parading the great national spirit, creativity, and ability.” It added, “The product exhibition has become an important turning point to revitalize the production of daily commodities of the people and revealed brilliant prospects for the future development of the light industry of our country.”
Thus, this year was depicted as an important year for light industry. The development of light industry was described as an unwavering goal of the workers and the party members to succeed in the march for improving the lives of the people by 2012 and celebrate the 100th anniversary of the DPRK founding leader’s birthday.
Institute for Far Easter Studies (IFES)
2011-8-10
The minimum wage for North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) has risen annually at a rate of 5 percent since 2007. The year 2011 stands to mark the fifth consecutive year that such an increase has occurred.
Recently, the steering committee for the KIC and South Korean and North Korean authorities reached an agreement to accept a 5 percent wage hike for North Korean workers at the complex. Accordingly, as of August 1, 2011, North Korean workers at the KIC should earn USD 63.814 rather than USD 60.775 in monthly wages. South Korean authorities, as an exchange for accepting the North Korean demand for a wage increase, requested that productivity be elevated via the adoption of a more efficient method of worker placement.
At the meeting, the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, representatives of companies in the complex, and the head of corporations were in attendance and reached an agreement to form a task force specifically for the improvement of productivity of workers. While the overall output of the KIC has increased, the output per worker has not improved, leading to the decision to establish the task force, with the goal of enhancing the competitiveness of the complex.
The minimum monthly income of USD 60.775, which kicked in last August, remained in effect until July 31 of this year. The Labor Law of the KIC caps the wage increase at 5 percent; a 5 percent increase to the minimum wage this year would elevate the minimum monthly wage for workers to USD 63.814.
At the meeting, North Korea mentioned international wage levels and made demands for a wage hike of more than the upper limit. However, most of the companies that operate in the KIC adamantly oppose such demands.
Despite the May 24 sanctions implemented by the South Korean government after the March 2010 sinking of the ROK navy corvette Cheonan, the growth of the KIC has continued. The trade volume has increased by 24.23 percent while the production output has increased by 26.1 percent compared to the same period last year.
Although the eight-year old Kaesong Industrial Complex boasts its competitiveness against other industrial complexes in China and Vietnam, it still has many challenges that must be resolved, including employment flexibility and incentive system.
From the institutional perspective, there are many tax benefits that Kaesong offers that industrial complexes in China and Vietnam do not. For example, the enterprise profit tax in Kaesong is at 14 percent. In contrast, China and Vietnam abolished the preferential treatment for foreign companies in 2008 and 2009, respectively; they currently apply a 25 percent of enterprise profit tax to both domestic and foreign companies. Even in terms of labor and wages, the KIC would appear to offer better quality of labor. In addition, the labor productivity of the KIC is comparable to 71 percent of South Korea, which is much higher than that of China’s Qingdao Industrial Complex (60 percent) and Vietnam’s Tanttueon Industrial Complex (40 percent).
Another advantage is the KIC’s favorable geographical proximity to South Korea, which helps reduce distribution costs and time. This advantage helps to reinforce the sales competiveness of the companies in the complex. In addition, the KIC has sufficient potential for expansion into markets in China, and domestic markets in South and North Korea.
On the other hand, Kaesong has relatively low flexibility of employment due to the principle of indirect recruitment. Difficulties in applying an incentive system are also a disadvantage of the KIC.