The Daily NK, reports on a interesting claim by Kim Kwang Jin, senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy:
In his article “The Dollarization of North Korean Economy and Dependence on Foreign Currency by the Residents,” [Kim Kwang Jin] analyzed “dollarization of North Korean economy is a result of the disintegration of the official economy and the subsequent spread of foreign currency rather than the government’s foreign currency policy.”
The total amount of U.S. dollars circulated and amassed by North Korean people was estimated 500 to 600 million dollars (100 per each household), [Kim Kwang Jin] suggested.
Kim’s further specification is as follows: “In the China-Korean border region, the Yuan is particularly popular, while in Wonsan (a seaport on the East Sea)[where the Mangyongbong 92 docks], the Japanese yen is attractive.”
According to Kim’s article, the North Korean people fully realize impossibility of withdrawing North Korean won from their bank accounts and the depreciation rate is too fast. Kim’s estimate was that “each North Korean household is secretly holding 100 dollars in average.”
Methodologically, I am not sure how valuable we should find the claim that the North Korean economy is dollarized to the tune of $100 per household (max of 6,000,000 households). Averages do not tell us much in large populations because they do not address distribution questions (which are fairly significant). For instance, a few individuals might have lots of cash, while most have relatively little. What is the median distribution of dollars, and what is the mode? This data would tell us much more about grass-roots financial conditions in the DPRK, but this information is not available.
Also, Mr. Kim claims that North Korea has “foreign currency areas” along the Chinese border (Yuan) and around Wonsan (Yen). This claim at least seems plausible for obvious reasons: These are areas where lots of trade and exchange take place. So where is the dollar currency area? With no major trading relations, why would there be one (outside of Pyongyang)? Where would all these $USD come from?
Finally, it seems that in the last couple of decades the Yuan and the Yen would be a superior mechanism than the dollar for protecting one’s savings in North Korea. These currencies are used by the DPRK’s major (current and former) trading partners; these currencies have experienced low inflation in the last couple of decades (the Yen obviously doing a better job); and North Koreans could probably better explain to any curious officials why they have them if they were under scrutiny.
All of these topics might have been addressed in the paper, but I have been unable to find a copy in English.
