Archive for June, 2010

U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

The Council on Foreign Relations has published the Independent Task Force Report No. 64: U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula.

The publication web page is here (overview and task force members).

Download the report here (PDF).

Overview
As tensions on the Korean peninsula rise after an international investigation found that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of a South Korean warship, a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force warns that North Korea’s continued provocations pose a serious threat to its neighbors and that its nuclear weapons program must be stopped. “The United States must seek to resolve rather than simply manage the challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea,” asserts the Task Force.

In its report, U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, the Task Force emphasizes that “despite the difficulty of the challenge, the danger posed by North Korea is sufficiently severe, and the costs of inaction and acquiescence so high, that the United States and its partners must continue to press for denuclearization.” The United States cannot risk “the potential spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states, terrorist groups or others—especially in the Middle East.”

The Task Force says that the United States also must provide leadership with its regional partners to “coordinate actions designed to contain the spillover effects of possible North Korean instability while insisting that North Korea give up its destabilizing course of action.” It recommends that contingency pla nning be prioritized: “Given the uncertainties and associated risks related to North Korea’s future, it is necessary and sensible for its neighbors to consider the possibility of volatility in North Korea and plan for its possible effects.”

The bipartisan Task Force, chaired by former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea Charles L. “Jack” Pritchard and former commander of UN Command/U.S. Forces Korea John H. Tilelli Jr., and directed by CFR Adjunct Senior Fellow Scott A. Snyder, is comprised of roughly two dozen distinguished experts representing a wide variety of backgrounds. The report commends the U.S.-South Korean partnership and applauds the close alliance coordination following the ship incident. The Task Force urges the passage of the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which it says is good for America and would send a strong message of support for South Korea.

While each member of the Six Party talks—China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States—has its own concerns, “any hope of resolving the North Korean standoff will depend on all parties cooperating with one another and being firm with North Korea.” The report emphasizes that “Chinese cooperation is essential to the success of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and to ensuring regional stability.”

The report makes several specific recommendations, including calling for the establishment of a dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula, bilateral talks with North Korea regarding missile development, and close consultations with allies South Korea and Japan. The report recommends that the Obama administration prioritize its approach to North Korea in the following order.

* Prevent horizontal proliferation: “The United States and its allies should heighten vigilance against the possibility of a transfer of nuclear weapons technologies or fissile material from North Korea and strengthen the capacity to carry out effective counterproliferation measures.”
* Stop vertical proliferation: “North Korea’s unconstrained efforts to develop a missile delivery capability for its nuclear arsenal would dramatically expand its ability to threaten its neighbors and further complicate prospects for reversing its nuclear program.”
* Denuclearize: “The debate over nonproliferation versus denuclearization is a false choice; the United States and its partners can and must do both by containing proliferation while also pressing for denuclearization.”

The Task Force recommends that the United States seek ways to integrate North Korea into the international community, including through cultural and academic exchanges. “The Obama administration should change long-standing U.S. policies blocking North Korea’s participation in activities of international financial institutions,” notes the report. It also condemns North Korea’s abysmal human rights record: “North Korea’s shameful human rights situation and failure to meet the needs of its people is a human tragedy that should be addressed by U.S. humanitarian assistance and other measures to improve human rights conditions inside North Korea.”

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Lankov on DPRK sanctions

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

Lankov provides a rhetorical argument against the feasibility of sanctions leading to policy changes in the DPRK.  Writing in the Korea Times:

As everybody repeats these days, the “Sunshine Policy” of engagement and unilateral concessions is dead. After the Cheonan sinking, all Seoul talks about is sanctions and pressure ― and this position finds some understanding in Washington.

It is not likely that talks of tougher sanctions will actually produce tougher punishment against the North. In all probability the attempts to put pressure on Pyongyang will be quietly (or not so quietly) sabotaged by China, perhaps with some Russian support.

This will be disappointing news for many Korean and American hardliners, but they should probably not be that upset: in the very unlikely case of a truly vigorous sanctions regimen being implemented, it is not going to succeed in influencing North Korea’s behavior. The peculiarities of the North Korean regime make it essentially immune to sanctions.

How does a sanctions regimen normally work? When a country is subjected to international sanctions, it does not mean that the leaders suffer from malnutrition ― in all probability, their daily intake of caviar and cognac does not go down a lot, and the fuel tanks of their Jaguars are still full.

Contrary to the lofty rhetoric of diplomats, in nearly all cases it is the common population and lower reaches of the elite who feel the brunt of the sanctions.

Depending on the time and place it might mean anything from surviving for years on a starvation diet to a mere inability to buy a new car, but at any rate people do not take the noticeable decline in their living standards lightly.

So, the dissatisfaction begins to build up, and people start feeling bad about the policy which brought the sanctions upon them (and also toward the government which initiated such a policy).

This is bad news for the government. If a country has relatively free and fair elections, chances are that the government will be voted out of power. In less liberal regimes, a revolution is a likely outcome.

And, last but not least, the factions of the ruling elite might seize the opportunity and use the public discontent to stage a coup. At any rate, a government which is too stubborn faces a very real risk of losing its power because of popular discontent.

However, this mechanism is clearly not what is going to work in North Korea. None of the above-mentioned scenarios of regime change can be realistically expected there.

Needless to say, the North Koreans do not vote ― well, they vote with a predictable 100 percent approval rate for the sole candidate, appointed by the government long before elections.

A popular uprising is not likely either. In the late 1990s North Korea suffered a disastrous famine which killed between half a million and a million people. To a large extent it was brought about by the policy of the government which refused to implement reforms out of fear of instability.

But even the famine victims died quietly, with little, if any, resistance. The North Korean population was too terrified and disorganized to stage any efficient resistance movement. The North Koreans did not know much about available alternatives to their regimented existence. Nowadays the situation has changed to some extent, but not that much.

In other words, the North Korean political system does not receive feedback. The economic prosperity and even survival of the population is not high on the regime agenda, and the population itself has neither violent nor peaceful ways to influence the government policy.

It seems that sanctions supporters pin their hopes largely on a coup orchestrated by the dissatisfied elite, so it makes sense to dwell on this scenario a bit longer. Their logic runs like this: Kim Jong-il uses his funds to bribe top officials, providing them with cars, hi-tech gadgets and luxury goods.

If they do not get these giveaways, they will become resentful of Kim Jong-il and his policies and will probably demand changes or even stage a coup ― in order to have a reliable supply of Hennessy.

But will they? This logic would probably work in some Latin American dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s where the change of the dictator would not lead to a collapse of the entire system, so ambitious colonels were always looking for an opportunity to get rid of the aging generals. This is not the case in North Korea.

The North Korean leaders understand that any attempt to rock the boat is dangerous. A sight of disunity at the very top might send a dangerous signal to the hitherto docile and terrified populace, and the collapse of the entire system becomes a probability (East Europe of the early 1990s demonstrated once again how sudden revolutions can be).

The god-like status of the Kim family complicates the situation further. The top leaders might have more realistic ideas about the dictator, but they understand that for the populace the sight of a god being removed from power will come as a huge shock. After that, people might become ungovernable.

But, unlike most other countries, North Korea is a part of a divided nation, and an outbreak of instability there might bring about unification with the South ― the ultimate nightmare of the present day elite. If that happens, the top officials and generals have no chance of keeping their privileges, and they are seriously afraid of being prosecuted for their past misdeeds.

It is not incidental that Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il’s father and founder of the regime, in the early 1990s made sure that all members of his entourage watched the footage of the execution of Ceausescu, a Romanian strongman who was the closest analogue to the Kims, and the violent Romanian revolution.

His message was: if I am removed from power, you will lose everything, including, probably, your lives. The message was not lost, more so since it appears to be correct.

So, the North Korean generals and dignitaries can survive on a reduced amount of Scotch whisky if the most likely alternative seems to be a lifelong survival on prison rations ― or worse. Kim Jong-il is seen by those people as a guarantee of stability, and none of them will challenge his supremacy.

Thus, if by some unlikely miracle China sincerely joins the sanctions regimen and puts serious pressure on North Korea, the immediate result will be neither revolution nor coup, but simply a dramatic increase in the mortality rate ― in other words, a lot of dead farmers.

Perhaps some breaking point exists and can even be reached if sanctions are applied systematically and for a long time, but this breaking point seems to be too many corpses away.

Fortunately for the average North Korean, it is not going to happen. Driven by fear of instability (and decisively unenthusiastic about unification) China does not want to see North Korea cornered, and will not allow any efficient sanctions to be applied.

Read the full story here:
Sanctions against North Korea
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
6/17/2010

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OECD on Korean unification costs

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

According to Yonhap:

The widening inter-Korean economic and social gaps could eventually increase the cost of unification, a report showed Friday, highlighting the importance of the private sector’s role in “limiting the gap.”

According to the report compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, South Korea’s economy is about 38 times larger than the North’s and 18 times larger on a per-capita basis as of the end of 2008.

North Korea’s total trade volume remains just 0.4 percent of South Korea’s, while production of electricity and steel stands at a mere 6 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively, the report showed.

The report also noted that the North Korean economy grew 3.7 percent in 2008 following two years of contraction but its currency reform in late 2009 triggered “serious economic problems,” pointing to a tough road for the reclusive country’s future growth.

The North is also showing a marked gap with the South not just in the economic field but also in social and welfare areas such as high infant mortality rates and relatively short life expectancy, according to the report.

“The large gap in income and health will boost the eventual cost of economic integration,” said the report.

“The expansion of trade driven by private sector firms in the South, in line with the government’s strategy of limiting cooperation to projects that are economically viable and that do not overburden taxpayers in the South, provides the best hope for limiting the gap,” it added.

The report comes as inter-Korean trade and investment except for an industrial park in the border town of Kaesong was suspended after a multinational investigation recently proved that the North torpedoed one of South Korea’s patrol ships in March, killing 46 sailors.

The two Koreas are still technically at war as no peace treaty was signed at the end of the 1950-53 Korean War.

Of course, Yonhap does not bother to tell us the name of the study or provide a link!

I think I found it however. I am 99% confident that Yonhap is citing the OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2010.

The reason I was able to locate the report was because one of the quotes Yonhap provided above was used word-for-word in the OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2008. Check out the last sentence of paragraph 2 on page 54.

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Frank Hantke on the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s DPRK operations

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

The German-language Interview Blog has posted an interview with Frank Hantke on the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s DPRK operations.

The interview is in German here.

Here is the interview translated into English by Google Translate.

Here is the official web page of the Frederich Ebert Stiftung, which should not be confused with the Freidrich Naumann Stiftung which has also carried out numerous programs in the DPRK.

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DPRK abandons food rations, orders self-sufficiency

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-06-17-1
6/17/2010
 
As North Korea’s food shortages worsen and reports of starvation continue to grow, the Workers’ Party of Korea have acknowledged the failure of the central food ration program. Since the end of May, the Party has permitted the operation of 24-hour markets, and the regime has ordered the people of the North to provide for themselves.

The human rights organization Good Friends reported this move on June 14. According to Good Friends, the Workers’ Party organization and guidance bureau handed down an order on May 26 titled ‘Relating to Korea’s Current Food Situation’ that allowed markets to stay open and ordered North Koreans to purchase their own food. This order, recognizing that the food shortages in the North have continued to worsen over the last six months, since the failed attempts at currency reform, acknowledged the difficulty of providing government food rations. It calls on those who were receiving rations to now feed themselves, while also calling on the Party, Cabinet, security forces and other relevant government agencies to come up with necessary countermeasures. Now, authorities officially allow the 24-hour operation of markets, something that most had already tacitly permitted, and encourage individuals, even those not working in trading companies, to actively import goods from China.

It has been reported that government food rations to all regions and all classes of society, even to those in Pyongyang, were suspended in April. The last distribution of food was a 20-day supply provided to each North Korean on April 15, the anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung. Because of the difficulty of travelling to markets, the suspension of rations caused many in farming communities to starve to death. When Kim Jong Il’s recent visit to China failed to secure expected food aid, the Workers’ Party had no choice but to hand down the ‘May 26 Party Decree’. While the suspension of rations has considerably extended the economic independence of North Korean people, the regime has significantly stepped up other forms of control over society. Public security officers have begun confiscating knives, saws and other potential weapons over 9 centimeters long in an effort to stem murder and other violent crimes. Additionally, state security officials are cracking down on forcefully resettling some residents of the age most likely to defect, while sending to prison those thought to have contacted relatives in South Korea.

According to Daily NK, North Korean security officials are pushing trading companies to continue trading with China, while calling on Chinese businesses to provide food aid. It also appears that North Korean customs inspections along the Tumen River have been considerably eased, and there is no real attempt to identify the origin or intended use of food imported from China. Sinheung Trading Company has asked Chinese partners investing in the North to send flour, corn and other foodstuffs. The Sinheung Trading Company is operated by the Ministry of State Security, and is responsible for earning the ministry foreign capital. It appears that food acquisition is now a matter of national security, as North Korea is expecting South Korea and the rest of the international community to economically isolate the country.

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DPRK fishing ships increasingly crossing NLL

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

nll-1-2-thumb.jpg

According to Reuters:

The “Northern Limit Line (NLL)” off Korea’s west coast, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War, has been the site of several deadly clashes in the past, and with tensions running high after the corvette Cheonan exploded and sank, the chance of new skirmishes has risen.

It was unclear if the violations were intentional, but some of the fishing boats were known to be operated by the North Korean military, South Korea’s Yonhap News quoted spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Park Sung-woo, as saying.

“We’ve confirmed that the North Korean military is operating fishing vessels on the side, but we haven’t yet established whether those ships were equipped with heavy weapons,” Park said.

In all of the roughly 20 cases so far this year the ships retreated after warnings by the South Korean navy, he said.

A team of international investigators, led by South Korea’s military, said in May that a North Korean submarine torpedoed the Cheonan, presenting evidence that included parts of the weapon recovered from the site of the incident.

Pyongyang says the incident was fabricated and has threatened military action if the U.N. Security Council punishes it.

Read the full story here:
N.Korea fishing boat incursions on the rise – South
Reuters
John Ruwitch and Jack Kim
6/17/2010

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US State Department releases 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP)

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

Download the report here.

According to the Daily NK:

The U.S. Department of State released its 10th “Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP)” yesterday, once again classifying North Korea as “Tier 3,” meaning it is a country whose government does not “fully comply with the minimum standards” and is “not making significant efforts to do so.” The North joins Cuba, Kuwait, Sudan, Zimbabwe and another eight countries in Tier 3, the lowest on the list.

North Korea has been in Tier 3 since 2003, when it first appeared on the TIP.

The TIP recommends that Pyongyang move to “improve the poor economic, social, political, and human rights conditions in North Korea that render North Koreans highly vulnerable to trafficking; recognize human trafficking as a problem in North Korea; cease the systematic punishment of trafficking victims in forced labor camps and others.”

However, the report defines North Korea as a place which has made “little, if any, efforts to combat trafficking in persons through law enforcement efforts over the last year, and continued to severely restrict the movement of its citizens internally and across its borders.” It also adds, “The North Korean government continues to deny the existence of trafficking as a problem. Little information is available on North Korea’s internal legal system.”

The report explains that the most common form of trafficking involves North Korean women and girls who are forced into marriage or prostitution in China. Another form is the forced labor which is a key part of the North Korean system of political repression. As an example, the report mentions “labor mobilization campaign such as the ‘150-Day Battle’ and ‘100-Day Battle’ in 2009.”

North Korea’s notorious prison camps also come up in the report, which says, “An estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons are held in detention camps in remote areas of the country; many of these prisoners were not duly convicted of a criminal offense. In prison camps, all prisoners, including children, are subject to forced labor, including logging, mining, and farming for long hours under harsh conditions.”

Meanwhile, the TIP also designates China as a country on the State Department’s “Tier 2 Watch List”, just one level above North Korea, and recommends that it “cease the practice of forcibly repatriating North Korean trafficking victims,” pointing out that repatriated North Koreans face harsh punishment upon their return.

Read the full sotry here:
North Koreans Vulnerable to Human Trafficking
Daily NK
Choi Yong Sang
6/15/2010

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Japan, USA extend DPRK sanctions

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

According to Business Week:

Japan will tighten controls on sending money to North Korea next month as part of additional sanctions in response to a suspected sinking of a South Korean warship.

The cap on undeclared cash transfers will be lowered to 3 million yen ($32,800) from 10 million yen, according to a statement released by the Ministry of Finance.

The ministry also will reduce the amount of money an individual can take into North Korea to 100,000 yen from 300,000 yen. The change will take effect on July 6, the statement said.

Read the full story here:
Japan to Tighten Control on Sending Cash to North Korea
Business Week
Kyoko Shimodoi and Keiko Ujikane
6/15/2010

According to the White House web page:

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.  In accordance with this provision, I have sent to the Federal Register for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466 of June 26, 2008, is to continue in effect beyond June 26, 2010.

The existence and the risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula constitute a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency and maintain certain restrictions with respect to North Korea and North Korean nationals.

BARACK OBAMA

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 14, 2010.

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DPRK traders hit hard

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

According ot the Daily NK:

People working for North Korean enterprises overseas are concerned by their poor financial performance and excessive requests for remittances since the Cheonan incident and Kim Jong Il’s visit to China.

Cheong is one such businessman. In his 50s now, he has been residing in Shenyang since the early 2000s working on exports of North Korean mineral resources. He has won recognition from home for his efforts, but nowadays he is growing more anxious and says he has lost his composure.

Upon meeting with The Daily NK’s correspondent, who arranged the meeting in the guise of a businessman, Cheong said frankly that life is exceedingly hard at the moment.

“Even though the General (Kim Jong Il) visited China, there were no clear promises of Chinese aid or investment in North Korea,” Cheong says. “Therefore, the authorities are requesting more foreign investment and that money be given to the country in order to get past the situation.”

According to him, the authorities have threatened to merge export offices that do not perform to expectations. He says he plans to avoid this by first gathering around $2,000 to remit to Pyongyang, and then visiting the North Korean capital to check on the domestic situation next month.

He says that the failure of the currency redenomination has affected the credit worthiness of North Korea. China-based traders are anxious about the situation as the number of foreign investments and sales has deteriorated this year.

“Since the route for seafood exports to South Chosun has been blocked, we have been instructed to sell it all in China,” he adds. “Although the quality is quite good, we have to have dumping sales in order to find immediate ways to sell it. Therefore, profits are reduced and we have to compensate for the loss. It is terrible.”

He says he has thought about going back to the North, but his wife bitterly opposes it for their son’s education. She was surprised by Cheong’s thought, he says, since the couple had even devised a method to bring their daughter, who is still in Pyongyang, to China.

He explains, “Even those who are known as old hands and who are seen as very skilled in foreign currency earning business look worried about the need for ‘loyalty funds.’ They are eager to make contacts in powerful positions by whatever means necessary, because background and supporters can be decisive in your life.”

One example, Kang, who is in charge of importing light industrial products in Beijing, dropped by Shenyang on his way to meetings with other branch managers. He became a well-known trader after he made good money supplying air conditioners to the Mansudae Assembly Hall and fabric to the military authorities.

His business is stable because he is known as a “Kim Jong Nam person”, i.e. a close associate of Kim Jong Il’s first son, and his life is also stable; he resides in a luxurious apartment in Beijing and his son is studying in the U.K.

However, even he has grown concerned lately, he says. “Decrees demanding increased ‘loyalty funds’ have been constantly handed down,” he explains. “The amount they request has increased by two or three times. It is awful.”

North Korean traders residing in Shenyang generally agree that, in Kang’s words, “In order to survive overseas, Kim Jong Eun is now a lifeline. When chiefs of foreign offices go to Pyongyang, they busy themselves trying to find invisible backers (i.e. Kim Jong Eun) to give a few thousand dollars to.”

Read the full story here:
North Korean Traders Feeling Pinch
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho and Shin Joo Hyun
6/16/2010

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Kaesong firms to ask for emergency funds

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

According ot Yonhap:

South Korean companies at a joint industrial complex in North Korea said Thursday they will ask their government to provide emergency funds, as business conditions worsened amid heightened cross-border tensions triggered by the North’s sinking of a southern warship in March.

The industrial park in the North’s border city of Kaesong, where 110 South Korean factories operate with some 42,000 North Koreans hired, is the last-remaining inter-Korean business project. Its future is thrown into doubt after Seoul officially blamed Pyongyang for torpedoing the 1,200-ton Cheonan on March 26 that killed 46 sailors.

South Korea has taken a series of retaliatory measures, including a ban on most inter-Korean trade and diplomatic efforts to censure the North at the U.N. Security Council.

South Korean companies at the joint complex report a sharp drop in orders amid cross-border tensions.

Earlier in the day, representatives of the South Korean firms held a meeting and decided to ask their government to provide emergency funds and ease border restrictions.

About 800 South Koreans are now working at the Kaesong park.

Read the full story here:
S. Korean firms in Kaesong to ask for emergency funds
Yonhap
6/17/2010

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