DPRK stiffens drug laws
From the Daily NK:
“The North’s adoption of partial open door policy has resulted in the rapid spread of western culture into the society, which could trigger the collapse of socialist ideology and regime. So, as part of efforts to prevent the collapse, the North adopted a series of amendments to its criminal laws,” explained Choi.
“In March 2008, North Korea introduced another amendment according to which individuals charged with drug possession are to be sentenced to death by shooting because drug use has been increasing among people suffering from the lack of basic necessities and medicine despite the state’s strict drug control,” said Choi.
According to the 2004 amendment, North Korea sentences those charged with drug manufacturing to two to five years in the labor reeducation camp (Article 216), those with drug use to up to two years in the labor-training corps (Article 217), and those with drug trafficking and sales to either up to five years in the labor camp (Article 218).
“The amendment of March 2008 further stiffened penalties against drug offenders. Individuals found to be possessing more than 300 grams of drug are to be sentenced to death penalty,” Choi said, “In addition, North Korea which did not have sufficient legal grounds to punish individuals involved with new types of offenses including making international phone calls, possessing copies of foreign pictures and smuggling now appears to have strengthened legal punishment against them.”
The passage of these statutes is probably as close as the DPRK government will get to admitting that markets for recreational drug use are firmly established. Stiffening drug laws will make no difference to the dissipation of the state’s socialist ideology, but North Korea’s drug cartels will certainly benefit.
The Economics of Cartels
In a competitive market, it is difficult to maintain a cartel. Cartels work by restricting output to raise prices. The problem is that once everyone in the cartel has done so, each individual member has an incentive to sell more than his quota to capture those artificially high profits. After everyone figures out how to do this, the cartel falls apart and prices return to their competitive equilibrium.
So how can cartel members be relied on to maintain their production quotas and not cheat/sabotage each other? Many times this is done by group acquiescence to government statutes and regulations. Restrictions on prices, services, quality standards…these can all be used to protect incumbent firms by driving up costs for smaller competitors, and what’s more, the government pays for the enforcement.
And now for the conspiracy theory
If there is not already a cartel of “companies” or families seeking to corner the DPRK drug market, there soon will be. Stiffening criminal penalties for drug production simply raises the costs of small-scale producers and distributors, forcing them out of the market because they cannot afford protection/bribes. This helps the big guys, who can afford these services, to maintain their price premium.
No doubt the groups coming to dominate the drug trade had representatives involved in making sure these statutes were changed (meaning they are now sufficiently politically connected to protect themselves). What will be the effects on crime? Well, if the cartel members keep to their agreements, crime could drop, and police would only be used to break up non-cartel operations.
Small-scale producers will respond by shifting into “high quality, low volume” drugs (much like in prohibition when smugglers carried liquor over beer and wine).
Thoughtful comments appreciated.
Read the full story here:
North Korea Has Introduced Amendments to Its Criminal Codes to Save the Regime from Falling Apart
Daily NK
Yang Jung A
5/13/2008
